THAILAND: Student Activism and Political Change
THAILAND: STUDENT ACTIVISM
AND POLITICAL CHANGE
This book is dedicated to those who died and were wounded in the struggle for freedom and constitutional government.
PREFACE

This book should be of special interest to those interested in student oriented social movements in particular and Thai politics and culture in general. It is advised that the novice to behavioral research who may find Chapter VI overly tedious, should perhaps skip over the data analysis and read only the summary statement at the end of the chapter to enjoy the full continuity of the book. However, it is hoped that the avid behavioralist will scrutinize the techniques employed in Chapter VI.

Overall, the book attempts to give the reader some insights into the past, present, and future role of student activism in the politics of Thailand. Particular emphasis is placed on the cultural determinants of Thai political behavior and the eventual effect of the student revolt of October 1973 on Thai politics in the future.

Chapter I introduces and discusses the primary concepts and hypothesis regarding student activists and their role in the politics of developing nations. Also presented in this Chapter is a brief and general inventory of the most frequently encountered assertions in the literature on student politics, with a specific focus on the nature of student protests and the protesters, and factors related to individual student participation in protest activities. In this chapter the role of the university as a major factor in politicizing students is explored in the general context of social movements for political change.
This is followed by Chapter II which traces the history and development of higher educational institutions and student activism in Thailand up to the over-throw of the Thanom government in October, 1973. Thereafter, Chapter III gives a detailed account of the "Ten Days in October", which pitted army and police against students and other civilians in some of the bloodiest battles ever to occur in Bangkok. Chapter IV explains from a sociological perspective some cultural aspects of Thai political behavior, and their relationship to student activism. Chapter V builds from the base of the Thai case study and a general review of the literature and available statistics to expand into a comparative analysis of Thailand with seven other politically and culturally diverse countries. Relevant and available statistical data are incorporated in a comparative study of the eight countries across several dimensions of educational and participation characteristics. Data on the Thai students are integrated in the comparative analysis of aggregate and survey data taken from a review of the research and case studies in each of the eight nations (i.e., India, Thailand, U.S.A., West Germany, France, Brazil, Chile, and Japan). The data included measures of the following participation and educational characteristics: domestic conflict (i.e., riots and demonstrations), field of study, enrollment, unemployment, membership in student political action organizations, and participation in demonstrations. Chapter VI tests empirically some of the hypothesis and assumptions presented in the previous chapters. The first section of this chapter test the relationship of background and socialization factors to students' political predispositions and degree of participation. Using a variety of statistical techniques, data on Thai students were "plugged into" the original and alternative simulation models in an attempt to test the validity of the general hypothesis. In the second section of this chapter several hypothesis were tested through a comparative analysis of survey data on Thai and American students collected in 1972. Chapter VII speculates on the future of student activism in Thailand's political development based on a descriptive analysis of past performance of Thai democratic institutions and political trends since October 1973.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Somporn Sangchai, Professor of Public Administration, who while a senior fellow at the East-West Center graciously reviewed several drafts of this book, and extend a special thanks to Linda Ching, who persevered in typing all drafts of this publication.

March 1974

Bangkok

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I. STUDENT ACTIVISM AND POLITICAL CHANGE

by Ross Prizzia

The ever-increasing incidence of student activism is a worldwide phenomenon which necessitates consistent and continued explanation. The progressive long-term effects of student activism on the political systems of the developed and underdeveloped countries have only begun to be felt by the administrators. Events in Southeast Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world have demonstrated the importance played by college and even high school students in politics. While it is a student's job to study, there are occasions when his decision to lay aside his books and to take up a political banner can make a difference in the political future of his country.¹

While university students have become less overtly active since 1970 in most of the Western (i.e., France, U.S., etc.), and even Asian countries (i.e., Japan, India, etc.), the decade of the seventies have seen a steady increase in the number and intensity of student demonstrations in Thailand. Furthermore, while the membership and effectiveness of student organizations in most Western and Asian nations have decreased considerably, the Thai students have become more increasingly organized, with expanded membership on a national scale, and have become more effective in achieving their demands. Moreover, the effectiveness of Thai student demonstrations persisted and even gained momentum since the imposition of martial law in 1971. This is remarkable when compared with the fate of student activism in the Philippines where following the imposition of martial law, effective student organizations and activism were almost non-existent. Thus, the significance of the university student participation in protest movements became even greater during such periods of partial and total martial law. Since the military coup of November, 1971, university students have represented the only outspoken and effective oppositional force in Thailand. Oppositional sentiment in the form of mild criticism of government policy and action have been represented through the newspapers, the national assembly (which was appointed by the government), and an occasional petition for improved services by small community groups. However, by and large, the average Thai citizen, even in the municipality of Bangkok, is uninvolved, if not by choice, then by the mere fact that avenues of political participation were extremely limited. Therefore, members of the in-operative opposition parties, indignant members of the middle class who once sought representation through an elected legislative body which was dissolved, and many ordinary citizens who were
discontent with certain government actions vented their frustrations through support for student protest movements.

It is the intention of the authors to describe and explain the various aspects of student protest movements in Thailand from a historical and sociological perspective. Working within the parameters of the Thai cultural context and the "resocialization" process, it is intended to present a more precise conceptualization in explaining the role of university students in the politics of Thailand. Growing evidence has shown the potential and real significance of the "unanticipated results" of organizational and institutional behavior—which are at first viewed as inconsistent with the goals and purpose proposed by the administrators.2 Student protests, seen as unanticipated, or more correctly, unofficial results of the university resocialization process, can become and often are, important avenues of social change for the greater society, particularly in the developing countries.

Since World War II, student movements in Southeast Asia have evolved an ideology of nationalism which is broader-in-scope than "anti-colonialism," with an emphasis on modernization and industrialization. Student groups have directed their interests to the change of traditional values and promotion of rapid economic growth. This trend is exemplified by the relatively non-leftist nature of certain Philippine, Indonesian (particularly KAMI), and Thai student groups which are extremely nationalistic.3 However, many contemporary student protests are still directed against "neo-colonial" practices (e.g., external military and economic presence and/or pressures) which in many instances are perceived as constraints on the host nation's economic and political development.4

Student protest movements played an influential role in the resistance to Diem in 1963; mass riots against the Japan-U.S. Treaty in Tokyo which forced the resignation of the Kishi government in 1960 and pressured the Sato government to negotiate for the return of Okinawa in 1960; the anti-Sukarno movement in Indonesia in 1966; Thai student demonstrations against military imposition of martial law after promulgation of the constitution of 1968. However, as Lipset points out, "although students may be catalysts for political action, they can seldom bring a revolutionary movement to fruition."5 A perfect illustration of this point is Korea, where students who began the movement which overthrew the Rhee government in 1960 succeeded only with the necessary aid from the army and popular pressure. The Thai student revolution of October, 1973, may prove to be an exception.
Particularly important is the fact that in the developing nations, the pressures of student demonstrations are brought to bear on the government directly, and "political actors" in the bargaining usually involve the top government officials. Thanom, as Prime Minister responded to student demands in Thailand; Sukarno and later Suharto did likewise in Indonesia. In contrast to many Western democracies where stability and legitimacy of the established political structures, and bureaucratic distant political actors successfully resisted student activism, most developing nations lack the "intermediary" institutions and formal political organizations which might help absorb the upheaval of social movements. In lieu of such institutions student activism as an agent of political change has reached a new intensity and significance particularly in countries like Thailand which are undergoing rapid and revolutionary political, economic, and social modernization.6 Moreover, in the developing nations the major universities and the nerves of government are usually in close proximity in the nation's capital city. Hence, it becomes rather difficult for the ruling elites of unstable governments (particularly in Southeast Asia) to remain politically removed from the student demonstrations and social movements. Existing data suggests that in the developing countries with skills scarce, authority unstable, and economic pressures enormous..."the products of the universities have a crucial role to play. ...They are the generation with the least commitment to maintaining the status quo; they are the least vulnerable to political control and military force; they are the most energetic, the most secular, the least traditional, and the most uncommitted group in Asia...They could become the catalytic force in generating change and in demonstrating the extraordinary beneficial consequences that can accrue to a society from reasonable self-sacrifice."7

In striving for greater conceptual clarity in explaining student activism the following questions are to be considered:

1. What are the origins and nature of student protest in developing countries?
2. Who are the protesters?
3. What factors (e.g., historical, cultural, educational, etc.) of student politicization best explain the difference between the activist and his non-active counterpart?

Other ramifications of student politics broader-in-scope which also need to be considered include the extent to which student protest affects political change and moreover, political development.
Brief Review of the Literature

1. Nature and Origins of Student protest

A brief descriptive account of the earliest of student protests might shed some light on the general scope of student politicization in developing countries. India is used for illustrative purposes because there exists there a tradition of student activism which in the past was closely related to widespread political movements against the colonial government. As early as 1905, Lord Curzon was burned in effigy by students protesting the partition of Bengal. Ghandi later visited universities of northern India to inform students of the anti-national nature of their educational institutions. In 1936, Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Pandit Nehru helped form the All-India Student Federation which advocated use of the venacular languages in place of English, reduction of university fees, and student representation in the university administrative boards. In early 1940's the Quit-India Movement mobilized student protest and strikes in advocating the demands of Congress. Some scholars (e.g., S.M. Lipset and J. Fischer) suggest that the tradition of student activism in those developing nations which have experienced colonialism has persisted to the present. While the Thai have never undergone colonialism as experienced by India, the authors propose that certain aspects of U.S.-Thai relations since World War II and Japanese-Thai relations since 1960, characterize at least “neo-colonial” practices. Moreover, student activism became evident only after World War II and developed momentum as United States and Japan increased their influence in Thailand’s political and economic affairs. Shils attributes the violent “restiveness” of Indian students to remote teachers, linguistic troubles, poverty--and “an educational output incommensurate with the absorptive capacity of the economy.” While some of these conditions are also contributing factors to Thai student activism, violence as a manifestation of student activism, is of little more than parenthetical significance to the purposes of this book. The intensity of the violence is not seen as important as the cause that precipitates protests, and the individuals who participate.

Who are the Protesters?

The relevance of this question to the politics of the developing countries might be explained by posing the question “Who were the protesters?” Some of the former university students who led, organized, and/or instigated government protests include Sukarno, U Nu, and Mao Tse-tung. As Lipset
points out, "international student meetings were held as early as the 1920's, and such men as Nehru of India and Hatta of Indonesia were profoundly influenced by these student organizations and movements." Anti-colonial struggles were often led and supported by particularly the "returned students" who had lived and studied abroad and upon return agitated for ideas of "modernization and Marxism, socialism and struggle."

Returned students from abroad still provide intellectual and moral support for the student movement, but the real impetus of the protest is comprised of "local" undergraduates of the most prestigious national universities. A review of the literature suggests that student demonstrators are predominantly male between the ages of 16 and 25, usually engaged in the study of humanities, social sciences, and law. Most protesters in Thailand, as well as most Southeast Asians, are middle-to-upper class urbanites and have been exposed to and influenced by politically relevant mass media (e.g., newspaper, T.V.), and Western culture, ideas, and personnel (e.g., teachers).

A survey of 1,600 Thai university students conducted by the author in 1969 showed exposure to foreign teachers, and particularly American Peace Corps teachers, to be a significant factor in the political socialization of Thai university students. Survey results showed that the percentage of students who had participated in protest demonstrations and other forms of student political participation was significantly higher among students who had been exposed to Peace Corps teachers. Moreover, scores on the various participation variables for each student interviewed increased as the number of years exposed to Peace Corps teachers increased. Though no direct casual relationship was firmly established, the survey results did provide some indications that the political attitudes of Thai students might have been affected by exposure to the highly liberal, and in some cases even radical, views of certain Peace Corps teachers over a prolonged period of time.

A survey taken one month before the 1968 Presidential election of approximately 40% of the Peace Corps Volunteers in Thailand indicated widespread opposition to the United States foreign and domestic policies, and voting preferences for third party candidates. Clearly 80% of those who responded to the questionnaire were opposed to the Vietnam war while over 50% frankly admitted that the reason they had joined the Peace Corps was to avoid the draft. Even more significant was the response to political party preference. Slightly over 30% indicated that they preferred both the party platform and the candidates of the Peace and Freedom Party,
while 35% choose the Democratic Party and 20% the Republican Party. Approximately 15% of the respondents either indicated that they had no preference or would not vote. Moreover, approximately 78% of the respondents indicated opposition to several Thai government policies and the idea of a government ruled by the military.

Results of factor analysis of the Thai data (i.e., principle component) showed that the greatest single factor in a university student's political socialization (or "resocialization") is exposure to Western influence in general and American influence in particular. It is noteworthy that a secondary analysis of the Southern Negro survey done by John Orbell of Negro students and a factor analysis of the author's survey of Thai university students reveal interesting comparable results. One factor emerged as particularly significant from the Orbell study (an "exposure to the dominant white culture" factor) from which he hypothesized that "proximity to the dominant white culture increased the likelihood of protest involvement." Similarly, a factor analysis of the Thai student data produced "an exposure to Westernization" factor (e.g., Peace Corps Volunteers, Western teachers, etc.) from which could be hypothesized that proximity to the carriers of the dominant Western (American) political culture increases the likelihood of protest involvement. (This proposal is explained further in Chapter IV.)

Certain "resocializing" effects of the university are explained in the results of a survey of students at several universities in Southeast Asia. Findings revealed that university students between the ages of 17 and 25 represent that group in underdeveloped societies which is most exposed to the institutions and beliefs of modernity and which is in many respects most responsive to it. Moreover, results of the survey revealed that the students who study foreign languages, read foreign periodicals and meet foreigners and take serious the ideas they encounter in their studies are most likely to be socialized into a world much different from that in which their parents live. As a result of research at the universities in Burma, Ceylon, Thailand, Indonesia and India (i.e., 1954-'58 and 1960-'62). Fischer suggests that the growth of the individualism at universities has been "one of the unintended consequences of nationalism, urbanisation, industrialisation and the impact of mass media...The university is now the condition and the barrier to the realisation of these aspirations which are now held by far more young persons than ever before." Moreover, students who have been under somewhat of an authoritarian family system find themselves at the
university relatively free from that authority simply by being some distance away and immune from its controlling scrutiny. They exist in a type of institutional and “ecological environment which is new to many of them and at which their behaviour is relatively uncontrolled.”19 As Fischer points out, this emancipation from the familial authorities under whom they grew up goes hand in hand with a tendency to look critically at all authority and to regard its demands as oppressive. The emancipation from familial authority extends to the refusal to accept institutional and political authority as well. The elites of the new states, even though they were once revolutionary students, are now middle-aged and even older men. They belong to the “established authorities”; they are thought to be on the side of oppression, of officialdom; they are remote. The order of things which they represent does not recommend itself to young persons in process of education and emancipation.20

A survey comparing certain psychological aspects of the cultural and political attitudes and behaviour of Thai and American university students was conducted approximately one year before the October student revolt in 1973.21 Results of the analysis of the data showed that the Thai sample reflected discontent with the government itself, not the policy of the government. The American students listed policies of the government, such as the Vietnam policy, defense spending, and wage-freezing, as the causes of their discontent, while most Thai students listed the characteristics of the government such as corruption, nepotism, dictatorship, and inefficiency as causes of their discontent. The data revealed that whereas the American students reflected the desire to see change in some government policies, the Thais expressed the desire for a change of government.

Some of the cultural aspects (e.g., conformity, authoritarian submissiveness) of Thai university students which were apparently precluded by a high level of discontent and other related factors of the resocialization process are explained further in Chapter IV.

Some Factors Related to Student Participation

The location of the university, access to mass-media, field of study (Faculty), and increased enrollment, consistently emerge as significant among the political socialization factors related to student participation. Location of the university and/or access to mass-media is an especially important indicator of politicization in the developing nations where the best (and sometimes only) universities are in the capital city.
The proximity of the university to the nerves of government and the ruling elite give the educational environment a greater political potential. In Thailand, like most of Asia, universities in capital cities and other populous urban areas have direct links of communication with the political environment. T.V., radio, and other means of communication bring the issues to the urban areas through newscasts, speeches, and documentaries. Emmerson concludes that, "In the capital, the students' proximity to government and opposition, their easy access to political information and commentary, and the ready availability of a national audience via the capital-centered communications media all tend to facilitate the task of the activist." Location of the university as an indicator of political socialization applies to all Asian countries when the location is specified as "very populous urban area." However, if the location is specified as only the capital city — India and Pakistan are the exceptions. Student activism was most concentrated in northeastern India and what was once East Pakistan, and not in the capitals. The general rule (location as capital) does apply to the other Asian nations, especially Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia. Until fairly recently, almost all student political protests occurred at Chulalongkorn and Thammasat Universities, both located in Bangkok. Since 1971, student activism has been growing steadily at the newly formed Ramkamhaeng University, which is also located in Bangkok. In the election campaign of 1968-'69, the entire leadership of the opposition Democratic Party were either graduates or former professors of Thammasat Law School. Seni Pramoj, Democrat Party leader chose the vicinity of Thammasat University for the majority of his party's political rallies and campaign speeches. Students from Thammasat and Chulalongkorn were encouraged to attend rallies and participate in the process of political campaigning. In the month immediately preceding the election (February 10, 1969), students distributed campaign literature and leaflets (mostly for opposition parties) at Bangkok's intersections and public gatherings. It would make an interesting project to do research involving a measure of the impact of the student involvement on opposition political party success in the 1969 election. The opposition Democrat Party won every seat in Bangkok (15) and in the adjoining city of Thonburi.

In almost every attempt at studying the political orientation of students, researchers invariably conclude that the more politically active and better informed students are found in the humanities and social sciences. In India it is generally students whose major is sociology, economics, anthropology, history, and political science, who are inclined toward the left
and/or political participation, while students of commerce are inclined to the right with science usually in the middle. This is also the case in Thailand, and has been found to be the general pattern in all developing countries except in a few cases (see F. Bonilla and K. Silvert), where students in the exact sciences and medicine were more active than economic students. However, as Lipset has pointed out, part of the Faculty of Economics in some Thai universities as well as most of Asia is more of a business school to prepare for a career. Lipset emphasized the need for greater conceptual clarity when comparing faculties and suggests that a distinction be made between faculties that prepare students for specific occupational “roles” as opposed to those faculties which are not role oriented.

Generally, existing data suggests that it is the graduate students who are the most politicized in India while it is the undergraduate students who are the most politicized in Thailand. However, even in Thailand the student leaders and organizers of all student protests are usually seniors or graduate students. M. Spencer and J. DiBona provide adequate evidence to show that graduate students in India are not only more politicized than undergraduates, but also that Indian graduate students (particularly those in the humanities, social sciences, etc.) are usually older than graduate students in other developing countries. Shils attributes this trend among Indian graduate students to “vocational-prospectlessness,” which among other factors encourages graduates to maintain their student status. In describing the more politically active of the “eternal students,” Shils states: “Older, tougher, more ingenious, often seductively attractive, these ‘professional’ students are often the catalysts who agitate lambs into lions.” In lamenting this prolonged student status of Indian students, the Vice-Chancellor of one of the best Indian universities suggested that the sad trend nevertheless provides a social function: “We keep tens of thousands of young people off the streets, and instead of letting them become delinquents we turn them, instead, into communists.”

The effect of increased student enrollment in Southeast Asia is described by Fischer in emphasizing that “the figures will increase and the human beings which the figures represent will form the bulk of the carriers of public opinion of the country... Technologists, administrators, politicians, journalists and teachers will come almost entirely from this pool. Their outlook and qualifications are obviously of the greatest importance for the future of their country.” A perfect illustration of increased enrollment is exemplified by the case
of Ramkamhaeng University where university student enrollment (i.e., full and part-time) jumped from 10,000 in 1971 to over 40,000 by 1973. The significance of this increase and the role of these Ramkamhaeng students in the politics of Thailand is explained in detail in the last section of the following chapter.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER 1


3. Lipset, Student Politics, p. 10. It should be noted that the most recent developments in the Philippines (1969-1972) indicate that student activists have moved dramatically to the left.


own survey of Indian students at the University of Allahabad, "student indiscipline" was specified as: (1) breaches of minor university rules; (2) student efforts to promote their interests as students; (3) conflict with townspeople usually over some real or imagined disregard of student status; (4) instances when national politics have inspired students to action; (5) student action as an extension of teacher or political factional conflicts on campus.


14. See E. Wright Bakke, op. cit., study of student activism in Mexico, Columbia, Japan, India, Egypt and the U.S.


(1969). Interestingly enough, response from the mailed questionnaire was only around 15% after the first two weeks. However, the Peace Corps director, Mr. Kevin Delaney, greatly assisted my efforts by sending a telegram to all volunteers warning them not to respond to my questionnaire. Immediately thereafter, the number of responses greatly increased and by the end of October over 40% of the Peace Corps teachers mailed in their completed questionnaire. Some PCV's even commented that they had put the questionnaire aside until they were reminded about it by Delaney's telegram.

18. Ibid. p. 54. Fischer points out that:
...The student of a South and Southeast Asian university is now in a position in which he must 'succeed.' This is something new in the culture from which he has come. The student who fails at the university is a failure in life since the certification of the degree is necessary for employment by a public body.

19. Ibid. p. 45.

20. Ibid. p. 45.


22. The political potential of the university — and the education system in general — is explained in detail by J.S. Coleman, who states:

In modernizing countries education may achieve a central role precisely because it is one of the principle instruments for change available to the polity. It must respond to politically generated demands for its services, whether such demands originate among the masses or reflect the ideological presuppositions of the governing elites. It may also be affected by the desire of elites in new states to consummate freedom by reducing or eliminating dependence upon foreign educational institutions and personnel, the nationalistic compulsion to "indigenize" or "nationalize" the curriculum, the imperatives of national defense, the struggle to raise national status
on the global power or prestige system or by polity relationship, in short, is one of the reciprocal dependence, of mutual stimulus response.


23. An example of potential politicization through exposure to the available communication media is the following announcement which appeared on the front page of the Bangkok World's social section:

The Political Science Association will celebrate the 20th anniversary of its Faculty at Amphon Gardens on Saturday, Feb. 22, at 7 PM...A discussion on "Thailand at Present," will be held at the University as part of the celebration, Monday, Feb. 17, at 4:30 PM, as well as "Thailand in the Future," Thai TV Channel 4 on Feb. 18, at 9 PM...Taking part in the discussion are Gen. Prapas Charusathien, Foreign Minister Tha­nat Khoman, Lt. Gen. Sawaeng Senanarong, Prof. Phya Sunthornpiput and Prof. Tawee Raengkam. H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithyakorn, Rector of the University, will preside at a cornerstone-laying ceremony at the Faculty’s new building on Feb. 22, at 7AM." (Bangkok World, Feb. 2, 1969, p. 27.)


25. Student recognition of the capital city as the arena for the most effective protests can be seen in the recent student disturbances in the Philippines, where students at a small rural university (Central Luzon State University) sought to publicize their demands in Manila.

26. From the author’s data collected at Chulalongkorn and Thammasat University on those items pertaining to political socialization — and specifically to “exposure to mass-media” — it was found that the most politically active students (that is, predisposed to political activity and/or actual participation in demonstrations, elections, political parties, etc.) were:

1. Those students who had access to a TV and watched the newscast at least 5 times a week.
2. Those students who listened to newscasts on radio at least 5 times a week.
3. Those students who read the newspaper at least 5
times a week.

4. Those students who read Siam Rath (leading Thai language newspaper).

Siam Rath is Thailand's answer to the New York Times when compared to the (Thai) Daily News and other less politically sophisticated newspapers. Siam Rath also carries a weekly political journal emphasizing political commentary on contemporary political issues. It should be pointed out that the publisher, owner, and foremost political journalist of Siam Rath is Kukrit Pramoj. Kukrit, younger brother of the leader of the Democrat Party (Seni Pramoj), and former member of Parliament (1957), is a popular (though by some reports notorious) political personality among the educated Thais. Kukrit's long suspected ambition to become Prime Minister was somewhat realized when he played that part alongside Marlon Brando in the movie "The Ugly American." In a poll taken a month before the 1969 elections, Kukrit placing third, was far ahead of both Prime Minister Thanom and Deputy Prime Minister Prapas, in "votes" for the "person who would make the best Prime Minister."

27. One student, Prachuab, was a leader and organizer of the student demonstrations of June, 1968, was also founder, organizer, and leading member of the opposition Democratic Front Party, which won seven seats in the Parliament.


29. Lipset, Student Politics, p. 45.


31. For India, see E. Shils, M. Spencer, J. DiBona, Lipset Students and Politics (all cited above). For Thailand, source is a general sampling of data collected (1968-1969) which showed the great majority of student participants to be undergraduates (even by percentage), but the most politicized students of all by measure of "intensity" (e.g., highest political awareness, most politically socialized, most consistent in measure of political predisposition and political participation) were a few select graduate students.


...The young adults who attend universities in 1963 form an important and growing body: there are over 300,000 in the Philippines, 50,000 in Indonesia, about 160,000 in Pakistan, about 3,500 in South Vietnam, some 2,500 in Malaysia, about 42,000 in Thailand, about 15,000 in Burma, close to 4,000 in Ceylon, and in excess of 1,000,000 in India. The total for India represents more than a doubling of the university population since 1951. The University of Ceylon student population has grown from 904 in 1942 to 2,392 in 1953 to about 4,000 in 1963. The entire university population in Indonesia in 1940 consisted of 585 students; Gadjah Mada University alone has grown from 387 students in 1947 and 6,529 in 1953 to its present enrollment of almost 17,000. During the period from 1947 to 1963 student enrollment at Rangoon University has increased from 2,636 to about 13,000.
II. HISTORY OF STUDENT ACTIVISM IN THAILAND
by Narong Sinsawasdi and Ross Prizzia

In resisting colonialism (particularly from 1873-1910), Thai history was characterized by a domestic policy designed to completely reorganize the basic government structure, and a foreign policy construed to reluctantly appease the more immediate appetites of Western innovators through maximum appearances and minimal concessions.¹ Hence, Thailand, unlike India, lacks any real tradition of student activism. In the early 1900's while Indian students protested political issues (e.g., partition of Bengal—1905), the relatively few existing Thai university students remained detached from political matters, which were left entirely to the King and the Royal Council until 1932. This was due primarily to the fact that Thai university students as such were non-existent until 1916, when by Royal Command the status of the Civil Servants School was elevated to that of a university and named Chulalongkorn University, in memory of King Chulalongkorn the Great. It was not until June, 1932, that the absolute monarchy was abolished in a bloodless coup and the reigns of government transferred to a military and civilian elite. The liberal ideals of new ruling clique were reflected in the area of higher education and in 1933, just one year after the coup, the “University of Moral and Political Science” was founded. This name was later changed to Thammasat University in 1952, but the curriculum continued to emphasize the humanities, particularly political science and law. In 1942, the Faculty of Medicine was separated from Chulalongkorn University and became “Mahidol University,” named after the father of King Bhumibol, the present king of Thailand. In 1943, the School of Agriculture and the School of Forestry were combined to establish the first agricultural institution of higher learning, Kasetsart University. Also, in 1943, Silpakorn University, specializing primarily in architecture and the fine arts, was founded. In 1954, the College of Education was established and granted university status, with its prime objectives to train teachers, school administrators, and educational research workers. Since its conception, various other educational programs have been added, and the College of Education now is comprised of four campuses in Bangkok and four campuses spread throughout the outer provinces of Thailand. It should be noted that the first five universities mentioned above, though all institutions of higher learning, were not all administered by the Ministry of Education. Only Chulalongkorn, Thammasat, and Silpakorn Universities were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education while
Kasetsart University was administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Mahidol University by the Ministry of Public Health. However, in 1959, all five universities were placed under the Prime Minister’s Office and in 1963, as a result of the Prime Minister’s Office Organization Act, each university gained the legal status of a ministry’s department. Soon thereafter, the National Council of Education was established to function as a co-ordinating committee whose primary concern still is the activities of all universities.

Of these five universities, only Chulalongkorn maintained a broad curriculum offering degrees in several areas of study. Originally, Kasetsart University offered courses only in agriculture; Mahidol provided instruction only in medicine; Thammasart University in jurisprudence; and Silapakorn in various areas of art. However, since 1965, each of these universities has expanded the scope of its curriculum by adding new faculties and new fields of studies, particularly in the area of the humanities. Moreover, several recently established universities include a broad base of academic fields of study, and provide educational opportunities to the residents of outer provinces. In 1964, Chiang Mai University was established in the ancient northern capital of Chiang Mai province, and in the same year Khonkaen University was created to afford higher educational opportunities to the residents of the northeastern province of Thailand. In 1967, the University of the South in Pattani Province was opened to residents of southern Thailand. This was later expanded to a Songkla Province campus (“Songkla Nakarin”), specializing in engineering and the medical sciences. Before the establishment of these universities in the provinces, Bangkok was, and to a large extent still remains, the primary residence of university students, and the universities in Bangkok still provide more than ninety per cent (90%) of the graduates. More recently, this percentage was somewhat increased with the establishment of Ramkamhaeng University in 1971. Located in Bangkok and named in memory of the famous King of the Sukothai era, this university was created through the efforts of liberal parliament members only months before martial law was declared in 1971. Beginning with primarily a Liberal Arts Curriculum and an open-admissions policy, Ramkamhaeng has had to adjust and expand its programs to the demands of an ever-increasing rate of enrollment. Precise enrollment figures and other relevant characteristics of the Thai universities are presented in the following table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of University</th>
<th>Number of Enrollment in 1972</th>
<th>Year of Foundation</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chulalongkorn</td>
<td>12,450</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thammasat</td>
<td>9,148</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahidol</td>
<td>3,901</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasetsart</td>
<td>6,007</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silpakorn</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College of Education</td>
<td>15,979</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Three campuses in Bangkok and five campuses in the provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieng Mai</td>
<td>7,236</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Chieng Mai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khonkaen</td>
<td>1,649</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Khonkaen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Songkla</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Songkhla and Pattani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramkamhaeng</td>
<td>28,611</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 86,031

The figures were obtained from the Office of the National Education Council.
Location of Universities in Bangkok

University students' protest marches always take place in Bangkok. The locations of the universities in Bangkok are of prime importance to the further understanding of student activism in Thailand.

Thammasat University may be used as the starting point to visualize the geographical implications of student activism. Thammasat University is located near the old palace where all kings of Bangkok except the present one have resided. Silpakorn University lies between Thammasat and the Palace.

In front of these two universities there is a large open field called Pramain Ground. Its size is comparable to two stadiums combined. In ancient times it served as the cremation site for those in the Royal family. Now it is used for the New Year Day Festival, the Water Festival, the Ploughing ceremony, kite fighting, and an open market where goods from the provinces are sold each weekend. On one side of this Pramain Ground there begins one of the widest, and most beautiful, streets of Bangkok called Rajdamnern Avenue. Located on the other end of this avenue is the Parliament Building with the office of the Prime Minister nearby. Along this avenue, about one kilometer from Pramain Ground, lies the Democracy Monument erected by the 1932 revolutionaries. Protest marches by the students almost always start from Pramain Ground and move along Rajdamnern Avenue to the Parliament Building or the office of the Prime Minister. Being both wide and not very long, this avenue is ideal in accommodating the huge throngs of students who participate in the protest marches.

Chulalongkorn University is about eight kilometers southeast of Pramain Ground. The main campus of the College of Education is about 14 kilometers east of Pramain Ground, while Mahidol University is located only about one-half kilometer from the Parliament Building. Kasetsart University and Ramkamhaeng University are somewhat farther from this site, located about 20 kilometers north and northeast of the Parliament Building, respectively.

The map in Figure 11.1 depicts the approximate locations of the various universities as to their relative proximity to Pramain Ground and to each other.

As can be visualized from Figure 1 the location of the universities has significant implications not only for the stra-
Figure II.1
LOCATION OF UNIVERSITIES IN BANGKOK

- Silpakorn University
- Thammasat University
- Old Palace
- Pramain Ground
- Rajdamnern Ave
- Democracy Statue
- Parliament Building
- New Palace
- Mahidol University
- Chulalongkorn University

To Kasetsart University
20 km away

To Ramkamheang University
12 km away from Pramain Ground

Office of the Prime Minister

Chulalongkorn University
about 8 km from Pramain Ground
tegy of the student protests but also for government attempts to stop the demonstrators. The openness of the area of Rajdamnern Avenue lends itself to tempered responses by the government, who hesitate to display force in an arena-like atmosphere.

The discussion which follows describes the major Thai student demonstrations in sequence of occurrence. It is interesting to note that all of these major demonstrations followed the path to the Pramain Ground, before launching their demands directly on the government administrators.

**Anti-French Demonstration in 1940**

The first incidence of student activism occurred in November, 1940. The root of that demonstration can be traced back almost 40 years earlier when Thailand was forced to cede sections of her eastern territory to France in 1903 and 1907. The Thais had always desired to reclaim this territory. When the war broke out in Europe in 1939, the Thai government declared Thailand as a neutral state. When France surrendered in June, 1940, the Thai government saw it as an opportunity to regain the lost territory. Hence, the government staged an extensive anti-French propaganda campaign. In November, 1940, there were many anti-French demonstrations by the Thais throughout the country. Chulalongkorn and Thammasat University students joined the demonstrations which were being promoted by various organizations in Bangkok.

**Conflict Between Thammasat Students and the Army**

After World War II the reigns of government were briefly in the hands of Pridi Panomyong, one of the most powerful and respected civilian leaders. As the leader of the "Free Thai Movement," a volunteer underground army which opposed Japanese occupation, Pridi claimed a great following among the civilian population. Pridi, as one of the 1932 revolutionaries was also the founder and an instructor of Thammasat University. In November 1947, a military coup forced him to leave the country. His followers, most of them civilians who graduated from Thammasat University, were driven out of politics. With the support of a group of his most loyal followers, Pridi attempted a coup in February, 1949.

Pridi received the support from some navy men and several civilian leaders, many of whom used to be his students. He sneaked into Thammasat University one night and held a meeting among his followers in one of the campus buildings.
Many of the university lecturers and administrators were also his old students and admirers. After the meeting, Pridi and his followers went on to seize the Old Palace nearby. Some of his men took over the government radio station and announced the news of the coup. However, within two days Pridi’s forces were crushed by the army and Pridi had to flee the country again.\(8\)

Many university administrators were detained for questioning. However, there was little effect on the Thammasat University students at that time. After the coup the army took over part of the main university campus and occupied it. However, the students still continued to study in the other parts of the campus.

In June 1951, there was another bloody coup led by a group of navy men. During the fight some of the ground troops occupied the Thammasat campus to fortify their position in combating the rebellion nearby. A few days after its beginning the rebellion was crushed by the government forces. However, the army remained at Thammasat University, claiming that the situation made it necessary to use Thammasat campus, because it was located in a strategic area. Moreover, the government claimed that since the campus had been used by the army before, they were justified in their occupation of the campus. Thammasat University was then closed for about one month.

In late August 1951, some Thammasat students were directed to attend Chulalongkorn University while others were told to go and study at the auditorium of the Ministry of Justice. Thammasat students at that time wanted to come back to Thammasat, but they were confused as to what course of action, if any, they should take. About two months later and after much debate the students decided to do something about the situation and on October 11th about 2,000 students went to attend a session of the Parliament at the Parliament Building. They asked one of the MPs to request the government to withdraw its troops from Thammasat University. The government representatives replied that it was necessary for the army to occupy this “strategic area” to maintain law and order, and refused to give specific dates as to when the government would withdraw its troops. At the end of the session the students asked to see the Prime Minister, Field Marshal Pibunsongkram. It should be pointed out that Pibunsongkram was once a friend but later became the arch rival of Pridi Panomyong, the founder of Thammasat University. The students avoided
ridiculing Pibun for what he did, and instead praised him in unison, "Long live Field Marshal Pibunsongkram." Then they talked with him asking him to withdraw the troops from the campus. Phibun assured the students that the troops would move out but he also did not give the specific date. In November about 3,000 Thammasat students went for a trip to Nakorn-sawan, a northern town about 250 kilometers from Bangkok. They came back on a train and arrived in Bangkok on November 5, 1951. Then, instead of going home, went together in buses to Thammasat University. They marched on the campus and walked in to "inspect" buildings. The soldiers were quite unprepared to receive the unarmed, though apparently angry students. After a few hours of badgering the soldiers and questioning them on why they were occupying the university, the students left peacefully. A few days later the government withdrew troops from the campus, and Thammasat University was reopened to the students again.10 It should be pointed out here that there was a constant rumor and some evidence, at this time that the government had specific plans for closing the university permanently, seeing it as an undesirable stronghold for Pridi Panomyong and his followers. However, pressure from the students finally forced the government to abandon this plan.

Demonstration Protesting the "Dirty" Election of 1957

In February 1957, there was a general election throughout the country. In Bangkok, Field Marshal Pibunsongkram and eight members of his party were candidates for the Bangkok seats. After the results were in, there was evidence to suggest that the Pibun followers had used dirty tactics to get the candidates of Pibun's party elected.11 Public dissatisfaction with the conduct of the election in February, 1957, which was vigorously expressed in the press and among students, caused the government to declare a national emergency. However, this move by the government only fanned the flames of anger among the civilian population of Bangkok and they began to gather regularly at the Pramain Ground and were joined by increasing numbers of students from Chulalongkom and Thammasat University to publicly criticize the government for the fraudulent election. In the meantime, students on the Chulalongkom University campus displayed protest signs accusing Pibun of destroying democracy.12

Several days later, the Chulalongkorn students marched from their campus to join with the people and the students of other universities at the Pramain Ground. They then marched to the office of the Prime Minister breaking police barriers along
the way. The police attempted unsuccessfully to force the demonstrators to stop the march without using guns. Many eye-witnesses' reports from the demonstrations indicated that when the demonstrators were asked to stop at the bridge near the office of the Prime Minister, the soldiers and police were about to use their guns. However, at the last moment the police officer in charge finally ordered his men to let the demonstrators pass by without incident. This marked the only time that confrontation with police almost led to violence. This remained the situation throughout all future Thai demonstrations up until the violent overthrow of the Thanom government in October 1973.

When the protesters finally got to the government building housing the office of the Prime Minister they broke down the gate and forced themselves inside demanding to meet with Pibun. The Prime Minister eventually came out and spoke to the protesters promising to remedy the situation. However, the person most responsible for calming the hostile atmosphere which was still evident among the student demonstrators was Field Marshal Sarit Tanarat. In September, 1957, Sarit, riding the tide of widespread oppositional sentiment among the Bangkok populace and with tacit student support, successfully lead a coup against the Pibun government and drove him and his most powerful allies out of the country.

A point that should be made here is that the general population of Bangkok including workers, professionals, and politicians all took part in the massive protest movement against the Pibun government, for their handling of the election and the subsequent declaration of the “national emergency.”

**Anti-World Court Demonstration**

In October, 1958, Sarit carried out another bloodless coup and made himself the Prime Minister. He abrogated the constitution, proclaimed martial law and appointed a committee to draft a new constitution. Martial law remained in effect until 1968 when the new constitution was completed. During this ten year period when Thailand was under martial law there was a major demonstration against the World Court. The Court had come to the verdict that Khao Praviharn, an ancient temple along the border of Thailand and Cambodia was rightfully under Cambodian sovereignty. In 1959, Cambodia requested the World Court to rule on the withdrawal of Thai police forces from the temple grounds which they occupied since 1954. The case remained unsolved with the World Court for the next four years, until June 15, 1962 when the court...
ruled in favor of Cambodia. This decision by the Court ignited demonstrations throughout Thailand. University students did not initiate the demonstrations, but after a few days of general public demonstrations in Bangkok and other cities, students joined in one of the largest student organized demonstrations ever to be staged in Thailand up to that time. On June 21, 1962, over 50,000 students marched from the Pramain Ground to the Parliament building shouting slogans and carrying placards denouncing the World Court verdict. The students represented all the major universities of Bangkok including Chulalongkorn, Thammasat, the Medical, Fine Arts, and Agriculture universities. In front of the Parliament Building hundreds of students of the various universities took turns in making speeches denouncing both the World Court verdict and the Cambodian leaders.

The students met with little government opposition due to the fact that the government position on this particular issue was similar to their own. In fact, some of the public demonstrations which occurred were not only supported by the government, but also promoted by government backed politicians.

**Demonstrations Against Martial Law and the Raising of the Bus Fare**

The drafting of the new constitution which began in 1958, was finally completed in 1968. During this ten-year span Thailand remained under martial law as it was declared and set forth by Sarit in 1958. Specific statutes of the constitution provided for such civil liberties as freedom of speech and assembly. However, the Thai government still retained martial law in Bangkok and other parts of the country claiming that it was a necessity to "protect the national security." The constitution provided for an election which was to be held within 240 days of the date the constitution went into effect. Thammasat students together with the public and some politicians began requesting that the government lift martial law to insure a fair campaign and election, and to show good faith in supporting the constitutional provisions for protection of certain civil liberties which were denied by several decrees under martial law. The students organized and marched from the Pramain Ground to the Parliament building to press for the adoption of their proposals. The government responded at that time by declaring that even though the 1968 constitution had been promulgated the population of Thailand was still under a law which prohibited public assembly without government approval. Though this demonstration was relatively small it could have been ruled as an act of illegal assembly by the
government. However, the government, rather than engage in an unpopular confrontation just before the election, complied with the demand of the demonstrators and lifted martial law in Bangkok, but retained it in the “threatened areas” of the outer provinces. 

In February 1969, immediately following the general election, there occurred another student demonstration against the increase of bus fare. Thai students rely almost exclusively on the crowded bus system for transportation to and from the university. When the government supported and operated bus companies raised the bus fare 50 per cent, many students felt this undue financial hardship to be directed at them for their agitation before the election. Hence, a well-organized protest demonstration was directed toward the government to lower bus fare back to its original price. Instead of confronting the students over what was considered a rather minor issue by top government officials, the Prime Minister ordered the bus fare back to its original price. Soon after this successful demonstration student representatives from Thammasat, Chulalongkorn, and Chiengmai universities, and later other universities began to form a council which they named the “National Student Center of Thailand” which was destined to play a major role in all of the university movements by Thai students up through the student revolution which overthrew the military government in 1973.

The Demonstration Against Corruption in Chulalongkorn University

Of all the Thai universities, Chulalongkorn University has the largest campus. Some of its land which is not used for educational purposes is rented to the public. As the metropolitan area of Bangkok continues to expand, the land value of Chulalongkorn continues to increase accordingly. One of its areas rented to a private firm was later developed into a huge shopping center in the late 1960’s. When the contract for the construction of the shopping center expired, it was rumored that some university administrators were bribed when negotiating with the construction company. Moreover, it became evident that the university received much less money than it should have from the private construction firm. On September 8, 1970, the students held a rally on the campus and demanded to see the deputy director and the secretary general of the university, but both administrators refused to appear. Thereafter, students marched to the office of the Prime Minister. Along the way, students from other universities joined the demonstration procession. As they marched some of the
demonstrators stopped to talk to the onlookers and explained that “there is a case of corruption at Chulalongkorn University. If not suppressed it will mean disaster for Chulalongkorn University and other universities in the future.” 

At the office of the Prime Minister ten student representatives went to meet with Thanom and requested that he fire the three administrators of the university that were involved in corruption. The students were specifically seeking the removal of the deputy director, the secretary general and the dean of architecture. They explained to the Prime Minister that if these three corrupt individuals were not fired the students would resort to violent means to rid the university of them. The students alleged that these three persons took part in a sleazy deal from which they gained great personal profit with an overall lost to the university. Thanom assured the students that he would talk to these administrators about the charges, in the university auditorium. The following morning the students began another march to the office of the Prime Minister. After meeting with student representatives of the various universities the students decided that Thanom should take a much stronger stand against the three administrators than just to have a discussion with students in the auditorium. At the office of the Prime Minister, students again demanded to see Thanom but this time Thanom refused to come out to meet with them. The students then marched to the Parliament building nearby and forced their way into the building and sat in seats reserved for members of the Parliament, claiming that they would not leave until they received a definite answer from the Prime Minister on the dismissal of the three administrators. Finally, Thanom came to see them and explained that he had talked to the authorities of Chulalongkorn University the previous evening until 1 a.m., and also, that he had called an urgent meeting of the University Council to consider the matter. He further explained that the Council made two important decisions. First, that a special committee would be set up to investigate the allegations of corruption; and second, that the three persons would be removed from their administrative positions but would remain on the university staff with professor status. Furthermore, Thanom explained that the three could not be fired yet because there was no conclusive evidence of their guilt, and their case was legally still pending. The students expressed satisfaction with the results of the University Council meeting and finally abandoned the Parliament Building discontinuing the protest.

The following morning there was a counter demonstration by a small group of students of the Architecture Faculty
which was staged on the Chulalongkorn campus. The students requested that their dean, who had been removed the previous day, be reinstated. Claiming that the dean was like their father, the students maintained that even if he was guilty of corruption they would be willing to forgive him. However, the decision to remove the dean was sustained, and it is very unlikely that this particular administrator will ever get his position back again.

All major demonstrations after the one described above involved the National Student Center of Thailand, a newly formed student organization with nation-wide membership. The formation and growth of this student organization was to become one of the most significant developments in Thai student activism.

The Foundation of the National Student Center of Thailand

Before the founding of the National Student Center students at most Thai universities were organized through student unions. A strong student union at each university was usually well organized for such social functions as moral support in cheering sections for their own soccer team, but these student unions were characteristically non-political and for the most part, not inter-university organizations. It was not until 1969 that some of the student union leaders from the various universities began co-operating on social and political issues. The first occasion for inter-university co-operation was the national elections of 1969, at which time students of all universities informally organized to supervise the voting at all polling places in Bangkok. Ostensibly, students were to assure an honest election and prevent the many irregularities which occurred in the previous national election of 1957.

After the national election of 1969, a meeting of a student organization called the World University Service, was planned for in Chiangmai. The representatives of all Thai universities attended this meeting and jointly proposed that Thai students should have an inter-universities organization. This was followed by a meeting at Kamlangsaen district, Nakonpathom; one at Kasetsart University in August, 1969; at Chulalongkorn University in September, 1969; and Prasanmitr Teachers’ College in December, 1969. A resolution at the last meeting called for students of all undergraduate institutions to organize a student center which became known as the “National Student Center of Thailand.” A committee to draft the constitution for this organization was also appointed at this meeting. There would be two members from each of the eleven institutions.
which included: Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat University, Kasetsart University, Silpakorn University, Mahidol University, Chiang Mai University, Konkhaen University, Songklal University, Prasamnira Teachers' College, Bangsaen Teachers' College and Patumwan Teachers' College.

The Goals and Policies of the NSCT:

The constitution drafting committee set up the following 7 goals for the Center:

1. To promote a good relationship among the students of all Thai universities, and between Thai students and students of other countries.
2. To serve and promote the welfare of the students.
3. To promote the students' freedom and to protect student benefits.
4. To further the educational standards and academic cooperation.
5. To promote a good understanding between students and the people.
6. To preserve and promote Thai culture.
7. To render services for the welfare of the society.

Though the constitutional drafting committee began its work in 1970, the final constitution was not disclosed to the public until February, 1973. It provided for the various separation of functions and responsibilities as described below.

The Organization Arrangement.

The NSCT's organization has 3 main executive organs: The executive committee, the secretariat committee and the financial committee. The diagram on the next page indicates the organizational arrangement of the NSCT.

The Executive committee consists of the chairman of the student union of each university. The main duties of the executive committee are (1) to formulate policy for the NSCT, and (2) to select the leaders of all units working under the secretariat committee.

The Secretariat committee consists of one secretary-general and three deputies, all of whom are directly responsible to the executive committee. The Secretariat committee acts as the spokesman of all the universities' leaders. The many functionally-oriented sub-committees under the secretariat committee include: public relations, foreign affairs, academic, volunteer and public welfare, office arrangement,
The Financial committee takes care of the financial affairs of the Center and consists of a representative from each university. This committee is also directly responsible to the executive committee.

The secretary-general is the most powerful person in the organizational hierarchy and is ultimately responsible for all NSCT activities. The first secretary-general was chosen from Thammasat University as was the second for the academic year 1970-1971. During this period, the NSCT did very little concerning political matters and concentrated their efforts in such social services as fund-raising for the flood victims, organization of a T.V. program blessing the King, and providing various counseling services to graduating high school students.

For the academic year 1972-1973, Thirayuth Boonmee, an engineering student of Chulalongkorn University, was elected secretary-general. Thirayuth, a brilliant student, who when graduated at the top of his class from one of Thailand's most famous and oldest high schools, Suankularb, also achieved the highest score of all high school graduates in Thailand on the nation-wide examination. It was under Thirayuth's leadership that the activities of the National Student Center of Thailand turned toward major political issues. Thirayuth started the NSCT on its path toward national recognition and political orientation with a nation-wide anti-Japanese goods campaign in November, 1972.


Before the government elected in 1969 completed its term of office, the military carried out a successful coup. In November 1971, Thanom led a coup against his own government, and subsequently dissolved the Parliament, abrogated the 1968 Constitution, and declared martial law. Thereafter, Thanom formed a government ruled by the National Executive Council, and proclaimed himself the leader of this council.

The first incidence of student activism after the 1971 declaration of martial law occurred about a year later in November 1972. For over 10 years Thailand faced a deficit in the balance of trade with Japan. This deficit was increasing at an alarming rate for the fiscal years of 1970, 1971, 1972. By the end of 1972, the trade deficit with Japan was placed at approximately $215 million dollars. In November
Figure 11.2 Organization Arrangement of the NSCT

Executive Committee

Secretariat Committee
- Public Relation
  - Foreign affairs
  - Academic
  - Volunteer and Public Welfare
- Office arrangement
  - Sport
  - Fund raising
  - Security

Financial Committee
1972, the students started a campaign against the purchase of Japanese goods by distributing leaflets to the public. Student leaders then proclaimed November 20th-30th as "anti-Japanese Goods Week." During this period they requested the co-operation of the public in refraining from buying Japanese goods. The students of various universities acted together under the name of the National Student Center. The following passage represents parts of the text of the leaflet that was prepared and distributed by the members of the National Student Center.¹⁷

Dear Thai Citizen,

We, the students, who are also your children are cooperating with one another to refrain from buying Japanese products during "anti-Japanese Goods Week." The reason for this is that Japan is taking advantage of us by using various business ploys to cheat us and also because the trade dominance by the Japanese in Thailand has increased alarmingly during the past 10 years, putting Thailand gradually into a position as Japan's economic slave.

What we are stating here is not far from reality, and if you study carefully the actions of Japan or look around and see Japanese dominance in trade and cultural spheres, you will see that what we say is true.

We would not have been in trouble at all if the Japanese role was to help to develop our country's economy as they often claim.

If we have a look at the numerous Japanese goods which have glutted Thai markets and become a part of the everyday life of the Thais, and influence by advertising (made by Japanese firms), you will realize that a large number of these products are not essential at all. Furthermore, they will cause more damage to the national economy.

We do not want violence because we realize the need for international relations. But if robbers come to our house we have to seriously fight them until they flee or stop being what they are.

This movement may be only an insignificant starting point, but it needs co-operation from every sector of the population as it is a fight for righteousness and national progress.

The National Student Center therefore has asked you to sacrifice your happiness and conveniences, and to save the money you may spend from buying and using Japanese goods and services during anti-Japanese Goods Week, No-
November 20-30th, to show that the Thai bloods runs thick and cannot be looked down on by anyone.

National Student Center
November 16, 1972

The students also proposed a 10-point plan for economic revival and presented it to the government on November 20, 1972. Some of the major points included the following proposals:

— The government should urgently enforce laws preventing aliens from taking jobs from local residents.
— The foreign owned department stores are not necessary to the country and the National Executive Council should prohibit the expansion of the existing ones and the establishment of any new ones.
— The government should consider controlling or prohibiting the importation of unnecessary goods and investment.

Even though martial law was in existence the Prime Minister did not attempt to stop this student movement. However, he warned the students that "there must be no violence, not even demonstrations outside the Japanese embassy." Thanom and the Deputy Prime Minister, General Prapas unofficially expressed admiration for this peaceful student movement against the unpopular Japanese by remarking at one point that the demonstration was a "masterpiece." King Bhumibol also said that the idea of the movement was "excellent" and should receive support because the purchase of luxury goods needed to be decreased. However, the King also stated "careful considerations must be given to what demands are made or the goals of the movement might be defeated."

The movement got the general support from the public, and the sale of Japanese goods was greatly decreased during that week. Moreover, in the midst of the anti-Japanese Goods Week the government issued a decree designed to control and protect the Thai economy against Japanese products and investments. The text of the government decree reflected most of the concerns which were stated in the 10-point plan prepared by the National Student Center.

On the last day of the anti-Japanese Goods Week, the students organized a protest march from Pramain Ground to the headquarters of the National Executive Council.
Ialongkorn students tried to go by bus to Pramain Ground but the police stopped the bus driver and ordered them not to transport the students. The students then had to walk to meet other students from other universities who had marched from Pramain Ground to the headquarters of the NEC. They attempted to get inside the building to see the Prime Minister but they were stopped by the police and security guards. Reporters at the scene of the demonstration gave the following account: "Thousands of shouting students carried their anti-Japanese Goods protest to the gates of the National Executive Council headquarters last night, but were prevented from forcing their way in by reinforced police and security teams."\(^{23}\)

Student leaders successfully calmed the demonstrators who at many points nearly clashed with the police and security guards. The Prime Minister did not come out to meet all the students but did send his representatives to meet with six student representatives. The Prime Minister's representatives told the students that Thanom supported them and would attempt to enforce feasible sections of the 10-point plan presented to the government one week earlier.

Demonstration Against the Control of the Judiciary by the Executive

On December 12, 1972, the National Executive Council issued Decree 299, which in effect gave the power to control the judges to the Minister of Justice. The Minister of Justice, as a political appointee of the Prime Minister, was put in a position to seriously undermine the power of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. According to the Justice Act of 1952, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court held the highest position of the judicial system and presided over all judges in Thailand. In this position the Chief Justice also served as the Chairman of the Official Judiciary Committee. Decree 299 was designed to transfer the chairmanship of this committee to the Minister of Justice. In addition to assuming all duties of this chairmanship, the Minister of Justice who was directly responsible to the Prime Minister was also given expansive power including the power to transfer any judge.

The law students of Thammasat University were quickly made aware of the political implications of Decree 299 as it applied both to their own career goals and that of the future of the Thai judicial system. The very next day the law students organized and began a protest movement against this Decree.
On December 15, 1972, the law students, joined by about 2,000 students of other faculties of Thammasat, marched from their campus to Chulalongkorn University. They carried signs, banners, and placards exclaiming ideals and demands such as "Give us back the court", "Dedicated to judiciary power", and "Justice supports the world." Student representatives at Chulalongkorn agreed to support the protest movement and the demands of the Thammasat law students. Soon thereafter, representatives from other universities also declared support for the movement, and on December 17th, representatives from all universities except Prince of Songkla University presented a letter to the Prime Minister urging him to retract Decree 299 and order a continuance of the Justice Act of 1952.

On the evening of December 19th, thousands of students began a protest rally and a sit-in at the Pramain Ground. They remained at this popular protest site throughout the evening and did not disperse until 8:00 a.m. the following day. In the meantime students at the largest and most prestigious university in the provinces, Chiangmai University, held a protest rally on their campus with students giving speeches denouncing Decree 299. Almost simultaneously the newly formed cabinet met hurriedly and came to an unanimous decision retracting Decree 299. At 2:27 p.m. the national Thai radio station broadcasted the news that the government was going to attempt to approach the demonstrators at the sit-in protest that evening. One government official of the cabinet personally carried the decision and a special message to Thammasat students who were planning to return to the sit-in. However, the students decided to go on with the second stage of the sit-in as planned because the newly appointed cabinet had the final authority in the matter, and the students wanted decisive action and not just promises from government officials. On December 22nd, the cabinet convened for the first time and Decree 299 was placed first on the agenda. Before their first recess of the day the Council voted to retract Decree 299, and re-enact the Justice Act of 1952.

Demonstration Against the Expulsion of Nine Students at Ramkamhaeng University

Though Ramkamhaeng University was the last major university founded, it has the largest enrollment. This is due primarily to the fact that Ramkamhaeng University unlike all other major universities does not require students to take an entrance examination. Ramkamhaeng is required to consider any student with a high school diploma for admissions. The government had hoped that Ramkamhaeng University would help solve the problem of finding a place in the educational system.
for the many students who failed the entrance examinations of other universities. Moreover, the establishment of this university was in keeping with the goals of the five-year plan for higher education, which was to make a college education available to all those who had met the minimum requirements. Because of the limited facilities and the enormous enrollment, university policy allowed and even encouraged students to study at home, and classroom attendance is generally not required. Many students came to the university only at the end of the semester to take the final exams. It must be pointed out here, such liberal policies on admissions and attendance do not exist in the other established universities.

The setting for one of the largest protest in the history of Thai student activism began in June 1973, when 9 students were expelled from Ramkamhaeng University by order of Rector, Dr. Sakdi Phasooknirand. These students were accused of issuing an illegal magazine attacking the government and personally criticizing the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, depicting them as “beasts” in the cartoons and editorials. When classes commenced during the first semester on June 20, 1973, students began to distribute leaflets decrying the expulsion of the “Ramkamhaeng Nine.”

In one particular incident as students were distributing leaflets at the gate of the university campus, some men drove up in a car and began beating the students. Other students who were in the immediate vicinity rushed to the aid of those students being assaulted. In the melee that followed one of the attackers pulled out a gun and forced the students to retreat while he and his fellow assailants fled in a waiting car.

The following day ten bus loads of Ramkamhaeng students were on their way to Chulalongkorn to gather support for their cause, when the busses were stopped by the police and the drivers forced to relinquish their license. This government tactic provided an impetus to the movement because the Chulalongkorn students joined the protest, and after meeting with the stranded Ramkamhaeng students marched together to the Bureau of the State Universities and demanded to see the minister, Dr. Bunrod Bintason. The minister refused to meet with the throngs of students whose number had grown to an estimated 10,000 strong. The students then changed their strategy and decided to congregate at the traditional rallying point, the Pramain Ground. Upon arrival at the Pramain Ground there were hundreds of students and onlookers who greeted them. At the Pramain Ground the students held a huge
protest rally with speeches from the various student leaders, and thereafter proceeded to march to the Democracy Monument. As they marched they sang a marching song written by some of the students. The lyrics reflected their determination and idealism and translated, went as follows:

"Fight without retreat, for the masses are waiting for us... we have joined together to fight for democracy..."

The students carried placards and huge banners, some of which expressed the immediacy of the crisis at hand. The banners proclaimed to the onlookers that "absolutism is taking over higher education", and that "Ramkamhaeng is hot with power", and asked the general population to "Help us escape this danger." On the same day, the official student organization of Chiengmai University "The Student Front", threw their support behind the student protesters in Bangkok, through a communique.

A group of lecturers from various Bangkok Universities issued an open letter protesting Ramkamhaeng's dismissal of the nine students. This letter was signed by 82 professors, who were later referred to as "young turks", from Chulalongkorn, Thammasat, Silapakorn, Kasetsart, and the National Institute of Development Administration (N.I.D.A.).

At the Democracy Monument, the students staged a protest rally and heard speeches from various leaders. The topics of the speeches were not confined only to the case of the nine students at Ramkamhaeng. The students addressed the many problems caused by the power and profit mongers in high government positions. They called for a new constitution to replace the one that had been abrogated through a military coup in 1971, an end to corruption, and measures to deal with the increasing price of rice, and the sagging Thai economy. The students remained, and camped near the monument overnight. Late the same evening, the government ordered to close all the major universities in Bangkok, including Kasetsart, Chulalongkorn, Thammasat, Mahidol, Ramkamhaeng, Silapakorn, and Prasanmit. The order carried with it a penalty of arrest for any student who tried to enter any of these universities' campuses. Simultaneously, the government sent about 500 metropolitan police to surround the student camp-in. This "commando" police force proceeded to form a human barricade, blocking all routes leading to the Democracy Monument (refer Figure II.1, p. 20). The students armed only with their idealism and their cause sought support from the general civilian population by distributing leaflets to publicize their
dilemma. The following is an excerpt taken from one of the leaflets (translated from Thai):

"To fathers, mothers and fellow citizens... Now these incidents have indicated that we are ruled by tyrants. They oppress us. They want us to starve because the rice is so expensive. No one up there paid any attention to our distress. Our peaceful begging for help did not mean anything to them. Last night students all over the country joined this movement in peace to ask for the rights and freedom which are part of all humanity. We were hungry and cold, but we stayed here until the morning. However, the police surrounded us. They are now saying that they will let your children starve and walk voluntarily to the barrels of their guns." 27

The government's move to close the universities proved to be a great mistake. With the universities closed many students who would have gone to class decided to join the sit-in at the Democracy Monument. Kasetsart and Thammasat University came in groups to the scene of the rally. About 4,000 Kasetsart students thwarted by police when attempting to take the bus, walked about 20 kilometers to the Democracy Monument. Several thousand Thammasat students were the first group to arrive. The police, who had joined to form a human barricade around the area of Democracy Monument almost clashed with the arriving throngs of students. However, after some minor skirmishes of pushing and shoving along the barricade line, the police finally decided that they had no choice but to allow the thousands of arriving students to go through the line and join the other protesters peacefully.

After the arrival of Kasetsart University students the number of the protesters swelled to around 30,000, 28 and by mid-day the figure was placed at about 50,000. 29 Almost as impressive as the unity of support by students of all the major universities, was the favorable response of the civilian population, who generously donated money, food, and drink to the protesters throughout their ordeal. One report of the incident noted:

"During the long hours of protest, a large amount of food, drink and money was donated from sympathetic citizens from all walks of life, ranging from street-vendors to well-known personalities...The amount of money collected was more than 40,000 baht (about $2,000 U.S.)." 30

Periodically, during the protest, the demonstrators would
turn and face the King's palace and sing the King's Song, as if to emphasize that even though they were hostile to the government, they still admired and respected the King.\textsuperscript{31}

In the meantime, the government attempted to deal with the changing and expanding dimensions of the protest. The cabinet members held an urgent meeting that morning to discuss the matter. After a long debate the cabinet members invited the representatives of the students, including the nine expelled students, to see the Prime Minister and other high officials of the government. The meeting resulted in the following points to which the government agreed to carry through on:

1. The case of nine students who were expelled from Ramkamhaeng University would be reconsidered by the Council of Ramkamhaeng University.
2. The student demand for the removal of the rector of Ramkamhaeng University would be reviewed and taken under consideration by the government.
3. The person who assaulted the students who were distributing leaflets during the first day of the movement would be tried and the matter would be taken up by the police department.
4. The government would declare the reopening of all closed universities, and all restrictions pertaining to the shut-down would be retracted.

After the meeting the student leaders reported back to the awaiting protesters, explaining that the government, while not conceding to all the demands, did agree to most of what the students wanted. Thereafter, the leaders advised the students to disperse and go home. However, the next morning the rector of Ramkamhaeng University announced the decision to change expulsion of the nine students to suspension for one semester. Moreover, one of the nine students, who had been reprimanded by the university administration before this incident, was to be suspended for two semesters. The student leaders who had called an end to the protest demonstration, did so with the understanding from the Prime Minister that the nine expelled students would most likely be readmitted without conditions. The rector's decision to punish the students with suspension only further angered the student leaders, who felt the crucial issue was freedom of the press and the right of students to criticize the government, and that this essential freedom should not be compromised. Word quickly spread throughout student circles that the government had broken faith with the students and tricked them into dispersing.
The student leaders of all universities reconvened and planned another massive demonstration, announcing that this time they would not even bother to waste their time seeing the Prime Minister. As the movement for the new protest gained momentum, the government suddenly held a high level meeting and announced that the nine students would be readmitted without any conditions. Ironically, at this crucial meeting, none of the cabinet members even attempted to defend Dr. Sakdi, the rector. Moreover, some of the cabinet members encouraged the Prime Minister to remove Dr. Sakdi for the way he handled the entire matter. A few days later, Dr. Sakdi submitted his resignation which was promptly accepted by the government. In achieving all their original demands without having to carry through with the planned follow-up demonstration, the unified and persistent nature of the movement was seen as a masterpiece of the National Student Center of Thailand.

The government leaders were unable to sway the determination which marked the nature of this movement, even after the students had dispersed. The cooperation among the various universities in support of nine fellow students, and the swelling public support gave an entirely new dimension to the strength and significance of the National Student Center of Thailand and its leadership in the politics of Thailand. However, there emerged another unique event in the aftermath of this student movement in support of student activism in Thailand. A group of students and professors protesting both the government's decision and the role of the National Student Center, staged a counter-demonstration supporting Dr. Sakdi. Approximately 1,000 Ramkamhaeng University students marched around the campus with placards and banners, one of which read “We don't want those nine students.” By mid-day, the number of protesters had grown to about 6,000. After a rally held on campus the protesters decided to march to the Prime Minister's office where they demanded to see Thanom. They held a public forum while waiting for a reply to their demand, making speeches which called for the return of Dr. Sakdi and ouster of the nine “troublemakers.” While waiting outside the Prime Minister's office, the protesters would periodically sing the King's Song and the national anthem to emphasize their loyalty to both King and country. The government was apparently unimpressed and did not even send a representative to see them. However, the government did let it be known that unless the protesters dispersed, they would be forced to use violent measures to restore order. Several hours later, after much discussion and rumor, the counter-demonstration broke-up and Dr. Sakdi's removal was upheld.
The organizational effort of the leaders of the National Student Center of Thailand was admired and praised by the government during the anti-Japanese Goods Week. However, through the actions and reactions of the government concerning the very domestic issue of nine expelled students, the National Student Center grudgingly won respect as an effective oppositional force in the ever changing realm of Thai politics. Government leaders unofficially reported on the fearsome potential of organized student pressure in domestic politics. The NSCT was able, on occasion, to enlist considerable support from the working class, the middle class, and the intellectuals. They were establishing themselves as the voice of the people, representing the best interests of a democratic form of government in the face of a government determined to rule by martial law. This characterization of contemporary student activism in Thailand was explained in a special paper distributed by the National Student Center and written by its elected leader, Thirayuth Bunmee. In the paper, entitled, "The Students Begin to Find the Target", Bunmee explains the relationship between the students and people as follows:

"...nobody can hurt the students without hurting the people. This is because, 1) students are the children of the people; 2) the people have great faith in students. The students have proved that they are greatful for the taxes collected from the people for educational purposes. The students also try hard with all their ability to solve the many social problems. As long as the students still stay on the people's side, the people's faith in the students will remain. This will mean increased bargaining power with the government..."34

About the students' perception of their own power, he writes:

"...student activism can change the society as witnessed in Indonesia, Turkey, France, Japan, U.S.A. and in other countries. We study and understand what has happened in other countries... but I hope that the students would not over-estimate their power. Power has to be controlled and used in a purposeful manner. Otherwise the power can cause destruction and chaos. And this we do not want to see."34

On the future of the student movement, Bunmee predicts with confidence:

"We came through the past and we will not destroy our movement in the future." 35
Activist Bunmee’s confidence in the future of the student movement as a social and political force significant enough to cause major change in the Thai political system soon became a reality. Less than five months after the occurrence of the major demonstration described above, Bangkok witnessed a violent student revolution which brought down the Thanom government and discontinued military rule by martial law. Though most political observers were caught unaware, it can be stated now with some satisfaction that the authors, while gathering additional data in Bangkok during the summer of 1973, did predict a similar course of events which in fact took place in October. Based primarily on the behavioral data previously collected on Thai students, a continuous file on student activism, and occasional rumors from university students in August, rather accurate predictions were made and discussed with several disbelieving colleagues and educational officials.

Though this revolution was the outgrowth of yet another demonstration against the arbitrary decisions of the military government and the rule by martial law, its overriding significance to the Thai student movement and the future of Thai political system merits that a separate chapter be devoted to this important political event. Chapter III explains in detail the events leading up the demonstration and subsequent violent revolution, and depicts, the political atmosphere in the immediate aftermath of student revolt.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II


2. This does not include the police and military academies or N.I.D.A. all of which represent institutions of higher learning that have as their specific purpose the training of prospective military and civilian government officials.

3. The present King resides in the New Palace about 3.5 kilometers from the location of the Old Palace.

4. This Territory is now part of Cambodia and Laos.

5. Bangkok Chronicle, November 1940. The estimate of the number of participants in one such demonstration was placed at 400,000.
6. Pridi returned after having received a law degree from France and became the highest ranking civilian in the 1932 bloodless revolution and group which usurped the power of the monarchy.

7. Prayat Sitiphan, History of Thai Politics, Thonburi, 1968, pp. 596-599. (Nakon Dhon Publisher.)

8. Thereafter, Pridi resided in the Peoples Republic of China, and was rumored to be the voice of the "Free Thai", a group of insurgents who have proclaimed a government in exile and vowed to return to liberate Thailand.


10. Most of this information was obtained through a personal interview with a former Thammasat student who lived through and participated in the entire affair.

11. In some provinces (e.g., Uttaradit) the votes for government partly exceeded the number of eligible voters.

12. Some Chulalongkorn students hung the Flag on campus at half-mast designating the "death of democracy" in Thailand.


14. The announcement by the military government to lift martial law in Bangkok was designed to reduce the pressure from opposition politicians who also were testing the free speech clause of the new constitution. For further details see R. Prizzia, Student Activism in a Comparative Perspective: The Political Participation of Thai University Students, Chapter III, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1971.


25. See Table 1.


30. Bangkok Post, June 23, 1973, p. 2. (however, unofficial reports put the figure at about 700,000 baht)


33. Ibid., p. 1.

34. (Translated from Thai), Thirayuth Bunmee, “The Students Begin to Find the Target” in Student Society of Thailand, July 1973.

35. Ibid., p. 2.

36. Ibid., p. 3.
III. THE STUDENT REVOLUTION OF OCTOBER, 1973

by Ross Prizzia
and Narong Sinsawasdi

The fate of the Thanom military government and the future direction of the Thai political system was suddenly altered by a series of critical events which occurred from October 6th to 15th, 1973. Commonly referred to as “The Ten Days,” this period of 1973 may well become known as the most important series of events in Thai political history since the “revolution” of 1932. An account of these eventful ten days are presented below.*

The Making of Political Prisoners

After the huge demonstration in June, Thirayuth Boonmee and other student leaders kept the pressure on the government to accelerate the promulgation of the constitution. On Saturday, October 6, 1973, Thirayuth and ten other political activists were arrested by special police agents while distributing leaflets urging support for the early drafting of the constitution. The leaflets specifically referred to December 10, 1973, Thailand’s Constitution Day, as the date by which the constitution should be promulgated. Thirayuth and the other activists were accused of violating a National Executive Council decree which forbade more than five people to gather for political purposes. Those arrested with Thirayuth included Prapan-sak Kamolpetch, a one-time Bangkok parliamentary candidate; Boonsong Chalethorn, deputy secretary-general of the National Student Centre; Bandhit Hengnilrat, a liberal arts student at Thammasat University; Visa Kanthap, a humanities student at Ramkamhaeng University; and Thanya Chunchathathorn, a writer for the weekly Maharaj magazine and a Thammasat political science student. Also arrested were Thawee Muenthikorn, a Thammasat economics instructor; Montri Jueng-siriarak, a writer for the Monthly Social Science Review; Nopporn Suwanpanich, a former Chulalongkorn arts instructor; Preedi Boonsue, a Thammasat political science student; and Chiwat Suravichai, former vice-president of the Chula-longkorn Student Union.

Those arrested were first taken to police headquarters and thereafter escorted to their homes where detectives

*Note: Much of the information for this chapter was obtained from a special Summary of “The Ten Days” compiled by the Bangkok Post.
carried out an extensive search for "more incriminating evidence." In ordering the arrest of the students in lieu of freedom of assembly, and the search of their homes in lieu of freedom from unwarranted search and seizure, the Thanom-Prapas governing clique only added fuel to the flames of discontent and provided visible proof to the Thai public that student claims of government repression were correct. Moreover, the military government, in ordering the confiscation of all leaflets calling for the promulgation of the permanent constitution as matter of domestic security, was quickly interpreted by the general Thai public as further evidence that Thanom and Prapas had no real intention of relinquishing their powerful position to Constitutional government.

The comedy of government errors continued the following day, Sunday, October 7, 1973, when the Deputy Director General of the Police Department, Lt. General Prachuab Suntharangkoon ordered the arrest of Kongkiat Kongka, who was accused of being an overly articulate member of another activist group demanding an early promulgation of the permanent Constitution. Meanwhile, on this same day, the leaders of the powerful National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT) threatened retaliation for the government actions.

The stage was being set for confrontation as the government continued to remain arrogantly insensitive to student demands and apparently ignorant of their determination. This was clearly seen the next day (Monday October 8, 1973) when Prapas ruled out the possibility of an early bail for the twelve arrested activists, and publically announced that confiscated documents linked the twelve with a plot to overthrow the government. Prapas, in a futile attempt to retrieve public support for the government's seemingly repressive acts claimed that the police had seized documents "about communism" in Thai and Chinese. The Student Organization of the National Institute of Development Administration (N.I.D.A.) also appealed to Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, to drop the charge of inciting the public to act against the Government against the twelve arrested members of the Constitution Movement, but the government refused.

Setting the Stage for Confrontation

The implication by Prapas that the activists were engaged in some communist inspired plot only angered the students further, and on the following day, Tuesday, October 9, 1973, over 2,000 Thammasat University students congregated for an anti-government rally. Meanwhile, the entire
Metropolitan police force was put on full alert as police received reports that the students threatened to march to Bang Khen where the twelve arrested activists were being held. Thammasat students also symbolically registered their disgust with the government by lowering the national flag and putting up a black flag as a sign of mourning. Although the black flag was removed by Thammasat University authorities, students refused to attend classes to take the scheduled exams; and the first-semester examinations had to be called off for an indefinite period. In the meantime, small groups of students went to Bang Khen detention center to visit the arrested activists, but were only allowed to see five of the twelve. This continued practice of the police refusing to allow personal visits to the remaining seven activists (which included Thirayuth) eventually led to rumors late in the week that they had been killed or seriously tortured in captivity.

During the afternoon of October 9th, the Thammasat Student Legislative Body voted approval of a five point proposal to be carried out by the Thammasat Student Council. These points were:

*Non-violent protests will be made first and the students will remain at the Photi compound until the release of the 12 detainees;*

*Ten representatives will be appointed to negotiate with the Government for a speedy release of the 12 detainees;*

*Letters will be sent to all universities and institutes, calling for a show of strength and unity to support the negotiations;*

*If the Government still refuses to release the 12 after these non-violent protests have been made the students will resort to violence in the form of demonstrations and bloodshed.*

Rallies were held on other campuses on October 9th, and topics were not always political as was the case of the one very practical group of students at Prasarnmit Teacher's Training College. It was reported by the Bangkok Post as follows:

Several student leaders voiced their opinion during a mass student rally at the college yesterday that toilets are most important during student demonstrations. They pointed out that past demonstrations showed the marchers could not hold on longer than a few days since all of them
have to go to toilets, change their clothes, and brush their teeth. They reasoned that if movable toilets are set up at the demonstration sites, the marchers could hold on longer in their fight for justice and democracy. The rally yesterday, which was participated by around 300 students, produced a consensus that any students could submit their ideas to the Students’ Council about the most efficient way to build the movable toilets — just in case they might have to be used in view of the present ferment among the university students.

After the rallies, students from the Thammasat and Chulalongkorn Universities and several of the teacher training colleges of Bangkok, joined in an all-night vigil braving the cold and light showers, and vowed “full support” to those arrested. The arrested now included former Member of Parliament, Khaisaeng Suksai, and the list of political prisoners climbed to thirteen.

The following morning, October 10, 1973, the students made good their promise of support and an additional 1,000 students joined in the protest rallies. Much to the satisfaction of the swelling crowds of students, student leaders declared that the Thanom-Prapas clique had staged the revolution “of itself, for itself, and by itself.” As the crowds at the rallies continued to grow throughout the afternoon, and with tension mounting, the government announced that Deputy Prime Minister Prapas had been appointed head of a special independent organization to “restore peace and order.” At the same time, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, General Kris Sivara, was named as Marshal Prapas’ deputy in the new suppression force which had its headquarters, interestingly enough, at the Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC).

On the following day, October 11, 1973, Prapas agreed to meet with student representatives of the National Student Center of Thailand, who promptly demanded the release of the 13 political prisoners. Prapas refused the demand but vowed to have a constitution ready in twenty months. When asked why Article 17, which allowed arrest and detention without due process, was evoked against the political activists, Prapas cleverly explained that it was for the benefit of the detainees because authorities would be empowered to expedite the case without going through normal legal procedure in postponing the litigation of the case. Thai student leaders remained unimpressed with the government’s attempt at negotiation, and particularly perturbed with Prapas’ refusal to release the 13
political activists. They returned to the rally which had now moved to the Thammasat University football grounds to accommodate the growing crowd of more than 50,000, to announce that the NSCT would take sole responsibility for the school closures and the student walkouts. At that point about 70 per cent of all private and government schools in Bangkok had already called off classes either by official order or by action taken by the students to join forces with NSCT at the Thammasat campus.

In the meantime, the 13 political activists who were being held at the Metropolitan Police Training School in Bangkhen staged a hunger strike to protest the delay in police investigations and to give moral support to the mass rally of students. Seemingly worried over the course of events, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn and Deputy Prime Minister Prapas Charusathien consulted with His Majesty in a special audience that evening at Chitrlada Palace which lasted for about two hours. His Majesty the King had reportedly expressed grave concern over the student uprising.

The next morning in a move which was apparently designed to avoid confrontation with the students, the government announced that: “If any investigations showed that the students were purely and sincerely demanding for the Constitution, they would be released with fines for political gathering of more than five persons.” However, making a clear distinction between young students and adult politicians, the government maintained that legal action would be taken against the eight politicians who were arrested on the same charges if they were found guilty as charged.

It was apparently an offer of too little, too late, for the day began in a frenzy as thousands of students from universities, technical colleges, teachers training colleges, vocational colleges and secondary schools streamed towards the Thammasat University rendezvous from all directions. Many of the students arrived on foot, often accompanied by sympathetic teachers and lecturers while several passers-by donated money to the marchers. The number of students pouring into the Thammasat grounds swelled into tens of thousands by midday as it was announced that all schools in Bangkok had been closed indefinitely. Chulalongkorn University and Ramkamhaeng University also announced the indefinite postponement of all examinations. Moreover, the Chulalongkorn Student Union declared in a formal statement that they “openly opposed” the government’s action on the arrests as “they could not bear the injustice any longer.” Meanwhile, the students stepped up the pressure on the government by announcing a demand for
the unconditional release of the 13 detainees who had been ar­
ested following their activities in connection with the consti­
tutional drive. The NSCT gave a 24-hour deadline starting
from midday and warned of “decisive action” if the demand
was not met. The Director-General of the Public Relations
Department, Major-General Prakob Charumanee, issued an
assurance that no force will be used against the demonstrat­
ing students and appealed to the public to avoid the Thamma­
sat University area. An extraordinary emergency Cabinet
meeting was called at the Communist Suppression Operations
Command at 2 p.m. to consider the ultimatum. The meeting
went on for several hours before a solution was arrived at,
while at Thammasat tension was building up as students
waited for an answer from the Government on their demand.
An hour-by-hour countdown was started with student leaders
telling the crowd that there were 23-22-21...hours to the dead­
line.

On the evening of October 12, 1973, about five hours after
the ultimatum was received by the government it was an­
nounced to the waiting students that the 13 political activists
would be released on bail. A great cheer went up around the
crowded field as most students appeared satisfied. However,
some of the student leaders were still disgruntled pointing out
to the rally that they had demanded an unconditional release
and not release on bail. One of the thirteen activists being
held by the government, Chaiwat Suravichai, was sent to
explain the situation. At the rally he indicated that the other
twelve persons were willing to remain in the detention center,
and that their release should not affect the continued demand
and protests for an early promulgation of the constitution.
After hours of debate, the majority of the students present
finally decided to reject the bail offer, and at 11:25 p.m.
the remaining twelve political activists, upon learning of the
decision of the NSCT, refused to sign a paper to accept their
temporary release.

This offer by the government, though not all what the stu­
dents wanted, was obviously as far as the government was
prepared to go. Using previous demonstrations as a yard­
stick for compromise, the government obviously felt that release
of the thirteen activists would allow both the students and go­

cernment to save face while avoiding a possible violent con­
frontation. The pattern of previous demonstrations might have
led most observers to speculate this to be the case. However,
the government gravely underestimated the determination and
seriousness of the students on the Constitutional issue. More­
over, discontent among the students and general Thai public
had reached an all time high and the student leaders were well aware of the implications and power of their position. Also, they had been misled by promises of release just three months before involving the “Ramkamhaeng 9.” They were not about to disperse as they had in the last demonstration and relinquish their powerful position, only to leave the government reneg on their promises. After the students flatly refused to accept anything but an unconditional release of the thirteen, the government found itself with the choice of either a complete loss of face or an impressive show of force. In choosing the latter, they set the final stage for confrontation.

Confrontation and Violence

At eleven thirty on the morning of October 13th, 1973, soldiers took up positions along the perimeter of the Communist Suppression Operations Command Headquarters while the 12 remaining activists remained on the grass outside the Bang Khen Detention Centre refusing to go with the police to Pathumwan Headquarters. About a half hour later, the government announced that it would not back down on its refusal to the student demand for the unconditional release of the 13 activists. About the same time, all gates leading to Thammasat University were closed as the demonstrators took up their positions. While the students were finalizing their plans to make the customary march along the Rajdamnern Avenue, pandemonium nearly broke out at the Bang Khen police Detention Center as police, under the direction of Special Branch Police Commander Major General Chai Suwannasorn, tried to get the twelve constitutional activists to leave since they were officially released on bail. A team of more than 20 commando police entered the cell where the twelve activists were staying. After heated discussions, the twelve activists, including Thirayuth Boonmee, voluntarily walked out from the detention center and waited patiently near the Super-highway for a “final decision” from the National Students Center of Thailand.

In the meantime, about 200,000 protesting students left Thammasat University campus in a protest march to demand the “unconditional release” of the 13 activists. Preparations were made for a prolonged demonstration at the Thammasat University as the NSCT food and welfare committees loaded about 10 small pickup trucks with food, fruit and other necessary supplies. The chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee of the NSCT, Mr. Rachan Wiraphan, said if the 13 constitutional activists were not released by noon the students would march to the Parliament House, and also revealed an alternative plan which called for the marchers to rally at the
Democracy Monument if they were blocked by government forces on Rajdamnern Avenue at Makkawan Bridge in front of ECAFE.

Strategy for the organized protest allowed for each university and school having students in the demonstration to assemble in a particular area so that leaders could detect any "third hands," and called for the tough vocational and engineering students to make up the front column of the protest march in case of any clashes with government forces.

As the march began, it became obvious that the NSCT leaders were meticulous in their plans, as a group of scouts were sent ahead to clear the way for the protest march (see Figure III. 1 on next page). Groups of students were organized and divided into separate sections to be responsible for food, first aid, co-ordination, commando duties, etc., each with its own coloured arm bands. Some engineering students carried wooden or metal bars while others wore protection against tear gas. A group of girl students marched ahead of the column carrying pictures of the King and Queen. Close behind the girls were a group of young men with thick sacks for placing on barbed wire obstacles and for throwing over police dogs. This group was referred to as the "anti-dog" unit. Small groups of first aid workers walked among the marchers holding Red Cross flags aloft for easy identification. While the students were protesting peacefully at Sanam Luang and Rajdamnern Ave, the King met with an NSCT delegation of nine, some of which were the released activists from Bang Khen Center.

Meanwhile, student support from the public swelled as large amounts of cash, food, and supplies flowed into the donation booths in and around Thammasat University. By noon the NSCT announced it had collected over 400,000 baht (approximately $20,000 U.S.). It was also reported that the majority of Bangkok bus lines running to the Sanam Luang area would not pick up passengers other than those going to Thammasat University, and bus conductors were turning away passengers who indicated that they were not going to attend the rally. One of the conductors of a packed bus which avoided the regular bus-stops and went directly to Thammasat University, simply explained his behavior by asserting that, "We are all fighting for the Constitution."

Before the protesting marchers, which had now swelled to over 400,000 people, moved from the Democracy Monument,
This diagram shows how the National Student Center of Thailand operated in organizing the five-day protest which climaxed in a massive demonstration and the eventual confrontation which overthrew the Thanom Government.
there was news that the government had agreed to the NSCT demand which called for the unconditional release of the thirteen activists. The government also promised that the permanent constitution would be promulgated by October, 1974. Having achieved what they considered a victory, the student leaders called off the demonstration at the Democracy Monument and returned to Thammasat University campus to celebrate.

However, more than 200,000 students remained on the streets, and thousands of them refused to disband. This group, which included the “hard core” vocational and engineering students, was under the direction of Saeksan Prasertkul, a student of political science at Thammasat University. These students were dissatisfied and wanted a guarantee that the government would keep its promises to the students. Saeksan tried to control the restless crowd urging them to avoid any violent measure, while attempting to reach the other leaders of the NSCT, but his efforts were in vain. At about twelve o’clock, midnight, Saeksan decided to lead the crowd to the royal palace to request the King’s advice. At that point some of the other leaders of the NSCT showed up and tried to convince the crowd that they should go home and not follow Saeksan. However, after Saeksan and the other leaders of the NSCT, ‘including the NSCT’s former secretary general, met and discussed what had happened, the two sides reached an understanding and then went together to seek the King’s audience. However, only a King’s representative, Col. Vasit Dejkunchorn, came to see them about 5:30 a.m.

It was still the same fateful Sunday morning of October 14th. The King’s representative read the King’s advice to the students which was to disband peacefully since the thirteen activists had been unconditionally released and the Constitution had been promised before October. After reading this message, Col. Vasit told the students that, “Their Majesties have been unable to sleep during the last four nights of protest. Now he would like all of you to go home.”

It looked for a moment that the situation would return to normal and the students themselves, after singing the national anthem together, began to prepare to go home. However, as the demonstrators started to disband, an unfortunate thing occurred which triggered the violent riot which was to last for the next two days. Unfortunately, as the demonstrators attempted to leave the street in front of the King’s palace, Police Lt. General Monchai Phankongchuen, Assistant Director of the Police Department, ordered his men to form a barricade so that
the students should leave the area in only one direction to ensure an orderly dispersal. The mass of students, however, proved too large and when the students' request that another exit should be allowed was refused, a wave of resentment ran through the mass of demonstrators.

It was about 6:30 a.m. when this confrontation turned into a violent clash. Exactly what happened has been reported in various ways. Some eye witnesses claim that the police started clubbing the demonstrators first because they were shoving against the police line. A reporter at the scene claimed that a bag of ice thrown from the crowd hit a policeman squarely in the head and knocked him down, after which the police began using tear-gas and threatened the students with their weapons. In any event, stones and other objects started flying in the direction of the police, while the police began beating the students. Many demonstrators were injured as some attempted to fight back with their wooden clubs. However, most of the students attempted to run from the area. Some jumped into the moat near by while others ran to take refuge inside the palace ground. Three girl students were said to have been beaten to death by the police. Many of the demonstrators ran back to the Parliament Building while some returned to the Democracy Monument, and others to Thammasat University. They quickly spread the news of the police brutality in the Palace clash. The story about the girls being beaten to death was told and retold.

The demonstrators were now without their leaders as all NSCT leaders disappeared from the crowd. Saeksan was said to have collapsed from exhaustion due to his intense and continued activity in the five days of protest.

Meanwhile, at Thammasat campus, the students started to regroup again, anxious to gain revenge for the police brutality. At about 7:45 a.m., a group of demonstrators set fire to a police booth beside Thammasat University. From that time on the violent clashes between students, who were joined by the public, and government forces continued along Rajdamnern Avenue for two days and one night. The area of heaviest fighting occurred near the end of Rajdamnern Avenue in the proximity of the Pramain Ground. The government brought several tanks and about 500 soldiers to the aid of the Bangkok police force in combating the demonstrators. However, the demonstrators refused to disband and many fought back with wooden clubs while a few had pistols. When the demonstrators were first confronted by the tanks, they thought that the soldiers would not actually use them against the students.
However this assumption proved false as the army fired the M-16 rifles and tank-machine guns into the crowds of demonstrators. These weapons along with the helicopter gunships which the government also used to shoot at the demonstrators were responsible for most of the casualties. Several hundred demonstrators were shot and wounded, while almost one hundred were killed. A small number of soldiers were also killed and injured.

Throughout the violent confrontation the government used the media to broadcast distorted news reports claiming that the demonstrators were not students but communist agents and the student leaders were forced to join in a plot to overthrow the government. The government greatly exaggerated the rioters' capabilities by claiming that some demonstrators possessed machine guns and killed many soldiers. However, the broadcasts never gave any account of the number of demonstrators killed or wounded.

At about 3:30 p.m. a rumour spread that the military would take control of Thammasat University, so large numbers of demonstrators withdrew across the Chao Phya River jamming the Pran Nok landing. As the demonstrators realized the futility in fighting tanks and machine guns with clubs and molotov cocktails, they turned their frustration and anger to other symbols of government authority. Many of the government buildings along Rajdamnern Avenue were set afire as people from all over Bangkok travelled to the scene of the fighting. The crowds of demonstrators and onlookers grew to over one-half million people as crowds began to pour into Rajdamnern Avenue. Finally, at about 5:30 p.m., October 14th, the government gave up the battle and the soldiers were ordered to withdraw from Rajdamnern Avenue.

At about the same time, the government announced over radio Thailand that it had rendered its resignation to His Majesty the King. At about 7:15 p.m. the King addressed the nation on television and all radio broadcasting stations, officially announcing that Thanom's government had resigned and Professor Sanya Thammasakdi, the rector of Thammasat University, had been appointed as the new Prime Minister. At that point, many people cheered and ran into the streets shouting victory. Late that night Professor Sanya Thammasakdi addressed the nation by television and radio, promising a constitution and election within 6 months.

Thereafter, thousands of students and other demonstrators congregated at Democracy Monument where student speakers
were asking them to disband and go home. However many students were still angry over the slaughter of hundreds of young and unarmed people. They argued that it was not enough that the government had resigned because Field Marshal Thanom still remained the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and Prapas was still Director General of the Police Department. Many demonstrators wanted to continue the movement until they were sure that Thanom and Prapas were powerless; others claimed that they wanted to see both men dead. The hard core "yellow tiger" commando unit of the students directed their hostility to the Metropolitan of the Headquarters which was now symbolic of the police force. The police protecting the headquarters had machine guns while several of the students had rifles and pistols.5

The gun battle between students and police in and around the police headquarters lasted from late October 14th to the following afternoon. At 7:00 a.m., the 15th of October, the "commando" students at Panfah Bridge were still holding out but were planning to retreat to the Monument. It was reported that a doctor, a medical assistant, and five nurses were shot dead in the Panfah Bridge area by what was believed to be machine gun and M-16 rifle fire, as they were tending to some casualties in the "battle field" facing the Metropolitan Police Headquarters several hours before dawn. As the battle ensued, many of demonstrators were gunned down as they tried to close in on the police headquarters.

Finally, the police abandoned the building as the students set it afire. Rumor had it that the technique employed was as ingenious as it was daring, for it was reported that after hijacking a fire engine at the scene, the students' "yellow tiger suicide squad" emptied the water from the tanks and then siphoned gasoline from a nearby gas station. They then sent a jet of the high-octane gasoline from a fire engine hose into the Metropolitan Police Headquarters near Panfah Bridge and tossed molotov cocktail bombs into the pool of gasoline. An eyewitness at the scene said that, "Some were shot down, but the remainder successfully sent gasoline from a powerful hose into the building and then set it on fire."6 In the meantime, rioting students and the public, many of them in their teens, roamed the streets, packed into commandeered buses and trucks and burned down or smashed most of the city's police booths, traffic lights and traffic signs.

At about 5:00 p.m., an unexpected calm came to the rioters when it was announced via radio and television that Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal Prapas Cha-
rusathira, and Colonel Narong Kittikachorn had left the coun-
try. 7

As the gatherings dissolved, bus companies joined army
buses in giving most students free rides home, while other
students remained to direct traffic and put out the fires.
It was clearly a victory for the students and other demonstrat-
ing civilians, and not a single uniformed policeman was in
sight on the streets of Bangkok. One student armed with a fire
hose to fight the flames which still raged along Rajdamnern
Avenue summed up the significance of these historic “ten days
in October” when he remarked, “We have made a new Thai-
land but it cost us a lot.” 8

While the role of the students in the overthrow of the
military government was no doubt the most significant of any
other single force, there were other groups and certain
conditions which aided the student cause. A major supporting
condition was the growing cleavages within the military
which had withered away much of the support for the Thanom
and Prapas regime. The Royal Thai Navy, which had remained
in a rather subservient position to the powerful army cliques
ever since the “Manhattan Affair”,9 openly supported the
student cause. Even among the army and the air force there
were those officers who found reasons not to come to the aid
of the police force while they were under siege by the stu-
dents. Also the intellectuals, the “Young Turks” of Thailand,
and former opposition politicians all helped the student
cause. Common laborers and other civilian workers who went
out on “wildcat” strikes in August and September aided in creat-
ing the atmosphere for revolt and many of these people also
participated in the mass demonstrations against the govern-
ment in October. The overall effect of the efforts of the stu-
dents and supporters was the creation of a free, but chaotic
atmosphere in the immediate aftermath of the revolt, at which
time the NSCT and other break-away student groups attempted
to consolidate their power. The psychological barrier which had
kept thousands of Thais submissive to military authority for
over five decades was seriously impaired if not altogether bro-
en. More important, the student revolution had created in its
aftermath at least the atmosphere for change, where signifi-
cant steps toward the establishment of democratic institu-
tions could be taken.

The next chapter describes in detail the general psycho-
logical barrier to political participation of most Thai which
dates back to the absolute monarchy, while Chapter VII ex-
plains further the significant role of the NSCT in the months
following the “Ten Days in October.”
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

1. Saeksan Prasertkul, at that time, was the public relation officer of the NSCT. In selecting the secretary-general of NSCT in July 1973, Saeksan was also on the ballot, but he was narrowly defeated by Sombat Thamrongtanyawong of Kaset-sart University. Saeksan possesses a great talent in public speaking, and always wears a hat like the one worn by Che Guevara, the South American martyr and revolutionist. Though many labelled him as a radical, he was to emerge from this October uprising as a hero.

2. Later that day the King ordered the Royal vehicles to take the students back to their homes safely.

3. The names of these three girls were never revealed, and some government officials claimed that no one was killed in this initial clash near the palace.

4. According to one report, tanks even pursued students to presupposed safety of Thammasat University and fired into the campus grounds through the fences.

5. Government radio said that the rioters plundered the gunshops. However, other sources said that the rioters asked for only a few guns from each shop and the owners just gave the guns to them voluntarily. Some owners were said to have even demonstrated the proper loading techniques.

6. As reported by the Bangkok Post, October 16, 1973.

7. It was later revealed that Field Marshal Thanom flew to the United States, while Field Marshal Prapas and Colonel Narong went to Taipei.

8. Bangkok Post Summary, The costs were great as all Bangkok hospitals were filled with the wounded. However, public support was also great as blood donations ran so high that many hospitals ran out of blood containers.

9. The Manhattan was a United States warship of World War II stock, which on June 29, 1951, was to be turned over by American officials to the Thai government. However, during the official ceremony aboard the ship, Prime Minister Phibun was kidnapped by navy officials who had long been disappointed with Phibun’s policy of favoring the Thai army, police, and air force at the expense of the Thai navy.
IV. SOME CULTURAL ASPECTS OF THAI
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND STUDENT ACTIVISM

by Narong Sinsawasdi
and Ross Prizzia

The main purpose of this chapter is to explain the behavior of student activists and the government response. However, before going into any detailed explanation, it is necessary to discuss: 1) Some characteristics of the political behavior of the Thai population in general, and 2) the unique characteristics of the Thai students as compared to the general Thai population.

A Some Characteristics of the Political Behavior of the Thais in General

The Thais have never had much of an opportunity to choose their own government and participate in the decision making process of the government. This has been the case throughout Thai history and is reflected in the Thai political culture which has traditionally defined political leadership in executive rather than legislative terms. Hence, the Thai political culture has been and remains characteristically "non-participant."

The Thai political culture does not in any real sense reflect the values of the "civic culture", so aptly explained by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba. Moreover, the non-participatory nature of the Thai evolved more out of a belief that the government decisions are not in their realm of responsibilities, rather than out of a belief that their participation would be ineffective, or out of a feeling of rejection of the political system, which are the basis of Almond and Verba's non-participant political culture. The Thai political competence, or lack of it, in participation is based much more on cultural orientation which suggests they need not participate, rather than on a subjective self-evaluation which measures their ability to participate. This distinction, though somewhat contrary to Almond and Verba's concept of political competence, is basic to the understanding of the unique implications of the generally non-participant political culture of the Thai. The general functional role perceptions of most Thai adult citizens is that they need not and even should not participate in national politics. Surveys conducted after the 1968 elections showed that the respondents from rural areas in particular felt their function was to tend to the farm and not get involved in government decisions or politics. These functions were the sole responsibility of the "chao nai" (government officials).
During the many centuries of absolute monarchy, from the Ayutthaya Period (14th-18th century) to Bangkok Period (18th century - present), the Thais never experienced, nor was it part of their political culture to expect, participation in the decision making of the government. There were many palace revolts during the Ayutthaya Period. However, in none of these upheavals did the general Thai population play any role. There was no time in Thai history that the Thais rebelled against the King as was the case in many European nations. The King's order was absolute. One well-known story which illustrates this point involved King Taksin the Great, who ordered one of his top generals executed for visiting his family during maneuvers. Though this incident occurred in the eighteenth century, the general recognition of the King's divine right to rule and administer justice has remained relatively strong up to the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1872-1910), who began to reorganize the government apparatus, as well as modernize the nature of the absolute monarch. While some of the early reforms of this period were instituted to bring about real change, many others were instituted with the prime purpose of appeasing the West and their prescribed image of Thailand. At his Coronation in 1873, Chulalongkorn abolished the practice of prostration in the Royal presence. In a proclamation at the coronation ceremony the King also expressed a desire for more participation in the decision making process by establishing the first State Council and Cabinet. The next year (1874), the King began the abolition of slavery by decreeing that from then on no one could be born a slave, and practice of selling oneself for debt was made illegal.

However, those changes took place essentially at the upper-most levels of the then existing Thai bureaucracy. This pattern of decision-making where change takes place and is instigated from the top, has persisted as the general practice of reform up to the present. Historically it has been very rare where government or major decisions were effectively influenced by domestic non-governmental organizations. The ruling elite has rarely been seriously effectively pressured by the civilian population for reform. There are presently only two groups in the realm of domestic politics which have recently presented a serious challenge to the decision-making power of the ruling clique, the communists guerillas and the students. While the military governments have consistently perceived the communist insurrection as an illegitimate challenge to the existing political system, student activism was, until 1973, still somewhat tolerated as a legitimate form of participation in the decision-making process. The seemingly contradictory nature of governmental rule by martial law tolerating illegal
protest demonstrations as somewhat legitimate forms of participation, is one of the unique aspects of Thai political system which has its roots in Thai political culture.

While the Thai military elite have been somewhat tolerant of student activism, the general Thai population usually reciprocates by being very tolerant of the ruling clique's control of periodic elections, and the Parliament when it is in session.

Ruling Clique's Control Over Elections and the Parliament

When the absolute monarch lost power in the bloodless coup of 1932, one of the revolutionaries' stated goal was to take sovereignty from the King and give it to the people. However, this goal never really materialized. In fact, the power has always remained in the hands of only a few people. The Thai people have never really had a chance to decide who should govern. Until the student revolution of October 1973, government changed by coup, the results of which was immediately recognized as the new decision-making elite. The Thais have occasionally gone through the ceremony of elections and periodic show-window democracy. The outcome of elections were never to decide on who would be in power but rather only to give legitimacy to the members of the successful coup. Though the Thai constitution changed many times, there remains one thing in common in most versions, a bicameral legislature, with the lower house being directly elected by the people. However, the upper house is appointed by the King from a list prepared for him by the government in power before the election. After the election the old government will usually have the loyalty of all the appointed Senators. Therefore, only a small number of the members of the lower house usually suffices for the old government to have the necessary majority in Parliament, and hence, the old government is always chosen by the Parliament to be the new government again. In the case that this government is overthrown by a coup, the coup group normally dissolves the Parliament and sets up a "temporary" government. When this temporary government, which sometimes lasts for years, thinks that they have consolidated enough power to control an election they will set an election date and give a list of their loyal followers to the King to appoint to the Senate. After the election the coup will resign as the "temporary" government, but will be elected again by the Parliament to be the new government.

During the new government's administration, these superficially elected leaders can affect the legislation and execution
of any policy they desire because they always retain a majority in the Parliament. Moreover, the Thai bureaucracy has aided in minimizing internal government conflicts and participation primarily because the civil service has been traditionally barred from participating in politics. Thus, the bureaucracy, except for very high ranking officials, is little effected by the internal shifts in power relations in Bangkok. Once the hierarchy formulates policy and devises laws, the subordinates dutifully implement those directives. This hierarchy in essence, forms the central government. Though the government is divided into distinguishable executive, legislative and judicial branches, the government does not realistically adhere to the principle of separation of powers. However, these three divisions, plus the constitutional monarch, theoretically compose the Thai government. Although all power is exercised in the name of the King, he has very little real power in his own right. The real significance of the monarchy in national politics has been his symbolic representation of national unity and through royal appointment to the major ministerial offices of the state. The practical application of the power by the elected government in accordance with the 1968 Constitution best illustrates the minimal role of the legislature and the overall control by the executive branch. The executive branch made and implemented policies and supervised the operation of the judiciary. The executive branch was organized into twelve ministries, whose chiefs, known as ministers of state, collectively formed the Council of Ministers. Their work was supervised by the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers was the center around which the entire political system revolved. In addition to the COM, there were a number of quasi-autonomous bodies that performed certain specialized functions under ministerial supervision. As the most important member of the COM, the Prime Minister held the ultimate powers of appointment, investigation, and review. He countersigned all royal decrees and appointed and dismissed other ministers and civil servants holding the ranks of permanent under-secretary and head of department. He presided over cabinet meetings and controlled their agenda. Each minister of state represented his ministry in the cabinet and transmitted to the ministry the policy decisions and directives of the Prime Minister; and was responsible to the Prime Minister for execution of such policy. 4

By virtue of the Doctrine of Emergency Powers retained in 1970, the Prime Minister could take all steps necessary to maintain security to aid economic progress in a national emergency. He did not need to request approval of the legislature for these actions, but only inform them of what he had
decreed. Hence, in practice the executive branch has never been held responsible to the legislature. The power of the executive was further enhanced by the constitutional provision that all votes of confidence must be passed by a majority of the joint houses of the National Assembly. The leadership of the executive branch could always be assured of nearly unanimous support from the Senate and only needed the vote of a very small minority of the House of Representatives to preclude a vote of non-confidence. Moreover, the provisions which allowed the Prime Minister nearly unlimited authority to declare martial law whenever he deemed it necessary to maintain national security only further minimized the effect of any legislative opposition.

Even after the 1932 revolution the Thai people still never had a real opportunity to elect their government and control its behavior. As stated earlier, participation in decision-making is not seen as a necessary requisite to being a good citizen by most Thai and they are not very anxious either to obtain power or control the form of government. Surveys show that most Thai profess to desire good government. However, even though the Thais will think that a certain government policy is bad, or some government member is not efficient or even corrupt, the Thais usually do not feel personally responsible to request reform and above all, do not want to get involved. Moreover, most Thais do not perceive their government to be undemocratic and the majority of the Thais still think that the country is being ruled by a democratic form of government. A nation-wide survey conducted by a group of professors of the political science department at Thammasat University in 1971, showed that the majority of the Thais believed that Thailand had a democratic form of government. This belief prevailed even after the country was ruled by martial law (1971-1973). The results of this survey suggest that even though they are not permitted to elect officials or even indirectly have some control of the government, many Thais still believe that Thailand has a democratic form of government. In general, it can be said that the Thais are very submissive to government, whether it is efficient or not, dictatorship or not. There is much evidence to suggest that the Thai of this century which lived through a series of civilian and military governments, have retained similar culture-bound political orientations that characterize the 19th century Thai perceptions of the monarchy.

It might seem inconceivable that the political behavior or political culture of many Thais has not changed much from that of the Thais under absolute monarchy. However, the change was taking place so slowly that the old values, beliefs, per-
sonality traits, and political attitudes are still being transmitted to the present, and to a lesser degree, the next generation of the Thai people. Some of these personal attributes and major characteristics of the Thai political personality which were acquired through the process of socialization are described below. It is the authors' bias that these traits discussed in the explanation that follow have, and continue to contribute to, the passive nature of the "non-participant" Thai citizen.

Fear of Authority

Under the absolute monarchy fear of the King was functional. As in most traditional societies, historically, the few ruling elites in Thailand did not have to rule the mass by force; rather, the authoritarian personality of the masses made them submit willingly to the ruling elites. Everett Hagen explains this phenomena as follows:

The authoritarian hierarchical traditional social structure must have persisted because submitting to authority above one, as well as exercising authority, was satisfying; and secondly, because the conditions of life recreated personalities, generation after generation, in which it continued to be so.\(^5\)

The socialization process inculcates the authoritarian submissiveness into the individual, and differences in the socialization process can cause varying degrees of authoritarian submissiveness in individuals. The socialization process might very well vary from one society to another. A good example is the difference in the socialization processes of Thai and American societies, which results in different levels of authoritarian submissiveness. Hence, to bring a Thai child to fear authority of parents, senior relatives, public officials, and the King, was perceived beneficial to the survival of the political system and of the individual's personal development. This fear was always present even though the individual would never have the chance to encounter the King, because he would most likely come in contact with the King's emissaries or other public authorities who carried the authority of the King. When a child matures, this fear of parents and teachers is usually transferred subconsciously to the fear of government. The Thai child is not allowed to talk back to his parents or the teachers. When he walks by or passes between his parents or elders he is trained to bend his back to display deference. The Thai child is not supposed to touch his parents' shoulder or head. He will be taught the hierarchical order of individuals. Those who are older, more powerful, or have higher education will be
those who are higher than him in social rank and he must learn how to address them accordingly both through word and gesture. He is not supposed to at any time ridicule his parents knowing that they can inflict some punishment on him. Thai parents will usually cause fear in the child as a way of having the child obey orders. Physical punishment is considered an appropriate measure and tends to create the necessary fear in the child. One common Thai proverb justifies the punitive measures against children as follows: “If you love your cattle tie them, if you love your children, spank them.”

At school as well as at home, the Thai child experiences physical punishment, usually by the school disciplinarian, if he violates his teacher’s rule of conduct. Hence the school only reinforces the child’s fear of authority.

Respect for Authority

The Thai are also reared to respect authority. The Thai child is constantly told that gratitude to one’s parents is the greatest of all virtues. The Thai children are told stories about their parent’s hardships in rearing a child and the common story of the person who never achieved anything in life no matter how hard he tried because he did not express gratitude toward his parents.

The Thai is generally socialized to be much more submissive to family and school authorities than the American. Before he can talk, the Thai child is taught to perform a gesture of respect toward the parents and other senior relatives by putting two hands together at the breast and bowing. This behavior is reinforced by such things as a smile of approval from his parents. A Thai child is taught that it would be a sin to hit his parents, or to touch a parent’s shoulders or head. He is also taught never to speak disrespectfully concerning his parents, even though they may not be present. He is always to obey his parents and is never to talk back to them. At school the Thai child is taught to love, respect, and obey his parents and the teacher. In the classroom the Thai child is taught to bow to his teacher before the class begins, and to bow to him again when the class finishes. It is a Thai belief that one who talks disrespectfully of his teacher, or insults his teacher, will forget all that he has learned. Every year there is a day dedicated to the teacher. On that day all students, from the primary through the college level, will bring flowers, incense, and candles to the school to perform ceremonies in respect for their teachers.
The Shame-Avoidance Tendency

Ruth Benedict described shame as:
"...a reaction to other people's criticism"

and maintains that:

"A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected or by fantasizing to himself that he has been made to seem ridiculous. In either case it is a potent sanction. But it requires an audience or at least a man's fantasy of an audience."

The Thai, like the Japanese, are raised to be extremely conscious of shame. The child is told constantly by his parents to avoid situations where there is a possibility that people will laugh at him. The child is socialized to conform to the way others behave. The audience can be anybody. In this sense, conformity and authoritarian submissiveness is not the same. Authoritarian submissiveness refers only to submission to the family and school authorities. However, conformity refers to feeling shamed before any person whether he is a family or school authority or not. Observations concerning Thai and American degrees of conformity can further illustrate the high degree of conformity among the Thai. In general the American is socialized to have a lower degree of conformity than the Thai. If an American thinks it is appropriate to do something he will be likely to do it regardless of other people's reaction. In Thailand, a strong tendency to avoid shame plays a great part in influencing an individual's behavior. A Thai is inculcated with this tendency from his early childhood. A Thai mother will tell her child to dress well so that no one will laugh at him instead of telling the child to dress well so that he will have a good appearance. The Thai teacher will tell the student to work hard so that he will be successful and never bring shame to his family and school. A very insulting comment to a Thai is "you are a shameless-faced person."

Faith in the Leader

The Thai child is also reared to have faith in the leader. When he is about to go to someone's home, a child will be told not to worry about a vicious dog if he walks closely behind an accompanying adult. A Thai child is told many stories about the greatness of their Thai leaders who led the country out of danger courageously and wisely. Historically, the Thais have been fortunate in always having a capable leader come upon the scene in time of need to lead the country out of danger. In the
period when Ayutthaya was the capital city, it was attacked by
the Burmese on two different occasions. Each time the Thais
rallied around a new leader to repel the Burmese attacks and
drive them out of the country. It became a common belief that
"Ayutthaya will never run out of great men." When Bangkok be­
came the capital city, there occurred situations where a great
leader emerged unexpectedly in times of need. In one such
instance, Thalang, a town in Southern Thailand which is
presently Phuket, was surrounded by the Burmese troops.
During the siege, the governor of the town became ill and
died. However, his wife and his sister assumed the roles of
leaders and rallied the townspeople to fight back courageously
until the Burmese had to give up their plan to capture Thalang.
In another instance, Korat, a town in the Northeast, was cap­
tured by troops from Laos when the town's governor was away
on business in Bangkok. The leader of the Laotian troops forced
the townspeople to march back to Laos where they were to be
sold or used as slaves, which was a common practice for 18th
century prisoners of war among the kingdoms of Southeast Asia.
However, along the route to Laos, the wife of the governor of
Korat, secretly planned to retaliate. Methodically, she rallied
the Thais to fight back, and managed herself to kill the Laotian
leader and forced the remaining Laotian troops to retreat and
disperse. In the reign of King Rama IV (1848 - 1868), and
Rama V (1869-1910) of Bangkok, Thailand was in constant
danger of being colonized by England and France. However,
with the wisdom of these two kings, Thailand escaped coloniza­
tion, though she was forced to cede several provinces in Laos,
Cambodia and Malaya to these colonial powers.

To Be Content With What One Has

This value is a direct influence from Buddhism. Buddhist
philosophy holds that the desire for materialism, prestige,
and power will cause one's unhappiness. To have ultimate
happiness is to have the least desires. Of course, all Thais
do not adhere completely to this philosophy, but it pervades
much of their social and political behavior. Like the familiar
American phrase, a Thai proverb warns that: "When you die,
you cannot take anything with you." The Thais feel that to
aspire for status far above their own, will only bring disap­
pointment, loss of face if they do not achieve it, and ultimately
unhappiness. These feelings tend to minimize fierce competi­
tion and overt achievement. This is not to say that the Thais
are not ambitious if the opportunity arises or that they lack
motivation for achievement. However, there seems to be less
of a need to possess these personal attributes for social
acceptance and success in a government career. In fact, these
very attributes are often frowned upon by the Thai in general. The Thai tend to be more realistic in their appraisal of their own and their children's potential for upward mobility in general. Unlike the American parent who, regardless of background, tends to promote and eventually pressure their children to aspire to become doctors, lawyers, and even the President, Thai parents usually make more conservative appraisals of their children so as not to disappoint themselves and the child. If the child achieves more than expected, the parents can rejoice with the knowledge that they have made merit with Lord Buddha, and good fortune is upon them. This was evident in a nation-wide survey conducted by the Population Institute of Chulalongkorn University, in which there showed a rather modest, and perhaps more realistic, parents' appraisals of their children's potential educational achievement.  

The diagram in Figure IV.1 shows the general relationship between the five basic characteristics of the Thai discussed above and their passiveness toward the government.
Unique Characteristics of The Thai Students as Compared to That of The General Thai Population

Obviously the Thai students also possess the five characteristics described above which make the Thais in general passive toward politics. However, the students also possess characteristics that make them more aware of politics, and more prone to participate than the Thais in general. It is proposed by the authors that these "other characteristics" are those which are promoted through a resocialization process, in which the values obtained through the university experience are expressed in patterns of behavior unique to the cultural and political environment of Thailand. The student's university experience evidently causes discontinuity in the political socialization process. This discontinuity is reflected in the rate of change, content and nature of the socializing process and the student's response to these changes. The effect of this socializing process on the student is reflected in their attitude and unconventional behavior towards the government and the Thai political system. Some of the manifestations of their behavior are in large part due to the unique characteristics of the Thai university student.

A general visual representation of the relatively abrupt discontinuity which takes place during a Thai student's university experience is shown in Figure IV. 2. The accelerated rate of change in the "resocialization" process for most Thai university students begins in the last two years of Thai "high school" education (i.e., Matayom Suksa 4 and 5) which is the equivalent to the first two years at many Thai colleges -- and continues throughout the university years. Usually it is the freshman and sophomores who participate in demonstrations in the greatest numbers, and it is also this group who tend to be the most susceptible to change, adhering quite readily to the influences of Westernization. The juniors, seniors, and especially some select graduate students who have most likely had extensive exposure to the West (e.g., former American Field Service students), usually assume the leadership roles. A perfect example of an American educated leader is Saeksan, a former AFS student who spent the customary senior year in an American high school, and was one of the most influential leaders in the October student movement of 1973.
Figure IV. 2
Generalized Rate Of Change In The Socialization Process Of The Thai University Student

Agents of Change in Socialization Process

Traditional Values

Modem Values
(Westernization, (religion, family, etc;)

Secularization, etc.)

Career Employment

University Experience

High School

Grammar School

Home
As Figure IV. 2 shows, the abrupt change to the acceptance of modern values during the formative years at the university is somewhat tempered when the student turned graduate accepts employment. This tempering effect on the acceptance of modern values and the gradual adaptation and reacceptance of many traditional Thai values takes place at even a faster pace when the graduate is employed by the government bureaucracy, where hierarchical patterns of respect must be immediately adhered to.

Some of the factors related to the resocialization process which takes place at the university and which make the Thai university population characteristically different from the Thai population in general, are explored in the following discussion.

(1) Thai University Students Are More Exposed To the Western Concept of Democracy

In the universities, the Thai students, especially if they are in the field of social science, have a chance to study political theory, the political system of other countries and understand at least better than the general population, the meaning of democracy. The students of other fields, even though they do not study politics, will get to talk to the others who do. So they too, will usually have some understanding of the nature of politics. In the library, students will have the opportunity to read books concerning politics in which the the average Thai would not have. The professors, many of who were educated in America, England and France will relate to them the political systems of these democratic countries. Some students will have a chance to talk to visiting foreigners or members of the American Peace Corps and get to talk about politics. Hence, the over-all exposure to Westerners and modern ideas is more frequent, and the opportunity to discuss politics openly is much greater for university students than any other comparable group in the general Thai population.

(2) They Follow the Political Events Closer

Because of their high level of education, the student places more value on newspaper reading than the average Thai with just a primary education. All universities are in the urban areas with more than half of the university student population located in Bangkok. Hence, students get to hear political rumors, read newspapers, listen to the radio, watch television and know more of what is going on in politics than most Thais who live in the rural areas. They are in close touch with cur-
rent social and economic problems of the country and are also more aware of the relevant political events in other countries. Mentioning proximity to "political rumors" as a criterion for political awareness might seem somewhat odd. However, in the Thai political system where direct political confrontations rarely occur for many of the cultural reasons discussed previously, and moreover, where the government usually rules by martial law with all the customary constraints on free speech and press, circulating rumors of potential political events tends to be one of the most acceptable and secure methods of spreading relevant political information. Moreover, the political rumors of government officials and events, particularly in times of martial law, tend to be not only very relevant but also more accurate than many of the accounts reported through the media.

(3) They Conceptualize Themselves as a Group of Potential Leaders

The students know that they are the group of people who have attained a higher education than the average Thai. They perceive that they will play a significant role in controlling the destiny of the nation in the future. The Thai people accept this as fact and the mass media promotes it in socializing the students. The press always refers to the students as “Panya-chon” which literally means “intellectuals.”

Most of them are also young and single and rather idealistic. Thai university students are usually clean-cut in appearance and customarily possess a responsible attitude toward their future. Unlike their counterparts in many Western countries, university students in Thailand are highly respected by the general Thai population. Thai students usually express through their behavior that they consider themselves as having a real obligation to articulate political opinions for themselves and for the whole Thai population. This is clearly seen in the student role in the anti-Japanese movement and the proposal given to the government explaining how to solve the problems of the high price of rice. Also, this was the case in September 1973 when students began the drafting of a constitution for the government and pushing for its adoption through pressure on select government officials and the cabinet. The significance of the perceived role of the students in articulation of national concerns is also recognized by the government. On August 17, 1973, the Deputy Prime Minister Prapas announced that the constitution would be completed within a year. This was after the student constitutional proposals were presented and pressure was brought to bear
on the government. Previously, Prapas had announced it would be more than 3 years before the new constitution could be promulgated.

(4) They are Less Vulnerable to be Punished by the Government

As a pressure group that performs interest articulation quite often, the students know that the government is less apt to retaliate to their acts of protest than similar acts by private citizens or adult politicians. The student also knows that the government looks up to them as the intellectuals and future leaders of the nation. Also, many of them are the children of the generals, high-class civil servants, and upper-middle class merchants. Hence, the government feels it must be very cautious in dealing with them. Moreover, there are more than 50,000 students in Bangkok alone. It is a respectable number of people for an unpopular government to have to suppress for a sustained period of time. There are also additional aspects of Thai culture which play a role in the government's perception of university students. While they are potentially the leaders of the future, the students are still perceived as “dek nakrian” (young students) by many of the “phu yai” (adult government officials). Hence, these “phu yai” expect and are ready to tolerate a certain amount of emotional behavior from students. Another cultural determinant which underlies much of the government’s reluctance to use force against Thai students is the traditional protective role that the “phu yai” is supposed to play vis-a-vis the “dek.” This traditional perception of the leader of government, the “pau muang” (father or guardian of the country) filters down from the highest levels of government to those government officials with the initial responsibility of dealing with student activism. However, when the very survival of the ruling military elite is at stake, even tradition does not prevent the government from taking drastic steps in repelling the students with force as was seen for the first time in the case of the October student movement of 1973.

The unique characteristics of Thai university students will be explained in further detail in chapter six, in which some of these assumptions regarding influence of the university experience, a student’s role perception, and exposure to mass media and Western ideas, on student political attitudes and behavior are tested empirically. The following discussion for the remainder of this chapter will deal primarily with the nature of Thai student activism, citing the major issues, and identifiable patterns in Thai student activism and government
response.

Students' Pattern of Activism and the Government Response

From the specific cases of student activism described in Chapter II, certain discernable factors regarding the general nature of Thai activism can be identified through utilization of the following three general topologies: issues, approaches used by the students to achieve their goal, and the response from the government.

1. Issues

Protest issues of Thai student activism can be placed into three general categories: anti-foreign, internal affairs of the university, and external affairs of the university other than anti-foreign protests.

a. Anti-foreign protests

The anti-French demonstrations in 1940, the anti-World Court decision in 1962 and anti-Japanese goods protest in 1972 are in this category. In the first two protest movements, the general Thai population also actively participated in demonstrations. In the anti-Japanese movement, the students initiated it but also asked and got the co-operation from the general Thai population of Bangkok.

b. Internal affairs of the university

The examples of such protest issues are the 1949 movement to take back the campus from the army involving the Thammasat students; the 1970 anti-corruption protest by Chulalongkorn university students; the demonstration to change the name of college of education to "University" of education in 1973; the protest against the enrollment of air force cadets in Engineering Department of Chulalongkorn University in 1973. In these cases only students of the university participated in the protest. They did not ask for the cooperation from the universities, and the other universities' students did not interfere or come to their aid.

c. External affairs of the university excluding anti-foreign movements.

The examples of the issues in this category are the demonstration against the "dirty" election in 1957; the protest against Decree 299 concerning judicial power in 1972; the
movement against the expulsion of the nine students of Ramkamhaeng University in 1973, the attempt to draft the constitution (1973), and the attempt to recommend to the government on how to solve the problem of rice deficit in Bangkok (1973).

These issues, except for the anti-dirty election protest of 1957, occurred after the establishment of National Student Center in 1969. These issues not only represented the students' concern, but also represented the concern of the Thai people in general. The movements in these categories since 1969, were done under the name and through the organizational efforts of the National Student Center.

One thing that should be pointed out is that up to September 1973, none of the protest issues, except for the case of Phibun in 1957, were directed against the Thai Prime Minister. This is due to the fact that the Prime Minister was traditionally the one powerful position which the students consciously feared and respected. In other words, it is the manifestation of the characteristics acquired through the process of Thai socialization described earlier. There is nothing comparable to this aspect of Thai activism in the student activism in America in the 1960's. American student activism, when occurring on a national scale, is almost always directed against the American president as in the case of protest movements against the decisions of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.

2. Common Characteristics of Thai Student Activism and Approaches Employed by Students in Achieving Their Goals

Protest Strategy and Issues

(1) Generally, when there is any issue causing discontent, the students normally begin through informal discussion groups. If there seems to be widespread discontent about a particular issue, the students might then distribute leaflets to attract more attention. Thereafter, they usually have a rally on the campus where the various leaders will deliver speeches on the issue. If the crowd is big and enthusiastic, the leaders will call for a protest march. For issues involving the internal affairs of the university, the students usually direct their march to the offices of the administrator inside the campus. If the students are refused an audience from the university authorities on campus, they usually march to the Prime Minister's office or to the Parliament building to present their grievances.
(2) If the issue involves an anti-foreign protest or external affairs, the campus who initiates the protest would try to ask for the cooperation from other universities. The students usually organize some means of transportation to bring in to the campus many students from other universities. This was the case in the protest against Decree 299 when Thammasat students travelled to Chulalongkorn University to request and obtain their cooperation in the protest movement. Similarly, Ramkamhaeng University students travelled to Chulalongkorn University in 1973 to request cooperation in the protest against the expulsion of nine Ramkamhaeng students.

(3) If the protest march was planned in advance it usually involves students from more than one university. In this case, the protest march will almost always start at the Praman Grounds and proceed along Rajdamnern Avenue and end at the Parliament building, or at the office of the Prime Minister. In the 1973 demonstration against the expulsion of nine Ramkamhaeng students, the destination of the protest, for the first time, was at the Democracy Monument on Rajdamnern Avenue.

(4) When the protest march reaches the Parliament Building or the office of the Prime Minister, the students will normally demand to see the Prime Minister. If the students are granted an audience with the Prime Minister they normally do not criticize him, but rather ask for his support. A common opening dialogue from student representatives to the Prime Minister would usually begin something like... “something is wrong and we come for your help,” or “we come to ask you to solve this problem.” This is in sharp contrast to the less diplomatic and more straight-forward student dialogue that usually takes place between American student activists and government officials. This only goes to show that while the Thai students are unique in their articulation of political issues, they often use approaches which would suggest that they still respect and adjust to the traditional Thai values and culture. A classic example of this indirect approach to allow for the saving of face and a minimum of conflict occurred during the army occupation of the Thammasat University campus in 1949. The army’s refusal to withdraw its troops after the crisis was obviously the responsibility of the Prime Minister who had approved such a move. However, when the students saw the Prime Minister they said “Long live Field Marshall Pibunsongkram,” and asked for his help to order the troops out of the campus.

(5) Generally, Thai students will not dissolve their protest
until at least some of their demands are met and their goals achieved or they exact some promise from the government.

(6) Until October 1973, the students never used violent methods in their protest and never destroyed public property. Even during the October movement in 1973, students attempted to avoid such tactics as stoning the police and burning buildings. In contrast to student activists in other Asian nations like Japan where the students sometimes carry a long stick, wear helmets and fight directly with the police, the Thais utilize psychological tactics and embarrassment techniques. In comparison to the student activism in the United States and Japan, Thai student activism, is usually less violent but considerably more effective in achieving their stated goals. However, the October, 1973 uprising is an indication of the potential for violence even in the traditionally non-violent Thai protest demonstrations. Though property was destroyed and police were stoned in the student demonstration of 1973, most of these acts were attributed to the more volatile vocational education students from the various technical schools of Bangkok. These students, though they had been traditionally prone to rather violent activities involving inter-department and inter-school conflicts, have been characteristically non-political in their rebellious behaviour, and have usually not participated in the major protest demonstrations involving the universities. Their participation in the violence of the student revolution of October, 1973, added a new dimension to the Thai student movement, and under the capable leadership of students from the major universities such as Saeksan Prasertkul of Thammasat, these students will continue to play a very significant role in the changing character of Thai student activism.

(7) Thai students usually display some symbolic gesture of respect to the King during their protest march to show the general public that while they are discontent with the government and their policies they still respect the monarchy and the country. This was clearly shown in the demonstrations against expulsion of the Ramkamhaeng students in June, 1973, where demonstrators periodically turned their faces to the King's palace and sang songs praising the King.

(8) The students care about public opinion and make great efforts to secure public support for their protests. They want the people to see and understand their actions, and at least spiritually support it. One of the student's marching songs contains the following phrase, "fight without retreat, the masses are waiting for us...."
In the June, 1973, demonstration against the expulsion of nine Ramkamhaeng students, students distributed leaflets to the general population of Bangkok condemning the government, and asked for public sympathy for their protest.

In the student protest march against corruption in Chulalongkorn in September 1973, the students went among the crowd and tried to explain to the onlookers why they had undertaken the protest march and why it was necessary.

(9) Two counter-demonstrations — one during the September, 1970 protest against corruption in Chulalongkorn, and the other during the June 1973, demonstration against the expulsion of Ramkamhaeng students — show that the students who disagree with the demonstration will also express their approval by demonstrating. However, the counter-demonstrations have met with little or no success thus far in achieving their demands.

(10) Often students plan a protest demonstration to articulate discontent with the government on one particular issue only to stimulate discontent on a much more significant issue, usually with far more reaching political implications. This was the case in the protest against the expulsion of the Ramkamhaeng students which eventually opened debate and protest demands for the end to martial law, the drafting of a new constitution, the end to corruption in government, and immediate solutions to the problems related to the rice shortage.

The ten points above refer to those tactics and characteristics commonly present in Thai protest demonstrations. The following section will attempt to describe those characteristics commonly present in the government response to student protest movements.

3. The Response from the Government

In describing the government response to protest demonstrations, a brief review of the two traditional Thai concepts of government reaction is in order. They are "Pra dej" (referring generally to the use of force and harsh or cruel measures), and "Pra Khun" (usually meaning the use of diplomatic benevolent measures).

Until October 1973, the Thai military leaders had for the most part ruled benevolently without resorting to force, with tacit support of the populace even though the average Thai citizen had very little, directly or indirectly, to do with deter-
mining government policy. It was within this cultural framework that the Thai population found the limits to their oppositional behavior, and the military leaders the necessity to rule as a “benevolent” dictatorship. Similarly, it was within this cultural framework that the Thai student movement discovered the limitations of their oppositional behavior. It was when the student movement removed itself significantly from the accepted and expected kinds of behavior that the government found itself in a position where it could no longer even compromise effectively and resorted to an all out use of force. For a “benevolent” dictatorship to respond to student protests with tanks and machine guns was a misuse of the tradition of “Pra dej” and these actions offended even the loyal government bureaucrats and the generally politically complacent population of Bangkok. Moreover, it offended strong Buddhist traditions in a country where even the slaughtering of animals openly is frowned upon. To kill and spill the blood of young Thai students in the open avenues in full view of all, was beyond the capacity for even the most complacent Thai to accept. The government actions were clearly described as “baab maak” (a great sin), and seen as far worst by the general Thai population than the seemingly abrupt break with traditions of the student activists.

The points covered below are in reference to the general response of the government when all parties have been working within a mutually accepted cultural frame of reference. However, even under these circumstances some of the techniques and often untraditional strategies employed by the more volatile student protesters often confused the government, and they would usually give in to most of the demands rather than risk an unpopular confrontation with the students.

(1) Except for the anti-foreign movements, the government is usually in direct opposition to most of the student demonstrations. First, protest demonstrations almost always are related to some form of government action, inefficiency, or corruption. Second, the Thai government is accustomed to general acceptance of their policies and actions by the Thai population. Rarely is there any vocal or overt opposition to their policy. The existence of the discontent expressed by a large group of intellectuals creates uneasiness in the government circles. Hence, the government would usually respond to such discontent by trying to persuade the students not to carry out any demonstration. An example of this kind of government move was during the sit-in protest at the court house opposite Pramain Ground in 1972 against the Decree 299. The students said two days in advance that they would start the sit-in protest at 5
p.m., December 19th, 1972. On that day the government quickly summoned the cabinet members for a meeting. At 2:30 p.m. the National radio station broadcasted the news that the cabinet unanimously decided to abrogate Decree 299. At about the same time the government also sent a representative to inform the students at Thammasat University about the Cabinet decision.

(2) Once the protest march commences, the government rarely tries to stop the students by force. Hence, up to October 1973, there rarely was any sustained violent clash between the government authorities and the demonstrators. One method the government usually employs is preventing the demonstrators from taking the bus to Pramain Ground, the usual starting point of the protest march. Kasetsart, Ramkamhaeng, and College of Education and Chulalongkorn University are located farther away from the favourite rallying point of the protest marches. The government strategy is to stop, or at least hinder, the buses from delivering protesters from their campuses, and to discourage the students from marching. Kasetsart students who had to walk 20 kilometers in the sun to join the protest rally at the Democracy Monument were quite exhausted when they arrived at their destination, but the fact that they had taken on such a sacrifice gave added spirit to the other protesters.

(3) When the demonstrators requested to meet with the Prime Minister, he would not come out to meet all the students. Instead, he would either send a government representative to talk to the students or let a few student representatives come to see his representative or himself. This way the Prime Minister did not have to risk being embarrassed by the students. In the meeting with the student representatives, the Prime Minister would feel less pressure from the students than if he had to speak to them as they were assembled outside his office.

(4) In the final analysis, the government has almost always yielded to most of the demands of the student protesters.

This chapter has explained some of the more relevant patterns of student activism and government response in the cultural context of Thai political behavior. The following chapter will describe and compare profiles of Thai protest behavior and relevant educational characteristics with those of seven other countries which have experienced extensive student activism.

2. See Prizzia, R., “King Chulalongkorn and the Reorganization of Thailand’s Provincial Administration,” op. cit., p. 49.

3. See Prachom Chomchai, Chulalongkorn The Great (Tokyo, 1965), p. 31. The change in decision-making process was described as follows:

   His Majesty wishes to remove oppression and lower his status so as to allow officials to sit on chairs instead of prostrating in his presence. His reason for founding this Council is that, as he cannot himself carry out the public duties successfully, the assistance of others will bring prosperity to the country. Appointment of selected intellectuals is simply to advise the King, and in cases of controversy, he can decide impartially regardless of the seniority of persons concerned. Whatever is agreed on can be turned into a bill to be presented to the King at the following session. When the bill is finalized, it can be read to advisors. If all is found to be in order and it concerns only a minor matter it can be proclaimed as an act without further ado. If, on the other hand, it constitutes a major principle, it will be referred to the various Secretaries of State, and, if their consent is obtained, then the bill receives a royal assent and becomes an Act.


9. G. Almond, and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, (Boston, 1965), p. 329. See also Frank C. Darling, Political Development in Thailand and the Philippines: A Comparative Analysis paper delivered at APSA meeting in Los Angeles. More generally, a five-nation study by Almond and Verba show education to be a decisive factor on the process of political socialization. In finding a positive correlation between education and political cognition and participation (awareness of governmental impact, exposure to politics, political information, range of political opinions, subjective political competence, political participation”), Almond and Verba conclude that: “Education attainment appears to have the most important demographic effect on political attitudes.

See also J. D. Barken, The Political Socialization of University Students in Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda, (paper presented at APSR meeting in New York City, 1969), p. 3. In his study on African university students, Barken concludes “the school is an extremely powerful agent of resocialization for the few who pass through the entire educational system. Indeed, for those who are fortunate enough to receive a secondary education or better, the school is the most significant agent of socialization in their lives.”

See also P. C. Washburn, “Some Political Implications of Student’s Acquisition of Social Science Information,” Social Forces, (March 1970), pp. 373-383. The resocializing effect of specific educational content was researched by P.C. Washburn who found a definite relationship between a university student’s political orientation and behavior, and their exposure to, and acquisition of, social science information.

Moreover, in his paper on Thailand delivered at the APS conference in L.A. (September 8-12, 1973) p. 9, Darling maintains that: “The extent of formal education at the secondary and university levels influences the dissemination of political information and the shaping of political attitudes. The larger these upper levels of the education system, the more young people are separated from the traditional forces and the more they can be inculcated with new political values and roles.”

10. However, the climate is always ripe for violence and at several points in the 1973 demonstration involving the expulsion of nine students, violence almost erupted. Group behavior being difficult to predict under such circumstances does not rule out violence as was seen quite vividly in the October
student movement which brought down the Thanom government.

11. In fact, one report of the incident which allowed the incoming students to join the other protesting Ramkamhaeng students, held that when the students sang the King's song, many of the police stood at attention with their hands at their side, enabling students to slip through and eventually break the human barricade.
V. THAILAND IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE — A
PROFILE OF RELEVANT EDUCATIONAL CHARACTERIS­
TICS AND DIMENSIONS OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT FOR
EIGHT NATIONS (1955-1965)

by Ross Prizzia

The previous chapter presents a general sociological ex­
planation of Thai student activism, covering social attributes
and attitudinal variables (i.e., role perception, etc.). It is the
purpose of this chapter to explore and explain some of the
more significant demographic variables related to student ac­
tivism.

Relevant and available statistical data are incorporated in a
comparative study of eight countries across several dimensions
of educational and participation characteristics. Data on Thai
students are integrated in a comparative analysis of aggre­
gate and survey data taken from a review of the research and
case studies in each of eight nations. The data included mea­
sures of relevant participation and educational characteristics
in the eight nations for the following variables: domestic
conflict (i.e., riots and demonstrations), field of study, enroll­
ment, unemployment, membership in student political action
organizations, and participation in demonstrations. These six
variables were chosen on the basis of a priori assumptions
as to the most relevant of the educational characteristics
related to student activism, and the results of the preceeding
extensive review of the literature. Thereafter, the six varia­
bles are presented in a comparative study of available data
on India, the U.S., Japan, Chile, Brazil, Thailand, France and
West Germany. The rationale for choosing these particular
countries include: 1) availability of data due to a relatively
high incidence of activism; and 2) a diversity of culture
(e.g., Asian, South American, North American, European)
and forms of government.

The rationale for choosing Thailand as the focal point of
the overall study involved recognition that Thai student acti­
vism at its most recent (i.e., 1968-1973) intensity is a relative­
ly new phenomenon worthy of explanation. Moreover most of
the Thai university student population is neatly condensed into
five major universities in a typically Asian urban environ­
ment, fostering most necessary conditions for investigation and explanation on a "micro-level" analysis.

Lacking the results of a similar survey instrument (e.g., questionnaire) for the eight countries, a comparative analysis of student attitudes and related behaviour is not possible. However, other statistical data related to student activism collected systematically for all eight countries, does lend itself to a comparative analysis. It is therefore the purpose of this section to describe and explain comparable data related to student activism along relevant dimensions (e.g., field of study, number of demonstrations, amount of student participation, etc.).

1. General Domestic Conflict Related to Student Activism

A general comparison of the extent of domestic violence directly and indirectly related to student activism in the eight countries is represented in Table V. The table is adapted from data collected for the DON project under the supervision of R. J. Rummel. The eight countries are rank-ordered with the lowest number (i.e., No. 1 - India, ranked as the most violence prone nation along the two dimensions chosen - riots and demonstrations). 1

Demonstrations. Any peaceful, public gathering of at least one hundred people for the primary purpose of displaying their opposition to governmental policies or authority. This does not include general strikes or political party rallies. Student strikes aimed at the government are considered demonstrations. A demonstration which involves the use of force is categorized as a riot. Demonstrations are considered discreet events, limited to a day and a group of people. A demonstration that is continuous for more than a day, but not more than two days, is counted as two demonstrations.

Riots. Any violent demonstration of at least one hundred people. A mob or crowd of people clashing with the police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>'56</th>
<th>'57</th>
<th>'63</th>
<th>'64</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>'55</th>
<th>'56</th>
<th>'57</th>
<th>'63</th>
<th>'64</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. India</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. U.S.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Brazil</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chile</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. W. Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
or troops or attacking private property is counted as a riot, as long as such violence appears to be spontaneous. Riotous clashes between rival political groups, racial clashes, and the like, are categorized under “clashes.” Riots of a distinct anti-foreign nature are not counted here. The term “violence” refers to the use of physical force, and the existence of a riot is generally evidenced by the destruction of property, people being wounded or killed, or by the use of police or riot control equipment such as clubs, guns, or water cannons. Arrests per se do not indicate a riot. Riots are counted in the same way as are “demonstration.”

Though Rummel’s definitions are not explicit in differentiating among various participant groups in riots and demonstrations (i.e., workers, intellectuals, students), Table V.14 does provide a profile of activism, violence, and conflict for the various nations in which student input is implicit.

2. Field of Study and Student Activism

One factor that consistently differentiates the student activist from the non-activist and the politically leftist from the rightist, is the student’s faculty or field of study. Arthur Liebman concluded in his extensive study of Puerto Rican university students, that “a relatively large proportion of leftists come from the Schools of Social Science, Humanities, and Law, where students study subjects dealing with man, his values, his social relationships, and his society.” Conversely, Liebman explains that “students in the Schools of Business, Engineering, General Studies and Natural Sciences are more likely to favor parties on the right of the political spectrum, be less prone to activism.” Similar results were reported in a study of four schools at the University of Chile indicating that most of the leftists are in the School of History and Social Sciences with the least number of leftists in the School of Engineering. Some of the results of Liebman’s data (1964-65) on Puerto Rican University students indicating a relationship of field of study (i.e., School) and leftism are presented in Table V11.

A general profile of university students (by %) and their respective field of study for the eight countries is presented


3. Ibid., p. 100
Table V.11

Field of Study and Relative Political Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Studies</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Ibid., p. 100
in Table V.12. (For a general descriptive account of the relationship of study activism and field of study see Chapter I). The eight countries are rank-ordered according to the country which consistently had the highest percentage of students in the Humanities, Law, and Social Science, coupled with the lowest percentage of students in the Natural Sciences and related fields (e.g., No.1 — India, approximately 84% and 16%).

The data were compiled from the annual statistical reports on the eight countries by UNESCO. The blank spaces in the table (e.g., Thailand — 1957, 1960, 1964 — indicate that no aggregate and comparable statistic was reported by the respective national and international educational agencies for those years.5

3. Unemployment

Unemployable graduates of the university and "job prospectlessness" among potential graduates has been cited by many scholars as an underlying factor related to student discontent and activism. The results of Rand Corporation data collected in 1969 on Philippine University students found unemployment to be the most frequently cited problem among the young, and particularly crucial for university graduates. The Rand Study concluded that unemployment is mainly "concentrated among young people (with) over half of all unemployed falling into this category."6 Similarly, Fisher's data collected in Burma, Ceylon, Thailand, Indonesia, and India revealed that one of the main causes of student unrest is "the scarcity of socially and economically rewarding opportunities for employment."7 Moreover, Fisher concluded that "the poor prospects of employment following the degree are fundamental to the insecurity of university youth."8 Table V.13 gives a general

5. UNESCO Statistical Abstract (Geneva, 1970), pp. 373-379. Not represented in table are those students who did not specify their field of study. However, the "not specified" category was never more than 3% for any of the years except in the case of Germany (42%) and the U.S.A. (17%), in 1966. Whether these figures represent the new trend or a unique situation would require additional data from 1966 to the present.


7. See Fischer, op. cit., p. 44.
Table V.12

University Students (by %) and Field of Study for Eight Countries, 1957-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Schools of Humanities, Law, and Social Sciences</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Schools of Natural Sciences, Engineering and Medical Sciences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
profile of the extent of unemployment and increased number of graduates for six of the eight countries, 1960-1968. There were no consistent and comparable data available for Thailand and Brazil. Countries are rank-ordered according to a consistent high rate of unemployment (i.e., % of total unemployment and number of educated unemployed) and high ratio of graduates per hundred thousand inhabitants (e.g., India — approximately 8% total unemployed, and 45 graduates per 100,000 inhabitants in 1960-68).

Table V13 indicates unemployment in the highly industrialized nations of Germany and Japan has not been a serious problem in the 1960's. However, as pointed out in Chapter I, “job prospectlessness” is of much greater concern to the Indian and Thai student, whereas the German and Japanese may afford themselves the luxury of being more preoccupied with “job-purposelessness.” As is often the case in the underdeveloped countries (and becoming more frequent in the developed countries), graduates must choose what job, if any, is available and not necessarily what they were trained for at the university. This trend is especially evident in Southeast Asia and reflected in the results of surveys made of the activities of elites in Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and India. Some of the results indicated that in some fields as many as 60 per cent of those trained are not using their skills or the specialized knowledge which university training has given them. A survey taken in Thailand of 125 chemists of whom 85 had foreign degrees showed that more than half were serving as administrators in positions totally removed from chemistry.

4. Enrollment

Another factor related to student activism consistently cited by scholars is a rapid increase in university enrollment that is incommensurate with the rate of increase of teaching staffs and university facilities necessary to properly receive the swelling student population. Table V. 14 shows a general

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8. Ibid., p. 51.

9. Yearbook of Labour Statistics, International Labour Office (Geneva, 1969) pp. 396-433. However, there was data available on Thailand and Brazil for the category “number of graduates per hundred thousand inhabitants.” If this were to serve as the only criteria, Brazil would be ranked as 7th (i.e., average of 24 graduates/100,000 inhabitants) and Thailand ranked 8th (i.e., average of 19 graduates/100,000 inhabitants).
Table. V.13

Profile of General Unemployment, Educated Unemployed, and Number of University Graduates for 8 Countries, 1960-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Unemployment (% of unemployed of total population)</th>
<th>Graduates (No. of graduates per 100,000 inhabitants)</th>
<th>Educated Unemployed No. by thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'60</td>
<td>'64</td>
<td>'66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. India</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. U.S.A.</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. France</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chile</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. W. Germany</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Japan</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
profile of the rates of increase of student enrollment and teaching staff for the years 1960-'61 and 1967-'68. The countries are rank-ordered according to relatively high increases in enrollment and low increases in teaching staff from 1960-'68 (e.g., No. 1 — India, approximately 200% increase in student enrollment and a 25% increase in teaching staff).

Fisher points out that the "control over the flow of students to different faculties lies within the present capabilities of most underdeveloped Asian states, yet very little is being done." However, even this has changed in Thailand where enrollment figures have soared since 1970, particularly at newly formed universities such as Ramkamhaeng. The sudden increase in enrollment in Thai universities without the necessary facilities to accommodate the incoming students is proposed by the author as a major underlying cause of the increase in both intensity and frequency of student activism from 1971-1973. Moreover, the graduating class from Ramkamhaeng will exceed 5,000 students, the largest ever in Thailand, and will only add to student insecurities about prospects for employment. Sato sees the rapid increased enrollment in Japanese universities as one of the main causes of student discontent and activism, citing that Japan's student enrollment increased from 750,000 in 1960 to 1.5 million in 1968. Moreover, Kasuko Tsurumi's study of the Japanese student movement points to a definite relationship between increased enrollments and students' dissatisfaction with their university education.

5. Membership in Student Political Action Organizations

In describing the "dynamics of conflict" in Western European student movements, Frank Pinner presented four propositions:

12. Ibid., p. 53.
Proposition 1: Since authorities are charged with the preservation of social and political boundaries, they will be particularly vulnerable at points where the boundary of the system is weak. Conflicts tend to originate at such points of weakness because authorities usually over-react to any act of transgression.

Proposition 2: A defeat of student protest leads to scattered activities of varying types.

Proposition 3: The magnitude of the length of a conflict depends on the isolation of students.

Proposition 4: Students exhibit a special sensitivity and tendency toward conflict when issues of justice and truth are involved. This sensitivity sets students increasingly at odds with prevailing social values.¹⁵

Students, like workers, and other interest groups, have attempted to participate in the “dynamics of conflict” with the existing authorities by forming political action organizations which magnify specific grievances and demands for change. These student organizations center around various cultural, religious, and political issues relevant to the political system of their respective countries. In some countries there are a

¹⁴ Kazuko Tsurumi, “Some Comments on the Japanese Student Movement in the Sixties,” Journal of Contemporary History, V. 1 (1970), p. 107. According to the survey conducted by the Yomiuri Newspaper in February 1969, 75.8 per cent of the 1530 students from twenty-one universities were dissatisfied with their university education. Varied as the sources of their complaints were, the prevalence of dissatisfaction is noteworthy. The students protests launched on the two major campuses, Tokyo University and Nihon University, spread to many others all over the country. Within four months from the beginning of the academic year in April 1969, 111 universities out of the total of 379 four-year universities now existing in Japan, had been involved in campus disputes, (see Tsurumi, p. 108).

Table V.14

General Profile of University Enrollment and Teaching

Staff for Eight Countries, 1960-61, and 1967-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Enrollment (No. of students per 100,000 inhabitants)</th>
<th>Teaching Staff (total no. of university teachers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. India</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. U.S.A.</td>
<td>1,983</td>
<td>3,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Japan</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Thailand</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chile</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. France</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>1,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. W. Germany</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Brazil</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
scattering of many and various organizations as is the case of India (i.e., approximately 26 student organizations). More often, there is one main organization which umbrellas all the others, and is usually the spearhead of any student protest demonstration," national in scope. Japan’s Zengakuren and France’s UNEF are such cases, even though there exist internal ideological disputes among the extreme Maoist and Stalinist factions. Most student organizations which have spearheaded national protest demonstrations from 1955-1968 tended to be relatively to the left of the political spectrum. The extent of student membership (i.e., per cent of total university student population) in these relatively radical organizations has been posed as a factor related to student activism as well as a measure of student participation by several scholars of student politics. Table V.15 attempts a crude profile of the extent of membership (by %) in the most significant student organization for each of the eight countries. “Significant,” as it is used here, denotes a student organization which is national in scope, has remained intact throughout the ’1960’s, and organized and/or spearheaded the major national protest demonstrations in their respective country during that period of time. The countries are rank-ordered according to the highest membership (by %) in the most relatively significant student organization for the eight countries for 1960 and 1968 (i.e., No. 1 — Japan, Zengakuren: approximately 36%).


17 In the case of the UNEF, it became very active during the Algerian War. After the war ended, the UNEF was subjected to large number of skirmishes among various left-wing groups vying for leadership of the Union. However, the government had established an alternative, less controversial body after the war and cut off UNEF’s funds. Accordingly, its membership in 1968 had dropped to 50,000 from a figure of 100,000 in 1961 although French student population had doubled to 500,000. Under the leadership of Jacques Sauvageot, UNEF joined forces with the other student groups, notably the Mouvement du 22 mars, after May 3 and the raid of the Sorbonne by the police. See R. Salloch, In Pursuit of Ideology: The French Student Revolt (MIT, 1969), p. 40.

It should be noted from 1971 on, the Thai student organization most responsible for demonstrations was the National Student Center of Thailand. It was the NSCT that eventually claimed membership of over 35-40% by 1972, and was instrumental in overthrowing the Thanom government in October of 1973. Available data on student activism for the 1970's show a general trend of decreasing membership in all the countries cited in Table V.15 except Thailand and Chile, before the military coup of September 1973. However, data for the years 1960–1969 supports the conclusions of most research on students showing a general trend of decreased student membership in political organizations. Only the U.S.A. and W. Germany are shown as exceptions. These unique cases are due primarily to the relatively dormant period of student politics in West Germany and the U.S.A., which some scholars attribute to a combination of Cold War politics and "McCarthyism" in the immediate post-war period, extending to the late fifties.

It should be pointed out that some student organizations, like the SDS in the U.S.A., did not officially adopt their name.

Table V. 15
Membership (by %) In Student Political Action Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Student Organization</th>
<th>Membership (by %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Japan</td>
<td>Zengakuren</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. France</td>
<td>U.N.E.F. (National Union of French Students)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. India</td>
<td>AISF and NSSU (All India Student Federation and National Socialist Student Union)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chile</td>
<td>FETCH (All Chile Student Federation)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Brazil</td>
<td>UNE (National Student Union)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Thailand</td>
<td>TSU (Thai Student Union)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. W.Germany</td>
<td>SDS (Socialist German Student Federation)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. U.S.A.</td>
<td>SDS (Students for a Democratic Society)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Membership by %" does not represent % of students in organization from entire student population of the country, but rather % of students in organizations among the student population at universities where the specific student organization exists.
until 1962. Its forerunner in the early '60's was the S.I.S. (Students for an Intelligent Society). Moreover, it is noteworthy that the other organizations like the B.S.U. (Black Student Union) has a greater membership among Black university students at White colleges (approximately 85%) and among all students at predominantly Black colleges (approximately 35%), than does the SDS among white students and all students at all types of colleges. The B.S.U. is also very active nationally in protest demonstrations centered around issues of Black recognition. However, SDS is one organization represented on most college campuses in the 1960's and spearheaded the majority of student demonstrations on national issues broader-in-scope than Black recognition. The Black student organizations only became a powerful force on the majority of campuses in the late 1960's. Prior to this time there existed significant Black student organizations only at the predominantly Black Southern Colleges, who joined in protest with several mixed, non-campus organizations (e.g., NAACP and A.C. L.U.), on the civil rights issue in the late '50's and early '60's. A possible exception to this was SNCC. However, even SNCC was largely supported by non-university leadership, personnel, and funding.

6. Participation in Protest Demonstrations

Many researchers have cited student participation in protest demonstrations as the main determinant of student activism in any given country. The relationship of student activism and student participation in demonstrations has become of even greater importance due to the high incidence of student protest demonstrations around the world in the late 1960's. Table V.16 provides a crude profile of student participation in protest demonstrations for the eight countries in 1960 and 1968. The eight countries are rank-ordered according to the highest percentage of student participation in protest demonstrations for 1960 and 1968, (e.g., No. 1 — France: approximate average, 58%).

Table V.16 shows an overall increase in student participation in demonstrations. If the data of Tables V.15 and V.16 are combined, there exists a general decrease in organization and an increase in participation. This trend supports data of other researchers (e.g., Lipset, J. Silverstein, Sato) who see most contemporary (i.e., 1968-70) student demonstrations

20. A. Cahill, op. cit., Chapter I
composed of ad hoc forces temporarily united around a concrete issue.

While student movements have been variously defined as "an association of students inspired by aims set forth in a specific ideological doctrine, usually, although not exclusively, political in nature" and described as "a combination of emotional response and intellectual conviction," most authors agree that the ideological rigidity of post-war student groups appeal to relatively few of the contemporary student protesters. Sato points out that in the Japanese student demonstrations:

...the new student rebellion is supported or participated in by a far greater number of students than before. Formerly the student movements were, in most cases, carried out by a small group of professional leaders who were mostly recruited from among members of the Communist Party or other revolutionary parties. Recently, however, the so-called non-secretarian radicals, namely those radical students who do not belong to any political parties, have come to play an important role.

Data in all of the above tables of this section (i.e., Tables V.10, V.12, V.13, V.14, V.15, and V.16) have been presented for the eight countries to explain the general relationship, if any, within and across political systems, of the various


22. See M. Shimbori, "Zengakuren; A Japanese Case Study of A Student Political Movement," Sociology of Education, (1964), p. 232. According to one survey, 78.8 per cent of the activists, 76.7 per cent of the interested, and 13 per cent of the apathetic, said that they were "very much interested in Marxism." The interest in Marxism among radical students is not surprising in Japan, but there were some significant new features: out of 100 subjects, 56 were sympathetic to Marxism but one half of these also favoured some ideology or ideologies other than Marxism and nihilism. Shimbori concludes that: "This electric attitude towards Marxism is in sharp contrast to the monolithic and absolutist approach to Marxism which characterized prewar Japanese communist."

## Table V 16

University Student Participation (by %) In Protest Demonstrations for 8 Countries, 1960 and 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Participation in Demonstrations (by % of Total Student Population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. France</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Japan</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. India</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chile</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Thailand*</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Brazil</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. W. Germany</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. U.S.A.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*During the 1972-1973 student movements in Thailand participation was placed above 80%.*
proposed educational characteristics and student activism. Table V.17 (see next page) presents the data on eight countries across six items, based upon how each country ranked in the various tables on the educational and participation characteristics. The eight countries were ranked by totaling the rank-order scores across the six items; the lower the score the higher the rank-order (i.e., India, ranked 1st in four tables, 3rd in the other two, for a score of 10).

If domestic violence is used as the sole predictor of student activism there exists in India an exact proportional relationship with field of study, unemployment, and enrollment. A comparison of the aggregate data seems to suggest that domestic violence increases at the same rate as an increase in students in humanities, increase in rate of unemployment, and increase in rate of enrollment. Membership in political organizations and participation in demonstrations is shown to be considerably less of a predictor of student activism in India than is domestic violence. However, this could be due to the many and diverse existing student political organizations in India. The AISF and NSSU represented in Table V.17 are only two of the longer existing organizations. This factor also affects the computation of participation in demonstrations as a predictor of student activism. Another factor affecting the saliency of membership in student political organization and participation in demonstrations as predictors of student activism in India is the nature and origins of protest demonstrations. In the past decade (i.e. 1960-70) the protest demonstrations in India tended to be increasingly less politically oriented, often ignited by students failing exams, or involving conflicts of personality or procedures of discipline with a member of the teaching staff or administration.

Membership in political organizations and participation in political demonstrations are better predictors of student activism in Japan. This can be mainly attributed to the organizational ability and national appeal of the Zengakuren, which has provided the thrust of virtually all major student demonstrations in Japan since 1950. Field of study (i.e., highest percent of students engaged in the study of the humanities) emerges as the most significant of the educational variables relevant to student activism in Japan. The table shows similar results for France, with membership in politi-
## Table V 17

### Profile of Relevant Educational Characteristics and Extent of Student Activism in Eight Countries, 1960-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Relevant Education Variables</th>
<th>Student Activism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field of Study</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. U.S.A.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chile</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Brazil</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Thailand</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. W. Germany</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No aggregate and comparable statistic was reported by the respective national and international educational agencies for this variable.
cal organizations and participation in demonstrations as best predictors of student activism. However, among the educational variables unemployment is shown to be more related to student activism than either field of study or enrollment in France. Unemployment also ranks high among the educational variables related to student activism in the U.S. Unlike France, the table shows that field of study and enrollment in the U.S. are significantly ranked among the educational variables, with domestic violence as a considerably better predictor of student activism than either membership in the political organizations and participation in demonstrations. Although ranked 7th overall among the eight nations researched, Thailand ranked relatively high on field of study and enrollment among the education variables. Moreover, the table shows Thai student participation in demonstrations (ranked 5th) and membership in political organizations (ranked 6th) as much better predictors of student activism than domestic violence. The significance of these became even greater as the Thai student movement grew and the incidence of student demonstrations increased from 1969-1973.

While comparable data for 1972 and 1973 is not readily available for all the variables discussed above, the trend in Thailand has shown a marked increase in enrollment and in the number of students in the field of social sciences. The most dramatic example of this increase is Ramkamhaeng University where enrollment more than tripled from 1971 to 1973. Moreover, about 75% of the estimated 40,000 students attending day and night classes were in the general field of social sciences. Moreover, the role of the National Student Center as an appealing and effective student organization, was and continues to remain a significant factor in all aspects of the increased student activism in Thailand. It was largely because of nation-wide appeal, and the organizational efforts of the NSCT, that membership and student participation in protest demonstrations more than tripled from 1971-1973.

Another important factor related to student activism and discussed in previous chapters is exposure to the media. This particular factor was purposely omitted from the general comparative analysis because the focus of this section was primarily on education and participation characteristics of student activism. However, if mass media as a demographic
variable is measured in terms of number of television and radio receivers, Thailand ranks first in rate and ratio of increased media receivers from 1960 to 1970. The table V. 18 shows the relative increase in number of receivers for the eight countries for the years 1960 and 1970.

While number of receivers is not the only demographic measure of exposure to the media, it is a measure of potential listeners and the table (V. 18) shows that this potential was increased thirteen times in the ten-year span (1960-1970). This in itself is significant in a country such as Thailand, which is undergoing rapid changes through the influence of modernization and urbanization. Chapter six presents more precise measures of exposure to the media of the Thai university students through the use of survey data and statistical techniques.

Utilizing primarily demographic variables and available annual statistical data, the relationship of several university variables to student activism is presented for eight nations where this phenomenon exists. The unit of analysis in this chapter has been represented by country in the eight country study. It is the authors' bias that the ideal analyses of student activism would involve the student as the unit of analysis and individual participation (i.e., a personal political involvement scale) as the means of measurement. A personal political involvement scale delineates the "degree" of activism (or participation) of individual students by including such items as a student's:

1. participation in protest demonstrations
2. membership in student political parties
3. membership in ad hoc and/or standing student committees or organizations involved in national politics
4. voting in national elections
5. voting in student elections (where there exists a Student Union or Student Political Organization)
6. membership in Student Union
7. leadership role in Student Union or other student political organizations
8. campaigning for national candidates seeking political office and/or "student volunteer" at polls during election
9. number of years involved in student movement or political organization
10. frequency of participation in protest demonstrations of any kind.

As Collins concludes in his research on campus disorders:
Table V.18

Number of Television and Radio Receivers (per 100,000 inhabitants) for the Eight Countries in 1960 and 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Approx. Increase Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Thailand</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. India</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Japan</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chile</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. U.S.</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>1412</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. France</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Germany</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Brazil</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1971
The data are thus conceived to be indicators of the extent to which a general climate or culture of participation exists on the campus. The indicators are only indirect. Direct attitudinal and behavioral data would be needed to measure such a participatory climate more rigorously.\textsuperscript{25}

Taking Collins' advice seriously, direct attitudinal and behavioral data is presented in the next chapter, as a relatively more precise measure of student activism.

The next chapter utilizing attitudinal survey data collected between 1969 and 1972 attempts in a more direct and precise manner to explain and predict protest behavior of Thai University Students.

\textsuperscript{25} See Collins, \textit{op. cit.}, P. 14.
VI. SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF THAI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, 1969 and 1972

by Ross Prizzia
and Narong Sinsawasdi

This chapter will deal primarily with the analysis and findings of the surveys conducted and supervised by the authors in 1969 and 1972, respectively. Realizing the need for attitudinal data to test some of the assumptions and hypothesis suggested and proposed in the descriptive analysis of Thai student activism explained previously, extensive survey data was collected in 1969 and 1972 and is presented in the following two sections of this chapter. The 1969 survey involved only Thai university students, while the 1972 survey included a comparison with American university students.

General Approach to Data Collection and Analysis of the 1969 Survey of Thai University Students

I hesitate to say that it is absolute truth, because to determine what is absolute truth is too great a task for any human being, and is reserved for God alone, if there be one.

Yu-lan Feng.1

When one engages in applied research—or any research—there is a continuous attempt to effectively discriminate between significant truths and insignificant truths. What often determines which truths are the most significant are the aims and goals of the research project. When conducting a survey-type research other determining factors, such as quantifiability and accessibility of the data, become especially important. However, it is realized that those variables which are most easily quantified and accessible are not necessarily the most significant.

As the Chinese philosopher, Yu-lan Feng views absolute truth, this research should be viewed in accordance with Charles Pierce's specification of "truth as the outcome of inquiry infinitely prolonged."2 Ideally, it is hoped that through careful inquiry and analysis, the correlation of variables "ex-


performed with" will render some kind of significant relationship from which predictions can be made. Perhaps even more important are the new questions which might be raised—and the "new" relationships of "old" variables from which more significant hypotheses develop.

The collection of data involved a general survey of students—an approach which had already gotten positive results in the pilot-project in Honolulu (1967) and the pilot-interview in Bangkok in October (1968). After having made the necessary changes in the questions, and interviewing techniques, the survey was expanded to include both Thammasat and Chulalongkorn University students. Approximately 1,600 students were interviewed by January, 1969. An important factor which supported the objectives of the interview (e.g., honesty of respondents) was the political environment. Four months before the author's arrival (June 1968), Thailand had finally promulgated a new constitution, with provisions for freedom of speech and press, and the first elections in 12 years were to be held on February 10, 1969. Political parties began campaigning in September, gaining momentum through November, December and January. Political rallies, student demonstrations, and seminars geared to educate potential voters, became commonplace. The press, students, and even "the man on the street" were no longer afraid to voice their opinions. In short, it was a most perfect time for a survey of Thai attitudes on political issues. Even government officials became more frank—while military leaders attempted to compromise with the critics to give the image of "accountability" to the people—and hence produce a better chance of winning the election.

Possibly the concessions were due to government's confidence in securing ultimate victory. Prime Minister Field Marshal Thanom already had spiritual assurance when he registered a Sahapracha Thai party—the United Thai People's Party—at ten minutes of ten on the night of October 12, because that was the auspicious time selected by the priest and astrologers. The founders of the party including the Prime Minister, consisted of the 12 top military officers of the kingdom and three civilians.

3. The pilot project involving a survey of Thais and former PCV's to Thailand, was part of a project for Political Science 601, instructed by Dr. M. Shapiro.

A. Special Techniques

When conducting a survey research in a foreign country, the host country's culture and customs must be accounted for in any methodological approach employed. Cross-cultural survey research is especially vulnerable to influences that are likely to invalidate the results. There are many problems that any researcher attempting such survey research must face. Investigators who are concerned with cross-cultural or "comparative" research must keep certain distinctions in mind when confronted with the multiple problems involved. One set of problems arises when there is an attempt to conduct essentially the same survey simultaneously or in a sequence in several different countries. Another set of problems involves replication in one other culture of an investigation which has already been completed in the U.S. Still other kinds of problems arise when the researcher's concern is less the replication of a complete study in different cultures than simply the use of similar or identical concepts with a desire to make cross-cultural comparisons. R.E. Carter relates the problems of one such study which investigated a Chilean "peer-group opinion leader" and the ways in which he is like or unlike his U.S. counterpart in specific spheres of influence. In the Chilean study, Carter discovered that "public-affairs opinion leadership was not related to education or income in the case of women respondents, but there was such a relationship in the case of men. Now, it is quite clear that in Chile there is a culturally prescribed requirement that men be interested in talk about politics. This obligation is less obvious in the case of women, which immediately raises the question, what were they talking about when they had the conversations they later reported to interviewers as having involved advice-giving?" Techniques to identify and compensate for such "cultural traits" in cross-cultural surveys have been proposed and explained but have rarely been employed as either a prerequisite to the survey or a supplement to the explanation of results. A descriptive account of the more basic problems encountered by a researcher of student attitudes in Indonesia follows:


The original design of this study envisioned a questionnaire to be administered to a large, representative sample of students. This methodology proved impractical for a number of reasons. Two pre-tests of a questionnaire revealed widespread reluctance on the part of young people to respond in writing to any questionnaire items. The hesitancy of students to fill in questionnaires may have been related to the tense political atmosphere in Jakarta and the tendency of students to withdraw from politics, but in many cases it seemed to stem more directly from unfamiliarity with the idea of survey research. Among those students who did answer questionnaires or parts of them, many devised unique and often unintelligible techniques of selecting and marking alternative responses... Educators, too, know little about survey research. Compounded with their very cautious approach to any activity with political overtones, teachers' unfamiliarity with the proposed research technique generally produced a reluctance to authorize its use in their classes. Requests for permission to administer the questionnaire to classes of a few teachers whom the researcher had befriended were granted, but the resulting sample would have been too small to permit very meaningful analysis of written responses, and the fact that all students in the sample were taught by persons willing to cooperate in this research would have been a potential source of bias in the results... The most feasible and attractive alternative to the survey technique appeared to be a series of personal interviews with students... One of the most troublesome sources of bias in the sample was the fact that some students allowed themselves to be interviewed and others did not. In most cases the reasons for refusal were imperceptible. There was no apparent systematic self-exclusion on the part of persons with anti-western political views, for example. In order to minimize the frequency and the effects of refusals, the early stages of the interviews involved an attempt to establish enough rapport between interviewer and interviewee so that the latter would be unlikely to withdraw from the interview later. Interviewees were not paid, but an occasional treat to a snack or a meal proved a fairly effective means of obtaining cooperation. In general, the Indonesian research assistant was more effective than the author in gaining the confidence of interviewees, and the results of his interviews, which constitute more than four-fifths of all the interviews used in this study, were of a higher quality. 7

In my survey of Thai students I attempted to cope with and compensate for the more basic problems as described by
Douglas by accounting for (as a result of experience, trial and error) the host country's culture and customs. To attempt a conventional interview and questionnaire in Thailand would result in what the Thais might consider "conventional" (safe) responses—if they respond at all.

A "conventional" interview, a face to face confrontation, would be an uncomfortable experience to the sensitive Thai. An impersonal questionnaire could be taken lightly—or completely avoided—even when distributed by a professor in the classroom atmosphere. In adapting to the Thai cultural patterns of behavior, an attempt was made to combine the best qualities of both interview and questionnaire techniques. The final result was an "interview-questionnaire" involving about five people at a time creating an informal but somewhat impersonal atmosphere. Students of Chulalongkorn and Thammasat Universities with special instructions and prepared questions, conducted the survey at their respective universities in the Thai-style eating and reading lounge of the "student-union" building. Though offered, assistance from the Thai educational officials was declined. Unfamiliar faces, with official capacity, be they Thai or American do not help stimulate sincere responses from Thais for many obvious reasons. However, the great majority of respondents never even questioned the author's student assistants—since their university sweatshirts made them easily recognizable as "insiders." These more appropriate compromise techniques were the result of a keen sensitivity to the Thai culture, and "test-questionnaires" and interviews involving about 30 respondents in each survey. The author had intended to employ more sophisticated cross-cultural techniques in the survey (e.g., semantic-differential)—but the Thais have negative reactions to isolated word dramas—and almost no reaction to abstract indirect questioning—even when posed in the Thai language. In experimenting with the Thai's reaction to the semantic-differential the results proved useless for analysis of variance even for the few who did respond. Systematically and consistently the Thai students cautiously avoided the extreme ends of the scale with about 98% choosing the exact middle (e.g., love - - - - - hate). Attempting to "force" the responses in one of the categories by having only even number of choices (e.g., love - - - - hate) usually got inserted responses or no

response at all. If the Ford criterion were to be applied (i.e.,
necessity of a set percentage of the respondents in all cate-
gories), virtually all the items would have had to be rejected.

B. The General Model

The general model presupposes a relationship between the
independent variables typologically assigned as (A) background
variables, (B) socialization variables and (C) political predis-
position variables; and the dependent variables as (P) political
participation. The proposed relationship is simplified by the
equation, \( P = A + B + C \).* The visual representation of this
relationship is shown below. (C can also be interpreted as
an intervening variable or possibly used as a dependent vari-
able.)

* The dotted lines represent alternate casual paths. Such
an alternative model might employ a path analysis. The equa-
tion would then be \( C = f(A, B) \).
The Typology of Variables (i.e., essentially the English translation and adaptation from the Thai questionnaire)

A. Background Variables
1. Age
2. Sex
3. Class (in university)
4. Hometown (rural-urban)
5. Ethnic Origin
6. Religion
7. Parent's Occupation

B. Political Socialization Variables
1. Location of University
2. Western Teachers (e.g., Peace Corps)
   a. years studied with Western teacher
   b. nature of ideas and knowledge imparted to student
3. Years studied abroad
4. Course of study (faculty)
5. Exposure to mass media (e.g., political information from newspaper — newscasts — T.V. — movies, etc.)
   a. Frequency of listening to news per week
   b. Frequency of reading newspaper (and nature of newspaper read)
6. Auspices of university (e.g., private vs. public, religious vs. secular)

C. Political Attitudes or Predisposition (adapted from approximately 20 items).
1. Pro-government vs. anti-government scale (approximately 5 items).
2. Pro-American policy vs. anti-American policy scale (approximately 5 items).
3. Awareness of political issues scale (approximately 5 items).
4. Liberal-conservative scale (or modern-traditional scale).
5. Awareness of and/or agreement with student protest and demonstrations (3 items).

D. Political Participation (P)
1. Participation in demonstration (i.e. political, issue-oriented demonstration). 
2. Member of National Political Party.
3. Member of student political party or political organization.
4. Voted in national and/or provincial elections.
5. Volunteer to be "student observer" at the polls on
Election Day.
6. Student Volunteer for work-study in the poor provincial areas during university summer recess.

It should be noted that the above typologies are derived from the following assumptions about the dimensions of the data:

1. Biographic and economic factors combine to form a measure of the socio-economic level of students.
2. Education and communication factors combine to form a measure of the students’ political socialization.
3. Dimensions of the socialization process and the socio-economic level of the students are hypothesized to be directly related to students’ political predispositions toward participation, and actual participation.

C. Method of Analysis

Raymond Cattell explains that the history of science shows it is best to adopt a compromise between the two basic methods of constructing a hypothesis, (i.e., a compromise between stating the law we expect to find before observing co-variations and observing the events and then seeking a law to fit them).8 This study attempts such a compromise by combining a normative method of investigation with the following analysis (see flo-chart). The following analysis is employed within the framework and proposed working model represented by the equation \( P = A + B + C \) (i.e., Participation = Political Background + Political Socialization + Political Predispositions).

Descriptive Analysis

\rightarrow Factor Analysis

\rightarrow Dependent (P) and Independent (A, B, C) Variables

\rightarrow Guttman Scale of P (i.e., P1, P2, P3, P4, P5)

\rightarrow Factor Analysis

\rightarrow Independent (A, B, C) Variables

\rightarrow Cross Tabulation

\rightarrow Product-Moment Correlation

\rightarrow Smallest Space Analysis

\rightarrow Step-wise Regression

\rightarrow Canonical Analysis
1. Factor Analysis of Original Set of Variables

While factor analysis delineates the distinct factors which co-vary in the same way, it also groups the variables together in ways that permit one to synthesize the new entities. Since the variables are selected and grouped into respective typologies on the basis of a priori assumptions about the data, factor analysis of all the independent variables is employed primarily as a testing device to determine if the essential "wholes" among the influences at work are the same or similar to the hypothetical causes and intervening construct assumed by the general research design. Any "new" and relatively independent functional unities which the factor analysis yields are to be incorporated into the general research design, with the significant variables thus rearranged in an inherently more relevant structure was for further analysis (e.g., \( P = A + B + C + D + E \) or in the case of related sub-groupings, \( P = A^1 + A^2 + B^1 + B^2 + C^1 + C^2 \)). That is to say, Participation (P) could be found to be represented in an additive model whereby the variables comprising the typologies Political Background (A), Political Socialization (B), and Political Predispositions (C) could either converge around one proposed typology or emerge split among several sub-groupings of any typology. The equation \( P = A^1 + A^2 + B^1 + B^2 + C^1 + C^2 \) denotes the possibility of each typology of the independent variables (i.e., A, B, C) to split into only two subgroupings. The Equation \( P = A + B + C + D + E \) is used for illustrative purposes to denote the possibility of groupings (factors) other than the proposed typologies of A, B, & C to emerge. Perhaps a factor named "Authoritarianism" designated by "D" and another named "Nationalist Loyalties" designated by "E" might emerge as more dominant or equally significant as the proposed typologies of Political Background (A), Political Socialization (B) and Political Predisposition (C).

Indeed, it was presupposed that factorization would produce a new order of variables and concepts from which hypothetical associations, previously undiscovered in the intuitively arranged surface variables, might emerge. Moreover factor analysis is employed to yield evidence as to the degree of association between variables, as well as to determine the presence or absence of an association.

9. A factor analysis of the Thai student data produced "an exposure to Westernization" factor (e.g., Peace Corps, Volunteers, Western teachers, etc.) from which could be hypothesized that proximity to the carriers of dominant Western (American) political culture increases the likelihood of protest involvement.
Table VI. 1*
Cross-Tabulation (by %) of Dependent (P) and Independent Variables (A, B, & C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Background (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable No.</td>
<td>a1  a2  a3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Name</td>
<td>b1  b2  b3  b4  b5  b6  b7  b8  b9  b10  b11  b12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;High&quot; &quot;P1&quot;</td>
<td>22 23 21 20 20 21 20 20 21 20 20 21 20 20 20 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P2&quot;</td>
<td>9 8 12 12 14 12 10 10 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P3&quot;</td>
<td>33 34 29 35 34 31 36 36 31 31 33 35 35 35 35 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P4&quot;</td>
<td>88 88 85 86 87 90 89 88 88 87 86 88 88 88 88 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P5&quot;</td>
<td>44 46 43 41 38 39 53 45 43 41 43 36 43 43 43 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P6&quot;</td>
<td>44 45 45 50 39 39 45 39 40 44 41 39 41 41 41 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Low&quot; &quot;P1&quot;</td>
<td>19 18 25 22 18 19 19 19 20 18 24 17 19 17 17 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P2&quot;</td>
<td>3 3 6 8 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P3&quot;</td>
<td>30 29 23 26 28 26 22 24 24 28 27 28 26 26 26 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P4&quot;</td>
<td>81 83 82 71 74 74 78 79 82 85 84 84 84 84 84 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P5&quot;</td>
<td>24 22 27 29 29 28 19 21 23 24 23 31 21 22 23 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;P6&quot;</td>
<td>35 34 32 44 37 37 30 37 30 37 30 37 30 30 30 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=500 See next page for interpretation of variables. For interpretations of "high" and "low" in each case (e.g., a1, p1 means 23% of the boys — "high" and 14% of the girls are members of student political organizations).
In an attempt to test the general a priori assumptions of the idealized model (i.e., $A + B + C = P$, with $A$ — Background Variables, $B$ — Political Socialization Variables, $C$ — Political Predisposition Variables, $P$ — Political Participation Variables) a series of factor analyses of all variables was at first employed. Testing the original set of variables through factor analysis proved inconclusive when the independent ($A$, $B$, $C$) and dependent ($P$) variables were combined. However, when only the independent variables were factor analyzed there emerged two dominant dimensions of the data, "an exposure to Westernization" (i.e., Peace Corps, Foreign Teachers, Study Abroad, etc.), and "an exposure to mass media" factor which when combined formed a measure of political socialization ($B$); and two less dominant dimensions, "A background" factor ($A$), and "a political attitude" factor ($C$), which tentatively supported the original hypothesis. After the data had undergone factor analysis, specific variable categories were collapsed (i.e., dichotomized) through special programming techniques, and some nominal categories were dichotomized to fit a somewhat uniform ordinal pattern. A frequency count for all regrouped variables allowed elimination of discernable variables where there existed a split of approximately 90-10 or more, (e.g., age: "22 and under" — 449, "23 and over" — 51). The most salient of the remaining variables within each typology were then further determined through the use of cross-tabulations.

2. Cross-Tabulation of Regrouped Variables

A cross-tabulation of all independent variables ($A$, $B$, $C$) with the dependent variables ($P$) produced significant relationships with relevant variables of each typology. Especially significant were sex (i.e., typology $A$ — Background, variable a1), field of study (i.e., typology $B$ — Political Socialization, variable B7), and agreement with demonstration (i.e., typology $C$ — Political Attitude, variable C1). For further explanation see Table VI. 1. Though a cross-tabulation of all independent and dependent variables was employed, only the most salient of the independent variables are represented in Table VI. 1. Moreover, these particular variables, having consistently emerged as "significant" in a review of the literature and as "groupings" in the factor analysis (i.e., $A$, $B$, $C$), are considered to be the most relevant for the purposes of this research.

The typologies of the cross-tabulations of independent and dependent variables represented in Table VI. 1 are further defined and explained on the following page:
I. Dependent Variables - Participation (P)

- “P1” Membership in student organization (e.g., TSU)
- “P2” Membership in political party
- “P3” Intent to join political party
- “P4” Intent to vote in national election
- “P5” Volunteer to watch polls at election
- “P6” Participation in demonstration

(Note: Hereafter, the original participation variables will be represented in quotes, “P1”, to distinguish them from the new participation variables obtained through further analysis).

II. Independent Variables - Background (A), Socialization (B), Predisposition (C)

A — a1 Sex
   a2 University
   a3 Region

B — b1 Years studied with Peace Corps
   b2 Class studied with Peace Corps
   b3 Peace Corps and English
   b4 Peace Corps and new ideas
   b5 Years studied abroad
   b6 Foreign Teacher
   b7 Faculty (field of study)
   b8 Favorite newspaper
   b9 Read newspaper
   b10 Listen to A.M. news
   b11 Listen to P.M. news
   b12 T.V. news

C — c1 Agree with demonstration
   c2 Attitude toward government
   c3 U.S. - Thai relations

3. Guttman Scale and New Set of Participation Variables

Guttman scaling of participation variables (i.e., “P1”, “P2”, “P3”, “P4”, “P5”) produced the “new” variable P3.10 A Personal Involvement Scale of participation variables (i.e., “P1” + “P2” + “P3” + “P4” + “P5”) produced new variable P1 and Participation in Demonstration (i.e., “P6”) is represented by the new variable P2. Most analyses of student’s political

10. Marginal reproducibility is quite high at 0.71200 and coefficient of reproducibility is relatively sufficient at 0.87867.
involvement use participation in protest demonstrations as the only criteria for political participation. It is the purpose of this research to test alternate measures of participation (see P1, P2, P3, P4, in the simulation model that follows).

4. Simulation Model

In any methodological approach the ideal is to use many varied techniques of analysis and see if the findings and relationships change or converge. A review of the literature, factor analysis and cross-tabulation illuminate and explain the most significant variables of each typology allowing an idealized model (e.g., A + B + C = P) to be operationalized through simulation (see Diagram VI. b, next page)

---

Diagram VI. b*

Simulation Model of New Set of Variables

i.e., derivation of A = 3 variables ← sex ← 3/0
university ← 3/0
region ← 3/0

1 + score of A = (A)
1 + score of B = (B)
1 + score of C = (C)

Political Background
Political Socialization
Political Attitude

A
B Participation (P1, P2, P3,..)
C

1. Additive Model

\[
A + B = (A + B) \\
A + C = (A + C) \\
B + C = (B + C) \\
A + B + C = (A + B + C)
\]

P1 (Political Involvement index of the various participation variables, i.e., P1+P2+P3+P4 P5)
P2 (Participation in demonstration, i.e., P6)
P3 (Guttman Scale Score of the various participation variables, i.e., P1, P2, P3, P4, P5)

2. Multiplicative Model

** P4 .(Factor Scores of various participation variables, i.e., P1, P2, P3, P4, P5)

\[
A \times B = (A \times B) \\
A \times C = (A \times C) \\
B \times C = (B \times C) \\
A \times B \times C = (A \times B \times C)
\]

(Multiple Correlation and Smallest Space Analysis are used to explain the relationship of the new set of variables.)

* For derivation of A, B, & C, see next page.

** Factor scores (P4) were not used in the final analysis.
Diagram VI c
Derivation of Composite Background
Socialization, and Attitude Variables (i.e., A, B, & C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Thamm</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chula</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>High</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Siam Rath</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Correlation Co-efficients - The New Set of Independent and Dependent Variables

The relationships of the "new" set of independent and dependent variables are presented in Tables VI.2, VI.3 and VI.4. These co-efficients are the results of a product moment correlation program which was used to obtain the necessary co-efficient data input into the smallest space analysis program as well as to show the relationships of the new set of variables. The three matrixes below indicate the correlation of the Personal Involvement Scale (P1), Participation in Demonstrations (P2), and Guttman Scale Scores (P3), with Background (A), Political Socialization (B), and Political Attitude (C). Table VI.2 shows the relationship of participation variables and the various independent variables separately (A, B, C), Table VI.3 shows the relationship of participation variables and the various independent variables represented in an additive model, and Table VI.4 shows the participation variables and the various independent variables represented in a multiplicative model.*

Table VI.2 shows a generally more positive relationship of the independent variables (A, B, C) and participation as represented by Participation in Demonstrations (P2) and Guttman Scale Scores (P3), than the Personal Involvement Scale (P1). The table shows that relatively significant correlations exist for Participation in Demonstrations and Political Socialization (B), and Political Predisposition (C), with the most positive relationships existing between Participation in Demonstrations (P2) and Political Background (A), and Guttman Scale Scores of Participation (P3) and Political Background (A).

Table VI.3 shows a generally more positive relationship of Participation (P1, P2, P3) with the combination (i.e., sum) of Socialization and Background (A+B), Background and Predisposition (A+C), and Socialization and Predispositions (B+C), than any of them separately (i.e., A, B, & C, see Table V.2), or all of them together (i.e., A+B+C). As in Table V.2, Participation as represented by Participation in Demonstrations (P2) and Guttman Scale Scores (P3) showed overall higher correlations with all units of the additive model than did Participation as

* The exploratory experiments with the "additive" and "multiplicative" models were employed to render some kind of comparison of the newest of variables which might ultimately suggest a significant causal relationship in the multiplicative model.
### Table VI.2
Correlation Matrix of Participation and Independent Variables (N=500)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal Involvement Scale (P1)</th>
<th>Participation in Demonstrations (P2)</th>
<th>Political Attitude (P3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Background (A)</td>
<td>0.0585</td>
<td>(0.4662)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Socialization (B)</td>
<td>(0.0840)</td>
<td>(0.4574)</td>
<td>0.4016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Attitude (C)</td>
<td>0.0171</td>
<td>(0.4585)</td>
<td>0.4256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table V1.3
Correlation Matrix of Participation Variables and Additive Model of Independent Variables (N=500)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal Involvement Score (P1)</th>
<th>Participation in Demonstrations (P2)</th>
<th>Guttman Scale Scores (P3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Background and Socialization A+B</td>
<td>(0.0979)</td>
<td>(0.6040)</td>
<td>(0.5654)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background and Predisposition A+C</td>
<td>0.0486</td>
<td>(0.5801)</td>
<td>(0.5680)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization and Predisposition B+C</td>
<td>0.0646</td>
<td>(0.5990)</td>
<td>0.5385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background, Socialization, and Predisposition A+B+C</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
<td>0.3919</td>
<td>0.4062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table VI.4
Correlation Matrix of Participation Variables
and Multiplicative Model of Independent Variables (N = 500)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal Involvement Score (P1)</th>
<th>Participation in Demonstrations (P2)</th>
<th>Guttman Scale Scores (P3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background and Socialization</td>
<td>Ax B</td>
<td>0.0866</td>
<td>(0.6028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background and Predisposition</td>
<td>A x C</td>
<td>0.0551</td>
<td>(0.5932)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization and Predisposition</td>
<td>B x C</td>
<td>0.0319</td>
<td>(0.6036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background, Socialization and Predisposition</td>
<td>A x B x C</td>
<td>0.0469</td>
<td>(0.6660)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
represented by the Personal Involvement Scale (P1). The table shows that relatively significant relationships exist between Participation in Demonstrations (P2) and the combination of Political Socialization and Background (A+B), Political Predispositions and Background (A+C), and Political Socialization and Predisposition (A+C). Also significant (i.e., 0.5+), but to a lesser degree, were relationships of Guttman Scale Scores of Participation (P3) and the combination of Political Socialization and Background (A+B), and Political Predisposition and Background (A+C).

Table V1.4 shows a generally more positive relationship of Participation (P1, P2, P3) and all units of the multiplicative model (i.e., A x B x C) than with the additive model (i.e., A + B + C, see Table V1.3). The table shows that relatively significant relationships exist between: Participation (P1, P2, P3) and the multiplicative combination (i.e., “product”) of Political Socialization and Background (A x B) and Political Socialization and Predispositions (B x C), and Political Background, Socialization and Predispositions (A x B x C). As in Table V1.2 and Table V1.3, Participation, as represented by Participation in Demonstrations (P2) and Guttman Scale Scores (P3) showed overall higher correlations with all units of the multiplicative model than did Participation as represented by the Personal Involvement Scale (P1), with the MOST significant relationship existing between Participation in Demonstrations (P2) and the product of Political Background, Socialization and Predisposition (i.e., A x B x C).

6. Smallest Space Analysis

Louis Guttman’s smallest space analysis is a non-metric approach where “a symmetric table is given of relations between things....the computer plots the things as points in the smallest space possible that will preserve the rank order of the relations.”12 Smallest space analysis was used to further test the efficacy of the model equations and show graphically relationships among the independent and dependent variables. Smallest space analysis was chosen as the final technique because it defines the distances of points on an Euclidean space 13 Figure V. a. plots the additive model (i.e., A+B+C) against the three participation variables (i.e., P1, P2, P3). As was the case in previous tests, P3 (i.e., Guttman Scale Scores) and P2 (i.e., Participation in Demonstration) emerge as the closest to the sum of additive model (i.e., A + B + C).
Other SSA plots showed the relative distances of the participation variables (i.e., P1, P2, P3), the independent variables (i.e., A, B, C), the sum of additive model (A+B+C), and product of multiplicative model (AxBxC). The SSA plots show that all independent (A, B, C) and dependent variables (P1, P2, P3) are closer to the multiplicative model (AxBxC) than the additive model (A+B+C). If the multiplicative model is used as the focal point, Guttman Scale Scores (P3) and Participation in Demonstrations (P2) are the closest followed in order by Background (A), Political Predisposition (C), Political Socialization (B), and Personal Involvement Scale (P1). If the additive model (A+B+C) is used as the focal point, Background (A) and Political Predisposition (C) are the closest, followed in order by Guttman Scale Scores (P3), Participation in Demonstrations (P2), Political Socialization (B), and Personal Involvement Scale (P1).

7. Step-wise Regression and Canonical Analysis

a. Step-wise Regression

Step-wise regression and canonical analysis is employed to further test the casual relationship of the independent and dependent variables. Results of the stepwise regression show that Political Background (A) predicts best to participation in all cases (i.e., P1, P2, P3). However, as Table VI. 5 shows, Political Background accounted for only 22% of the variance when participation was represented by Participation in Demonstrations (P2), and 24% when participation was represented by the Guttman Scale Scores (P3). Political Sociali-

12. Louis Guttman, “The Non-metric Breakthrough for the Behavioral Sciences,” (reprinted from the Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Data Processing, January 5-6, 1966, Rehovoth, Israel), p. 1. The coefficient of alienation represents statistically the goodness of fit, i.e., the degree to which the relationships between A and B are most closely set forth in Euclidean space. The smaller the coefficient of alienation, the better the fit. It has been generally acceptable to consider a coefficient of alienation of .2 as a good fit. In all the analyses performed on the Thai student data, the coefficient obtained is between .0 and .2.

zation (B) showed to be the next best predictor of participation explaining 15% of the variance in predicting to Participation in Demonstrations (P2), and 11% of the variance with the Guttman Scale Scores (P3). Political Predispositions (C) accounted for only 10% of the variance in predicting to Participation in Demonstrations (P2) and 6% with Guttman Scale Scores (P3). All the variables together (i.e., A+B+C) accounted for about 47% of the variance when predicting to Participation in Demonstrations (P2).

b. Canonical Analysis

The canonical variates are the bases of both spaces. It is only one set of an infinite number of bases. Three variates were defined, the canonical correlations were (1) .75 (2) .08 (3) .05 (see Table VI. 6). If we look at only the first variate which is the highest correlation, about 50% of the variance of one space is explained by the other space. This correlation is not very high, but is similar to the results of the total variance accounted for in the step-wise regression. Also, a trace correlation (average of all three canonical correlations) is even smaller.

Three basic inferences that can be drawn from the results of the step-wise regression and canonical analysis is that: (1) the independent variables together better predict to participation than any one of them separately; (2) that separately the independent variable which best predicts to participation is Political Background (A); and (3) that separately or together all variables predict better to Participation in Demonstrations (P2) than any of the other participation variables (i.e., P1 and

14. The BMD02R Step-wise Regression computer program was utilized. "This program computes a sequence of multiple linear regression equations in a step-wise manner. At each step one variable is added to the regression equation. The variable added is the one which makes the greatest reduction in the error sum of squares. Equivalently it is the variable which has highest partial correlation with the dependent variable partialed on the variables which have already been added."

15 Canonical analysis produces a coefficient which explains the amount of variance in one space which can be predicted given knowledge about the basis of the second space. The technique makes no assumption of independence or dependence associated with regression or factor comparison techniques.
P3). Similar inferences were also drawn from previous analysis (i.e., Product-Moment Correlation, smallest Space Analysis.)

D. Summary of Results of Analysis on Thai Data

The general conclusions from this study of Thai students support many of the results of similar surveys of student activists in other countries. Generally those students who desire change the most are also the most predisposed toward participation and actually do participate in student forms of politics. More specifically, the results of the data analysis supported the hypothesis that a student's score on relevant background variables (A), and score on relevant socialization variables (B), are highly correlated with a student's score of predispositions to change and action variables (C), and actual participation (P). Participation in Demonstration (P2) emerged as the best determinant and measure of Participation (P) in the original and alternative models. In fact, P2 was considerably a better determinant of participation in both the multiplicative and additive model than was P1, the Personal Involvement Scale. Guttman Scale Scores (P3) produced significant correlations (.5 + ) in both model equations (i.e., A + B + C = P and A x B x C = P). Product-moment correlation and smallest space analysis showed that the multiplicative model (AxBxC) was found to be generally a better predictor of participation than was the additive model (A+B+C). Moreover, combinations of Political Socialization, Political Predispositions, and Political Background (e.g., A+B, A+C, C x B, A x B, etc.) were better predictors than any one attribute separately. Smallest space analysis showed that the best overall predictor of participation (P1, P2, P3) of the independent variables (i.e., A, B, C) in either model equation was Background (A), followed in order by Political Predisposition (C), and Political Socialization (B).

16. Trace correlation ascertains the degree of relationship between the spaces and the average of all canonical correlations. It is an estimate of the average correlation between variates for any set of basic vectors derivable in dimensionalizing the two spaces.

17. Step-wise regression including the additive model (i.e., A + B + C), and the multiplicative model (i.e., A x B x C) showed the multiplicative model as a much better predictor of participation, accounting for 43% more of the variance than the additive model.
Table VI. 5

Step-wise Regression Analysis of Participation Variables (i.e., P1, P2, P3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>RSQ</th>
<th>Increase in RSQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Background (A)</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.0092</td>
<td>.0092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Socialization (B)</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.0071</td>
<td>.0163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Predisposition (C)</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.0092</td>
<td>.0205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Background (A)</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Socialization (B)</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Predisposition (C)</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Background (A)</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Socialization (B)</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Predisposition (C)</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation Variable Predicted to

- Personal Involvement
- Scale (P1)
- Participation in Demonstration (P2)
- Guttman Scale Scores (P3)
### Table VI. 6

**Canonical Analysis of**

Independent Variables (A, B, C)

and Participation Variables (P1, P2, P3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (A)</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (B)</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-.66</td>
<td>-.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. (C)</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>-.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canonical Correlation. 75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. (P1)</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. (P2)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. (P3)</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other findings included discernable positive relationships between a student's participation (P) and

1. a student's exposure to mass media (i.e., "high" exposure to newspapers, T.V. and radio news broadcasts.)

2. a student's exposure to Westernization (i.e., "high" exposure to Peace Corps, Western teachers, study abroad, etc.).

3. a student's field of study (i.e., humanities, social science, etc.)

4. a student's attitude toward the Thai and U.S. governments (i.e., "negative" attitude toward policy, leaders, and political status quo).

5. a student's exposure to urbanization (i.e., University, Bangkok, travel abroad, etc.).

6. a student's sex (i.e., male).

7. a student's university (i.e., Thammasat).

Findings in general of the 1969 survey show demographic variables (e.g., Background, A) to be more significant than attitude or predisposition variables (C) in predicting to student activism. The next section examines empirically, the influence of values and psychological determinants of expression of discontent toward the government, through a comparison of Thai and American University students.

Analysis and Results of The 1972 Survey of American and Thai University Students

Psychological determinants of student activism

The survey for this research was conducted by Narong Sinsawasdi in 1971 and 1972 in Thailand and in the United States.18 The main dependent variable of the research is called "civil expression of discontent". Civil expression of discontent...
tent refers to an action carried out by an individual to express his discontent toward a government policy. The word "civil" is included to signify that it is an expression of discontent by an individual toward the government and not by an individual toward another individual.

"Civil expression of discontent" includes the following actions:

1. Actions carried out with the intention of putting pressure on the government and those without such intention.
2. Both verbal and non-verbal expressions such as conversation among friends, writing to newspapers, speaking in rallies, non-violent demonstrations, and burning the draft cards.
4. Both violent and non-violent actions.

Eight variables were theoretically selected to study whether they have any influence on the variation of the intensity of CED. They were:

1) Level of discontent which refers to the degree of the dissatisfaction the individual has toward a certain government policy.
2) Number of discontented issues which refers to the number of the government policies causing dissatisfaction to the individual.
3) Perceived legitimacy of CED which refers to the attitude toward the righteousness of civil expression of discontent.
4) General interests in politics which refers to one's interest in political affairs other than civil expression of discontent such as voting in elections, taking part in election campaigns, following the news about politics, or discussing politics with others.
5) Authoritarian submissiveness which refers to the tendency to be submissive to family or school authorities.
6) Conformity which refers to tendency to avoid action that might bring the ridicule or criticism from the others.
7) Self-reliance tendency which refers to the tendency to work for what one wants himself.
8) Democratic value which refers to the degree to which one appreciates political democratic practices such as the ultimate accountability of the leader to the non-leaders, the toleration of different political ideas, and universal suffrage.

Measurement

In measuring all the variables in the research, the ques-
tionnaire technique was chosen. Three pretests were performed before the final version of the questionnaire was administered to 180 Thai students at Thammasat University, Bangkok, and 180 American Students at the University of Hawaii. The attempt was made to avoid many problems labeled against using questionnaire such as acquiescence response set, and cultural bias.

The Thai and American data were analyzed separately. The data was arranged so that the score of each variable would range from 1 to 4. Some interesting comparisons between the Thai and the American data are:

1) The American sample is more prone to express his discontent toward the government than the Thai sample. 132 American samples of the total 180 said that they have expressed their discontent one way or the other, while only 44 of 180 Thai samples said that they have expressed their discontent toward the government.

2) There is not much difference between the samples of both groups as far as the level of discontent is concerned.

3) The American sample is significantly higher than the Thai sample in perceived legitimacy of CED.

4) The American sample is significantly lower than the Thai sample in authoritarian submissiveness and conformity.

5) As for self-reliance tendency and democratic value, both groups are not significantly different.

Finding

In predicting the intensity of CED from the eight independent variables discussed above, the most appropriate method is the multiple regression analysis. Table VI. 7a and VI. 7b show the product-moment correlations of all variables. Partial correlations (Correlation of each independent variable with the intensity of CED holding other independent variables constant) are also listed.

The following two equations show how much influence all eight independent variables, acting together, have on the intensity of CED. As every independent variable has the score of 1-4, every b-coefficient of each variable is comparable. The b-coefficient indicates the comparative influence each independent variable has on the intensity of CED.

a. American samples

\[ R = .77, R^2 = .59; F\text{-test} = 30.74, P = .001 \]
Table VI  7a Correlations Of Nine Variables*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Level Disc</th>
<th>(2) Number of Issues</th>
<th>(3) Legit. of CED</th>
<th>(4) Political Int.</th>
<th>(5) Authoritarian</th>
<th>(6) Conformity</th>
<th>(7) S-r Tendency</th>
<th>(8) Democ. Value</th>
<th>(9) Intensity of CED</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>S-r ten.</td>
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<td>Demo. Va.</td>
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Partial Correlations: .27 .24 .48 .05 .15 .07 .10

*If normally distributed correlation of ± 16 or more would have significant level at .05, and correlation of ± .23 or more would have significant level at .01 (both for one-tailed test). However, as some variables such as level of discontent, intensity of CED, number of discontented issues are not normally distributed, statistical significance should be viewed in this context.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Level of Disc.</th>
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<th>(3) Legit. of CED</th>
<th>(4) Political Int.</th>
<th>(5) Authoritarian</th>
<th>(6) Conformity</th>
<th>(7) S-r Tendency</th>
<th>(8) Democ. Value</th>
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<td>Democ. Value</td>
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<td>Partial Correlations</td>
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</table>
Intensity of CED = .45 general interests in politics + .24 level of discontent + .20 number of discontented issues - .12 conformity + .12 perceived legitimacy of CED + .07 democratic value + .06 self-reliance tendency - .05 authoritarian submissiveness - .48

b. Thai samples

(R = .46, R^2 = .22; F-test = 5.89, P = .001)

Intensity of CED = -.19 conformity + .13 level of discontent + .08 perceived legitimacy of CED + .07 general interests in politics - .04 authoritarian submissiveness + .03 number of discontented issues + .02 self-reliance tendency + .00 democratic value + 1.18

By squaring the multiple correlation coefficient (R), coefficient of determination (R)^2 will be obtained. In the American samples, the coefficient of determination is .59. It means that eight independent acting together accounted for .59 percent of the variance of the intensity of CED. In the Thai samples, the coefficient of determination is .22.

From the multiple correlation analysis, the following patterns can be summarized:

1. The American student who is prone to express his discontent toward the government is the one who has a very high level of discontent toward the government; has many discontented issues; thinking that he has the right to express his discontent toward the government; is very interested in politics; has low degree of authoritarian submissiveness and conformity; and has a high self-reliance tendency and democratic value.

2. The Thai student who is prone to express his discontent toward the government is the one who has a very high level of discontent toward the government; thinking that he has the right to express his discontent toward the government; is very interested in politics; and has a low degree of authoritarian submissiveness and conformity.

Relevance of Survey Results to Student Revolt of October 1973

Initially, the October demonstrators stated that they only
wanted to see the release of the 13 prisoners. However, apparently they also wanted a change of the government. This is why the violent incidents took place even after the government had agreed to comply with the demand to release demonstrators. Many demonstrators were injured, and some were killed. It seems that the students were aware that such a thing might well happen. It is evident from the findings in this research, that the level of discontent toward the government is a very important determinant of the intensity of CED. Level of discontent, unlike other variables such as authoritarian submissiveness of conformity can be acquired, increased, or decreased in a short period of time. This is because the level of discontent is strongly influenced by the government’s policy which may be changed greatly in a short period of time. An American’s level of discontent toward the Vietnam war policy might disappear overnight if the government decided to withdraw American troops from Vietnam. During the period of time that this survey was conducted and during the October, 1973 uprising in Thailand, this researcher does not believe that there was much change in authoritarian submissiveness, conformity, general interests in politics, and perceived legitimacy of CED which are significant determinants of the intensity of CED. The change was in their level of discontent which was already high at the time of the survey. The level of discontent toward the Thai government, of the Thai students was no doubt increased greatly when 13 persons asking for the constitution were arrested. Then when many students were injured on the morning of October 14, their level of discontent must have been even higher reaching a point where they were not even deterred by the threat of death. This is why hundreds of demonstrators, armed only with sticks, dared to fight police and soldiers who used machine guns and tanks.

The October, 1973 uprising in Thailand is an extreme case of the collective expression of discontent toward the government. The level of discontent of the demonstrators became so high that other determinants of CED may have been meaningless. However, as the findings in this research have shown, if the level of discontent is not so extremely high, there exists other significant determinants of the intensity of CED: namely perceived legitimacy of CED, general interests in politics, authoritarian submissiveness, and conformity.

19. Assuming that the 180 Thai samples are representative of all the students who participated in the October demonstration.
This chapter has presented empirical evidence supporting some of the authors' assumptions and hypothesis about Thai student activism. Results of the 1969 survey showed that exposure to Westernization and particularly Americans, and the mass media to be the most important socialization factors related to student activism. The analysis of the 1972 survey presented in the second section of this chapter operationalize some of the cultural aspects of Thai political behavior explained in previous chapters. Results of this analysis showed significant relationships between these cultural factors and the expression of discontent toward the government. The following chapter gives a general descriptive analysis of the role of elections and student activism in Thailand's future democratic development.
VII. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE FUTURE OF THAI STUDENT ACTIVISM

By Ross Prizzia

The future of student activism may well depend upon the development of permanent democratic institutions. The most obvious criteria for democratic development which has been periodically experimented with is national elections. While student demands for elections has been continuously an issue, the role of students in the candidacy and process of national elections has been minimal. Students are occasionally requested to watch the polling places during elections to present the guise of high moral quality to the procedures and results. Student based parties at the university have occasionally given influential support to a national party or candidate. However, for the most part students have not played a major role in the election of candidates or the results at the polls, or have their demands for constitutional reform and an effective election process been sustained. It remains to be seen as to whether the immediate changes which took place in the aftermath of the student revolution in October 1973 will be sustained through viable and permanent democratic institutions. If some of the democratic reforms (e.g., regular elections as a means for changing governments) attempted by the present government of Sanya Dharmasakti become a functionally permanent part of Thai political process, students might well play a major role in the future political development of Thailand.

The following discussion will focus on the past and future Thai election process as a potential avenue in furthering political development and political change in Thailand.

The Function of Political Parties and Elections in the Thai Political Process

The periodic creation of political parties and national elections do provide some basis of conventional types of political participation for the Thai. However, participation in elections, except for a very small group of the voting Thai population, has been characteristically ceremonial in nature. This is especially true in the campaigning and elections which take place in the provinces. Constitutionalism has had a central, though often short-lived, influence on Thai politics.
as witnessed by the last constitution promulgated in August, 1968; the major charter since 1932. Interposed between major constitutions, have been three provisional ones and a short suspension without revision. Constitutionalism in Thailand—as elsewhere in transitional Southeast Asia has served the country's political development by providing a main element in the justification of political power. It has also been a symbol of the process of admitting broader groups into political processes while allowing the ruling bureaucratic and royal elite to maintain their traditional status. Constitutions; although manipulated and remade to serve the regime in power, have created several basic institutions that continue to have a certain vitality. The non-political king as a point of stability, the Cabinet and national assembly have now been, for the most part, established aspects of Thai political system. National elections have been the most significant aspect of the development of constitutionalism which are usually carried out to meet specific constitutional provisions for the various national assemblies. The last election which occurred in February 1969, was the twelfth in an irregular string of national elections in company with various constitutions extending back to 1932. Since the end of World War II, the 1969 elections were the sixth involving a limited form of political party participation. Thus, Thailand has had more experience with national elections than any of the other countries of the region, except the Philippine Republic. The 1969 elections were reasonably well administered and the results were, for the most part, accepted across the country by both the winning and losing candidates in contrast to the elections of 1957, when public dissatisfaction with alleged fraud caused the government to declare a national emergency and eventually led to a coup d'etat in September, 1957.

While no election in Thailand has ever presented a clear-cut possibility of altering the leadership of the government, elections have provided the opportunity for broader political participation, increased political awareness and an exercise in national citizenship at the local level. Surveys have shown that today's villagers probably accept voting as a custom that is good for the country even though their electoral or political understandings remain vague. Elections are also important as a principal form to establish the ruling group's legitimacy, or accepted title to rule. Popular sovereignty sustained by constitutional forms and the "ceremony of elections" meets a traditional need for law and authority in Thailand's political system. The direct purpose of every election so far has been to return candidates to a national representative assembly, which is itself another key factor of
political development. However, legislative prerogatives are
carefully delimited, and political discussions have had little
relationship to political decision making. Participants in the
House of Representatives have little realistic expectation of
influencing events, since elected representatives are balanced
by appointed senators presumably loyal to the governing group.

This persistent presence of appointed members in every
assembly since the first one in 1933 has characterized Thai­
land's political development as a "tutelary democracy." The ruling elite have traditionally expressed a democratic
goal to teach the Thai people how best to participate in national
political activities, but they maintain a concentration of power
in their own hands. Major modernizing changes have always
been introduced by the governing leaders, in a "tradition of
change" at least 100 years old, and despite numerous "palace
revolts", no popular uprising has ever occurred. This
influence of an absolute, paternalistic government and auto­
cratic bureaucracy cannot be underestimated, and has usually
been reflected in the activities of the National Assembly,
even though elected representatives did force three no con­
fidence votes upon the government from 1932-1939. However,
since then the constitutional form has successfully limited
this political action, as is witnessed by the last constitution of
1968 which prevented the House from calling a no-confi­
dence vote at all. However, even within these limitations,
the House of Representatives has been the main impetus for
the development of political parties in providing the essential
conditions for party growth and political participation. Thai
political parties are only in their beginning stages of develop­
ment and they still tend to be more like political clubs or
parties of "individual representation." Because of inter­
vening periods of autocratic repression, political parties have
not been active between elections, and only one has maintained
any continuity since its founding in 1946. Most parties are
still the personal followings of individual leaders, or fronts
for the autocratic cliques who control political power. How­
ever, while political parties in Thailand have a pragmatic
desire to win elections, there is little ideological contention.
The parties seek widely-based, popular candidates who can
appeal to the majority of the Thai people. Thus far, politi­
cal parties have not been functional. While evidence has sug­
gested that the government does not function well without
political parties, experience has shown that the political system
has not functioned well with them. Periodically the Thai go­
vernment recognize political parties as a more flexible instru­
ment for gaining popular support than through the military
or bureaucracy. Consequently there usually emerges a brief
liberalizing trend of political liberty in an effort to increase public approval and thus the longevity of the ruling group. Also, a reasonably consistent purpose of the growth of parties and the elections has been aimed at the enhancement of Thailand’s image abroad. In 1948 after a coup d’etat, the institution of elections and a party-based government earned foreign recognition, but the Assembly lasted only two months before a military clique installed its own premier.

Although such factors as constitutionalism, elections, a representative assembly and political parties provide some visible evidence of political progress towards democracy by their mere existence their lack of tenure as viable and permanent institutions minimizes any sustained influence on the political environment. Elections and representative assembly have been shortlived in the past and could be so afflicted again, while constitutions have also been revised and political parties banned before.

Democracy, with its inherent personal freedom cannot exist unless there is a widespread belief that this type of governing authority and political order are justified, or legitimate for the society. Voluntary choices essential to democracy require such a conviction, and legitimacy for a democratic system of government implies a willingness to cooperate with its demands. The strength of this belief is an essential factor for political progress towards a democratic form of government. Thailand has been more characterized by an autocratic form of government which has always enjoyed strong social acceptance and a centralized bureaucracy which established its own structural legitimacy centuries ago. Respect accorded to official superiors has been basic to relations between government and people, and the authoritative kingship has remained a source of both ideological and personal justification for all elements of society. Since 1932 the tradition of autocracy has survived in the form of military oligarchy, and it has been alleged that after 1949, all Thai political leaders had in effect accepted military force as the legitimate basis for government. It becomes quite evident that Thailand’s development towards democracy will require the transfer of legitimacy from the traditionally autocratic regime to a democratic form of authority and government, or the Thai may achieve a Constitutional form without the substance of its political freedom.

Constraints to Political Development

There are many and various obvious constraints to the
acquisition of legitimacy for a democratic political system in Thailand. The foremost constraint being the periodic interference of military coup d'etats. Political parties cannot develop or carry out worthwhile functions if elections are postponed or overturned by force. However, apart from the unchallenged strength of the military, there are real social barriers to the growth of democracy, particularly among the rural population which is less affected by modern political notions. The Thai peasantry is willing to attend rallies and listen to political speeches, but they come to see the Phuu Ying Yai, the big and powerful men, rather than to participate in a political party.

Inadequate education and illiteracy limit political awareness in the villages; but education and literacy rates are steadily climbing, bringing social changes which are associated with political development. Urban Thais are reasonably exposed to mass communication media, although there is a wide gap between accessability of political information in rural villages compared to Bangkok. Regional surveys show that about three-fourths of the population in Bangkok and regional towns own a radio to which they listen daily, and except for the south, read newspapers almost every day. This percentage compares favorably with many Western countries. 

At the village level less than twenty percent listen to a radio every day, but 78 percent report some listening and recent changes have increased news coverage. Moreover, a larger number of radio sets and introduction of television has continued to reach more people, particularly urban audiences which have grown in regional towns as well as in Bangkok. While mass communications are giving the Thai an enlarged coverage of political news, this recent growth has taken place more within a basic social role of passive spectator than active participant. Bangkok has the country's greatest collection of newspapers and radio stations, but has traditionally lagged behind the national average of voter participation, about 28 percent averaged for all elections and 19 percent in the municipal elections of September 1968.

Bangkok voters are less subject than the provincial population to social or cultural demands which overcome basic apathy and encourage voting. Whatever political awareness that has developed has not translated directly into election participation or conventional political activities. 

Political interest and the political process are still a combination of many loosely related functions within Thai society. The representation of specific opinions and aggregation of these opinions into sufficiently strong public demand for government action are concentrated within the communal, personal and social
relationships. Political interest representation through parties is not widely accepted, and specific interests are represented through the bureaucracy, especially by local administration officials whose functions of interest determination and administration overlap. National leaders find it difficult to identify or respond to specific public opinion, or more particularly to measure relative support for one political interest versus another. Consequently, in Thailand the national leadership is encouraged to think of itself as representing the interest of all the people which is not a conducive situation for development of independent, opposing political interest groups.

In contrast to fledgling political groups, the bureaucracy provides an attractive method of political participation to the Thai elite, as sources of personal careers. In fact, almost the entire middle class is in the Thai bureaucracy, including civil and military. Even professional groups are in a similar position, employed in one or another specialized branches of government ministries. This situation is further supported by bureaucratic leaders who attempt to recruit potential political rivals into their own camp. The most common Thai form has been the enlistment of candidates into a government party. Some political interest may be inferred from the fact that there were more than 900 applicants for government party candidacy for the February 1969 election to 219 seats in the House, and even after the elections the government party continued to recruit independent politicians who were elected. About 50 percent of all independent candidates elected in February were willing to support the government party, while it was claimed that about 20 candidates actually joined the party’s ranks. Opposition groups face a pervasive belief by those in power that their independence will result in factionalism and separatism. In the past opposition politicians’ high priced demands for cooperation with the government contributed to the charges of corruption and served to justify the 1957-1968, and 1971, coup d’etats. The factionalism displayed during previous brief periods of political activities have not been forgotten in Thailand’s latest election. The 1968 constitution provided less opportunity for democratic opposition to the government than previous versions, and various restrictions became one of the centers of controversy between the ruling group and elected representatives.

As long as politicians outside the government appear as obstacles to national progress in a developing country, they also will have a very restricted ability to achieve political
rewards, which is the real obstacle to their growth. Inability to provide peaceful channels of access to power has discouraged Thailand's political parties up till now.

Social and cultural restraints on political development in Thailand have led to another sort of conflict: the clash between traditional and modern ways of government. The issue of political freedom and democracy versus the absolute bureaucratic tradition has been in the center of the normal processes of modernizing Thai society since 1932.

Political party systems in Thailand, as elsewhere in Asia, are closely linked with the impact of western influence, particularly in the United States, which has emphasized support for constitutional issues and development of legislative and political processes. However, in Thailand, the impact has been measured and slow with less social demand for democratic forms and most of the change has been at the local government level. Provincial councils were given legal status in 1955, and elections to provincial and municipal councils took place at the end of 1967, after a twelve year "revolutionary era" of appointed members. The announced reason for the creation of new institutions of local government was described as a government desire to promote democracy and to allow the people to practice democracy at a local level, but the provincial council has lacked any actual authority, and local institutions relate more to issues of social and economic development than to political participation in national affairs. This can be seen in the efforts of the Democracy Development Program in Northeast Thailand during 1965-1967, when administrative councils of selected, elected and ex-officio village leaders were created with limited functions, the most important of which was consideration of local economic development programs.

On the national level, western forms of politics appeared briefly in 1955 after the Prime Minister, Pibunsongkram, returned from a world tour. His reforms included a "Hyde Park" forum for unrestrained expression of public opinion, press conferences on the western model and liberalized election laws. But these practices were soon suspended in 1958, and did not reappear until 1968 with somewhat more acceptance. However, there is one group nation-wide which has continually reflected the greatest western political influence, that being the Thai intelligentsia. Foreign-educated Thai continue to be one of the most important channels of western political ideas and will become even more significant as westernized education or wealth in the recruitment of people into political elite
Thailand's political parties are a product of modern political ideas and are also active transmitters of modern political and social development. Western methods, technological gadgets of campaigning including loud speakers, television, printing, etc., use of students and schools for polling, and emphasis on social development goals all associate political parties' activities with modern culture. These activities have a direct impact on such problems of political development as national integration, participation, and legitimacy of the government. Thus, it might be argued that the state of political parties reflects the modernizing progress of the country. It is sufficient to note that political development involves political parties in a conflicting balance between old and new social forces. Despite the various social and culture value to political development, parties can develop popular support for the leaders, or loyal membership to an ideal. They offer a means of institutionalizing personal leadership for charisma, such as one example in 1957 when the government party group campaigned as, "the Prime Minister and his eight friends." While elections in Thailand have not produced the realization of personal freedom and liberty, they have fostered an environment for increased democratic political development, as is shown in the brief analysis of the last elections to take place in Thailand.

The 1969 Elections

The leaders seemed to have recognized at least as early as 1964 that a government political party should be established to face the people in elections when a new constitution was promulgated. In the brief period following Marshal Sarit's death, leaders of the former political groups began efforts in the provinces to solicit support and identify candidates. There was anticipation of elections, even on the part of ranking government officials. However, a lack of progress and delay practically ended political activity until June, 1966, when Prime Minister Thanom indicated at a press conference his willingness to serve as head of a political party, if the people wanted him to. Surveys of the Thai National Research Council in 1965 and 1966 indicated popular interest and a possibility of elections, and local newspapers reported in April 1966 that many of those interviewed by the survey expressed their belief that only through elections could the country's political problems be solved. Support for increasing political partici-
pation came also from the King of Thailand, who stated that he wished to see a great number of people exercise their voting right under the new Constitution. 24

As the 1969 campaigns enfolded, the government parties listed as their primary policy a pledge to make the people aware of the meaning of democracy, and this goal carried over into the new policies presented to a joint session of the national assembly. 25 A pledge was preeminent to “promote public understandings to political rights and obligations...and develop democracy and preserve it.” 26 The Prime Minister’s television slogans broadcasts after evening news programs adopted the theme later in April of that year. Thanom proudly announced that “the democratic system of government....is the most suitable form of government for Thailand,” and that...“the people will be encouraged to play a greater role and participate in the political administrative processes...” 27 However, these statements were typical of the Thai tutelage system, where democracy and participation do not mean a share of national power. Interpreting the Constitution, top ranking officials explained that “the members of the House will act as the people’s representatives, but...they are to have no direct part in the forming of the new government...” 28 The Prime Minister reiterated this point further when he stated that.... “politics is not trying to seize power.” 29

Throughout the campaigns the fifteen million eligible voters among the Thai population were subjected to strong governmental encouragement to vote, and bureaucratic directives to government offices and state enterprises urged employees to vote, while military members were usually directed to vote. Voting songs were composed and commemorative postage stamps were issued. Fifty thousand district officials and village headmen received subsistence pay on election day to help supervise and carry out the elections. 30 Approximately fifty percent of the eligible voters cast their ballots, less than the 1957 record of 58 percent, but more than the average 30 percent of early Thai elections. 31 In Bangkok about 35 percent voted, also lower than the 1957 responses of 54 percent. Bangkok voter participation compared more closely to the national turnout for municipal elections which had been around 30 percent since 1948 period. Frequent interference with Thai elections in the past, and the inability of elected officials to effectively control the administration of the government were reasons cited for the urban voters’ beliefs that elections are unimportant. 32

When an election is conducted, the outcome concerns not
only whether the regime gained popular support, but also whether the system of elections and political parties was more established than before as the appropriate method of government. Voting participation is an uncertain measure of support for the system. Perhaps more relevant are the areas of voluntary participation, such as candidate nominations. There was high interest in joining the government party, and also in campaigning throughout the country, and according to one newspaper more than 1,200 candidates declared for the national election. Approximately 700 candidates as independents without political party affiliation, with the ratio of candidates to available seats in the House being more than 6 to 1. Where there were many candidates, voter interest and participation was higher than for comparable provinces without the challenge of several competitors for each position, and available data shows that every province with candidate ratio of 2 or less to 1 had below average voter turnout.

Political campaign strategy in the February 1969 elections involved as principal actors the appointed officials and local community leaders, and this group still represents the main sources of influence among rural voters. One observer suggests that abbots, teachers, district officers and village headmen, in that order, hold the local power over election outcome. This situation helps explain why the government and political opposition attempted to recruit or sway the provincial and local leaders during organizational and campaigning phases, and furthermore, why several government party officials called district officers together to “explain the party’s policies.” Moreover, local officials made up a large proportion of the candidates, presumably to take advantage of their acceptability among the influential people and their greater exposure to the provincial population. One example was provided by Prachuab Kiri Khan in the mid-south area of the Kra Peninsula. Eight candidates had applied for the one available seat. Except for a leader in the Thai Fisheries Association, a young lawyer and a prominent merchant, the five were all associated with the provincial political or governmental structure. The two most popular candidates were the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly and a district police officer whom the voters nicknamed “Mr. Heart.” As the government party nominee, Mr. Heart won the seat for his province, and this situation was repeated in many of the elections in the provinces.

In late September the Lord Mayor and provincial assemblyman of Satun was reported to be developing support of village chiefs and headmen for the election, while the winner in
Rayong Province was a former deputy finance minister in a previous government and ex-member of the Assembly for several terms.\textsuperscript{33} In fact, of the 219 elected representatives, 54 were former members of the Assembly. The overall political activities of provincial and local leaders reflected a broad interest in the elections and a desire to participate actively as candidates, inferring a certain voluntary compliance and legitimacy for an electoral system of government. Another source of voluntary approval came from urban students. Active as poll watchers and vote tabulators in both the September Bangkok municipal elections and February national election, the students were welcomed by the political opposition and discouraged by the government, who refused to sanction them as official poll watchers. Nonetheless over 2,800 volunteered and they filed several protests of fraudulent activities, most of which were against the government party.\textsuperscript{34}

Regardless of the government parties extensive efforts, there were early signs that the election might not produce a majority of government party members, and canvassers reported in July 1968 that many potential voters disliked the government because of the unpopular officials sent to govern them, particularly in the northeast.\textsuperscript{35} In September the Bangkok voters turned out a pro-administration incumbent municipal council plus another group of government-supported “independents” in favor of the opposition Democratic Party candidates. The Democratic Party also won four seats in elections for the Chiang Mai municipal council at the end of 1968. In early January the leader of the government party slate in Bangkok predicted his candidates hoped to win half of the Bangkok seats, but a party rally in Bangkok was disrupted by jeers, booing and rock-throwing opposition elements.\textsuperscript{36} In general, the government leaders were slow to organize and direct their resources towards building an effective party machinery and up-country recruiting of potential candidates fell to several competing factions within the government. Moreover, government candidates were not popular in the northeast, where dislike of local bureaucrats out-weighed the obvious advantages of government patronage. Elsewhere, however, the government party formed a reasonably strong team supported by the various government factions.

Campaigning brought out the factional competition between government party members, and some attacked their own party members, a tactic that more often worked against the accusers, and to the detriment of the government party. Other candidates shunned any open party affiliation, and after
the elections they claimed to have won as popular individuals, not as party members. Once the 219 party nominees were selected, many of the other hopefuls declared their candidacy as pro-government independents, while some remained ostensibly independent and thus in opposition to the government party. There was a confusing array of candidates, including party members who attacked the other government candidates, independents who supported the government and others who fit neither pro-government nor opposition groups. Voters faced a difficult choice even while it heightened their interest in the elections. The northeast provinces provided an interesting example of this impact on the voting for candidates who advocated extreme policies such as socialism and neutralism, where they were rejected for the most part, although seven out of the eight extremists elected came from the northeast. While many voters did not support the government party representatives they elected 33 independents most of whom openly campaigned as pro-government candidates.

Country-wide the results established in the House of Representatives at least two opposition political groups: those who were elected as various opposition party candidates, numbering about 72, and the large group of 72 independent politicians whose support for various government policies was yet to be determined. The government party won about 35 percent of the seats, 75 out of 219 total. If the Assembly was to function, the ruling group had to make terms with one or both groups to gain support. The non-government political parties divided into two tentative positions. The Democrat Party with 57 members was the oldest political party in Thailand. It had served as both government and opposition, but campaigned in 1969 as a loyal opposition party. It had gained solid support in Bangkok where the party won all 21 available seats, and also won most of the seats in the northern provinces and a reasonable share in the northeast and south. The party members used good organization, campaigned on the policies rather than as individual candidates, and they pledged to try to amend the Constitution to make it more democratic. Thus, they presented a conservative opposition, reasonably widely known and respected.

Close to the policy position of the Democrat Party was the Democratic Front Party which elected seven members, the third largest political party. It claimed to possess a large political party membership but nominated only 54 candidates. In parliamentary maneuvering after the election, the leader shifted his alignment away from the conservative Democrat Party towards more extreme splinter parties and interested
independents. This group included about 30, with approximately 50 percent from the smallest parties and the rest from the independent House members.

The clearest example of government accommodation to potential opposition groups appeared in attempts to gain the open support of the independent politicians. Leaders of the government met shortly after the election to discuss means of getting their support. Estimates of pro-government members ran from 40 to 60, including those who were members of the Free Peoples League of Thailand (FPLT) and presumed loyal to the ruling clique. At first about 60 of the 72 independents refused to join with the government party, but behind the scenes persuasion convinced a growing number to support the government, "to ensure stability of Parliament and allow a democratic process to function...". By the end of March about 20 had come into the government party, which left it still short of a majority.

On two measures of organization the government successfully bargained for support from the remaining opposition elements. In early March the Prime Minister outbid the Democrats for independents' votes for election of the House Speaker and second deputy, and in exchange the independent nominee for deputy speaker was supported by the government party. Later in the month, government leaders obtained support from the Democrat Party for the composition of eight standing Commissions of the House. Each commission's membership was voted through as a list, and included 17 non-government party members: eight independents and nine Democrats.

The compromise caused a walk-out protest by 32 other independents and lesser party members, one of whom charged the proceedings to be a "tyranny of the majority." Nevertheless the government had indicated its willingness to deal with the opposition groups to achieve a majority position in the House of Representatives. However, cooperation has its limits, especially on the issue of constitutional amendment. Opposition parties had criticized the Constitution and during the campaign had promised to attempt its amendment. With this purpose in mind, the Prime Minister was questioned during the opening parliamentary debate on government policy. Visibly controlling his anger, the Prime Minister stated that it would not be amended since it was presented by His Majesty to the people. In later comment to the press, opposition politicians elaborated on their criticism that the government is not of the people until the elected representatives are allowed to decide on its legitimacy through a vote of confidence or no confi-
Maneuvers among the extreme opposition aimed at unifying a position on a constitutional amendment proposal, and other "unreasonable" demands by House members, eventually led to the 1971 coup which settled the constitutional issue by declaring martial law and dissolving the Parliament.

The Future of Thai Student Activism
and the Prospects for Political Change

Though the campaign and elections of 1968-1969 reactivated political parties, and other civilian groups including the students, the results of all this political activity and the constitutional provisions protecting the permanency of these results met the same fate as all previous attempts at parliamentary government. As in the past, when the military felt it could no longer tolerate both the costs and criticism of the members of parliament, the ruling clique simply rolled out the tanks and after announcing a coup, dissolved the Parliament, declared martial law and ruled by executive decree.

The prospects of this kind of change of government were somewhat diminished in the immediate aftermath of the October student revolt of 1973, but not completely eliminated. The military leaders are not likely to mildly acquiesce to the results of the new order of government for a prolonged period. The military has played a significant role in the Thai government's decision-making process since 1932, and it is reasonable to assume that they will remain a major influence in the shaping of the new government in the summer of 1974. There is even a remote chance that the military may resort to the coup, if the demonstrations which have continued through December, 1973, becomes more violent or directed against the present military leaders, or in the event that the ongoing student movement becomes exceedingly leftist in nature and tactics.

There are also significant cultural factors which will continue to plague the apparent success of the student revolt in moving the Thai elite to accept their demands for free and open elections as the basis for change in governments, and parliamentary government as a basis for decision-making. In addition to the many cultural factors cited in previous chapters, as to why the typical Thai citizen tends to be politically non-participant, there are also certain cultural determinants which play a major role in the behavior of the elected member of parliament. Decision-making through the legislative process, usually necessitates open debate and compromise. Often the
debate on the pros and cons of any issue is often characterized by the proponents on either side taking firm stands on their own interpretations of how the issue should be resolved. Backing down from one's initial stand on an issue is all part of a resulting compromise common to much of the conflict resolution in most legislative bodies in the Western democracies. However, it is not common for the Thai to engage in open and heated debates over an issue, nor is it acceptable to his friends, colleagues and constituents for him to compromise openly once he has taken a noticeable stand on an issue. To do so would be to "kai naa" (lose face and respect) and seriously threaten any further effectiveness on his decision-making. Hence, it seems that if the Thai elite, who have apparently accepted student demands for a more democratic process for political change, are to have an effective and permanent parliament, they must either adapt this legislative institution to Thai cultural patterns or undergo major cultural change themselves. Significant change in values has apparently become a noticeable priority of some of the student leaders, who felt that merely removing some Thai military elite at the top of the government apparatus would not make for permanent and necessary changes. Marches were organized against personnel in other significant levels of the government bureaucracy where information and advice for many of the government decisions are provided. Moreover, the whole educational system came under attack as the students began to launch a series of demonstrations all over Thailand against selective highschool teachers and university professors, who the students felt were corrupt and overly authoritative. This seemingly disrespectful behavior on the part of the students became commonly referred to as "sit lang kru," which literally translated means "student who wash teachers." Some of the events which characterized the beginnings of this Thai cultural revolution are described in the following section of this chapter.

Student Activism in the Vanguard for Change After the October Revolt

The successful student revolt of October, 1973, marked a significant departure from all previous changes of government in Thailand, in that the new government was not only civilian dominated, but that it had ascended to dominance through the efforts of a prolonged and well-organized student-led demonstration. Moreover, the victory for the civilian led government was obtained at the expense of the army and the police when these two groups were in complete control of a government ruling by martial law. This was no small accom-
plishment, and the students were quick to grasp the implications of their increased power-base. While the period immediately following the forming of a civilian government showed a sudden decrease in general civilian protests and other related political activities, there was a steady increase in student activism and protest demonstrations throughout the country.

In the months immediately following Sanya Thammasakdi’s accession to the Prime Minister, student protest were mounted against provincial governors, high-ranking university officials and other educators, a major Thai newspaper, the United States Ambassador, and Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan. One such protest occurring on October 21st, and involving an estimated 5,000 students in the Northern province of Lamphun demanded and obtained the resignation of the Governor Rong Thasanachalee for alleged corruption in administering funds allocated for local school projects. Another more revolutionary kind of protest involving the Dean of the School of Public Administration at the National Institute of Development Administration (N.I.D.A.) occurred in mid-November, 1973. The Dean, Dr. Amorn Raksasatya, was forced to resign from his position, for misrepresenting the students and the student revolt in an informal meeting with Thai students in Tokyo. While attending a conference in Tokyo, Dr. Amorn agreed to speak at an informal gathering on Thai students about the important events that had occurred in Thailand before he left. Apparently, while giving his version of the student revolt he was being taped, and the tape was subsequently sent back to Thai student leaders in Bangkok for review transcription, and distribution. Soon thereafter, Dr. Choop Kanchanapakorn, the rector of N.I.D.A., and appointed MP to the National Assembly, announced his resignation.42 A more democratic system was proposed whereby candidates for Rector would be chosen by referendum, and subject to approval by a board of Deans of the various institutes, and the Dean was to be selected by a majority vote of the school’s faculty. The system was overwhelmingly approved by referendum with 80% voting in favor of the new system of selection. Under the new system Dr. Thinapan Nakata was elected Dean of the School of Public Administration and Dr. Somsak Xuto was chosen as N.I.D.A.’s new Rector. More important than the shift in persons at the top of this institution, was the fact that the appointment process, so prevalent in the Thai bureaucracy was overruled in favor of a more democratic elective process. If this system of selection becomes institutionalized and begins to permeate various levels
of the government bureaucracy in other educational and service-oriented institutions, significant change may well take place in making the traditional bureaucracy more accountable. However, while there were early indications that other institutions were ready to adapt the new system (e.g., Kasetsart University), there were also indications of resistance to this system by those who maintained that it was incompatible with Thai culture.

This apparent "purge" was also directed at the Dean's assistant who had accompanied him to the conference and taped meeting. It was no small coincidence that both men had been requested (and of course had to accept) to act in an advisory capacity to the National Executive Council (NEC) of the ousted government of Thanom and Prapas. Immediately thereafter, many of the tradition-bound educators and other high-ranking officials in the government bureaucracy began either to "change" their views on the significance of the student revolt and the importance of heroes of the revolution, or keep their opinions to themselves. Student leaders, having blacklisted many of the high-ranking officials in the bureaucracy, were usually not able to have these people removed from government service, but did manage to have many of them transferred to less sensitive positions located in some of the most remote provinces of Thailand. The students therefore effectively utilized the age old bureaucratic technique of transfer to dismantle much of the supporting cast of the Thanom-Prapas clique.

Thus, in this particular instance, the students departed significantly from what might be expected of them according to Thai cultural patterns of respect for the more important cause of the "revolution." Moreover, this event forced at least a slight change in the attitude of some of the high-ranking officials in the crucial levels of the traditional Thai bureaucracy. Some student leaders realized the necessity to change cultural values of the established authorities, particularly among the educational administrators. An informal practice which eventually was to be referred to as "lang Kru" (literally translated meaning "wash" or "clean-up" the teachers) began to be carried out by students at every level of the Thai education system, being particularly intense at the university and high school levels. The purported purpose of the "washing" exercise was an attempt to "modernize" teachers' view of students and student-oriented programs for reform. Moreover, it grew out of desire on the part of many students to have teachers better understand student values,
behavior and aspirations. However, the harsher interpretation of “lang kru” is to, “clean out” by removal or transfer, in such cases where teachers are seen as a threat to the student’s political and social movement. If permanent acceptance, tacit or real, of the democratic innovations proposed by the students is to be a reality, change in various crucial levels of the Thai bureaucracy must take place.

Another significant departure from all previous Thai student movements were the emergence of influential independent student organizations which broke away from the “moderate” and more central positions of the National Student Center of Thailand. The most significant of these organizations is The Free Thammasat Movement, led by Saeksan Prasertkul, the political science student who played a significant role in the demonstrations which led to the overthrow of the military regime. A close affiliate of The Free Thammasat Movement and apparent counter-part at Chulalongkorn University is the Independent Chulalongkorn Student Group. Both student groups are extremely nationalistic and support more socialistic positions on domestic issues and anti-imperialistic positions on foreign policy issues, than does the National Student Center. These particular groups continue to be in the vanguard of the protest demonstrations for structural and policy change in Thai government. It was the Independent Chulalongkorn Student Group which launched a city-wide protest against the newly appointed American Ambassador William Kintner, in mid-November, 1973. Posters demanding to “Chase Kintner Away” were displayed around the Chulalongkorn University campus, while students distributed over 30,000 leaflets at all throughfares in Bangkok. The leaflets described Kintner as a career military man and warned the Thai people that the new U.S. Ambassador would be “war-minded” in his approach. The leaflets further attacked American “imperialism” and contended that:

American intervention in Indo-China has caused adverse effects on Thailand. Support for the previous military government has led to the decay of democracy in Thailand, and American bases here have tarnished the good image of Thailand as an independent country.  

It took less than two months for Ambassador Kintner to fulfill the students prophecy of “intervention”, as a widely publicized C.I.A. blunder provided adequate proof that this agency was in fact “meddling” in the affairs of the Thai government. The incident was especially embarrassing to William R. Kintner, who was not only a former U.S. Army
Colonel, but also worked for the C.I.A. for two years in Washington. In a rare instance of openness, the U.S. Embassy admitted the C.I.A. involvement and Ambassador Kintner issued an official apology to the Thai government.

The bizarre incident involved a C.I.A. agent whose base of operation was the provincial town of Sakhon Nakhon in Northeast Thailand, an area where communist insurgents have steadily increased their activities in the last five years. The agent apparently sent a phony letter to Prime Minister Sanya Thammasak, and several newspapers as well, proposing a cease-fire with the insurgents in exchange for granting autonomy to rebels in Thailand's northeastern provinces. The letter from the C.I.A. agent was sent in the name of the local rebel commander of the estimated 2,000 communist insurgents in Sakhon Nakhon.

The C.I.A.'s involvement was revealed by an apparent blunder by a messenger boy who had the letter registered allowing Thai officials to trace it to the C.I.A. office in Sakhon Nakhon. While Ambassador Kintner, in his apology, described the agent's actions as a "regrettable" and "un-authorized initiative", suspicious Thai officials wisely surmised that the letter was designed to assess the new government's response to a cease-fire with the communists. Apparently, the students also realized that the most regrettable aspect of the incident as far as the U.S. Embassy was concerned was the fact that the C.I.A. agent's activities were unfortunately exposed. With the support of most of the Thai language newspapers, the students launched a series of protest activities directed at U.S. intervention in Thai affairs. On January 6, 1974, Thai students laid a wreath in front of the Embassy bearing the slogan "Go home, ugly Americans", while the newspapers carried anti-C.I.A. editorials and cartoons.

Hoping to stem the tide of anti-C.I.A. and anti-American sentiment which was on the rise after the incident, Ambassador Kintner, on January 8th, disclosed that the C.I.A. agent responsible for the letter was transferred out of Thailand, while an embassy spokesman revealed that "appropriate disciplinary action" was being taken. Apparently the students were unimpressed with Kintner's explanation, for on the very next night, January 9th, about 5,000 students protested at the U.S. Embassy grounds, while student leaders attacked the C.I.A. over a public address system outside the embassy gates. More important, several days after the C.I.A. incident, senior Thai officials revealed that the C.I.A. would be told to close its field posts and stay out of Thailand's internal affairs.
Previously, the C.I.A. had enjoyed Thai government cooperation for most of their clandestine activities. Operating out of the political section on the fourth floor of the U.S. Embassy under the agency's Plans Directorate, the department became known as the "dirty tricks department." The C.I.A. operation in Thailand has been one of the largest overseas operations and one of the most effective in cultivating an exceptionally close relationship with the former Thai Prime Minister, Thanom Kittikachorn. According to informed Thai sources, the relationship was so close that Thanom often made himself much more available to the C.I.A. chief than to the U.S. Ambassador.

During the same tumultuous weeks of the C.I.A. incident, thousands of Thai students gave Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka a hostile reception as he arrived in Bangkok for a two-day visit. The students massed outside Tanaka's hotel and blocked all the entrances with buses and demanded that Tanaka leave the country immediately. They withdrew that threat and moved the buses only after Japan's ambassador accepted a list of demands from them. These demands included that:

1. all Japanese loans to Thailand be without conditions.
2. Japan lift its import quotas on Thai products.
3. the Japanese government train all prospective Japanese investors in Thailand in Thailand's needs, tradition, and culture.

Thereafter, the students allowed Tanaka to leave his hotel, but as he left they beat on his limousine and shouted "Japanese go home." Interestingly enough, the police did not interfere, and only student marshals with red arm-bands held back the noisy crowd of students who began burning paper effigies (i.e., Japan-made cars) in front of the Japanese Trade Center nearby.

During the months following the student revolt, a major student protest was also launched against Thailand's most influential Thai language newspaper, Siam Rath, because of a letter critical of King Bhumibol. At a student rally the newspaper was publicly burned as a symbol of the students' discontent with the letter and determination to censor the editor from further publication. Shortly thereafter, the Thai police suspended the editor's license indefinitely for publishing the article by two Thais in Sweden criticizing the King for not controlling troops and police during the student revolt
in October, 1973. The newspaper’s editor, Nopporn Boonyarit, hopelessly attempted to defend himself by asserting that the paper was simply trying to expose attempts to undermine the monarchy.

As described in previous chapters, the monarchy and particularly the present King, has always played a significant role of respect and admiration in all Thai student movements. King Bhumibol has been continually involved in public activities, and especially those activities related to Thailand’s youth. Moreover, since his accession in 1955, he has personally presented the diploma to every university graduate in the country. A photo snapped of each such presentation are hung on the wall of around 15,000 Thai homes every year.

While the student protest was an attack on the newspaper, Siam Rath, and in support of the King, it had the intended effect of putting all newspapers on notice that public criticism of those people and ideals held sacred by the new student revolution would not be tolerated. The implications of the latter became much more significant to the student leaders who continued in their strategy to change the Thai society and political system.

The Role of the NSCT

Voluntary public support for the main student organization, the NSCT, continued since the October uprising and as of December 1973, the NSCT had received almost 20 million baht (approximately 1 million in U.S. currency) in donations from the public. Some of the money was used to help the families of those who were killed while other funds went toward paying the medical bills of those demonstrators who were injured during the uprising. The NSCT also set aside a huge sum as a proposed budget for the “teaching democracy program” which was to begin at the end of the 1973-1974 academic year. University authorities have co-operated with the proposed student program by re-scheduling the completion of the second semester so that the students could be released from classes as soon as possible. Moreover, by December 1973 government officials were also “persuaded” to assist the NSCT programs. The NSCT though led mainly by upper-classmen, graduate students, and even students who refused to graduate, know that only continuity in their own organization will assure the programs they fought so hard to establish. Eventually, even most “professional students” grow up and enter the government bureaucracy or politics and the NSCT could not continually enjoy the voluntary efforts and fund raising which occurred immediately after the October revolt. Hence, the NSCT leaders, pressured the Prime Minister to eventually agree
to provide a “special” fund for the NSCT from the national budget. If this budgetary procedure becomes officially recognized for future fiscal years, the NSCT might be guaranteed permanency through salaried positions of its bureaucratic organization and its politicized leaders might then remain on as monitors for the reforms of the social revolution.

The NSCT teaching democracy program is designed to have all people in all provinces become aware of the purpose and political implications of democratic institutions and principles. The students have planned to bring the message to the people through the use of several thousand dedicated NSCT members who would spend their time and energy “teaching democracy” in the outer provinces and remote villages of Thailand. Student leaders apparently realize that the success of their “cultural revolution” in the provinces will, in large part, determine the permanency of the political changes they have already achieved as well as the acceptance of effective constitutional government in the future.

**EPILOGUE**

If the students continue to be increasingly more aggressive there is the possibility that public sympathy might shift away from their movement. Generally, the Thai are very sympathetic people, and tend to empathize with even those who are wrong if their fall from power is accompanied with severe punishment or extreme ridicule. In keeping with the wisdom of the Thai proverb “khon lorn jaa kam” (if a person falls do not step over him), the Thais, even if they were not overly sympathetic toward leaders are usually very reluctant to heap additional abuse on persons in a beaten situation for fear of retaliation in the future. Moreover, many Thais still hold the belief that to abuse a person when he is down helps that person gather special powers which he will then use against his abuser. From a strictly cultural perspective some of the very conditions which supported the students in their quest for power might prove to be their undoing. In the immediate aftermath of the student revolt when the police finally returned to the streets of Bangkok many were immediately confronted by student abuse. Some policemen were even spit upon while others were openly chided with remarks such as, “that big policeman looks rather small these days.” Moreover, there occured some public criticism of some student demands to have Thanom, Prapas, and Colonel Narong extradited and returned to Bangkok to be tried for “their crimes against the people” of Thailand. The vindictive kinds of retaliatory
actions apparently were beyond the limits of the commonly accepted Thai cultural patterns. There were certain indications that the political wind had already begun to shift to a more moderate position by mid-December, 1973.

In the balloting for the 299 members of the temporary National Assembly in December 1973, Kukrit Pramoj, a moderate-liberal, received the most votes while Puay Ungpha-korn, an economist of Thammasat University and former student and supporter of Pridi, received the second highest number of votes cast. Others chosen among the 299 as representatives included numerous educators, and even several village headmen ("phu yai baan"), and commune chief ("kam-nan"), while 46 members, approximately 15% of the temporary legislative body, were from the various branches of the armed forces and police. An interesting feature of the new temporary legislative assembly was that most of the members had backgrounds in political science.

Kukrit, an astute politician, as well as author, editor, instructor and practitioner in classical Thai arts and drama had been wooing the student and faculty support at Puay’s own political base at Thammasat University.

Soon after the election of the temporary legislature, political parties once again began to emerge and mobilize support for party leadership. The most familiar and oldest established party, the Prachatipat (Democrat) Party gathered over 5,000 members together to hold elections for party officers in late February. M.R. Seni Pramoj, older brother of the flamboyant Kukrit Pramoj was unanimously elected as party leader and potential Prime Minister, by the convention held at Hua Mark Sports Stadium. Seni was no stranger to the Thai political arena having served as leader of the Democrat Party, in previous campaigns and was once Ambassador to the United States during World War II, and former Prime Minister of the caretaker government which was created immediately after the war. The party’s twenty-two man executive committee also began to formulate party policy for the coming election. One new far-reaching policy involved proposed plans for the establishment of a labour federation for the negotiations of wages and working conditions. Other announced intentions of the party platform included:

1. government intervention to protect the public interest, and also to uphold the principles of private property and free enterprise.

2. support of local self-government with the decentraliza-
tion of authority and budgetary funds to local administra-
trations.
3. support of a total separation of civil service from poli-
tics to enable the development of a more efficient service system free of corruption and oppression.
4. separation of investigative powers from the powers to arrest to expedite litigation and judicious proceedings.
5. a proposed "land to tillers" program in an effort to aid farmers with irrigation, fertilizer, labour-saving machines and settlement of their debts.

Other party policies alluded to the customary platitudes of party platforms (e.g., "to combat deterioration of morals" and "support of the family system"). However, Seni catered to the predominant political climate and social conditions when he indicated that the overall economic policy of the Prachatipat would be "mild socialism." As the proposed campaigns and the party platforms of the Prachatipat and various other political parties began to enfold and dominate the media in late February and early March, the role of the students and student leaders became increasingly vague. The Thai public and media which had steadfastly supported the students in almost all issues and actions before, during and after the October revolution of 1973, began to turn their attention to the upcoming elections and criticize the behavior and proposals of student leaders.

Moreover, it seemed as though the public had began to show weariness with the many strikes, demonstrations, and the sometimes violent fighting among students from various vocational schools which became commonplace in the three months which followed the October revolt. The public seemed to express the sentiment that since the military "tyrants" were overthrown and the new constitution was already drafted, the students had accomplished their main mission. Therefore, in view of rising inflation, the energy crisis, and sagging economy, the Thai public became more interested in practical solutions and traditional moderate approaches to political change.

However, the student leaders remained determined to continue the movement which had lost much of its momentum by March, 1974. Student leaders began to attack various activities of the government and business leaders in search for an issue that would gain nationwide support. With the major opposition, the former military ruling clique, no longer in power, even the moderate NSCT will have a more difficult time convincing a public suffering from a major economic
depression which reached crisis proportion after the October revolt, to support them on various idealistic issues. The major opportunity which still remains for the leaders who wish to maintain some continuity in the student movement is the "teaching democracy" program which will send thousands of students to the country-side in late March, April, and May of 1974. Whatever the outcome of this very promising grassroots exercise, Thai students and the NSCT will be forever remembered as the group most responsible for the ending of military rule by martial law and the establishment of a new constitutional government dominated by civilians.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VII


7. See Phillips, op. cit., p. 34

8. See Wilson, op. cit., p. 273.


12. Almond, op. cit., p. 114


32. Siam Rath (September 3, 1968).
35. Thai Rath (July 28, 1968).
40. Bangkok Post (March 25, 1969).
42. Bangkok World (Nov. 18, 1973).
43. Ibid.
44. See Footnote 26 in Chapter 1.
45. The King appointed 2,346 persons from various professions and regions of the country to cast ballots and choose among themselves the 299 most qualified people to represent the Thai in the Temporary National Assembly.
46. Bangkok Post (February 25, 1974).
47. Ibid.
48. The "teaching democracy" aspects of the program became somewhat misleading, and after some initial set-backs, student
leaders and advisors who were promoting the program, such as Dr. Chaianan Samudavanijja and Dr. Tawat Wichaidid wisely adjusted their objectives in adapting to the provincial conditions. Before the program had officially begun F.I.S.T., a newly formed break-away student group from the NSCT, under Saeksan’s leadership decided to carry their cause to the provinces. Unfortunately, the Westernized middle-class and urban backgrounds which characterized many of the students of this group hindered them from establishing the necessary rapport with the common people of the provinces. Learning primarily from some of the mistakes and successes of Saeksan’s experiment and the performance (and lack of performance in many cases) of the Democracy Development Program of the late 1960’s, “the teaching democracy” program was redirected in the form of a domestic Peace Corps with the predominant philosophy approaching that of “thought reform”. To improve the establishment of rapport between students and villagers, about 5,000 students were now to be selected and chosen for a particular assignment on the basis of their knowledge of that particular province. Hence, an attempt was being made to assign students from the northeast and South and other provincial areas to their hometowns, and rather than “teach democracy”, they were to reacquaint themselves with the concerns of the villagers. Moreover, students from metropolitan Bangkok who were to be sent to rural areas were now urged to shed their urban and western life-styles and live like the people whose interests they wish to serve, and to listen to the villagers problems before discussing politics.
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APPENDIX
THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF 1974
CHAPTER 1
General Provisions

1. THAILAND is a Kingdom, one and indivisible.
2. THAILAND adopts a democratic form of Government having the King as Head of the Kingdom.
3. THE sovereign power emanates from the Thai people. The King who is the head of the State exercises sovereign power only in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
4. A PERSON may acquire and lose Thai nationality in accordance with the provisions of law on nationality.
5. PROVISIONS of any law which are in conflict or contradictory to this Constitution are void.

CHAPTER 2
The King

6. THE person of the King is sacred and inviolable.
7. NO PERSON may bring an action against or sue the King in any manner.
8. THE King professes the Buddhist faith and is the upholder of religions.
9. THE King exercises legislative power through the National Assembly.
10. THE King exercises the executive power through the Cabinet.
11. THE King exercises the judicial power through the courts of law.
12. THE King holds the title of Supreme Commander of the Thai Forces.
13. IT IS the King’s prerogative to create titles and confer Royal decorations.
14. THE KING selects and appoints qualified persons to constitute a Privy Council of a President and not more than fourteen other Privy Councillors.

The Privy Council has the duty of advising the King upon royal command on all matters pertaining to Royal functions and has such other duties as provided in this Constitution.
15. THE SELECTION, appointment and retirement of the Privy Councillors shall be at the King’s pleasure.

The Royal Command appointing or removing the President of the Privy Council is to be countersigned by the President of the National Assembly, and the Royal Command appointing or removing other Privy Councillors is to be counter-
signed by the President of the Privy Council.

16. A PRIVY Councillor shall not be a permanent government official, Minister of the State or other political official, Senator, Member of the House of Representatives, or member or officer of any political party; nor shall he express any active sympathy for any political party.

17. BEFORE taking office a Privy Councillor shall make the following solemn declaration before the King:

"I (name of the declarer) do solemnly declare that I will be faithful and loyal to His Majesty the King, and I will faithfully perform my duties in the interests of the country and of the people, and will preserve and observe the constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand in every respect."

18. A PRIVY Councillor vacates his office by death, resignation or by Royal Command.

19. THE appointment and removal of the officials of the Royal Household and of the Chief Aide-de-Camp General shall be at the King's pleasure.

20. WHENEVER the King is not in residence in the Kingdom or whenever for any reason he is unable to exercise his functions, he shall appoint a person, with the approval of the National Assembly, to be the Regent. Such an appointment shall be countersigned by the President of the National Assembly.

21. IN THE case where the King has not appointed a Regent under Section 20 owing to his not being "sui juris" or for any other reason, the Privy Council shall submit the name of a person suitable to hold the office of Regent to the National Assembly for its approval. Upon the approval of the National Assembly, the President of the National Assembly shall, by a notification made in the name of the King, appoint such a person to be the Regent.

22. PENDING the appointment of the Regent as provided in Section 20 or Section 21, the President of the Privy Council shall temporarily act as Regent.

If the Regent appointed under Section 20 or Section 21 is unable to exercise his functions, the President of the Privy Council shall act temporarily in place of the Regent.

While being the Regent under paragraph 1 or acting in place of the Regent under paragraph 2, the President of the Privy Council shall not exercise his function as President of the Privy Council. In such a case the Privy Council shall elect one of its members to be its temporary President.

23. BEFORE taking office, the Regent appointed under Section 20 or Section 21 shall make the following solemn declaration before the National Assembly:

"I (name of the declarer) do solemnly declare that I will be faithful and loyal to His Majesty the King (Name of the reigning King), and will faithfully perform my duties in the interests
of the country and of the people, and will preserve and observe the constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand in every respect.”

24. SUCCESSION to the throne shall be in accordance with the Royal House Law on Succession B.E. 2467 and with the approval of the National Assembly.

The repeal of or the amendment to the Royal House Law on Succession B.E. 2467 shall be made in the same manner as that applicable to the constitution.

25. SHOULD there be a vacancy to the throne, the Privy Council shall submit the name of the heir to the throne in accordance with the Royal House Law on Succession B.E. 2467 to the National Assembly for its approval. Upon the approval of the National Assembly, the President of the National Assembly shall invite the heir to take the throne, and shall make the notification thereof to the public.

Pending the notification of the succession under paragraph 1, the President of the Privy Council shall be temporary Regent. If the throne vacates during the time that a Regent has been appointed under Section 20 or Section 21 or that the President of the Privy Council has been Regent under Section 22, paragraph 1, the Regent or the President of the Privy Council, as the case may be, shall continue his regency until the notification of the successor to the throne has been made.

In the case where the Regent, who has been so appointed and who continues his regency under paragraph 2, is unable to perform his duties, the President of the Privy Council shall temporarily act in the place of Regent.

In the case where the President of the Privy Council is the Regent under paragraph 2 or temporarily acts in the place of the Regent under paragraph 3, the provision of Section 22, paragraph 3, shall apply.

CHAPTER 3

Rights and Liberties of the Thai People

26. ALL PERSONS are equally entitled to the protection of the constitution.

27. ALL PERSONS are equal before the law and are equally entitled to the protection of the law.

28. ALL PERSONS shall have the rights and freedom under the provisions of the constitution.

Limitation of the rights and freedom in a manner to violate the intention of the provisions of the constitution cannot be made.

29. Every person shall have complete freedom to profess
any religion, any religious sect or religious creed, and to conduct practice of worship in accordance with his own belief, provided that it is not contrary to his civic duties or to public order or good morals.

In exercising the freedom as mentioned in paragraph 1, every person shall be protected against any act of the State, which would deprive him of his rights or be of detriment to his due benefits, on the ground of his profession of a religion, a religious sect or religious creed or of his conduct of a practice of worship different from those of others.

30. NO PERSON shall be held criminally liable for any act committed by him unless such act is an offence defined by the law at the time of its commission and punishment to be inflicted upon him shall not be heavier than that provided by the law then in force.

31. IN CRIMINAL cases, the alleged offender or the accused shall be presumed innocent.

Before final judgment is delivered convicting any person of having committed an offence, such person shall not be treated as a convicted offender:

An application for release on bail of the alleged offender or the accused shall receive consideration, and excessive bail shall not be required. The denial of bail must be based upon the grounds specially provided by law, and the alleged offender or the accused must be informed of the grounds for such denial.

Persons under detention or undergoing a term of imprisonment are entitled to reasonable visits.

32. ALL PERSONS have bodily freedom.

An arrest, detention, or personal search under any circumstances may be made only by virtue of the provisions of law and any person so arrested or searched shall without delay be informed of the allegation or the cause and appropriate details, of his right to refuse to make statement to the officers and that any statement given may be used as evidence in consideration of the case, and that he has the right to meet and consult with his counsel in private.

In case of detention of a person, the aggrieved person himself, the public prosecutor or any other person acting in the interests of the person so detained has the right to submit a complaint to the local court having criminal jurisdiction, alleging that the detention is unlawful. On receipt of such complaint, the court shall forthwith proceed to conduct an ex-parte investigation. If the court is of the opinion that it presents a prima facie case, the court shall order the person responsible for the detention to produce the person so detained forthwith before the court, and if the person responsible for the detention is unable to satisfy the court that the detention is
lawful, the court shall order instant release of the person detained.

33. ARREST and investigation for prosecution for criminal offence cannot both be carried out by competent officials of the same department, unless otherwise provided by law.

34. IN CRIMINAL cases, the alleged offender or the accused is entitled to speedy investigation and trial.

In the case where the alleged offender or the accused is poor and has no money to acquire counsel, such person is entitled to assistance from the State as provided by law.

35. PERSONS have the right not to give self-incriminating statements which may provide a basis for criminal prosecution of their persons.

Any involuntary admission of guilt extracted from a person by torture, threats or force of any action cannot be accepted in evidence.

36. IF A person serves a criminal punishment as a result of a final judgment, and upon any retrial there is a judgment that such person did not commit such offence, he shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the conditions and procedures as provided by law.

37. NO PERSON may be drafted for military service except by virtue of the provisions of law particularly enacted for the purpose of averting imminent public calamity, or by virtue of the provisions of law when the country is at war or in a state of war, or during the time that a state of emergency or martial law is declared.

38. THE right of persons to be secure in their dwelling shall not be violated.

The right of persons to peaceful habitation and possession of their dwelling is guaranteed. Entry into a dwelling without the consent of the possessor or a search thereof may be made only by virtue of the provisions of law.

39. THE right of private property is guaranteed. The extent and limitation of such right shall be determined by law.

Succession in inheritance is guaranteed. The right of a person to inherit an estate shall be in accordance with the provisions of law.

Expropriation of immovable property may be effected only by virtue of the provisions of law particularly enacted for the purpose of public utility, direct defence of the country, exploitation of national resources, city planning, or for other interests of the State, and just compensation must be paid to owners thereof as well as persons entitled thereto who have suffered damage by such expropriation, as specified in the law. Determination of compensation under paragraph 3
shall be made by taking into consideration the condition and location of the immovable property and the purpose of the expropriation.

40. ALL PERSONS are to enjoy freedom of speech, writing, printing and publication.

Abridgment of such freedom may be made only by virtue of the provisions of law particularly enacted for safeguarding the right, freedom, honour, or reputation of others, or for maintaining public order or good morals or protecting youth against moral degeneration.

Closing of a printing press or prohibition of printing in a manner to affect freedom under this section is void.

No requirement of submission of articles or contents in a newspaper for prior censorship by officials can be required unless the nation is engaged in battle or war or there exists a state of emergency or martial law, provided however such requirement may be made only by virtue of the provision of law enacted under paragraph 2.

Only Thai nationals can own newspapers in accordance with the conditions stipulated by law.

Financial support to a private newspaper shall not be given by the State.

41. ALL PERSONS are to enjoy freedom of education in all kinds of arts and technology provided such education is not contrary to civic duties under the laws governing education and the laws on the organisation of educational institutions.

42. ALL PERSONS are to enjoy the freedom to assemble peaceably and unarmed.

Abridgment of this freedom may be made only by virtue of the provisions of law in the case of public assembly and for ensuring facilities for the public in the use of public places, or for maintaining public order when the country is at war, or in a state of war, or during the time that a state of emergency or martial law in declared.

43. PERSONS enjoy the freedom to form associations.

Formation, objects and operation of an association must not infringe the law.

44. EVERY person enjoys the freedom to form a political party for the purpose of pursuing his political activities by democratic means as provided in this constitution.

The formation and management of political parties shall be subject to the provisions of law on political parties.

Political parties must declare openly the sources of their income and their expenditure.

45. EVERY person enjoys the freedom of communication by post or by other lawful means.

Inspection, detention or disclosure of letters, telegraphs, telephone or other messages which one communicates with
another may be made only by virtue of the provisions of law. All persons have equal rights of access to the means of communication provided for public service.

46. EVERY person enjoys the freedom to choose his residence within the Kingdom.

Abridgment of this freedom may be made only by virtue of the provisions of law particularly enacted for the interests of the security of the country, national economy, public welfare, or for preserving the family relations.

Deportation of a Thai national from the Kingdom can not be effected.

47. EVERY person enjoys the freedom to choose his occupation.

Abridgment of this freedom may be made only by virtue of the provisions of law particularly enacted for the interests of the security of the country, the national economy, public welfare, or for preserving family relations.

48. FAMILY rights are guaranteed.

49. A PERSON or a group of persons has the right to submit a petition under the conditions and procedure prescribed by law.

50. THE right of a person to sue a government body which is a juristic person for its liability for an act performed by any public official is guaranteed.

51. MEMBERS of the armed forces and of the police forces, civil officials and local officials enjoy the same constitutional rights and freedoms accorded to nationals, subject to abridgment imposed by laws, by-laws or regulations issued by virtue of laws involving political activities, efficiency or discipline.

CHAPTER 4

Duties of the Thai People

52. EVERY person has the duty to protect the nation, religion, the King and the democratic form of government of this constitution.

53. EVERY person has the duty to protect the nation.

54. EVERY person has the duty to undergo military service as provided by law.

55. EVERY person has the duty to respect and comply with the law.

56. IN EXERCISING his vote in an election or in referendum, every person must act in good faith and for the common interest.
57. EVERY person has the duty to pay taxes and duties as prescribed by law.
58. EVERY person has the duty to render assistance to the government service as prescribed by law.
59. EVERY person has the duty to attend primary education under the conditions and procedure as prescribed by law.

CHAPTER 5

Directive Principles of State Policy

60. THE provisions in this chapter are intended for the guidance of legislation and administration in accordance with the prescribed policies and do not give rise for any cause of legal action against the State.
61. THE State must maintain its independence.
62. THE State is to promote international relations and adopt the principle of equality among nations.
63. THE State is to co-operate with other nations in maintaining international justice and in promoting world peace.
64. THE State is to establish the administration of justice so that justice shall be available to the people and independence of the courts is guaranteed.
65. THE armed forces are to be properly maintained in so far as they are necessary for safeguarding the independence, security and interests of the nation.
66. THE armed forces belong to the nation and do not depend on any individual, group of persons or political party.
67. THE armed forces may be employed for the purpose of battle or war or for suppression of riots.
   Employment of the armed forces for other purposes shall be in accordance with the provisions of law.
68. THE State is to promote and support education.
   The administration of the educational system is exclusively the function of the State. All educational establishments shall be under the control and supervision of the State.
   In the case of higher education the State is to make arrangements to enable academic institutions to administer their own affairs within the limits prescribed by law.
   Government and municipal academic institutions shall permit equal access to every person according to his own capability.
69. PRIMARY education in governmental and municipal educational institutions shall be provided without charge. The State is to assist the poor to receive appropriate scholarships and material necessities for every level of education.
70. THE State is to promote technological, scientific and statistical research and analysis.

71. THE State is to promote and maintain the culture of the nation, but there shall be no compulsory measures against the will of any person.

72. THE State is to maintain and preserve places and objects of historic, cultural and artistic value.

73. THE State is to maintain natural beauty, including forestry, sources of water and streams.

74. THE State is to promote the search for natural resources for the benefit of economic uses.

75. THE State is to endeavour to remove economic and social inequality between persons.

76. THE State is to organize the ownership and the possession of land for the benefit of agricultural or industrial promotion and prescribe obligations for owners of land to make use of the land, subject to the condition of the land.

77. THE State is to promote ownership by farmers and other agriculturists of land for agricultural purposes.

78. THE State is to promote and maintain agricultural activities. The State is to safeguard and preserve the interests of farmers and other agriculturists in connection with marketing their products.

79. THE State is to promote and support co-operatives.

80. THE State is to promote and support commercial and industrial activities.

81. THE State is to support private economic initiative. The State is to operate activities of public utilities in the manner conducive to common benefit to the people as a whole. Operation of activities of public utilities may be made only by virtue of the provisions of law. The State is to lay down measures to remove direct and indirect economic monopoly by private persons outside the provisions of law.

82. THE State is to encourage and support social welfare for the well-being and happiness of the people.

83. THE State is to encourage the people of working age to work according to their own ability and to protect them from exploitation of labour.

84. THE State is to arrange for disabled persons to have work according to their ability.

85. THE State is to encourage people to have hygienic lodging.

86. THE State is to promote public health as well as mother-and-child welfare and protect the health of all persons. The State is to provide free medical services to the poor. The prevention and suppression of epidemics shall be effected by the State without charge to the people.

87. THE State is to keep all the environment clean and pure and eliminate pollutants which are detrimental to mental
CHAPTER 6

Parliament — PART 1: General Provisions

88. THE National Assembly is composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Joint or separate meetings of the National Assembly shall be in accordance with the provisions of this constitution.

89. THE National Assembly shall elect one of either the Speaker of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives to be the Speaker of the National Assembly and the other to be the Deputy-Speaker of the National Assembly.

Election of the Speaker of the National Assembly and Deputy-Speaker of the National Assembly under paragraph I shall be voted by secret ballot.

The Speaker of the National Assembly has the function to conduct proceedings of the National Assembly at joint meeting in accordance with its rules and has other functions as prescribed in this constitution.

In the case where the Speaker of the National Assembly is absent or is unable to perform his functions, the Deputy-Speaker of the National Assembly shall act in his place.

90. THE Speaker and Deputy-Speaker of the National Assembly shall remain in office till expiration of the term of the Assembly or till dissolution of the House of Representatives respectively.

IF the Speaker or Deputy-Speaker of the National Assembly vacates the office of Speaker of the Senate or Speaker of the House of Representatives, the newly elected Speaker of the Senate or Speaker of the House of Representatives shall fill the vacated office of the Speaker of the National Assembly or Deputy-Speaker of the National Assembly as the case may be.

91. ALL bills shall be promulgated as law only by and with the advice and consent of the National Assembly.

92. AFTER a bill has been passed by the National Assembly, the Prime Minister shall submit it to the King for signature and it shall come into force after its publication in the Government Gazette.

93. IF the King disapproves of a bill and either returns it to the National Assembly or does not return it within 90 days, the National Assembly shall proceed to reconsider such a bill. IF the National Assembly reaffirms the bill by a vote of
not less than two thirds of the total number of members of both Houses, the Prime Minister shall resubmit it to the King. Should the King not return the bill with his signature within 30 days therefrom, the Prime Minister shall cause the formal publication of such bill in the Government Gazette to be enforceable as law, as if the King had appended his signature.

94. IF the King sees that a bill shall effect substantial advantage or disadvantage to the country or to the people and that it should be referred to the decision of the people, he maintains the right to refer the bill to a referendum of all people of the country for a resolution as to whether or not they approve such bill.

Referral of such bill to a referendum, shall be by promulgation of Royal Instruction within 90 days from the date of submission of such bill to the King and such Royal Instruction shall be countersigned by the President of the Privy Council.

In case of promulgation of the Royal Instruction under paragraph 2, there shall be enacted a Royal Decree fixing the date for the people to vote on the referendum within 90 days from the date of promulgation of Royal Instruction and the referendum shall be held on the same date throughout Kingdom.

If the King exercises his right under this section, the provisions of section 93 shall be of no effect.

95. A person who has the right to vote for election of members of the House of Representatives shall also have the right to vote at a referendum.

For the purpose of paragraph 1, the year when there is a referendum shall be deemed to be the year when there is an election and the date of a referendum shall be the date of election.

Principles and procedures for referendum shall be in accordance with the law on referendum.

96. UPON reference of the bill to referendum of the people under Section 94, the resolution shall be decided by a majority of votes. If the public resolution approves the bill the King shall append his signature within 30 days from the date of announcement of result of public resolution, and upon its publication in the Government Gazette, the bill shall come into effect. If the public resolution disapproves the bill, such bill shall be struck out.

97. MEMBERS of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall receive salary and other compensation in accordance with provisions of law.

98. No person may, at the same time, be both a Senator and a member of the House of Representatives.

99. A Senator or Representative may not be a permanent government official.

100. A Senator or a Representative
(1) Shall not take any position or duty in a government department or in any work unit of the State or in any State enterprise or take office of such position in addition to the position of a minister or political government official or the position which has to be taken by a minister as a result of provisions of law or a lecturer in a university or other high educational institutions.

(2) Shall not be a manager, director, consultant, representative, or employee of a partnership or a company in which a government department or work unit of the State or State enterprise has invested or holds more than 50% of the total capital or shares.

(3) Shall not receive any concession from the State or a government department or a work unit of the State or State enterprise or hold such concession or be contractor with the State or a government department or a work unit of the State or State enterprise which concession is in the nature of direct or indirect monopoly.

(4) Shall not receive any money or benefit from a government department or work unit of the State or a State enterprise specially in addition to the money or benefit provided by such government department or work unit of the State or State enterprise with other persons in its usual course of business except if the money or benefit is to be received in connection with the capacity of Senator or Representative or in the capacity of a position which is not prohibited under this section.

This section shall not apply in the case where Senator or Representative receives bounty, gratuity, pension, or annuity for members of the Royal Family or any other money payable under obligation as designed to be paid from the government budget and shall not apply in the case where a Senator or Representative receives or takes office as member of committee of the National Assembly or Senate or House of Representatives or member of the committee appointed in the capacity of a qualified expert in accordance with provisions of law.

101. SENATORS or Representatives shall not conduct themselves in a manner degrading to the assembly.

102. SENATORS or Representatives of not less than 25 in number may submit a petition to the Speaker of the House to which they belong, asserting that a member of either House has conducted himself in manner degrading to the National Assembly. The Speaker with whom the petition if lodged shall refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal.

The Constitutional Tribunal shall inform the Speaker of the House referring the petition under paragraph 1 of their decision.
Where the Constitutional Tribunal decides that the complaint is justified, membership of such representative shall terminate from the date when the Speaker of the House of which the representative is a member receives notice of such decision.

103. SENATORS or Representatives of not less than 5 in number have the right to submit a petition to the Speaker of the House to which they belong asserting that membership of a member of either House has ceased pursuant to Section 109 (3), (4), (5), (6) or (7) or Section 126 (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9). The President with whom the petition is lodged shall refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal for consideration and decision.

The Constitutional Tribunal shall inform the Speaker of the House referring the petition under paragraph 1 of their decision.

104. THE termination of office of a Senator or Representative by reason of expiry of term of office or resulting from a decision of the Constitutional Tribunal shall not affect any business conducted by such member in the course of his duties as a member or prejudice his right to receive salary or other compensation prior to his termination.

PART II:

The Senate

105. THE Senate shall consist of 100 Senators not disqualified under Section 117 and Section 120, elected by the members of the House of Representatives for their expertise in various fields of technology or business whose services will be beneficial to the government of the country.

The Privy Council shall keep a confidential list of the names of 300 qualified persons as prospective candidates for election by members of the House of Representatives pursuant to paragraph 1.

Election of the members of the Senate shall be voted by poll. Principles and procedures for election of members of the Senate shall be in accordance with the law on election of members of the Senate.

Upon election of members of the Senate, the person who acts as the speaker in the meeting for election of members of the Senate shall submit names of persons elected for appointment by the King and shall countersign the Royal Command for appointment of members of the Senate.

106. ELECTION of Senators must be effected within 15 days
from the date of the election of Representatives.

107. THE term of the Senate shall commence on the day the King appoints members of the Senate and shall terminate concurrently with expiration of the term of the House of Representatives or its earlier dissolution.

108. MEMBERSHIP in the Senate shall commence on the day the King makes the appointment.

109. A MEMBER's appointment to the Senate shall terminate on the occurrence of any of the following events:
   1. Expiration of the term of the Senate.
   2. Death of that member
   3. Resignation of that member
   4. Loss of Thai nationality by the member
   5. Commission by the member of any of the acts forbidden by Section 100.
   6. Disqualification of the member under Section 117 (1), (2), (3) or (5) or Section 120 (1) or (2).
   7. Imprisonment of the member by judgment of the Court, except for an offence committed as a result of negligence a petty offence, or an offence which bears the same penalty as a petty offence.
   8. Upon the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal that the member's conduct is derogatory to the Senate.

110. IF a vacancy of membership in the Senate occurs otherwise than by retirement of a member at the end of his term of office, and the remaining term of the Senate exceeds 180 days the Privy Council shall submit to the House of Representatives a list of persons possessing the qualifications under Section 105 numbering three times the number of vacancies whereupon the House of Representatives shall elect replacements. A new member so elected shall serve only for the remainder of his predecessor's term of office.

The provisions in Section 105 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the election in paragraph 1 hereof.

PART III:

House of Representatives

111. THE House of Representatives shall consist of not more than 300 nor less than 240 members elected by the people in accordance with Section 112.

112. EACH province shall have representatives in the House of Representatives determined according to its population as prescribed in the law concerning election of the members of
the House of Representatives.

At least one member of the House of Representatives shall be elected by each province.

Any province which is entitled to elect up to three representatives to the House of Representatives shall be regarded as one electoral district and each province which is entitled to elect more than three representatives to the House shall be divided into electoral districts, and each such district shall be entitled to elect three representatives to the House.

If it is not possible to divide a province into electoral districts on the basis of three members of the House of Representatives per electoral district, then the electoral districts shall be determined first on the basis of three representatives per district, with the remaining districts each having not less than two representatives.

If one province is entitled to elect four representatives to the House of Representatives the province shall be divided into two electoral districts, each district being entitled to elect two members of the House of Representatives.

113. A province which has more than one electoral district must divide the area of the electoral districts contiguously and must apportion the population with the number of the members of the House of Representatives which can be elected, in a number as close to each other as possible.

114. ELECTIONS to the House of Representatives shall be done directly by poll.

In each electoral district the electorate shall be entitled to cast votes for the number of candidates equal to the number of members of House of Representatives which can be elected in that electoral district.

115. A person who has the qualifications stipulated in Section 116 and who is not prohibited under Section 117 is entitled to vote.

116. TO be entitled to vote a person must have the following qualifications:

(1) Be of Thai nationality by law. A person who concurrently possesses Thai nationality and a foreign nationality, or a person who has acquired Thai nationality by naturalisation must have the qualifications as prescribed in the law concerning election of the members of the House of Representatives, persons having Thai nationality by birth who were born abroad need not possess such qualifications.

(2) Being not less than 18 years of age on the 1st of January of the year of election.

117. PERSONS having the following disabilities on the day of the election shall be forbidden to vote:

(1) Being insane or of unsound mind;
(2) Being deaf and dumb and unable to read and write;
(3) Being a monk, novice, ascetic or a priest;
(4) Being under detention by a court warrant;
(5) Being disenfranchised by court judgment.

118. A person who has the right to vote under Section 115 and possesses the qualifications under Section 119 and who is not disqualified under Section 120 shall be entitled to stand as a candidate in an election of member of the House of Representatives. The provisions of Section 117 (4) Shall not apply in the case where a person under detention has not been sentenced to detention by court judgment.

119. A candidate for election must possess the following qualifications:
(1) Have Thai nationality by law. A person who has Thai nationality and concurrently holds a foreign nationality, or a person who has acquired Thai nationality by naturalisation must possess the qualifications prescribed in the law concerning election of members of the House of Representatives. Persons who have acquired Thai nationality by birth but were born abroad need not possess such qualifications.
(2) Be not less than 23 years of age on the election day.
(3) Possess the standard of education as prescribed in the law concerning election of members of the House of Representatives.
(4) Be a member of one political party.

120. PERSONS having the following disabilities shall not stand as candidates for election:
(1) Being addicted to narcotics.
(2) Being discharged bankrupt.
(3) Having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, for an offence other than one relating to negligence, of two or more years, and having been released for a period of less than five years on the day of the election.
(4) Being a civil servant or an official of the local administration with a salary or a permanent position, except for a political civil servant.
(5) Being an official of a state agency or a state subsidised agency.

121. SUBJECT to the provisions of this constitution the regulations and method of election shall comply with the law concerning election of House of Representatives.

122. THE term of the House of Representatives shall be four years from the date of elections.

123. WHEN the term of the House of Representatives expires the King shall promulgate a Royal Decree for the election of the members of the House of Representatives at a general
election, the date of which shall be fixed within 60 days from
the date when term of the House of Representatives expires.
The election day shall be the same throughout the Kingdom.

124. THE King retains the royal prerogative to dissolve the
House of Representatives so that a new House of Representa-
tives may be elected.

Dissolution of the House of Representatives shall be by
Royal Decree which must fix the date of general election
of members of the House of Representatives within 90 days.
The election day shall be the same throughout the Kingdom.

Any event which forms the ground for actual dissolution
of the House of Representatives cannot be used again for
dissolution of the re-constituted House.

125. MEMBERSHIP in the House of Representatives shall
commence on the day of the election.

126. MEMBERSHIP in the House of Representatives shall
terminate upon the following events:

(1) Upon expiration of the term of the House of Represen-
tatives or its dissolution;
(2) Upon death of the member;
(3) Upon resignation of the member;
(4) Upon commission by the member of an act forbidden
under Section 100;
(5) Loss of member’s qualifications under Section 116
   (1) or Section 119 (1), (2) or (3);
(6) Disqualification of member under Section 117 (1),
   (2), (3) or (5) or Section 120 (1) or (2);
(7) Upon resignation of the member from membership in
   a political party or dissolution of the political party
   of which he is a member.
(8) Upon loss of membership by the member in a political
   party. In the case where the court orders the dis-
solution of a member’s political party or where the
political party resolves to remove a member from
membership and he is unable to seek membership
in another political party within 60 days from the date
of the court order or the resolution of the political
party as the case may be, his membership shall
terminate on the day following the expiry of the said
60-day period.
(9) If the member is absent throughout a session which is
   of a length of not less than 90 days.
(10) If the member is imprisoned as a result of court
    judgment except for offences relating to negligence
    or offences which are petty offences or offences
    bearing penalties of petty offences.
(11) Upon a finding by the constitution committee that the
    member conduct is derogatory to the House of Re-

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127. WHEN any vacancy occurs in the House of Representatives, for any reason other than completion of term or as a result of dissolution of the House of Representatives, there shall be an election of a replacement representative within 90 days, except when the remaining term of the House of Representatives is less than 180 days.

Membership of the replacement member of the House of Representatives shall commence on the day of the election and shall continue for the remaining term of the member he replaced.

PART IV:

Provisions applicable to both Houses

128. SENATORS and Representatives are representatives of the Thai people.
129. BEFORE taking office Senators and Representatives shall make the following oath before their House:

"I, (name of swearer) hereby swear that I shall assume all my duties honestly for the benefit of Thai people and shall preserve and implement the provisions of the constitution of the Thai Kingdom in every respect."
130. THE Senate and the House of Representatives, shall each have a Chairman and Vice-Chairman appointed by His Majesty the King in accordance with the resolution of the Houses.
131. THE Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Senate and Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the House of Representatives shall remain in office throughout the term of such House or the House of Representatives earlier dissolution.

(1) Loss of membership in their respective Houses where he is a member.
(2) Resignation from their office.
(3) Becoming a Minister or holding other political position.
(4) Sentence of imprisonment by the court.
132. THE Chairman of the Senate and Chairman of House of Representatives shall have the duties of conducting the proceedings of their respective Houses in accordance with the respective rules of procedure. The Vice-Chairman shall act in place of their respective Chairman when the latter are absent or unable to carry out the functions.
133. IF both the Chairman and Vice-Chairman are absent from any sitting of their respective Houses then the members of
that House shall elect one of their members to act as Chairman of that sitting.

134. ANY sitting of either House shall require the presence of one half of the number of members of the total of that House as a quorum.

135. SUBJECT to Sections 24, 93, 150, 159, 174, 176, 184, 216, 219 and 220, all questions shall be decided by a majority of votes.

Each member shall have one vote. In case of an equality of votes, the presiding officer shall have an additional vote as a casting vote.

136. AT any sitting of the Senate or of the House of Representatives or at joint sitting of the National Assembly, words uttered by members, whether in making a statement of fact or of opinion or in casting a vote, are absolutely privileged. No legal proceedings whatsoever may be taken against them. This privilege extends to the authorized printers and publishers of the Minutes of the sittings of either house and also to persons who have been permitted by the presiding officer to make a statement of fact or of opinion at the sitting.

137. WITHIN 30 days from the date of representative election, the National Assembly shall be convened for first session of its members.

The House of Representatives shall hold one or two ordinary sessions per year as decided by the House.

The date of first meeting in paragraph 1 above shall be the commencement date of the ordinary annual session. The House of Representatives shall determine the date of commencement of its next ordinary general session.

138. EACH ordinary session shall last 90 days, but the duration may be prolonged by the King.

Ordinary session may be closed prior to complete 90 days only with the approval of the National Assembly.

139. THE King convokes the National Assembly. He opens closes its sessions.

The King may open the session in person or command the Heir to the Throne, if he becomes of age, or any other person to perform the ceremony on his behalf.

140. WHenever the interest of the State so require, the King may call an extraordinary session of the National Assembly.

141. SENATORS and members of the House of Representatives jointly or members of either house separately, of not less than one third of the total number of both Houses, have the right to submit a petition to the King requesting a royal command convoking an extraordinary session of the National Assembly.
If the petition referred to in paragraph 1 is signed jointly by members of both houses it shall be submitted to the speaker of the National Assembly. If it is signed by members of the House of Representatives, it shall be submitted to the speaker of the House.

The speaker of the House who receives the petition shall submit the same to the King and countersign the Royal Command.

142. SUBJECT to Section 112, the convocation, prolongation and prorogation of the National Assembly shall be made by a Royal Decree.

143. DURING a session, members of either house are immune from arrest, detention or summons in connection with a criminal investigation or charge, unless the house of which he is a member waives such immunity or the member is arrested in "flagrante delicto."

The arrest of a member of either House in "flagrante delicto" shall be urgently reported to the speaker of the House of which he is a member and the speaker of that particular House may order the release of such a member from detention.

144. No criminal action brought against a member of either House during a session or a recess may be tried by the court during the session, unless permission of the House to which he belongs has been obtained. In any case the proceedings of the court must not interfere with the attendance of such member at the sittings of the House.

However the proceedings of the court prior to the invocation of the plea of membership of either House are valid.

145. IF a member of either House was placed under detention pending a criminal investigation or trial before the opening of the session, the official conducting the investigation or the court as the case may be, shall, at the opening of the session, order his immediate release if so requested by the House to which he belongs.

The order of release under paragraph 1 shall remain valid until the last day of the session.

146. BILLS can only be initiated by the Cabinet, senators or members of the House of Representatives. No finance bills may, however, be initiated by Senators or by members of the House of Representatives unless endorsed by the Prime Minister.

"Finance bill" means any bill dealing with all or any of the following matters namely:

(1) The imposition, repeal, reduction, modification and alteration, remission or regulation of taxes or duties;

(2) The appropriation, receipt, custody or expenditure of State funds;
(3) The raising, guaranteeing or repayment of loans;
(4) Bills dealing with currency.

In the case of doubt, the speaker of the House shall have
the power to decide if the bill is a finance bill requiring the
endorsement of the Prime Minister.

147. SUBJECT to Section 154, Bills initiated by the Cabinet
or by members of the House of Representatives shall be sub­
mitted to the House of Representatives, but Bills initiated by
Senators shall be submitted to the Senate.

148. WHENEVER the bill submitted in accordance with Section
147 has been examined and passed by the House of Representa­
tives or the Senate, the same shall be referred to the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, which
must complete examination of the bill thus submitted by the
other house within 60 days. However, in the case of finance
bill, the examination thereof must be completed within 30 days,
but the above period may, by resolution, be extended by the
House that initiated the bill. The said period of time means the
period during a session counting from the day when the Bill
reaches the respective House.

The period of time as referred to in paragraph 1 does
not include periods of consideration of the Constitutional
Tribunal under Section 151.

If the examination of the bill in the Senate or in the House
of Representatives is not completed within the period speci­fied
in paragraph 1, the Senate or the House of Representa­
tives shall be deemed to have approved of the bill.

On submission of a bill from the House of Representa­
tives to the Senate or vice-versa under paragraph 1, the
speaker of the House in which the bill originated shall de­termine whether the submitted bills are, in his opinion, fi­nance bills. Such a decision shall be final.

If the speaker of the House fails to give his decision whe­ther the bills are finance bills, they shall be deemed not
finance bills.

149. AFTER completion of examination of a Bill:
(1) If approved by the House to which submitted pro­ceedings shall be taken according to Section 92.
(2) If disapproved the Bill emanating from the House of
Representatives, shall be withheld and returned to the
House of Representatives or if emanating from the
Senate shall lapse.
(3) If there are amendments, the amended bill shall be
returned to the initiating House. In such case, each
House shall appoint persons, either from within or
outside the House, in equal number as fixed by the
initiating House, to form a joint committee for the
examination of the bill. The joint committee shall
examine and return the bill with a report to both Houses. If both Houses approve of the bill as returned by the joint committee, proceedings shall be taken according to Section 92. If either House disapproves the bill so returned, it shall be withheld if submitted by the House of Representatives or lapse if submitted by the Senate.

In the examination of the bill, the joint committee shall have the power to summon any person to make a statement of facts or of opinion before it. The privileges provided in Section 136 shall be extended to persons performing their duties under this Section.

At every meeting of the joint committee, the presence of not less than one half of its total number of members shall constitute a quorum and rules of procedure of the House of Representatives governing committees shall apply mutatis mutandis.

150. A BILL, the passing of which is withheld under the provisions of Section 149, may be re-examined by the House of Representatives after the lapse of 180 days counting from the day of its return by the Senate to the House of Representatives. In such a case, if the House of Representatives reaffirms the bill in its original draft, or approves of the amended bill as returned by the joint committee, by a majority of votes of more than one half of the total number of members of the house, the bill shall be deemed to have been approved by the National Assembly and proceedings shall be taken according to Section 92.

If the bill being withheld is a finance bill, the House of Representatives may immediately proceed to re-examine it. In such case, if the House of Representatives reaffirms the bill in its original draft, or approves of the amended bill as returned by the joint committee, by a majority of votes of more than one half of the total number of members of the House, such a bill shall be deemed to have been approved by the National Assembly and proceedings shall be taken according to Section 92.

151. WHEN a bill has been withheld under Section 149, the Cabinet, a Senator or member of the House of Representatives may not submit any bill which has the same or related matter to the withheld bill.

If the House in which a bill was submitted is doubtful whether the bill has the same or related principles as the withholding bill, the speaker of that House shall send that bill to the Constitutional Tribunal for decision. If the Constitutional Tribunal decides that the bill has the same or related principles as the withheld bill, that bill shall lapse.

152. UPON the expiration of the duration or dissolution of the
House of Representatives, all bills which have not been approved by the National Assembly or have been disapproved by the King or have not been returned by the King within 90 days or have not yet been submitted to referendum under Section 94, shall lapse.

153. THE annual budget of the State shall be in the form of an Act. If the Act is not passed in time for the new year, the budget act of the preceding year shall remain in force for the time being.

154. DRAFT bill of the National budget and draft bill on increased budget shall be submitted to the National Assembly by the Cabinet. After consideration by the National Assembly, proceedings shall be taken under Section 92.

Expenditure of State funds may be made only as sanctioned by the law on budget. However, in case of urgent necessity, expenditure may be made in advance, provided that it complies with the rules and procedures prescribed by law. In such a case, ratification by the National Assembly is required at the first opportunity.

Ratification by the National Assembly shall be made in the form of a specific act or included in an act transferring budgetary funds or in supplementary budget act or in the annual budget act for the following year.

155. EXPENDITURE of State funds may be made only as sanctioned by the law on budget. However, in case of urgent necessity, expenditure may be made in advance, provided that it complies with the rules and procedures prescribed by law. In such a case, ratification by the National Assembly is required at the first opportunity.

Ratification by the National Assembly shall be made in the form of a specific act or included in an act transferring budgetary funds or in supplementary budget act or in the annual budget act for the following year.

156. THE Senate and the House of Representatives, by virtue of the provision of this constitution, are vested with the power of supervising the administration of State affairs.

157. AT sitting of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, every member has the right to question a Minister of State on all matters within the scope of his authority. But a Minister may withhold his reply, if he considers that such matter shall not yet be made public for reasons of public safety or of vital interest of the State.

158. SENATORS or members of the House of Representatives numbering not less than one-fifth of the total number of members of each House have the right to submit a joint motion for a general debate in the sitting of their respective house, so that the Cabinet may make statement of fact or of opinion on any questions relating to the administration of State affairs.
The motion under paragraph 1 shall be submitted to the speaker of that House, and the speaker shall give notice of the motion to the Prime Minister, in order that a date for the general debate shall be fixed. Such a debate must then be held within 30 days from the date the Prime Minister has been notified. However, the Council of Ministers has the right to request that such a general debate be withheld if, in his opinion, the matter should not yet be made public for reasons of public safety or of vital interest of the state.

In a general debate conducted under this Section, no resolution may be passed by the House on the subject matter of the debate.

159. SENATORS and members of the House of Representatives jointly or separately consisting of not less than one-fifth of the total number of members of both Houses have the right to submit a joint motion to open a general debate for the purpose of passing a vote of no-confidence in the Ministers of State either individually or collectively.

The joint motion under paragraph 1 shall be submitted to the speaker of the National Assembly or if submitted by members of either house, to the speaker of that particular house.

The general debate or the motion referred to in paragraph 1 shall be held during the sitting of the National Assembly.

When the general debate comes to an end the National Assembly shall pass a resolution for a vote of confidence or no-confidence. Such a resolution shall not be passed on the day when the debate or the motion ends. The no-confidence resolution must have a majority vote of more than one half of the total number of the members of the two Houses.

In the event the no-confidence resolution has less than one half of the total number of the two houses, Senators and members of House of Representatives who have subscribed for a motion for general debate are no longer entitled to support a motion for general debate for passing a vote of no-confidence in the Ministers individually or collectively throughout the sitting of that same session.

160. THE sittings of the Senate or of the House of Representatives shall be public under the conditions specified in the rules of procedures of either House. Secret sittings however, may be held at the request of the Cabinet or of not less than 25 members of either House.

161. THE Senate or the House of Representatives may select and appoint their respective members to form an ordinary committee, and may select and appoint their respective members or non-members to form an extraordinary committee to act or inquire into any matters within the scope of its authority and submit its report to the respective Houses. Such a com-
mittee is empowered to summon any persons to make a state-
ment of fact or of opinion before it or the work or matters
under its consideration.

Privileges as provided in Section 136 shall be extended
to persons performing their duties under this Section.
Membership of committees appointed by the House of Rep­resentatives shall contain members of each political
party in the House in direct proportion to such parties
membership in the House.
In the absence of the rules and procedure of the meeting
of the House of Representatives under Section 164, the
speaker of the House shall determine the proportions indicated
in paragraph 3.
162. AT meetings of the committees, the presence of not
less than one half of the total of its members shall constitute
a quorum.
163. SUBJECT to Section 215, if a question arises as to the
interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution relating
to the constitution, the National Assembly shall have the
power to thus interpret and such interpretation shall be final.
In interpreting the Constitution under paragraph 1 the pre­
sence is required of not less than one half of the total
number of the members of both Houses.
164. THE Senate and the House of Representatives are em­
powered to draw up their own rules of procedure, regulations
concerning election and duties of the speaker of the House, De­
puty-speaker of the House and committees, the conduct of its
meetings, its deliberations, motions, the opening of a general
debate, confirmation of confidence, preservation of regula­
tions and other matters pursuant to the provisions of this
Constitution.

PART V:
Joint meetings of the National Assembly

165. THE National Assembly shall hold joint meetings for the
following purposes:
(1) Giving approval to the appointment of the Regent under
Section 20 and Section 21.
(2) the solemn declaration of the Regent before the national
Assembly under Section 23.
(3) Abrogation or amendment to the Law on Succession to
the Throne B.E 2467 under Section 24.
(4) Giving approval to succession to the throne under Section 25.

(5) Election of President of the National Assembly and Vice-President of the National Assembly under Section 69.

(6) Reconsideration of the bills under Section 93.

(7) Giving approval to the closing of the session under Section 138.

(8) Opening of session of the National Assembly under Section 139.

(9) Consideration of the draft annual budget bill and the draft additional budget bill under Section 154.

(10) Approving payment from government budget under Section 155.

(11) Opening general debate under Section 159 and Section 175.

(12) Interpretation of the constitution under Section 163.

(13) Declaring policy and requesting its confidence under Section 174 and confirmation on requesting for ratification under Section 176.

(14) Consideration for approval or disapproval of the degree under Section 180 and Section 181.

(15) Resolution for abrogation of martial law under Section 183.

(16) Giving approval to declaration of war under Section 184.

(17) Giving approval to Treaties and Conventions under Section 185.

(18) Giving approval to appointment, punishment and removal of chief of a government work unit under Section 204.

(19) Appointment of the Constitutional Tribunal under Section 208.

(20) Considering a motion of allegation against a Ministry under Section 216.

(21) Alteration and amendment to constitution under Section 219 and Section 220.

166. THE rules of meetings of the House of Representatives shall apply mutatis mutandis to the joint meetings of the National Assembly.

167. SUBJECT to Section 163 paragraph 2, the provisions applicable to both houses shall apply mutatis mutandis to the joint meetings of the National Assembly with the exception of appointment of ordinary or extraordinary committee in which case the number of members of the committee appointed from members of each house shall be in direct proportion to the number of each House.
CHAPTER 7

The Cabinet

168. THE King appoints the Prime Minister and not less than 15 but not more than 30 Ministers to form the Cabinet charged with the duties of administering the affairs of state.

The National Assembly shall countersign the Royal Command appointing the Prime Minister.

169. BEFORE taking office, every Minister shall make the following solemn declaration before the King.

"I (name of the declarer) do solemnly declare that I will be faithful and loyal to His Majesty the King, and will honestly perform my duties in the interests of the country and of the people, and will preserve and observe the constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand in every respect."

170. A MINISTER shall not be a permanent government official.

171. NO MINISTER may perform any act prohibited to the Senators and Representatives as provided in Section 100 and may not be a manager, director, consultant, representative or employee of any person, partnership, company or any organization which carries on business for profit.

172. EVERY Minister has the right to attend the meetings and state facts or express his opinion in the House of which he is not a member but he has no right to vote.

The privileges as provided in Section 136 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

173. THE Cabinet before exercising the executive power, shall have confidence of the National Assembly.

Every Minister shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the administration of his office and shall be collectively responsible to the National Assembly for general policies of the Cabinet.

174. THE Cabinet who will exercise the executive power shall declare its policies to the National Assembly for confidence. Confidence resolution shall be decided by over half of total members of both houses present.

175. IN THE case where the Cabinet sees that a problem concerning an affair of the State should be referred to members of Senate and of the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister shall through the President of the National Assembly request a general debate in the National Assembly, but no resolution shall be made by the National Assembly on the debated problem.

176. DURING the time of execution of the executive power after receiving confidence from the National Assembly, if the
Cabinet sees fit, the Cabinet may request the National Assembly to repeat its confidence, in which case the provisions of Section 174 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

177. THE Cabinet shall resign “en masse” upon:
   (1) No-confidence resolution being passed by the National Assembly under Section 159.
   (2) Failing to receive confidence under Section 174 or Section 176.
   (3) The expiration of the term of the House of Representatives or the dissolution of the House of Representatives.
   (4) The resignation of the Cabinet.
   (5) The expiry of Ministership of the Prime Minister under Section 178.

The Cabinet which has resigned shall remain in office until appointment of the new Cabinet.

178. A MINISTERSHIP is terminated by:
   (1) Death of the Minister
   (2) Resignation of the Minister
   (3) Disqualification of the Minister as a candidate for membership of the House of Representatives under Section 119 or his falling under prohibition as provided in Section 117 (1), (2), (3) or (5) or Section 120 (1) or (2).
   (4) The Minister being sentenced to imprisonment
   (5) No-confidence resolution passed by the National Assembly under Section 159.
   (6) The Minister commission of acts prohibited under Section 171.
   (7) Royal Command under Section 179.
   (8) Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal under Section 216.

Provisions of Section 104 shall apply to the termination of the Ministership under Section 178 (2), (3), (4) or (6).

179. THE KING retains the authority to command the resignation of a Minister with the advice of the Prime Minister.

180. IN case of emergency where there is an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamity and the National Assembly cannot be convened in time, or when such event occurs during dissolution of the House of Representatives, the King may issue an Emergency Decree to be enforceable as an Act.

At the next following meeting of the National Assembly, such an emergency decree shall be submitted to the National Assembly without delay. If the National Assembly ratifies the same the Emergency Decree shall be effective as an Act. If the National Assembly withholds its ratification, the Emergency Decree shall lapse, but without prejudice
to the validity of any act done while it was still in force. The ratification or withholding thereof shall be published by the Prime Minister in the Government Gazette. In case of denial of the ratification, the denial shall be effective as from the date following the date of publication in the Government Gazette.

181. IF during a session, there arises necessity to enact law relating to taxes, duties or currency which, in the interests of the state, requires an urgent and confidential deliberation, the King may issue an Emergency Decree to be enforceable as an Act.

The Emergency Decree issued under paragraph 1 shall be submitted to the National Assembly within two days as from the date following the date of its publication in the Government Gazette, and the provisions of Section 180 paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

182. THE KING has the power to enact a Decree as prescribed in the constitution or other laws.

183 THE KING has the power to proclaim and abrogate martial law in accordance with the conditions and manners prescribed by martial law.

In case there is an urgent necessity to proclaim the martial law in certain areas, the military authorities may do so in accordance with the martial law.

After the martial law has been proclaimed for more than 30 days, members of the Senate and House of Representatives altogether or of each house in a number not less than 25 persons have the right to submit petition to the National Assembly for its abrogation by the National Assembly. The resolution to abrogate martial law shall be decided by votes of more than half of the total members of both houses.

The proclamation of abolition of martial law under paragraph 3 shall be processed in accordance with the martial law.

184. THE KING has the power to declare war by approval of the National Assembly.

The resolution granting approval of the National Assembly shall require the vote of not less than two thirds of the total members of both houses.

185. THE KING has the power to conclude peace treaties and other treaties with other countries.

Any treaty which results in the change of Thai territory or requires the promulgation of an Act to make it enforceable, or any military alliance treaty must obtain the approval of the National Assembly.

186. THE KING has the power to grant pardon.

187. THE KING has the power to divest persons of titles and recall Royal decorations.

188. THE KING will appoint and remove military and civil
officials to the rank of Under Secretary of State, Director General and positions of equivalent rank.

189. THE qualifications, recruitment, appointment, promotion, increase of salary, removal and punishment of officials shall be in accordance with provision of law.

190. SUBJECT to Section 15, Section 20, Section 94, Section 105, Section 110, Section 141, Section 169, Section 221 and Section 223, every law, Royal Proclamation and Royal Command dealing with State affairs shall be countersigned by a Minister.

CHAPTER 8

Court of Law

191. THE trial and passing of judgment shall be the exclusive power of the courts and must be conducted in accordance with the law and in the name of the King.

192. ALL courts may be established only by an Act.

193. NO NEW court shall be established solely to try any special case of special charge in place of ordinary courts which are empowered under the law for trying such case.

194. NO law may be enacted effecting alterations or amendments on additions to the law on court organisation or procedures for any special case.

195. JUDGES are to be independent in conducting trials and passing judgments in accordance with the law.

196. THE KING appoints and removes judges.

197. THE appointment, transfer, and removal of judges must be approved by the judicial commission in accordance with the law on judicial service before their submission to the King.

The promotion of judges and their salaries must be approved by the judicial commission in accordance with the law on judicial service.

198. THE judicial commission shall be composed of President of the Supreme Court as chairman of the commission, three judicial officials as "ex officio" commission member as prescribed in the law on judicial service, and another eight qualified commission members of whom four shall be judicial officials selected by judicial officials and the other four pension-retired government officials who were former judges not being political government servants, senators, representatives or lawyers.

Appointment and disqualification of judicial officials and members of the judicial commission shall be in accordance
with the law on judicial service.

199. A COURT martial has the power to conduct trial and pass judgment as prescribed by law. Court martial judges must conduct the trial and pass judgment in accordance with the law. Appointment and removal of court martial judges shall be in accordance with the law.

CHAPTER 9

Other Courts and Organisations of State

200. AN administrative court and a court for labour, tax or social affairs may be established only by virtue of an Act. Appointment and removal of judges, power and duty of the courts, and trial procedures of the court under paragraph 1, shall be in accordance with the law on establishment of such court.

201. IN the case where any dispute arises in connection with the respective powers and duties of courts of law and other courts or among other courts, decision shall be made by the constitutional tribunal.

202. EXAMINATION of income and expenditure accounts of State and income and expenditure accounts, financial and asset statements and the concerned documents of government departments, government work units and state enterprises including other work units as provided by law shall be the responsibility of a specific government to be established by law.

203. THE government department to be established under Section 202 is independent in exercising its power and conducting its duty as provided by law and shall annually propose to the National Assembly and the Cabinet the annual income and expenditure budget of State as well as the report on result of performance and remarks.

204. APPOINTMENT, punishment and removal of chief of the government department under section 202 must be with the approval of the National Assembly.

CHAPTER 10

Local Administration

205. ORGANISATION of local administration shall be in ac-
cordance with the principles of the self-administration, in-
tention of the local people and provisions of law.

206. LOCAL administration at every level in each province
must be by a locally elected organization and its election shall
be at intervals of time as prescribed by law.

   The organisation under paragraph 1 shall be independent in
determining its policy for local administration.

207. THE election of members of the local organisation shall
be made by means of casting direct votes.

   Regulations and procedures for the election of members of
local organisations.

CHAPTER 11
The Constitutional Tribunal

208. THE Constitutional Tribunal shall be composed of 9 mem-
bers of whom three members shall be selected by each of the
National Assembly, the Cabinet and the Judicial Commission
under Section 198 from the qualified persons who have legal
knowledge.

   The judicial commission shall first elect the Constitutional
Tribunal and inform the National Assembly and the Cabinet of
the result of election. Upon election by the National Assembly,
the Cabinet will be advised. Upon election by the Cabinet, the
Prime Minister shall submit names of the persons elected
to the King for his appointment as the Constitutional Tribunal.
The election and appointment must be completed with 60
days from the date of election of the representatives.

   The Constitutional Tribunal shall elect one of its members
as the President. If the President is absent or is unable to
perform his function, the Constitutional Tribunal shall elect a
replacement from its members to be the President for such
meeting.

209. MEMBERS of the Constitutional Tribunal may not be Se-
nators, Representatives, political government officials, per-
manent government officials or local officials.

210. MEMBERS of the Constitutional Tribunal shall receive
salary and other compensation as provided by law.

211. MEMBERS of the Constitutional Tribunal may not take
office for two consecutive periods.

212. A MEMBER of the Constitutional Tribunal shall vacate
office in any of the following cases:

   (1) Upon the first meeting of the National Assembly after
the general election.

(2) Death of the member.

(3) Resignation of the member.

(4) On the member becoming a Senator, a Representative, a political government official, a permanent government official, or a local official.

(5) The member being sentenced to imprisonment.

213. IF any vacancy in the Constitutional Tribunal arises, the National Assembly, the Cabinet or the Judicial Commission, whichever elected the member of the Constitutional Tribunal who vacated office, shall elect a new member to fill up such vacancy.

214. WHEN a bill has obtained approval of the National Assembly and before the Prime Minister will submit such bill to the King for his signature under Section 92;

(1) If members of the Senate and House of Representatives altogether or of each House in a number not less than one fifth of the total members of both houses consider that the bill under paragraph 1 is in conflict with or contradictory to the constitution, they shall propose their opinion to the President of the Senate or the President of the House of Representatives, as the case may be. The President of the House who receives such opinion shall pass the same to the Constitutional Tribunal for consideration and decision and will thereafter inform the Prime Minister of such opinion.

(2) If the Prime Minister sees that the bill under paragraph 1, contains provisions in conflict with or contradictory to the constitution, he shall propose such opinion to the Constitutional Tribunal for its consideration and decision and thereafter inform the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate and the President of the House of Representatives of such opinion.

Pending consideration and the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Prime Minister shall hold procedure to proclaim such bill under paragraph 1 until the decision has been made by the Constitutional Tribunal. If the Constitutional Tribunal decides that such bill contains provision in conflict with or contradictory to the constitution, the Prime Minister shall return such bill to the National Assembly.

215. IF in the application of the provisions of law to any case, the court sees that the provisions of such law fall under the conditions of Section 5 and no decision of the Constitutional Tribunal has been made on such provisions, the court shall hold the trial and passing of judgement for such case for the time being and submit request for opinion through the official procedures to obtain decision of the Constitutional Tri-
The decision of the Constitutional Tribunal shall be applicable to all cases but shall not affect final judgment of court.

216. THE decision of the Constitutional Tribunal shall be final and shall be published in the Government Gazette.

217. THE procedures for investigation of the Constitutional Tribunal shall be in accordance with the law.

CHAPTER 12
Amendment of Constitution

218. AMENDMENT of the Constitution can take place only under the following principles and in the following procedure:

(1) motion for amendment must originate from the Cabinet or members of the Senate or the House of Representatives or both, numbering not less than one-fifth of the total membership of both Houses.

(2) The motion for amendment must be presented as a draft amendment of the Constitution for consideration of Parliament in three readings.

(3) In the voting on the first reading for approval in principle, the method of roll-call must be used. Approval in principle must be given by no less than two-thirds of the total membership of both Houses.

(4) Voting on the article-by-article second reading is to be based on the simple majority.

(5) The third reading must take place after a 15-day lapse following the second reading.

(6) The voting in the final third reading has to be on roll-call and a vote in favour by two-thirds of the total membership of both Houses is necessary for passage.

(7) When the above mentioned procedures have been carried out the draft constitutional amendment bill has to be presented to His Majesty the King. Articles 92 and 93 are applicable here.

219. IN THE voting on the third reading in accordance with Article 218 (6), if the voting is short of the two-thirds membership of both Houses but exceeds half the total membership the bill may be presented again to Parliament for another third reading one year later. If the favourable vote exceeds half the total membership of both Houses, procedure under Article 218 (7) is to be carried out.

In the case of the favourable vote not reaching the number mentioned in the first paragraph, or if within the year men-
tioned in the same paragraph, the term of Parliament expires or is dissolved, the draft amendment is considered defeated.

220. IF HIS Majesty the King considers the Draft Constitution presented to Him under Section 218 or Section 219 affects important interests of the country or people and that it is appropriate the people should decide, His Majesty reserves the prerogative to call a nationwide plebiscite for approval or rejection of the Draft Constitution. In this case, Section 94 Paragraph 2, Paragraph 3 and Paragraph 4, Section 95 and Section 96 will apply.

Transitory Provisions

221. LET THERE be general elections to the House of Representatives in accordance with the provisions of this constitution within 90 days of promulgation of the Constitution.

222. DURING the period between promulgation of the Constitution and general elections in accordance with Article 221, let the National Legislative Assembly set up under the Interim Constitution of the Kingdom carry out the duties of Parliament in accordance with this Constitution. In this case the provisions of Article 99 and Article 100 are not applicable.

223. LET THE Cabinet which administers the nation at the time of the promulgation of the Constitution or is in office prior to the general elections according to Article 221 be the Cabinet under this Constitution. In this case the provisions of Article 170 and Article 171 are not applicable. When general elections have been held the term of office of the Cabinet under the first paragraph expires but the Cabinet will continue as caretaker until a new Cabinet is formed.

224. LET THE orders issued by the Prime Minister under Article 17 of the Interim Constitution continue to be enforced. Amendment or lifting of the orders must be carried out through legislative bills.
About The Authors

Ross Prizzia received his Ph.D. from the University of Hawaii in 1971. As a recipient of an East-West Grant he did research on students under the auspices of the National Research Council of Thailand in 1968 and 1969. In December 1971 he was invited to attend the EROPA conference held in Pattaya, and subsequently prepared a paper on “The Use of Quantitative Techniques in Explaining Student Activism and Administrative Response” which was discussed in the workshop sessions. In 1973 Dr. Prizzia returned to Thailand to gather data on the contemporary developments of Thai student activism, the end result of which is this publication.

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