Comparative Public Administration Study Guide

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE

HOW TO STUDY THIS COURSE

How to Study This Course

     The study of Comparative Public Administration in the study-guide mode
requires that you, the student, do the readings, activities, and exercises in
the sequence assigned. The course is divided into conceptual frameworks
(modules) and within these frameworks several subcategories are addressed,
particularly in dealing with the most significant comparative administration
concepts. These m6dul.es are organized as follows:

Module I - lays the theoretical and conceptual framework for subsequent modules,
chapters and exercises by examining the nature and origins of Comparative
Administration.

Module 2 - provides a brief explanation of the prominent "Models" of Comparative
Administration.

Module 3 - provides an exploration and description of the various variables and
forms of administration in the developed countries. Special attention is
focussed on the place of classic forms in administration and the role of "civic
culture" in Comparative Administration;

Module 4 - provides a brief analysis of the variety of forms of administration
in the developing countries with a focus on Southeast Asia. To this end a case
study on Thailand is presented. Since the primary focus of the course is on
developing nations, greater emphasis is placed on the strategies of
transformation, integration and political development, etc. of the developing
nations.

Module 5 - provides an explanation of the various terms, techniques, and
criteria used in simple and complex comparisons of countries. A comparative
study of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia using a historical approach is also
presented.

Module 6 - provides a sample of bibliographic sources by country. In most cases
the exact catalogue call number at Hamilton Library is also provided.

     How to Approach Each Module

          Each of the modules described above represents an individual study
     unit, with each unit including particular reading assignments, supplementary
     readings, cases, and exercises. In most cases appropriate audiovisual
     materials are also identified. It is important that you do the assigned
     readings and the additional suggested readings identified in the study
     guide supplement. As you do the assigned exercises and cases, it is important
     that you review the "Terms That You Should Know" section of each module.
Unless unavailable to you, the assigned videotapes and films should also be
viewed before proceeding to the next module. Viewing these materials will enrich
your understanding of the concepts dealt with in the modules.

Suggestions on how you should proceed are provided in the following list of steps.

1. After you have looked at the scheduled reading, begin your assignment by reading the brief narrative to each module. This narrative tells you something about the topic and provides information heeded to enable you to place the concepts dealt with in the proper context. In some modules an outline may also be provided.

2. Next, read the cases. (Note: Not all modules will have cases.) The cases vary in length, but they all present the main features of the assigned work by discussing key themes, ideas, and ways of interpreting what you are reading.

3. Continue by looking at the questions at the end of, the assigned chapter and cases. Review these questions before you begin the chapter assignment so you will have some points to look for while you read. When you come across a passage that provides information needed in answering a question, jot it down. Keeping such notes will prove valuable to you when we discuss these questions and answers in class.

4. Now review all the terms in the "Terms You Should Know" section. Or, if it suits your learning style, you may do this as the first step. The important thing is that you review these terms and definitions carefully, more than once if possible.

5. View the audiovisual material (TV tape, film or filmstrip) assigned for the module. While viewing these materials, try to perceive the relationships between the narrative, the terms, and the audiovisual materials you are reviewing. Occasionally a question relating to the audiovisual material is included on an accompanying worksheet; answer it if possible. If an assigned film does not arrive on schedule or is otherwise unavailable, simply omit the assignment, noting the reason for the incomplete assignment. The films and filmstrips are included in the course as an additional way of enriching your experience and understanding the readings and terms that make up the course.

Texts (Assigned Readings)

(Suggested) Thailand: Student Activism and Political Change, by Ross Prizzia and Narong Sinsawsdi.

2,. Various handouts provided by instructor.

Other Activities
In addition to the term papers, students will be grouped according to countries to be covered and for the purpose of a panel presentation and discussion. A country will be selected by each group from the following:

Thailand	Malaysia	Samoa
Philippines		Australia
Indonesia	New Zealand	
Singapore	Vietnam	Micronesia

1. No groups shall comprise less than 2 or more than 3 persons.
2. Each member of the group must select at least one aspect of the administrative process covered in class and in the readings and compare his/her findings with a similar situation in the U.S.

(Note: This will be explained further in class and a model for comparison will be presented.)

3. Grades on the panel presentation will include a "group grade" as well as an individual grade, so it is important that you coordinate your group activities.

I. COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: AN INTRODUCTION

General Background

There was public administration before there was a self-conscious study and teaching of Public Administration, just as business activity preceded a self-conscious study and teaching of Business Administration. The first textbooks and curricula of Public Administration appeared in the United States in the 1920s. These first textbooks provided a definition of a discipline of Public Administration as a science. This science was conceived as value-free, or, alternatively, single-valued, depending on whether efficiency was viewed as a value to be pursued or an end which, by definition, eliminated values when pursued. Both the process of administration and the scientific study of administration had as their purpose the most efficient pursuit of these ends. The central objectives of the scientific study of administration were presumed to be scientific "principles." These principles were conceived as being analogous to those of physics--or perhaps engineering, for they were conceived both as descriptive, as statements of cause and effect and as having an imperative quality, given the acceptance of efficiency as the goal of administration.

As students of administration, some of you may recall from your other administration courses the research of Frederick W. Taylor and his followers in the Scientific Management movement., Taylor's objective was "the development of a true science," a "one best way," by what he conceived to be the tested scientific means of careful observation, measurement, generalization. He and his followers had no doubt that their truths were universals, and in fact Scientific Management had become an international movement and organization by the 1930s. The similarity in thinking between early Public Administration and Scientific Management is not accidental; Public Administration was heavily in debt to the Scientific Management movement. In the opening paragraphs of the first textbooks (in 1926) White explicitly states that this base is management, not law. Public Administration and Business Administration were not only born in the same period, but had many common ancestors.

The nature of the "principles" of public administration, as conceived in the 1930s, were related to the principles which concerned theory of organization as represented at that time for Business Administration by Mooney and Reiley's Onward Industry! (or the later Principles of Organization by Mooney) and for Public Administration by the collection of essays edited by Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick, Papers on the Science of Administration (1937). More specifically, they concerned such matters as hierarchy or the "scalar principle," specialization and the "functional principle," the distinction between staff and line and their proper interrelation, executive functions and coordinating processes. They purported to tell one how he ought, or must organize and operate if he wished to achieve ends sought by organizations efficiently.

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Reaction to the Traditional Literature

Dissatisfaction with the older literature of the 1930s was delayed by World War II, but emerged in the late 1940s. Three items were especially important in this new literature.; Robert A. Dahl's "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems ",Herbert A. Simon's Administrative Behavior; A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization., and Dwight Waldo's The Administrative State; A Study of the Political Theory of. American Public Administration. In general, the charges made and argued were that the early writers had proceeded on premises they had not examined critically, that they had often confused and unwarrantedly mixed fact and value categories, that the claim to a knowledge of scientifically respectable principles were premature and presumptuous, that the understanding of scientific philosophy and methodology was very inadequate if not indeed quite erroneous.

Robert Dahl: A Science of Public Administration?

Dahl saw three problems with Public Administration as a science and his concerns were related to comparative studies as well. These included:

1. The problem "of constructing a science of public administration stems from the frequent impossibility of excluding normative considerations from the problems of public administration" (p. 1). The discussion charges that the traditional theory of organization and administration had confused and unjustifiably conflated fact and value categories, as seen by its treatment of efficiency and by its responses to such "public" matters as responsibility. The conclusion is that while the distinction between fact and value is important, even crucial, "the student of public administration cannot avoid a concern with ends . . . to refuse to recognize that the study of public administration must be founded on some clarification of ends is to perpetuate the gobbledygook of science in the area of moral purpose" (p. 3).

2. The second problem "stems from the inescapable fact that a science of public administration must be a study of certain aspects of human behavior" (P. 4). The discussion here concerns, in part, familiar methodological problems arising from the diversity, complexity and non-repeatability of the phenomena, but centers upon a tendency of writers to build a theory on a vastly over-simplified view of human nature. The writers, he charges, ask us to accept a ludicrously over-simplified Administrative Man rather like--in fact related to--Eighteenth Century Rational Man. Administrative theory must comprehend or at least allow for the emotional and non-rational; it must be sensitive to biases deriving from its historical and geographical matrix: from capitalism, industrialism, rationalism, and so forth.

3. The third problem Dahl presents is the relationship of "principles" to comparative study. Public Administration, he charges, has been all but oblivious to the significance of the social setting of administration. It has assumed that there are organizational and administrative universals rather than proving that there are; building on a parochial base, it pretends to universality. He concludes:

    a. Generalizations derived from the operation of public administration in the environment of one nation state cannot be universalized and applied to public administration in a different environment...,...

    b. There can be not truly universal generalizations about public administration without a profound study of varying national and social

characteristics impinging on public administration, to determine what
aspects of public administration, if any, are truly independent of the
national and social setting . . . .

c. It follows that the study of public administration must become a much
more broadly based discipline, resting not on a narrowly defined
knowledge of techniques and processes, but rather extending to the
varying historical, sociological, economic and other conditioning
factors . . . . (p. 11)

Public and Business Administration

As noted above, Public Administration was created by professors of
Political Science, and the two fields of study continue to have close and
important relationships. For more than twenty years, there has been a separate
professional society, and in some instances Public Administration stands as a
separate school or curriculum or is combined with Business Administration (as it
is at UHWOC). But more customarily, Public Administration is taught as a course
or branch of Political Science, and the parent discipline shows no disposition
to exclude its offspring from its journals and meetings. By definition Public
Administration is a part of the governmental process, even though it draws ideas
and techniques from many fields of knowledge and relates to a multiplicity of
functional areas such as welfare, agriculture, and education. What has happened
in Political Science is therefore also relevant to the development of
Comparative Public Administration.

"Behavioralism" is the one word that best signifies and summarizes the
development of Political Science during the period of the 1950s-1970s.
Behavioralism is a controversial word even in its definition, but in general it
refers to a desire and an attempt to make Political Science genuinely
scientific. In general it describes or implies an attempt to move from the
philosophical to the positive, the empirical, the existential; to separate
questions of fact from questions of value and to make the former the proper
concern of Political Science; to learn and make use of proper scientific
methodology; to draw inspiration, knowledge, and concepts from and to join more
closely with related fields of study that are deemed "behavioral sciences"; to
seek more, and more unified, empirical theory. By the late 1970s behavioralism
came under severe criticism in political science circles, but was still being
applied among scholars of Public Administration.

Simon: Administrative Behavior: Public and Business

In general, the impact of behavioralism on the Public Administration band
of the Political Science spectrum has been slow, Herbert Simon's Administrative
Behavior was not only a critique of the old Public Administration, it offered in
its place a strongly argued reconstruction of the study of administration along
behavioral lines. This work, it is agreed, has been influential in social
science generally.

Simon proposed a rigid distinction between questions of value and questions
of fact. This is certainly a different distinction from that between politics
and administration, but it is, like the latter, a sweeping two-fold division of
the "universe." Second, having rigidly separated value and fact, Simon argued
that the latter--including the facts of public administration--are subject to
scientific study in exactly the same way that facts in the realms of the natural
sciences are subject to scientific study. Thus, Simon agreed with and furthered
the belief and argument of the Founding Fathers that Public Administration is
subject to science, potentially if not presently. Third, Simon took the

discredited concept of <u>efficiency</u> as the goal of the scientific study and practice of public administration, carefully defined and redefined it, and placed it again at the center as the criterion by which an administrator must be guided in the factual aspects of decision-making. Decision-making and the words closely associated with this function are seldom encountered. This relates to the problem of the differential impact of the work of Herbert Simon in Business Administration and Public Administration.

The argument of <u>Administrative Behavior is</u> powerful, complex and subtle and few students in Public Administration could "refute" it. However, in overwhelming numbers these students refused to believe it, to be persuaded and converted. They may have been interested in and knowledgeable about some of the matters discussed by Simon, in <u>Administrative Behavior</u> and his later works--for example, the role of authority and communication; but on the central tenets they remained unconvinced. The reason is, that the conceptual scheme did not accurately reflect the "real world" of public administration as they experienced or observed it. All the points about the fact and value may be true as a matter of logical analysis, they thought, but in the real world of administrative action fact and value are always joined, and "organically" joined. The abstractions do not describe the essential facts of this real world or enable us "better" to deal with it.

Simon did his doctorate in Political Science, and <u>Administrative Behavior</u> is oriented toward Public Administration; but students of Public Administration were not persuaded. Students of Business Administration, on the other hand, tended to be admiring, and in this they were joined by an impressive array of behaviorally oriented students from a variety of disciplines. Simon's career turned more and more toward Business Administration while his relations with Public Administration became more and more attenuated.

Comparative Politics

Comparative Politics as a focus of inquiry and as an accepted tem has developed in the same period--roughly the past fifteen years--as Comparative Public Administration. In general, it is a response to the same stimuli and motivations: essentially to the emergence of new non-Western nations and America's world-wide involvement, and to the complex of objectives, conceptions and methods designated by the term behavioralism.

For decades there has been a field of Political Science designated by the term Comparative Government. It was concerned rather directly with the comparison of constitutions and constitutional systems, legislatures, executives, party systems, and so forth. Comparative Politics has been simply an effort to redefine and transform <u>Political Science.</u> The students have been deeply involved in the behaviorally inspired effort to define the "political" which is the proper subject of the "science," to delineate "the political system" as an entity conceptually if not empirically distinct from the total social system and its other sub-systems. Public administration is then a part of politics in this use of the term, in these sweeping conceptualizations of the universe of Political Science. Politics, that is, is used in its classic or generic sense, not in its more limited sense to designate only the actions of voters, pressure groups, politicians, and political parties.

Political Systems

It will be useful to review briefly a prestigious old essay, Gabriel Almond's "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," to illustrate what has just been said and to prepare the way for a closer look at Comparative Public

Administration. This essay is centrally concerned with a definition of "the political system"; this is viewed as a necessary preface to the study of Political Science in general and to the enterprise of comparison in particular. Almond defines a <u>political system</u> as " that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and -vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employment, or more or less legitimate compulsion." This political system he distinguishes from other social systems by three "properties,',': (1) comprehensiveness, (2) interdependence, and (3) the existence of boundaries. By-comprehensiveness is meant all interactions which affect the use or the threat of use of physical coercion. By interdependence is meant that one subset of interactions produces changes in all other subsets. By the existence of boundaries is meant that there are points where other systems end and the political system begins.

In developing his view, of the characteristics of the political system, Almond adopts but expands upon some categories previously set forth by David Easton; and he adapts the language of input-output analysis which is fashioned both in Comparative Politics and in Comparative Public Administration. The political system is fed inputs that are processed through the output functions into policy decisions. The input functions include: (1) political socialization and recruitment, (2) interest articulation, (3) interest aggregation, and (4) political communication. The output functions include: (1) rule-making, (2) rule-application, and (3) rule-adjudication. These last are the "functional equivalents" of the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. Political structures or institutions exist or are constructed to fulfill each of these functions. The "modernity" of a system is a function of the extent to which structured differentiation and role differentiation have taken place.

While most students of Comparative Public Administration would find something of value in Almond's model, they would argue that it provides no clear differentials and directions. The activities and functions of public administration are by no means all "output"; for example, public schools perform an important "input" function under the category of "political socialization and recruitment," and a great deal of "interest aggregation" may take place within the administrative process.

Trends in Comparative Administration

In an essay on "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration," Fred Riggs--who by various criteria might be considered an early leader of Comparative Public Administration--says that three trends may be discerned during the past half-century. Of these he judges the first to be "fairly clear," but the second and third to be "just emerging."

The first is a shift from normative towards empirical approaches. By the normative is meant "one in which the chief aim is to prescribe 'ideal,' or at least 'better,' patterns of administrative structure and action," in terms of such criteria as efficiency or "public interest." Empirical approaches, on the contrary, are identified with a growing awareness of more and more relevant phenomena, with "a growing interest in descriptive and analytic information for its own sake."

The second is a shift from idiographic towards nomothetic approaches. An idiographic study is defined as "one which concentrates on the unique case--the historical episode or 'case study', the single agency or country, the biography of the 'culture area'...." A nomothetic study, by contrast, is one "which seeks

generalizations, 'laws', hypotheses that assert regularities of behavior, correlations between variables...."

The third trend is from non-ecological toward ecological approaches. These terms are not defined, presumable because definition is deemed unnecessary. But we are informed that mere recitation of the facts of geography, history, social structure, and so forth is not enough, "for ecology implies not just a characterization of environments, but rather an analysis of the patterns of interaction between the subject of study and its environment." In terms of the subject to which it is addressed, what is meant by "traditional" is that attention continues to be addressed to the traditional categories of administrative anatomy and physiology: to chain of command, staff services, personnel classification, co-ordination, departmentalization, and so forth; and to common or "universal" functions or problems of government: to military administration, planning, welfare services, regulatory activities, etc.

There is increasing awareness of national and cultural differences, less disposition to presume that American or Western experience is directly relevant to problems elsewhere. In Riggs' essay on Trends, he specifies a three-fold evolution in the normative literature. There is first the "mirror for America" period of two or more generations ago, in which Americans (such as Woodrow Wilson) studied European administration and held it, up as a model for us to emulate. This was followed by the "mirror for others" style, in which our own experience was held up as a guide for the "underdeveloped" areas. We have now entered the "mirror for all" period in which there is much comparison of institutions and practices in all "advanced" countries and the student tries to identify "good" features wherever he finds them and to specify what, in a general way, should be done if development or progress is desired.

Development: Political and Economic Systems

"Development," which in some sense is both cause and object of the study of Comparative Public Administration, is usually conceived as economic development, in whole or part; and some of the "comparative" literature, such as that on national planning, is primarily the product of economists. A visual presentation of the general relationship of the political system and the economic system of a given nation is shown in Figure 1-1.

To advance to methodological concerns and conceptual foci: There has been a great preoccupation with "models." There has been much activity centered upon the construction of typologies of political regimes and institutions and the delineation of geographic-cultural areas—an activity prominent also in and shared with Comparative Politics. So-called action theory and the concepts and language of structural-functionalism have been often employed. The range of concept of culture has often been invoked; and the related and overlapping but different and broader concept of ecology is also frequently set forth as important. Equilibrium theory, and particularly the idea of a "system" with "inputs" and "outputs," is prominent.

If one were to "plug-in" countries along the various axis of the political and economic systems a very general comparison would emerge. For

FIGURE 1-1

General Relationship of Political System and Economic System

OPEN (e.g., political participation, democratic
institutions, etc.)

B   A

   DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM   PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY
(government control and/or   (elections, parliament, strikers,
ownership of vital industries)   "grass roots" movements, etc.)

SOCIALISM --CAPITALISM
(Communism)

C   D

                                           MILITARY REGIME

(government ownership of all   (e.g., martial law, no elections,
aspects of production and   no strikes, no social welfare,
industry)   rule from top down, etc.)

CLOSED(e.g., authoritarian, dictatorship,
           etc.)

- - - economic system
- political system

instance, where would you put the U.S.? Great Britain? The USSR? Sweden?
Korea? The Philippines before marshall law? After marshall law? Argentina?
Malaysia? Thailand? etc. Obviously, the U.S. with an "open" political
system and a capitalistic economy would be squarely in the "A" block.

But what of the other countries?

Assignment

Terms You Should Know
    principle   traditional
    normative   underdeveloped
    universal   economic development
    scientific   socialism
    political system   communism
    interdependence   functional approach
    interest aggregation   structural approach
    rule-adjudication   institution building
    empirical   idiographic
    nomothetic

Discussion Questions/Exercises

1. Construct a figure similar to Figure 1-1 and place on it all the countries mentioned above and five of the Asian/Pacific countries named in your course outline.

2. How are the origins of Public and Business Administration similar? How are they different?

3. Can Public Administration or Comparative Administration be considered a science? Why? Why not?

II. COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATION MODELS

The Bureaucratic Model

In Comparative Administration as in Public Administration, the bureaucratic model is one of the most widely used. By bureaucratic model is meant the ideal-typical model of bureaucracy as developed by Max Weber and since further developed, "applied," criticized, and altered. This model developed by Max Weber in 1911 included "characteristics" which remained the primary pillars of organizational theory for almost thirty years. Most organizations still adhere to these traditional characteristics of bureaucracy. Contrary to some of the contemporary views of bureaucracy and bureaucrats being overly rigid causing administrative delays and even stagnation, Weber viewed the bureaucracy as the most perfect way to organize people and resources to accomplish administrative tasks. Weber proposed that this efficient administrative process would be realized through adherence to the bureaucratic characteristics in Figure II-1.

<u>Figure II-1: Weber's Bureaucracy</u>
1. Fixed Authority and Official Jurisdictions
2. Written, Formal Rules
3. Impersonality
4. A Hierarchy of Offices
5. Specialization
6. Career Service
7. Permanence
8. Secrecy

Weber's contribution to the field of Comparative Administration included the above characteristics and following concepts (see Figure 11-2).

Concepts in the Thought of Weber Applicable to Comparative
Administration and Politics.

Fields of Comparative Administration	Weber's Concepts
System	Pluralist state of physical force and legitimized domination that promotes competition and distribution of power. Rationality, functional differentiation, and specialization, resulting in order, harmony, and efficiency.
Culture	Dominant authority based on beliefs and symbols in relation to ideal types: traditional, charismatic, and rational. Routinization of rational authority reflects increasing socialization. Individualism plus voluntarism (obedience) and legitimate control are parameters of liberty.
Development	Rationalization and ideal typology method. Theory grounded in clarification. Systematization of ideas and their impact on society. Emphasis on requisites of development. Focus on capitalist development.
Class	Class and status groups seen as ideal types that affect dispersion of power and interests in the community. Mobility of individuals within status groups and status groups within classes based on initiative, achievement, and talent. Class fragmentation rather than solidarity viewed as consequence of religious beliefs, ethnic loyalties, and nationalism.

The Weberian construct has become so well known among us and so much a part of
our intellectual orientation toward the study of Comparative Public
Administration, that it has generally been presented in the form of premises and
hypothesis in teaching and explicit model building. Weber's theory, which is
seen as a classic in Public Administration--is "Traditional"--and more recent
theories such as Riggs's Prismatic Model, have been more useful in explaining
transitional third world, developing countries in a comparative perspective.

Prismatic Society

The prismatic society is referred to as a social system that is semi
differentiated, standing midway between an indifferentiated fused society and a
highly differentiated diffracted society. It is a model pertaining to the
ecology of administration in a type of society. Figure 11-3 presents a
simplified version of Riggs' prismatic model.

Figure 11-3: Simplified Prismatic Model

Fused   Prismatic   Diffracted

The prismatic concepts helps us see why the models devised to study both ends of this continuum are inadequate for intermediate situations. One cannot comprehend any one of these structures without taking into account the related structures which continually and drastically modify its behavior. The prismatic model in its entirety deals with the full range of social phenomena and behavior. It pertains to the elite groupings, social structures, political power patterns, and situations calling for an alternative to conventional ways of thinking about the conduct of public administration.

Riggsean Terms

Because of the paradoxical nature of public administration in prismatic societies, it is difficult to use Western words to describe things that are Western in form but not in substance. For this reason, Fred Riggs created a new vocabulary to describe the ecology of public administration. Some of these terms are presented as follows:

1. heterogeneity: conflicting modes of life coexisting within one country that result in polarized, mutually hostile communities.

2. diffracted: a term used to describe a society in which new structures are both differentiated and integrated; a developed society.

3. prismatic: a term used to describe a society in which the differentiation of new structures occurs faster than the society can integrate them.

4. formalism: the existence of extensive forms and procedures that are not expected to work in practice; the degree of discrepancy between prescribed form and actual practice.

5. overlapping: a situation in which institutions formally give the impression of performing specific functions, e.g., education, but actually perform a variety of traditional functions.

6. sala: the prismatic bureau, an office that merges administrative tasks with traditional functions; taken from the Spanish word meaning both an office and a personal room in a home, church, or public hall.

7. canteen-bazaar: an economic system that formally resembles a market but actually works like a traditional economy. The canteen represents special stores serving privileged or captive clients; the bazaar represents the open market where the buyer must engage in protracted bargaining over the price of goods.

8. price determinancy: a situation in which the price of goods, services, or money is based on the relative status of the parties to the transaction.

9. agglomeration: the development of new classes in society, but in embryonic form, insecure, with a single elite imposing its domination over them.

10. kaleidoscopic stratification: a chaotic, continually changing society made up of overlapping communities and classes; taken from the term describing an optical toy.

11. attainment: the mixing of ascriptive criteria and achievement ethics as the basis for recruitment to positions in the society.

12. poly-communalism: the mobilization of several separate communities without their assimilation into the society.

13. clects: the prismatic association, an organization combining modern forms of association with a traditional communal orientation; taken from the words clique and sect. The clect draws its membership from persons with political or economic ambitions possessing a common social background who are discriminated against as a group.

14. status-contract nexus: the formula for determining personal access to property and power; a combination of traditional inheritance and legal rights.

15. double talk: the prismatic code that allows an official to decide whether to overconform to a rule or not enforce it at all, depending upon the status of the client.

16. blocked throughputs: a situation in which the linkages between inputs and outputs in a prismatic system are deliberately scrambled to allow officials the power to treat each situation as an exception to the rule.

17. poly-normativism: a myth system that mixes mystical and rational approaches to problem solving.

18. dissensus: the absence of agreement on the goals of the state or on who should rule, which leads to the use of coercion,, violency, money, or charisma as the basic methods for achieving goals.

19. bifocal scope of power: a measure of the difference between the formal authority of an official and the actual scope of his or her effective control.

20. interference complex: the ability of bureaucrats to intervene in the judicial, legislative, and executive processes because of an imbalance of power that favors the bureaucracy.

21. dependency syndrome: a situation in which a disproportionately large share of the total national product is consumed by a small elite, making all others in the society dependent upon the elite for their personal security.

Riggs' writings are voluminous and further elaboration would require an entire course on just this subject. It is sufficient to say that a number of his essays develop various aspects of the basic models and that Riggs' emphasis upon ecology, as noted above, is often prominent in his thinking. Moreover, his entire effort must be viewed in the binocular perspective provided; that is, on the one hand, by his long residence and considerable experience in Southeast Asia; and, on the other, his above-noted methodological commitment to the "empirical, nomothetic and ecological."

Structural-Functional Models

The structural-functional approach is the integration of personality, cultural, and social systems. That (a) reality is composed of different levels of systems; (b) social systems tend toward equilibrium states; (c) mechanisms in social systems operate to promote equilibrium states by integrating different levels of systems; (d) therefore, sociological analysis must invoke

an examination of social structures as instances of more general mechanisms of integration within and between system levels that, in turn, maintain equilibrium states of the social whole. Structural change are substantive, in that they represent permanent changes in attitudes, beliefs, or values. For instance, the increasing desire for families to own homes could be interpreted as a permanent change in attitudes and desires.

During meetings at Princeton University in 1958 and.1959 Almond and collaborators focused on the politics of the developing areas. They elaborated on a theory of structures and functions in a conscious effort to avoid the examination of constitutions and formal government institutions in areas where changes are widespread. The result was a book under the editorship of Almond and James S. Coleman in which Almond (1960) introduced a number of assumptions.

At the outset Almond made clear his intention to renovate the concepts of comparative politics. Thus, political system is used instead of the state and the legal and institutional apparatus that have caught the attention of traditional political scientists. Function replaces power, which Almond also considered to be legalistic in connotation. Role takes the place of office, and structure substitutes for institution.

Almond essentially set forth the thesis that political systems have universal characteristics and that for the purposes of theory and analysis these characteristics can be conceptualized into a schematic approach to the comparative study of politics. Four characteristics which stand out are:

1. All political systems have political structures.

2. The same functions are performed in all political systems.

3. All political structure ... is multi-functional.

4. All political systems are mixed in the cultural sense. These characteristics provide the basis for the comparative study of advanced and backward nations. Almond argued that similar structures are found everywhere, but to locate them, the correct functional questions must be addressed. Only in this way "are we led to an accurate representation of a dynamic process."

Almond was partially influenced by David Easton's framework of inputs, outputs, and feedback, which he felt moves toward "systemic functional theory." This framework is limited, however: "It is still too close to the generic model of a system, with its interdependence, its boundaries, and its inputs and outputs, to be particularly discriminating in the political field':" Almond then outlined his own functional categories, separating them according to inputs and outputs as follows:

Input Functions

    Political socialization and recruitment
    Interest articulation
    Interest aggregation
    Political communication

Output Functions
    Rule making
   Rule application
    Rule adjudication

The outputs are government functions and correspond to the traditional use of three separate powers within government. Thus rule making replaces legislation, rule application implies administration, and rule adjudication relates to the judicial process. These categories bias Almond's scheme, for his output functions clearly reflect a U.S. and European conception of Western government, indeed the traditional orientation of comparative politics.

Almond argued that the input or political functions, not the output or government functions, are crucial in characterizing the political systems of the developing areas. These functions represent the ingredients of the system: that is, who recognizes problems; identifies, deliberates, and resolves issues; and presents solutions; and how are those actions carried out. Spiro called this a process of "policy flow," and Easton characterized it as consisting of demands and supports for action. For Almond, political socialization induces people to participate in the political culture of a society; socialization takes place through the family, school, job, religious group, voluntary association, political party, and even government institutions. Political socialization involves the recruitment of people from classes, ethnic groupings, and the like into the political system of parties, bureaucracy, and so on. Interest articulation is the expression of political interests and demands for action. Interest aggregation is the coalescing of those interests and demands that are articulated by political parties, interest groups, and other political entities. Political communication serves all of these political functions. Political socialization, recruitment, articulation, and, aggregation occur through communication.

Almond viewed political culture as dualistic rather than monistic. Thus political systems may be characterized as modern and premodern, developed and underdeveloped, industrial and agrarian. Essentially he saw political systems as evolving through stages of development. Structures tend to become more differentiated and specialized as political systems reach higher stages of development. In particular, Almond referred to primitive, traditional, transitional, and modern systems. The less developed systems are characterized by the "traditional" style of diffuseness, particularism, ascriptiveness, and affectivity, and the more developed systems are characterized by the "rational" styles of specificity, universalism, achievement, and affective neutrality (1960: 63). Rational styles penetrate primitive and traditional systems, yet traditionality is never completely eliminated in the modern system. The modern system tends to regulate and control traditionality.

Almond believed that his scheme allows political scientists to move toward a "probabilistic" theory of the polity. His designation of functions and structure suggests "that political systems may be compared in terms of the probabilities of performance of the specific functions by the specified structures" (1960: 59). He even speculated that his theory of the political system might lend itself to mathematical and statistical applications. Further, he expressed the hope that a theory of modernization and its application to the problems of the world might be developed. (see Figure 11-4)

FIGURE 11-4
Almond's Political System and Levels of Functions

ENVIRONMENT		ENVIRONMENT		
	MAINTENANCE			Regulative Capability
	Interest Articulation	Rule Making		Extractive Capability
(Demands)	THE		(Decisions)	
INPUTS	Interest Aggregation POLITICAL	Rule Application	OUTPUTS	Symbolic CapaLility
(Supports)	SYSTEM		(Actions)	
	Communication	Rule Adjudication		Distributive Capability
				Responsive Capability
	ADAPTATION			
ENVIRONMENT		ENVIRONMENT		

Source: Adapted from Almond and Powell (1966:16-41).

Figure 11-4 illustrates the elements of Almond's political system. Almond introduced many terms into his conception of the political system, and these are defined and discussed in considerable detail in his work, but the figure may assist the reader in understanding the relationships among the terms and functional levels. The figure serves only as an abstraction of what is more fully delineated in his writing, however.

Almond's political system comprises many interdependent parts. These parts include government institutions as well as "all structures in their political aspects" (1966:18). A boundary exists between the system and its environment. Inputs and outputs affect the system, and feedback exists between the system and its environment.. Almond identified four examples of demands and four examples of supports, which serve the system as inputs. He also described four types of transactions that relate to the output side of the process. Figure 11-4 includes the aspects of a David Easton's framework, but it also incorporates the three levels of functions that Almond incorporated into his own formulation. One level consists of six conversion functions: interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication; these functions relate to input demands and supports and to output decisions and actions as internalized within the political system. Demands are formulated through interest articulation and are combined into alternative courses of action through interest aggregation. Rules are drawn up through rule making, they are implemented and enforced through rule application, and sometimes they are assessed through rule adjudication. Communication affects all of these activities.

A second level of activities comprises capability functions: regulation, extraction, distribution, and symbolic response; these functions relate to the performance of the system within its environment. Almond applied these functions to totalitarian and democratic societies. He felt that in democratic societies "outputs of regulation, extraction, and distribution are more affected by inputs of demands from groups" and that these societies therefore have "a higher responsive capability" (1966: 28-29). Totalitarian societies in contrast are less responsive to demands, regulate behavior through coercion, and extract maximum resources from their people. Symbolic capability relates to the symbol flow from the political system into the international environment.

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Maintenance and adaptation functions include political socialization and recruitment and represent a third level of activities. According to Almond, a theory of the political system can be based on understanding the relations among these three levels and the relations of the functions at each level. Comparative politics have witnessed emerging research in World Systems Theory. Most noted among the scholars in this area is Immanuel Walbistein who has written several compelling volumes between 1975-1982 on The Processes of the World System. Also, Albert Bergesen and others have followed Walbistein's lead in a 1980 edited book entitled Studies of Modern World Systems.

This dynamic and global approach to development and comparative politics begins with a historical interpretative framework that links countries with international global events, trends, and systems (i.e. capitalism, socialism, etc.) and the dominant societies and nations which adhere to these systems (e.g. U.S., U.S.S.R., China, etc.). It is a macro level of comparison composed of the interdependence of the various countries in the world systems rather than a 2, 3, or 10 country comparison along certain variables or indicators. It incorporates theories of political economy and dependency in this macro approach. The broad scope in the approach has been the primary strength and weakness since detailed data on specific countries in comparisons are difficult to ascertain. However, World System Theory has provided rich avenues for future research particularly in the area of development administration (e.g., see articles on Philippine political economy by Robert Stauffer of University of Hawaii).

As can be seen, development is a concern of the model-builders, sometimes only peripherally or ultimately, as with Riggs, but sometimes centrally. One might, then, speak of a development model, or developments models, as some have very explicitly with regard to the countries of Africa and Asia.

In viewing the changing shape of organizations for the purposes of comparisons it might be useful to see characteristics of Weber's bureaucracy in contrast to Fredrick Thayer's rather provocative perspective of "Post bureaucratic organizations." Thayer proposed that organizational change or "revolution" could only take place as an end to the "principle" of hierarchy (1973: 74).

Figure 11-5 provides the contrasting views of characteristics of the Weber's ideal bureaucracy and Thayer's ideal post bureaucratic form of organization.

Figure 11-5

Contrast of Weber's Bureaucracy and Post bureaucratic Organizations

Weber's Bureaucracy	Post bureaucratic Organizations
1. Fixed Authority and Official Jurisdiction	1. Authority flows to the persons with the ability to solve the problem.
2. Written, Formal Rules	2. A dialectical organization which adapts itself to the situation at hand.
3. Impersonality	3. The client as peer.
4. A Hierarchy of Offices.	4. A flat organization: A structured non hierarchy with nobody in charge.
5. Specialization	5. Team problem solving and collective decisions
6. Career Service	6. Professional mobility.
7. Permanence	7. A temporary organization with a Dionysian ideology.
8. Secrecy	8. Open communications.

In Thayer's 1973 book, he also called for an end to the rule of competition in organizations because in public and business enterprises it serves the same purpose: legitimizes the rule of one group of people by another. It excuses organizations that build pyramids, boss workers, and screw consumers.

Summary

The models, theories, and concepts presented in this module are only some of the many which exist and continue to develop in Comparative Administration. There has been an attempt to present some of the most important models which have influenced this field of study known as Comparative Administration. Obviously, there are some concerns which are also relevant to Business Administration. Contrary to the thought of some scholars (e.g., Simon) who viewed the theory of organization in comparative Public Administration to be culture bound--we find that many scholars (e.g., Riggs) have grappled with this problem with some success. It is true, that the respective concerns of Business Administration and Comparative Public Administration may lead to perspectives that are very different. However, we have come a long way with regard to the nature of theory of organization since Simon wrote the following in 1952.

> Organization theory has been largely culture-bound through failure to attack this problem (of the relevance of the mores of society). The theory of bureaucracy as developed by Max Weber and his followers represents the furthest progress in dealing with it. The historical data appealed to by the Weberians need supplementation by analysis of contemporary societies, advanced and primitive. A comparison of intra-cultural uniformity and variation in organization patterns with inter-cultural uniformity and variation would provide the evidence we need to determine to what extent the cooperative patterns in organizations are dependent of the mores of cooperation of the society. (1952: 130)

This would seem to be a fair enough recognition of the possible significance of the cultural factor, a clear warning of "relativity." However the word independent has become more significant to comparative study in the search for a universal-rational core of organizational behavior.

Reading Assignment

Terms You Should Know

specialization	ideal-type
model	prismatic model
dependency	ecology
development	structural-functional
empirical	political socialization
political recruitment	interest articulation
interest aggregation	rule adjudication
concept	interdependent
outputs	inputs
maintenance	adaptation
demands	post bureaucratic organization
culture-bound	detracted
differentiated	integrated

Discussion Questions

1. Do you think any of Weber's ideal-type bureaucratic characteristics are still relevant? Explain.

2. What was Fred Riggs attempting to accomplish with his "prismatic society" model?

3. Do you think most developing countries can be explained adequately with Almond's input and output functions? Explain. Give some examples.

4. Thayer wants to put the bureaucratic hierarchy on its side as a means to making it function more democratically--and more effectively. Do you agree with him? Why or why not?

5. Suppose you were an administrator in Southeast Asia--how would you attempt to escape being dependent on a country whose sophisticated technology you have adopted--and made part of your nation's development strategy?

III. ADMINISTRATION IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

General Background

The discipline of public administration is not quite the same in Europe as it is in the U.S. One of the main reasons is because in Europe its roots are in administrative law while in the U.S. they are in political science. It could hardly be otherwise. It follows from the accepted base of public office, as relating to the state. In Europe, the state used to be conceived primarily as a legal system, in a classical sense while in the United States, it is conceived primarily as (political) power system.

A fundamental question emerges. It refers to the demonstrable generality of insight regarding public administration. In general, in American literature on the subject there has been lack of attention given to the non-American appearance of public administration. Moreover, there has been a gradual shift in the European approach, under the impact of American writings on public and business management rather than those on "public administration" in a strict sense. On the other hand, the growing concern with comparative administration and with development administration--the two going hand in hand--appears to raise the question as to the influence of the classic forms of comparative administration.

Classic Administrative Systems

The bureaucracies of France and Germany adhere most closely to Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy and therefore are referred to as examples of "classic" administrative systems. In fact, Max Weber used the late 19th century, early 20th century German government, which in turn was modeled after the then "modern" but rigid German military bureaucracy, for his research. Hence, it is little wonder that many of the characteristics of Weber's bureaucracy are reflected in the German government bureaucracy.

Classic Administrative Systems incorporate the essential structural characteristics as a form of organization--hierarchy, differentiation, and qualifications. Bureaucracy is above all a form of organization dedicated to the concept of rationality, and to the conduct of administration and the concept of relevant knowledge. Recruitment is based on achievement as demonstrated competitively rather than on ascription. Service in the bureaucracy is a career for professionals, who are salaried and have tenured status, subject to discipline or removal only on specified grounds following specified procedures. Administrative roles are highly specialized units that re responsive to external control from legitimate political authority.

General Characteristics of Developed Nations

There are some general characteristics of developed nations which may include shared characteristics of the "classic" as well as other forms of bureaucracy. Five of these characteristics are presented below:

1. The systems of governmental organization is highly differentiated and functionally specific, and the allocation of political roles is by achievement rather than ascription, reflecting general characteristics of the society.

2.   Procedures for making political decisions are largely rational and secular. The power position of traditional elites has been eroded and the appeal of traditional values greatly weakened. A predominantly secular and impersonal system of law reflects this orientation.

3.   The volume and range of political and administrative activity are extensive, permeating all major spheres of life in the society, and the tendency is toward further extension.

4.   There is a high correlation between political power and legitimacy, resting on a sense of popular identification with the nation-state which is widespread and effective.

5.   Popular interest and involvement in the political system are widespread, but this does not necessarily mean active participation by the citizenry in general in political decision-making. The concept of modernization is not linked with any particular regime or ideology; it does not imply, for example, democracy and representative government. (Nevertheless, one of the characteristics shared by modernizing societies is that commonly "modernization begins under autocracy or oligarchy and proceeds toward some form of mass society--democratic or authoritarian.")

A list of general counterpart characteristics reflected in developed nations regardless of other variations in the countries' bureaucracy include:

1.   The public service of a modernized political system will be large scale, complex, and instrumental in the sense that its mission is understood to be that of carrying out the policies of the political decision-makers. (In other words, it will tend to have the attributes Weber specified for his "ideal type" bureaucracy, including both the structural prerequisites and the behavioral tendencies mentioned by him.)

2.   The bureaucracy will be highly specialized and will require in its ranks most of the occupational and professional categories represented in the society. (This is a reflection both of the range of governmental activities in a modernized polity and of the technical requirements for success in carrying out governmental programs.)

3.   The bureaucracy will exhibit to a marked degree a sense of professionalization, both in the sense of identification with the public service as a profession and in the sense of belonging to a narrower field of professional or technical specialization within the service, such as law, nuclear engineering, or social work. (This professional outlook springs from a combination of such factors as the standards of competence applied in recruitment and the common background in education and training that this implies for various specialties, pride in the work being done and in the manner of its performance, and career orientation to the public service as against private sector careers.)

4.   Because the political system as a whole is relatively stable and mature, and the bureaucracy is more fully developed, the role of the bureaucracy in the political process is fairly clear. (The desirability of a line of demarcation between the bureaucracy and other political institutions is generally accepted, although the line may be somewhat blurred. Some indicators point toward a double transfer of power in recent years--from the legislature to the executive, and from the executive to the top civil service--which as resulted in a partial merger of political power and administrative action in the

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careers of higher ranking bureaucrats who have been dubbed "the Western mandarins," but this has not meant the replacement of politicians by bureaucrats.)

5.   The bureaucracy in a modernized polity will be subject to effective policy control by other functionally specific political institutions. (This is partly due to the specialized orientation of bureaucrats.)

Developed nations are also characterized by such concepts as the level of political and economic development, nationalism, role differentiation, secularism, and the existence of a "civic culture." Each of these concepts are briefly explained below.

Political development is conceived as the political consequences of modernization. It is also defined as movement toward one or more goals such as democracy, stability, legitimacy, participation, mobilization, institu-tionalization, equality, capability, differentiation, identify, penetration, distribution, integration, rationalization, bureaucratization, security, welfare, justice, liberty. With this list in mind, political development is the consequence of events which may come from the international environment, from the domestic society, or from political elites within the political system itself. Thus, such political achievement can be compared by using the concepts of modernization and development.

Nationalism is the degree to which people are conscious of their common historical and cultural background and who wish to perpetuate this background politically; i.e., within the framework of a nation state, we can compare people, territory, government, and sovereignty.

Economic Development is understood to entail the diversion of a nation's scarce resources and productive powers to the augmentation of its productive wealth and to the progressive enlargement of its gross national product (GNP) and goods and services. Statistics showing an index of accomplishment can be made available for comparison showing associated economic data or strategy for economic advances, showing leading nations and trailing nations.

Role differentiation is related to behavior that is suited to a particular status and, according to Almond, "office." People are always socially interacting with others and consequently their behavior adjusts to and is modified by the response of others. Roles we play are shaped by others' reaction to us as opposed to "official" roles. It is a common occurrence to go into a situation prepared for one sort of role only to find that in the process of interaction, another sort of behavior is necessary.

What is required is a two-tiered model, a system which distinguishes between "formal" and "effective" structures, between what is prescribed ideally and what actually happens. The adoption of development administration with the end object being to relate different administrative roles, practices, organization arrangements, and procedures to the maximizing of development objectives is important in this context. Poor countries have special characteristics that tend to create a different role for government. These characteristics and this expanded or emphasized role of government, particularly as it affects economic growth, tend to make the operations of the public administrator significantly different. The above reasons are attributed to the differences in political systems among nations, and the difference is often attributed to national interest.

Secularization is the decline in the emphasis on religion, more marked in the 20th century than in any previous period of recorded history. At its minimum, secularization means the decline of the prestige and power of religious bodies; of religious teaching in national schools; of religious tests for public office or civil rights; of legislative protection of religious doctrines (e.g., the prohibition of contraception); and of the censorship of control of literature, science, and other intellectual activities in order to safeguard religion. Individuals are then free to deviate openly from religious dogmas and ethics. In comparison, some countries tend to resent religion's record of interference with freedom of opinion and behavior, preferring humanism. In Communist countries such as Russia and China, officials attempt to suppress religion as antisocial. On the contrary, both communism and worldwide youth culture seem to owe some of their popularity to the inclusion (in secular form) of religious features such as idealism, uniformity of dogma, and hero-worship (Ispan-Islam movements, Iran, etc.).

Civic culture is oriented towards centralization and city culture where society is dictated by the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the urbane population. The tendency of people to gather in the hub in a city allows citizens to better fulfill social and economical needs and functions and this relationship is represented in most major cities by the central government establishment as well as the central business district. (In Asia, "Primate City' concept.) The consequence of civic culture is crowding and most other burdens of urbanization. The recent trend in the United States is the out migration of the middle and upper class from the cities into the suburbs, even though they commute from home to the central business districts in the city proper. Civic cultures are marked by increased civic responsibility on the part of citizens of a state. Civic cultures are typically part of stable political systems. Civic refers in an analytical sense to the levels of institutionalism and participation in political systems. A proper balance between the two would hopefully determine political stability. By proper balance, in civic cultures, is usually meant a greater ratio of institutionalism to participation.

Assignment

Terms You Should Know
    classic administrative systems modernized political system
    political development   nation-state
    nationalism   economic development
    role differentiation   secularization
    civic culture   institutionalism
    participation   political stability

Discussion Questions

1. What are some of the main characteristics of classic administrative systems?

2. What are some of the potential criteria for comparing developed nations?

3. Are the Western nations the developed nations? What about Japan? Peoples Republic of China? The USSR?

IV. ADMINISTRATION IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

General Background

Five of the more common features of the politics of development affecting the administration of developing countries are:

1. a widely shared developmental ideology as the source of basic political goals;

2. a high degree of reliance on the political sector for achieving results in the society;

3. widespread incipient or actual political instability;

4. modernizing elitist leadership, accompanied by a wide "political gap" between the rulers and the ruled; and

5. an imbalance in the growth of political institutions, with the bureaucracy among those in the more mature category.

The developing countries were particularly influenced by a need for integration of the provincial areas and centralization of government functions. Some developing countries (e.g., India, Malaysia, Indonesia) accomplished these objectives with varying degrees of success either as a result of a colonial experience or a reaction to the spectre of being colonized. An example of the latter case is Thailand, one of the few countries in Southeast Asia which was never officially colonized. The case study on Thailand presented at the end of this module provides some excellent insight into the processes of integration, centralization, and consolidation as applied to one developing country in the late 19th and early 20th century.

In fact, many scholars attribute Thai King Mongut (made famous by the movie "King and I" and the book Anna and the King of Siam), and his son, Chulalongkorn, with being able to resist colonialism because of their success in integrating and centralizing the Thai government, as well as their manipulation of the Western colonial powers.

Some developing nations often having received Thai independence from the colonial powers retained many of the features of their government established by the colonizing country (-e.g., Malaysia, India). Other countries changed moderately first, then drastically as in the case of Indonesia. Still others, as in the case of North Vietnam, changed radically, economically and politically removing all vestiges of colonial rule.

Several of these developing countries took on a variety of forms of government after independence, moving from "minimal" to "guided democracy to "strong man" and/or "collegial" military systems.

Each of these forms are briefly explained below. Also described briefly are some of the concepts used frequently in the administration of developing countries.

Centralization is a common characteristic of developing countries. Much of the middle class, upper class, and government bureaucracy is massed together in the principal municipality of a metropolitan area, surrounded by suburbs and

smaller towns. Excess centralization causes higher officials to be overburdened with detail and to neglect policy formation and planning. The head of the departments is often deprived of all initiative and because of lack of delegation, those close to the goals of action cannot cooperate with their colleagues in other agencies whose work directly affects the success of their own efforts. Moreover, new agencies simply add to the intra-bureaucratic conflict, instead of helping, and adds to additional confusion and dysfunction. Disorganization and inefficiency is often result in developing countries.

It is often said that many developing countries have all the burdens of centralization but few of its fruits.

Decentralization is decreasing the concentration of government authority, industry, population, etc., in a main center and distribute more widely. It involves the retention of central control, but assigns responsibility for some decisions to subordinate personnel. Grants of autonomy for local self-- government, or to special-purpose elective body, such as school board, are examples. Decentralization is a common characteristic of developed countries where mass media and transportation links the widespread population together in unity. Expansion and modernization may result together with highly functional delegation of responsibilities and utilization of talent to govern local populace. (For a good example of the process centralization and decentralization in a developing country, see Diagram 3 in the Thai case study.)

Feudalism was characterized by any social system in which great land owners or hereditary overlords exact revenue from their land, and exercise the functions of government in their domains. Today, feudalism is based upon inequality and the privileged position of a social, political, or economic dynasty (e.g., the phrase industrial feudalism is often used in histories of 19th century America.) The third world countries are often characterized by this social system based upon inequality.

Ideology of development is the opinion, or way of thinking of any group regarding the political, economic, or social system. Certain groups may conceive development as functional through capitalism while others may conceive it to be dysfunctional and prefer socialism or even communism. For example, a pronounced imbalance in the form of high level of modernization and low level of institutionalization makes the political system dependent on the successful use of violence. This is characteristic of advanced fascist regimes such as Nazi Germany; or we can compare the semi colonial and dependent countries of the "ethnic fascism" of South Africa. An imbalance of the opposite kind, with a high level of institutionalization and low level of modernization, adversely affects the operational capability of the political system.

Strong man military systems. A military system where a leader is firmly and solely in executive control. The military oligarchy usually takes over a weak civilian government (for example, through a coup de'etat,). To serve his own purpose, he selects the heads of national cabinets, drafts budget, approves or vetoes laws. Under this plan, the law-making bodies attends to legislation but does not share executive powers. This form usually takes on a leadership "cult" such as Idi Amin in Uganda.

Collegial military system is a military system with authority or power shared equally among military colleagues. Usually not a leadership "cult" but rather a "corporate" authoritarian rule by the military. Argentina, South Korea and Taiwan are examples and can be compared with other similar governments taken over by military coup.

Monarchies are governments or states headed by a single or sole ruler, such as the King or Queen who is head of the state. Succession is lineal and hereditary. Historically, England and Hawaii were examples. Thailand until 1930 and Saudi Arabia today remains an example.

Bureaucratic Elite Systems. Power, influence or heads and staff of government headed by those persons designated respectively as an educated and enlightened class such as bureaucracy (higher civil service) and plutocracy (the wealthy). Those with large shares in the distribution of power--whether through elective or appointive office, whether through influence exercised without office--are designated the political elite. Membership in the general elite is usually transmitted through families, which may fluctuate from economic to political to intellectual activity between generations, and maintain their high position. Several governments are staffed under this system, where nepotism is often prevalent. Thailand is a classic example of this form of government.

THAI CASE STUDY

KING CHULALONGKORN AND THE REORGANIZATION
OF THAILAND'S PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

By Ross Prizzia

> To survive one must be like the young bamboo bending
> but not breaking in the face of a strong wind, being
> able to straighten once again when the wind subsides.
> — Thai Proverb

This significant period (1873-1892) in Thai history was characterized by a domestic policy designed to completely reorganize the basic government structure, and a foreign policy construed to reluctantly appease the more immediate appetites of Western innovators through maximum appearances and minimal concessions.

Having seized the opportunity to travel and study the methods of administration in Java and India when the government was under a regent (1868-1873) Chulalongkorn was far more enlightened than any of his subjects. Reflecting upon these travels in 1874, he asserted that he "persevered" in making distant and fatiguing journeys across oceans, visiting prosperous foreign countries, to see them and become familiar with their customs with a view of selecting what might be safe models for the future prosperity of this country. While some of the early reforms of this period were instituted with the prime purpose of appeasing the West and their prescribed image of Thailand. as Hall points out, "He (Chulalongkorn) realized forcibly that if his country were to preserve her independence she must, willy nilly, put her house in order according to the prevailing European notions, or at least keep up the appearance of doing so.

At his coronation in 1873, Chulalongkorn abolished the practice of prostration in the royal presence. In a proclamation at the coronation ceremony the King also expressed a desire for more participation in the decision making process by establishing the first State Council and Cabinet.

The following represents the preamble to the proclamation appointing the Council of State:

His Majesty wishes to remove oppression and lower his status so as to allow officials to sit on chairs instead of prostrating in his presence. His reason for founding this Council is that, as he cannot himself carry out public duties successfully, the assistance of others will bring prosperity to the country. Appointment of selected intellectuals is simply to advise the King, and in cases of controversy, he can decide impartially regardless of the seniority of persons concerned. Whatever is agreed on can be turned into a bill to be presented to the King at the following session. When the bill is finalized,

it can be read to advisors.' If all is found to be in order, and it concerns only a minor matter, it can be proclaimed as an act without further ado. If, on the other hand, it constitutes a major principle, it will be referred to the various Secretaries of State, and, if their consent is obtained, then the bill receives royal assent and becomes an Act.3

The next year (1874), the King began the abolition of slavery by decreeing that from then on no one could be born a slave, and practice of selling oneself for debt was made illegal. Also, the compulsory services of the Prai and Sui classes in the army and police and royal crown were discontinued. The eventual reforms of the military system and tax system helped somewhat to improve the lot of Thai peasants.

In 1875 a Revenue Development Office was established, which consolidated some taxes and led a study on the distribution of taxes and modes of collection. A Royal Telegraph Department was created to improve communication to the remote provinces. In 1881 a post office was established, and in 1885 a Department of Survey and Department of Foreign Relations were set up. In 1887 the Department of Public Instruction was established under the directing of Prince Damrong.

One of the first things Chulalongkorn did was to send a royal commissioner to reside in Chiengmai, one of the richest and most important vassal states. Since there had been disputes between the Lord of Chiengmai and European lumbermen and missionaries, Chulalongkorn intervened and took advantage of the situation after the death of Chiengmai's ruler by putting the city under 'More direct control of Bangkok.

This was the first significant step in paving the way for a modern system of territorial administration. It, in fact, set the stage for more effective integration of provincial areas, as Vella states:

This action marked the beginning of the direct administration of Chiengmai and the other northern vassal states by the central government. The royal commissioner took over the power of the northern princes in what has been termed "a silent revolution." Although the chiefs were allowed to retain their titles and nominal positions, the administration of the territories and revenues were assumed by Thai officials from Bangkok. The success of the experiment in the north led the King to appoint other royal commissioners to the northeast, east, and southern areas, over which the central government had exercised only a vague control.5

This significant administrative move by Chulalongkorn, and period immediately afterward (1892-1910), gave rise to the complete reorganization of the basic government structures, at which time many of the old courts and chambers were eliminated with their main duties and personnel being absorbed into new "ministries.6

Siffin refers to these changes as "the radical reorganization of 1892,"7 while Riggs terms it the "takeoff."8 Even though some of these reforms represented radical changes to a traditional society, they were carried out with a minimum of internal disruption due to the clever and delicate maneuverings of the pragmatic Chulalongkorn. Chulalongkorn's talent in transforming the basic government structure while at the same time maintaining a link with tradition, was later reflected in the overall plan for the reorganization of provincial administration. Through this pragmatic method of

implementing change, in addition to the good fortune of employing the right people (Damrong) at the right time to carry out the reforms, Chulalongkorn provided for a great degree of political continuity. As Riggs points out, "The changes were made possible by the fact that some of the new ministries were established on foundations that had already been laid, and that the more sacred structures of the old regime were permitted to continue without substantial modification, under the guidance of a brilliant leader who had greatly enhanced the effective powers of the monarchy."9

A Ministry of Interior was created combining all the functions of three of the more important old chambers: Mahadthai, Kalahom, and Klang (Diagram 1). In the Klang (center) was the central court responsible for the royal treasury. Traditionally the Mahadthai had represented--a kind of "home" - ministry--employing officials (or northern) palace, while the Kalahom represented a kind of "defense department" employing those officials of the "right" (or southern) palace.10 In theory the Mahadthai was more closely associated with civil administration while the Kalahom with the military. However, in actual practice both the "Minister of the North" (Mahathai) and the "Minister of the South" (Kalahom) (as referred to by Europeans) administered all matters in the provinces in their respective area of the country, including war, justice, and finance.

In 1889 the Ministry of Education replaced the old Department of Public Instruction. In 1891, the capable Minister of Education, Prince Damrong, was sent abroad to study educational systems in Europe, Egypt, and India. Upon his return in March 1892, the King transferred Prince Damrong from the post of Minister of Education to the newly created post of Minister of Interior announcing that "'the work of the Ministry of Interior was more important than the work of the Ministry of Education . . . if the administration could not be modified and developed into a modern system the country would be in danger; or worse, we might lose our independence and freedom. So, to protect the country by changing and developing the administration of the provinces was much more important than the work of the Ministry of Education, because the provinces were to be subject to the Ministry of Interior." 2

Though the fear of immediate loss of independence might have been somewhat exaggerated the threat of Western expansion in the provinces was a real one. By 1892, Thailand had already lost whatever vague suzerainty had been claimed over the greater part of Cambodia and most of northern Laos, and had just the year before (1891~) surrendered all claims to land east of the Mekong. As Sternstien points out, "Centralization of power was imperative, for if Bangkok could not maintain effective control over the provinces, if territorial claims were in any way indefinite, then it was probable that the suzerainty of either Great Britain (to the west in Burma and to the south in Malaya) or France (to the east in Cambodia and to the north in Laos) would extend over the area in question."13

King Chulalongkorn was very much preoccupied with the integration of the provinces. The reorganization of the whole system of administration was in effect, centralized under the Ministry of Interior, with its main purpose to deal with the problem of provincial administration.

So long as the provincial governors regularly submitted the due amount of revenue to Bangkok they were left alone. The provincial officials were free to engage in practices of faming of dues, feudal privileges (especially forced labor), and other activities which undermined both the efficiency and the integrity of the central government.14

As part of his reorganization plan Chulalongkorn substituted the direct collection of all taxes for the old faming system and instituted an entirely new system for the division of the kingdom. In the

past the practice had been to divide the country into three categories or units: inner provinces (,under the responsibility of the officials in Bangkok), outer provinces (ruled by appointed provincial lords) and dependencies (ruled by native lords).15

Chulalongkorn reorganized the old provincial administration by dividing the whole kingdom into eighteen monthons (circles), each with a resident High Commissioner at its head. These were subdivided into provinces, towns, amphurs (districts), tambols (communes), and villages which were administered by officers receiving monthly salaries instead of annual rewards from the King. Within the village complex were hamlets, each made up of about twenty families and presided over by an elder. The elders together elected the headman of the whole village.16

integration, through more effective provincial government was the main concern of Chulalongkorn, and he made it the primary goal of the Ministry of Interior "to dissolve all dependencies and half-dependencies in order to make them 'inner provinces' and to make all the people Thais, not Lao, not Malay at all."17

However, while the creation of a Ministry of Interior in Bangkok to deal with integration of the provinces was accomplished with relatively little difficulty, the practical application of such a program through an extensive provincial administrative apparatus was quite another matter. To this end the newly appointed Minister of Interior, "Prince Damrong,made an inspection tour of the northern provinces. On this, his first trip to the provinces, Damrong was received with both "surprise and alarm for a great senabodi (leader of the palace) had never come in a supervisory capacity, especially not in times of peace.18

Prince Damrong traveled through several provinces where crime and disorder was suppressed by hired hands of thieves who acted in the capacity of "protectors" of the government of a particular district and limited their other activities to strangers from other provinces. Damrong, after observing other districts with this rather "unique" system of maintaining order, came to the realization that the whole concept of the purpose of public administration was indeed in flux. He concluded that:

> The purpose of public administration is the maintenance of the peace and contentment of the people. This new concept is different. This was called 'to be in peace,' and can be traced in the law. Thus, if the governor was able to maintain order and peace so that no robbery occurred, he would be regarded as achieving his purpose. If there was much disorder, Royal Commissioners would be sent to suppress the evils, or the minister himself might even go if conditions were sufficiently serious. There had thus been no inspection in peaceful times. The concept that the country must be improved even in time of peace is a new one. It seemed to arise in the reign of King Rama IV, and was strongly emphasized as a principle of public administration from the reign of King Rama V.19

In addition to the governor's methods of protecting the people from bandits, Damron also observed the governor's method of using his power and his assistants in extorting goods and services from the people. Damrong records that "the governor and his people could control the people, and when they started business on their own, they could use their position for the benefit of their work . . . . Even the tax collectors from Bangkok, if they let the governor and his people have some share of the tax, they could collect it more easily. This was the cause of influential people using their own rank for personal profit."20 Damrong further observed that most of the provincial officials were members of influential local families who used their own homes for official business, since there were no government offices as such in the provinces. Some governors built a special

pavilion (sala) on their property to be used for official business, but as soon as he was no longer governor the sala became personal property and the next governor proceeded to build his temporary government office in a different house or even in a different district. The traditional practice of administering the provinces through influential families and "in-group" officials drawn from the local population, in addition to the lower standard of living and lack of facilities, greatly discouraged Bangkok officials of venturing out to the provinces to seek employment. As Damrong observed, "Very few officials who lived in Bangkok would dare go out to work in the provinces, because they were afraid of the difficulty of trying to earn their own living. They had to have their own money before daring to venture out of Bangkok or they had to be the in-laws of the influential people in the provinces. Especially the council members had to be chosen from the persons living in those provinces."21

With the increase of specialization and new functions of the government, the number of foreigners steadily increased from 84 at the end of Mongkut's reign, to over 300 employed by Chulalongkorn (Diagram 2). However. many of

these advisors now assume   much more significant role. As Ve11a asserts, Chulalongkorn "began a new policy of employing experts to give advice in the government on the top level." 22

One such foreign advisor, Slade, was very instrumental in assisting Chulalongkorn in strengthening his jurisdiction over Chiengmai. Slade was a British forestry expert who was brought from India to help Damrong from a Forestry Department within the Ministry of Interior. Foreign lumber merchants had operated in the past through agreements with the local head of the provincial government. In this case it was the Lord of Chiengmai. When disputes arose the, Bangkok government was usually bypassed, with appeals

DIAGRAM 2

Foreign Officials of the Thai Government, 1909 (23)

General advisors, in foreign affairs, finance,
  agriculture, etc 6
General financial agent of the government I
Lesser advisors, in education, etc.
Legal advisors, probationary legal advisors, and
  assistants   21
Director-generals of departments or equivalent 13
Assistant director-generals or equivalent 23
Foreigners engage in administrative work at the level
  immediately below departmental management, including
  various inspectors 69
Architects and engineers, civil, mechanical, etc.,
  not otherwise classified 51
Other engineering-type technicians 40
Educators not otherwise classified 14
Lawyers not otherwise classified 12
Naval ship captains 4
Assistants to naval ship captains 2
Naval engineering officers 2
Dredge masters. .   4
Harbor vessel Captains   1
Medical doctors not   6
Sericulture specialists (Japanese) 3
Statisticians 2
Accountants not otherwise classified 2
Chemists not otherwise classified 2
Nurse 1
Veterinarian 1
Interpreter 1
Locomotive engineers 15
Embassy councilors 3
Embassy secretaries 5
Embassy attache' 1
Consuls General 8

Total 319

Slade's effort resulted in royal decrees which provided for a government apparatus which would extend to the province to implement new rules regulating the use of forests by foreign lumber companies. Under the new system foreign concerns now had to consult first with the Bangkok government as to the terms of the lease as well as to the specific conditions for extracting the lumber.

In addition to creating a system to better regulate the foreign concerns in the provinces, Slade also helped in the integration of the provinces by weakening local opposition in enforcing the new regulations. Slade, in enforcing his new scheme of administration, of necessity had to "encroach" upon great tracts of land which were owned and controlled by the northern local Chiefs. The result of the conflict is dramatically described by Reginald Le May, who observed the whole affair first hand while in Chiengmai: but in the end, after a hard fight, he won his battle, and his victory weakened the position of the Chiefs, who never regained their former prestige. Slade may be said, therefore, to have played an important part in consolidating the Siamese Kingdom, and to have been of great assistance to the government in this r.egard."24

In later years Damrong made several more inspection tours carefully recording his observations. The prime purpose of all his traveling and investigation was to try to find the best possible government apparatus which could be superimposed upon the existing inadequate system. After careful consideration Damrong proposed a new apparatus for provincial administration which would provide for salaried officials who would be centrally appointed and responsible to Bangkok. These same officials, who would be rotated at regular intervals, were expected to be capable individuals who would execute and enforce the new rules of the central government in the provinces to which they would be appointed. Damrong's new plan for provincial administration was eventually termed the Tesapiban System.

The efforts of Prince Damrong culminated in the Provincial Administration Act of 1898, which made the Tesapiban System official and explained the precise structure and responsibilities of the new system. This statute in effect greatly enlarged the domain of the monarch, by bringing the provinces under a centralized power structure. More members of the political system were now involved in the decision-making (even if only in the capacity of advisors) and once decisions were made involving national policy these decisions ultimately reached the provinces through the newly constructed government apparatus. Though the actual operation of the new system was far from the ideal, it did provide the necessary framework from which the potential effectiveness of central control could eventually become a reality.

As Riggs explains "a fundamental silent revolution" in the character of the bureaucracy was carried out, not only in the overhead structure of functionally specialized ministries and departments, but also in the expansion of these new agencies to include field staffs potentially capable of implementing enacted laws, regulations, and programs on a country-wide basis.25

Under the new Tesapiban System, the integration of the villages included a plan by which "provinces were broken down into smaller administrative regions-districts. The district officer was chosen by the governor, with the concurrence of the commissioner."26

Several villages made up a Tambol (commune) which was headed by a Kamnan who acted as a kind of liaison officer between villages and the central

government. The villagers were to select their own leader (pu yai ban). The Kamnan was to be chosen by a group of village leaders, who would then be officially appointed by the governor of a cangwad (province). This was the extent of the decentralization since all officials above this level were chosen by and directly responsible to the Ministry of Interior. Directly above the Tambol was the amphur (district) headed by the nai amphur (district officer). Vella states that, "The district was the point of contact of the central government and the people, and its official was the executor of the orders received from the central government, the commissioner., and the governor. As the power of the central government increased, other representatives of the central government, education officers, agricultural officials, police officials—were appointed to the district office."~7 Diagram 3 shows the extension of the arm of the central government into the provinces, while at the same time making the village leaders and liaisons (kamnans) more accountable to the villagers. As Vella states:

> Although direct, administration ceased at the district level, more immediate control over individuals was attempted in the recognition by the central government of the ancient village organization. For the first time, the government took official notice of the locally elected village headmen, giving them the responsibility of reporting crime, maintaining registers of the population, and aiding district officials.28

As the diagram shows, the changes in the basic government structure which were to undermine the old concept of order and supplant the new one, did not involve a complete break with tradition. For instance, the new monthon commissioners were identified with the ancient royal practice of sending great commissioners (Kha luang yai) to take command of a particular territory in times of strife.29

However, with the creation of the monthons the powers of the provincial governors was somewhat limited. This change in status was reflected in the change of title from Chaomuang (lord of the place) to pu warajakarn changwad (man in charge of the province for the king).30 The governor was no longer supreme lord of the province for he no longer possessed the power to remove provincial officials of commissioned rank from their positions. In the past the governor had the power to "select a man of honesty and appoint him to be nai ban (equivalent to pu yai ban) in each district in consideration of his ability. The new Tesapiban System integration of the villages included a plan in which the villagers were to select their own leader, and as already mentioned, from a group of village leaders a Kamnan was to be chosen who would then be officially appointed by the governor.

On the village level this new system not only undermined the power and control of the provincial governors, but also made the village leaders, and liaisons (kamnans) more accountable to the villagers.

DIAGRAM 3
Before Transformation of Provincial Administration

(Diagrams are by the author)

                          KING

PROVINCIAL LORDS BANGKOK OFFICIALS   NATIVE LORDS
(Outer Provinces)(Inner Provinces)   (Dependencies)
                          GOVERNOR
                          (Cangwad)   (Hierarchy varied
                                         with area--Laos,
     KAMNAN   Malaya, Burma,
     (Tambol)   KAMNAN   and Cambodia.)
                        (Tambol)

     NAJ RAN
     (Muban)   NAJ RAN
                        (Muban)
     VILLAGERS
                        VILLAGERS

                After Transformation
                          KING

                MINISTER OF INTERIOR
                (Ministry of Interior)
                HIGH COMMISSIONER
                        (Monthon)

Centralization
(All government
appointments)   GOVERNOR
                        (Cangwad)
                        NAJ AMPHUR
                        (Amphur)

Decentralization   KAMNAN
(Villagers choose   (Tambol)
Pu Yai Bans and Pu
Yai Bans choose   PU YAI BAN
Kamnan with Naj   (Muban)
Amphur's approval.)
                        VILLAGERS

Though theoretically centralization seemed simple, in practical terms it proved rather difficult. There was a serious lack of qualified personnel, and adequate transportation facilities were for the most part undeveloped beyond the network of canals in and around the Chao Phraya basin. Even Prince Damrong, in describing the difficult task undertaken by the Ministry of Interior, states that it was "not an exaggeration to say that every city (provincial capital) has to be reconstructed (and) it is very likely that we (will) have to face the serious problem of lack of funds. "32 Even with the difficulties, Sternstien concludes "by the end of King Chulalongkorn's reign (1910) eighteen Monthons had been established, and it seems hardly a coincidence that territorial concessions ceased from this date."33

While attempting to effectively implement the new theoretical framework for provincial administration, Chulalongkorn took positive steps toward the integration and development of the provinces through substantial improvements in the transportation system. The most outstanding of these innovations was "strategic" railroad construction, which gave an impetus to development and a lasting influence on control of the provinces.34 Chulalongkorn, in delivering a speech at the grand opening of the Northern Line from Pak Nam Pho to Phitsanulok in 1907, perceptively revealed both the political and economic implications of the new railroad in furthering the development of effective administration as well as of the economy. The King clearly pointed out that "By bringing the different parts of a country within close communication the railway renders possible that close and beneficial supervision which is necessary to effective administration. By furnishing rapid and easy means of transportation it adds materially to the value of the land and its products. "35

Throughout Chulalongkorn's attempts to overhaul the basic government structure and integrate the provinces, there were no significant rebellions or upheavals by those who either resisted change or were adversely affected by the reformation. This was primarily due to the great compromising talents of Chulalongkorn and his capable ministers (especially Prince Damrong). Even old officials undermining the new regime were appeased with comfortable but powerless positions.

The transformation which was built upon a framework of tradition was carried out in an orderly civilized manner. Compromising with tradition to maintain some kind of order (which seems like the only sane thing to do when dealing with a traditional society) has remained a major aspect of Thai domestic policy involving public administration. This compromising policy was very much reflected in Prince Damrong's success in attempting the reorganization of the provinces. By instigating change through a framework still closely linked with tradition Damrong provided the necessary durability for the new administrative system. In speaking of Prince Damrong's contribution to the reorganization of government, Vella points out that, "The structure of provincial administration that he began to build upon in Thailand in 1894 was maintained, without any basic change, until 1932."36

A brief examination of Thailand's present day administration confirms the assertion of the evolution of the political apparatus as a successful continuity in adopting organization deeply rooted in their administrative tradition to modern problems. Sutton concludes that "continued progress in this area of state activity could reasonably be expected to promote the growth of social conditions from which a more balanced structure of government could arise. In pursuing this goal, the life and work of Prince Damrong gives to the provincial service corps a legacy of integrity, self-determination, and flexibility on which the

contemporary leadership of this important group of officials continues to draw."37

NOTES

1   King Chulalongkorn, "Proclamation for the Establishment of a Great Council," in J. Smith, ed., The Siam Repository VI, p. 384. (In Vella, p. 335)

2   D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (London, 1964), p. 636.

3   Prachom Chomchai, Chulalongkorn the Great (Tokyo, 1965), p. 31.

4   Hall, p. 637.

5   Walter F. Vella, The Impact of the West on Government in Thailand (Berkeley, 1955), p. 344.

6   Fred W. Riggs, Thailand--The Modernization of Bureaucratic Policy (Honolulu, 1966), p. 85.

7   Siffin, p. 58.

8   Riggs, p. 111.

9   Ibid., p. 111.

10   H. C. Wales, Ancient Siamese Government and Administration (London, 1934), P. 79.

11   Siffin, p. 59.

12   Riggs, p. 115.

13   Sternstein, p. 60.

14   Hall, p. 637.

15   Chomchai, p. 49.

16   Hall, p. 637.

17   Phaya Ammat, "The Story of the Ministry of Interior," section on "Beginnings of Rural Administration," in Sixtieth Anniversary Volume (in Siffin, p. 67).

18   Riggs, p. 135.

19   Prince Damrong, "Conditions Existing During the Establishment of the Ministry of Interior," Sixtieth Anniversary Volume, Part 2 (in Siffin, p. 68).

20   Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, Tesaphiban (Provincial Administration in Thailand during the Period 1892-1932), (ms. of translation from Cornell Research Center, Bangkok), p. 14. (Bangkok:, Klang Vidhya Press, B. E. 2495, 1952), (as quoted from Riggs, p. 135.)

21   Ibid., pp. 14-15.

22   Vella, p. 342.

23   Wm. W. Fegen, The Siam Directory (Bangkok: Siam Observer Press, 1910), (as quoted in Siffin, p. 97).

24   Reginald Le May, An Asian Arcady: The Land and Peoples of Northern Siam (Cambridge, England, 1926), p. 62.

25   Riggs, p. 147.

26   Vella, p. 345.

27   Ibid., p. 345.

28   Ibid., p. 345.

29   Siffin, p. 70.

30   Ibid., p. 75.

31   Ibid., p. 73.

32   A. Mekwawan, The Role of the Provincial Government in Thailand,Bangkok, 19 Institute of Public Administration 62), p. 106 as quoted from Sternstien, p. 61).

33   Sternstien, p. 61.

34   The idea of developing the northern provinces through construction of railroads has remained a great influence on the provincial administrators of this area. While accompanying several officials of the Ministry of Development on a ten-day inspection tour of the roads (and lack of roads) of northern Thailand, I had an excellent opportunity to observe the reactions of the provincial administrators. The purpose of the inspection trip was to determine the feasibility (by assessing the cost and difficulty) of constructing a main road from Chiengmai to Chiengrai. The Bangkok officials presented their proposals at conferences held with the provincial administrators. Except for the conference held at Chiengrai, there was little discussion on the part of the various regional officials, other than an occasional "Chaaj Krap" (Yes, Sir), and a nod of agreement. In contrast, the governor of Chieng Rai presented an interesting argument to the visiting committee. He maintained that the government was wasting their time building a road since what was really needed to "develop the northern frontier" was a railroad. Citing a somewhat exaggerated though very interesting illustration to support his argument, he explained, "Just look at America! If they had not built the Atlantic-Pacific railroad, the western frontier could not have been developed and integrated--and the U.S. might have been two (countries today . . . . They built the railroad first and what we need is a railroad first--not a road." (As recorded in my Journal, March 17, 1969.)

35   A. W. Graham, Siam: A Handbook of Practical Commercial and Political Information (London, T9-1-2T, vol. 2, p. 145 (as quoted from Sternstien, p. 627.

36   Vella, p. 344.

37   Problems of Politics and Administration in Thailand, edited by Joseph L. Sutton (Bloomington, 1962).

Assignments
1.   Read Chapter 4, "Some Cultural Aspects of Thai Political Behavior and
Student Activism" in Thailand Student Activism and Political Change by R.
Prizzia and N. Sinsawasdi.

Terms You Should Know
     ideology of development   centralization
     decentralization   colonialism
     feudalism   strong man military systems
     monarchies   bureaucratic elite systems
     collegial military systems   integration
     transformation   modernization
     provincial administration

Discussion Questions/Exercises

1. Why did most developing countries undergo so many and different forms of
    government since receiving their independence Explain and give examples.

2. Why was Thailand able to resist colonialism" Explain giving examples of
    administrative processes.

3. Is there an ideal-type form of government for developing countries? Why or
    why not?

V. GENERAL TECHNIQUES AND SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR COMPARISON IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRAT'ION

Classification and Typologies

Classification, the grouping together -of countries with similar characteristics, has been the traditional mainstay of comparative political analysis. Classification of polities according to the distribution of political power has been a particularly enduring feature of this tradition. Thus democracy as a form of government has been contrasted with government by one or by the few (variously labeled autocracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, dictatorship), constitutional government (with regularized restraints upon its powers) has been distinguished from authoritarianism and totalitarianism; parliamentary forms have been contrasted with presidential forms; federations have been distinguished from unitary states; monarchies have been compared with republics.

While these dichotomous classifications are perhaps the most obvious to a beginning student of politics, the possibilities for classification are vast, limited only by the number of polity characteristics that the analyst's imagination allows him to perceive. The many characteristics of legislatures, executives, judiciaries, bureaucracies, parties, interest groups, election procedures, and policy enactments--to name only the most obvious criteria--all readily lend themselves to schemes for classifying polities. In the field of comparative American state politics some rather manifest classification criteria include the two-year/four-year governorship, dichotomy, the closed/open primary dichotomy, or multiple-category classification according to methods of judicial selection or types of taxation levies.

Reflecting greater imagination and insight, however, scholars have classified the American states to such characteristics as types of party system (e.g., two-party, one-party, modified one-party); degree of party cohesion (strong, moderate, weak); strength of governor's veto power (strong, medium, weak); and expenditure per pupil for schools in relation to per capita income (high, proportionate, low). 1 It is readily apparent that the ordering of the states into these categories has required more than an ability to sort according to manifest categories. What has been needed has been: (1) ability to discern what is important; (2) judgment to decide upon an appropriate number of categories; (3) judgment to determine where the cutoff points of a continuous variable should be drawn, or judgment to allocate in those cases where the cutoff points cannot be precisely defined (strength of veto power, as contrasted to expenditure per pupil). With respect to the example of party-system classification the more appropriate designation is typology, rather than classification. The reason is that the respective categories represent neither manifest characteristics nor continuous variables, but rather the author's own abstract conceptualization of qualitative types of political situations. Derived from theoretical insights into what the fundamental differentiating characteristics among polities are, typologies provide the student of comparative politics with one of his most useful analytic tools.

At the cross-national level one of the most ambitious attempts to classify polities is reported in A Cross-Polity Survey, compiled by Banks and Textor. 2 This volume classifies 115 nation-states according to the following 57 characteristics (see Table 5-1).

1.   Classifications of this type may be found in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds., <u>Politics in the American States,</u> Boston, Little, Brown, 1965.

2.   Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, A <u>Cross-Polity Survey,</u> Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1963.

TABLE 5-1: CLASSIFICATION OF NATIONS

1. Areal Grouping
2. Size
3. Population
4. Population Density
5. Population Growth Rate
6. Urbanization
7. Agricultural Population

8. Gross National Product

9. Per Capita Gross National Product
10. International Financial Status

11. Economic Developmental Status

12. Literary Rate

13. Freedom of the Press
14. Newspaper Circulation per
    1,000 population
15. Religious Configuration
16. Religious Homogeneity
17. Racial Homogeneity
18. Linguistic Homogeneity
19. Date of Independence
20. Westernization
21. Former Colonial Ruler
22. Political Modernization:
    Historical Type

23. Political Modernization:
    Periodization
24. Ideological Orientation
25. System Style
26. Constitutional Status of
    Present Regime

27. Governmental Stability
28. Representative Character of Regime
29. Current Electoral System
30. Freedom of Group Opposition
31. Political Enculturation
32. Sectionalism
33. Interest Articulation by
    Non associational Groups

34. Interest Articulation by
    Institutional Groups
35. Interest Articulation by Non
    Non associational Groups

36. Interest Articulation by Anomic
    Groups
37. Interest Articulation by Pol. Party
38. Interest Aggregation by Pol. Party

39. Interest Aggregation by Executive
40. Interest Aggregation by Legislature
41. Party System: Quantitative
42. Party System: Qualitative
43. Stability of Party System
44. Personalismo
45. Political Leadership
46. Leadership Charisma
47. Vertical Power Distribution

48. Horizontal Power Distribution

49. Legislative-Executive Structure
50. Current Status of Legislature
51. Character of Legislature
52. Current Status of Executive

53. Character of Bureaucracy
54. Political Participation by the
    Military
55. Role of Police
56. Character of Legal System
57. Communist Bloc

These 57 characteristics serve well to illustrate the four distinct classification categories suggested above. The easiest categories to construct are those based upon manifest (in some cases nominal) characteristics. These include the unicameral/bicameral dichotomy, the four categories of former colonial rulers (Britain, France, Spain, other), the fourteen area] groupings (North America, South America, Australia, etc.), and the trichotomy Communist/non-Communist/quasi-Community (Cuba is the only polity coded in the last category).

Somewhat more difficult to construct are the categories relating to precisely measurable data of the kind found in statistical abstracts, census reports, and atlases. Categories are defined by precise cutoff points, then labeled by appropriate adjectives. One example is the land size categories of very large (2 million square miles and above), large (300,0001.9 million square miles), medium (75,000-299,000 square miles), and small (below 75,000 square miles). Additional examples are population density (very high, high, medium, low), population growth rate (high, low), and religious homogeneity (homogeneous, heterogeneous).

Much more difficult are those quantitatively defined characteristics that cannot be precisely measured. For them categories cannot be exactly defined and allocation of polities is a problem. Examples are the characteristics of sectionalism (extreme, moderate, negligible), interest articulation by anomic groups (frequent, occasional, infrequent, very infrequent), leadership charisma (pronounced, moderate, negligible), and status of executive (dominant, strong, weak). The difficulties presented by this type of characteristic may be illustrated by examining the authors' treatment of the sectionalism characteristic. Sectionalism is defined as "the phenomenon in which a significant percentage of the population of a nation lives i-n a sizeable geographic area and identifies self-consciously and distinctively with that area to a degree that the cohesion of the polity as a whole is appreciably challenged or impaired." The modifiers "significant," "sizeable," and "appreciably," together with. the difficulty of measuring "self-conscious and distinctive identification," amply illustrate the problem that the authors confronted when they tried to determine whether a nation should be classified as manifesting "extreme sectionalism" (one or more groups with extreme sectional feeling), "moderate sectionalism" (one group with strong sectional feeling or several with moderate sectional feeling), or "negligible sectionalism" (no significant sectional feeling). (see Table 5-2)

The fourth type of category set is best described as typological, representing abstract conceptualization of broad qualitative types of political situations. Some of the most familiar political classifications, used in everyday parlance, are actually typologies of this sort. Examples are the loosely defined dichotomy of democracy/non democracy, or the more rigorously defined trichotomy used in A Cross-Polity Survey, of constitutionalism (government conducted with reference to recognized constitutional norms); authoritarianism (no effective constitutional limitation); and totalitarianism (no effective constitutional limitation plus broad exercise of power in both political and social spheres). What distinguishes much recent work in comparative politics, however, is the use of typologies that are not generally familiar. Instead, they reflect the seminal writings of a number of social scientists who have launched departures from traditional ways of

TABLE 5-2. Classification of Nation-States by Degree of Sectionalism

Extreme Sectionalism (27)	*Moderate Sectionalism* (34)		*Negligible Sectionalism* (47)
Belgium	Afghanistan	Austria	Portugal
Brazil	Albania	Bolivia	Rumania
Burma	Algeria	Burundi	Rwanda
Canada	Australia	African	Saudi Arabia
Colombia	Bulgaria.		Sweden
Congo (Leo)	Cambodia	Chile	Tanganyika
Czechoslovakia	Cameroun	Cuba	Trinidad
Ecuador	Ceylon	Costa Rica	Tunisia
India	Chad	Cyprus	Turkey
Indonesia	China, P. R.	Denmark	U.A.R.
Iran	Congo	Dominican Rep.	Upper Volta
Iraq	Dahomey	El Salvador	Venezuela
Jordan	Ethiopia	Finland	Vietnam, N.
Laos	France	Germany, E.	Vietnam, Rep.
Libya	Gabon	Greece	
Malagasy Rep.	German F. R.	Guatemala	
Morocco	Ghana	Haiti	
Nigeria	Guinea	Honduras	
Pakistan	Italy	Hungary	
Somalia	Lebanon	Iceland	
Sudan	Liberia	Ireland	
Switzerland	Malaya	Israel	
Uganda	Mauritania	Ivory Coast	
U.S.S.R-	Netherlands	Jamaica	
U.K.	Peru	Japan	
Yemen	Philippines	Korea, N.	
Yugoslavia	Senegal	Korea *Rep.*	
	Sierra *leone*	Luxembourg	
	South Africa	Mongolia	
	Spain	New Zealand	
	Syria	Norway	
	Thailand	Panama	
	Togo	Paraguay	
	U.S.	Poland	

looking at political phenomena. Because of their importance in the literature, a number of examples are in order.

One of the most frequently encountered typologies is Max Weber's distinction between (1) the traditional polity; (2) the charismatic polity, and (3) the rational-legal polity. These are defined according to whether the authority wielded by the government is held to be justified and hence legitimate because (1) it is seen as a continuation of the ancient and sanctified past, (2) it is wielded by a person who enjoys absolute personal devotion, (3) it is exercised according to legally valid, rationally created rules. This trilogy of "pure types" aids today'§ political scientist in describing and differentiating between "real" polities as disparate as an African tribe, the French Fifth Republic, and the United States.

Another example of typology is Almond and Verba's distinction between the participant political culture, subject political culture, and parochial political culture.3 In the participant culture citizens possess the psychological orientations that provide the basis for political participation, broadly defined. In the subject culture citizens are knowledgeable of only the "output" side of government, i.e., government laws and benefits. In the parochial culture the predominant orientation is one of complete or near-complete unawareness of either "output" or "input" (elections, parties, and pressure groups).

Political parties and interest groups--and thereby the polities of which they are a part--have also been the subject of various typological shcema. Frequently encountered is Duverger's distinction between cadre parties (where a relatively few "notables" make up the party organization), 3Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963; paperback:Boston, Little, Brown, 1965 and mass parties (where the organization is based on mass membership). 4

A typology that attempts to encompass parties in both democratic and non democratic polities is Neumann's distinction between parties of representation and parties of integration (where the party exercises influence over all spheres of its members' lives, examples being not only fascist and Communist parties but also some European socialist and Catholic parties). 5

In regard to interest groups, McKenzie has distinguished between two types of organized interest groups operative in a democracy: sectional groups organized by the various "sections" of the society, and promotional groups that bring together persons wishing to advance a particular "cause" such as abolition of capital punishment. 6 Almond's typology identifies distinctions intended to be useful in analyzing groups in both democratic and non democratic and in both Western and non-Western polities. His scheme distinguishes between associational interest groups (e.g., labor unions, business organizations, veteran groups); non associational interest groups (e.g., ethnic, kinship, class); institutional interest groups (e.g., the army, the state bureaucracy); and anomic interest groups (riots and demonstrations). 7

4 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Barbara North and Robert North, trans., New York, Wiley, 1963.

5 Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties, Chicago, University of Chicago Press,, 1956, pp. 395-421.
6
 R. T. McKenzie, "Parties, Pressure Groups and the British Political Process,

The Political Quarterly (January-March, 1958), vol. 29, pp. 5-16.

7 Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative
Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the
Developing Areas, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 33-38.7

Graphs and Typologies

It should also be pointed out that classifications and typologies tend to
distort because they usually focus upon a single characteristic only, isolating
that characteristic from other political phenomena. Thus on some counts the
United States and the Soviet Union are much alike; they are both generally
characterized by a modern bureaucracy and by a secular culture. On the other
hand, the two polities differ from one another in a number of important
respects. What is required is a means of classifying these two polities along
more than a single dimension. In the case of typologies, the solution to the
problem is to combine a number of single descriptive designations (e.g., the
United States as a legal-rational, constitutional, presidential policy). With
continuous variables, however, the solution is to discard categories entirely
and to plot polities along a graph, the Y axis of which measures one dimension
and the X axis another. This method has the additional advantage of avoiding the
problem of artificial categorization noted above.

FIGURE 5-2

U.S.S.R.   United States   Mexico

Increasing Subsystem Autonomy

Source: Adapted from Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative
Politics: A Developmental Approach, Boston, Little, Brown, 1966, pp. 217, 308.
In the authors' graphic presentation the Y axis is defined as "structural
differentiation and cultural secularization."

An example of a two-dimensional graphic presentation, from a scheme advanced
by Almond and Powell, is shown on Figure 5-2. The Y axis measures the extend of
political development and the X axis measures what the authors call "subsystem
autonomy," i.e., the extent to which political institutions (e.g., parties,
pressure groups, "branches" of government) operate autonomously. It will be seen
that both the United States and the Soviet Union are high on the scale of
political development, but are far apart on the scale of subsystem autonomy.
Mexico is nearer to the United States than to the Soviet Union with respect to
subsystem autonomy, yet it is not as politically developed as either of the two
major powers.

Rankings

When continuous characteristics can be defined with precise cutoff points,
the approximate points on a graph can be discarded in favor of finely boned
rankings. Except in the case of ties, each polity can now be distinguished from
the other.

What prevents the wider use of the ranking technique is, of course, the fact
that political characteristics--as distinguished from any social, economic, and
geographic characteristics--seldom readily lend themselves to quantitative
expression.

As the cross-national level, the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators 8 compiled by Russett and associates presents the rankings of 133 polities according to 75 characteristics. As would be expected, the majority of the characteristics relate to the readily quantifiable economic and social data of the type collected by the United Nations (e.g.,

8 Bruce M. Russett, and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, Harold D. Lasswell, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964.

population size, gross national product, literary rate). The more directly relevant political characteristics are expenditures for selected purposes (e.g., social security, defense), voter turnout, votes polled by particular kinds of parties (e.g., communist, religious), executive turnover, and deaths from domestic group violence. The latter ranking, which is offered as an index of political stability, may be presented here as illustrative of the method. Of 74 nations surveyed, the per million deaths during the period 1950-1962 ranged from zero to 2900, with the mean being 107 and the median being 3. The complete rankings are listed 'in Table 5-3.

An imaginative use of rankings is found in the work of those authors who construct rankings based upon their own indices. Fitzgibbon's pioneering study ranked 20 Latin American states on a scale designed to measure the degree of democratic achievement with the rankings based upon points awarded to each state by a group of specialists in Latin American studies. The major difficulty with this method was its dependence upon the subjective judgment of the experts, as reflected by the fact that the judgments varied widely. To overcome this objection Phillip Cutright designed a more objective measurement of what he labeled political development. Briefly, the index was constructed by awarding to each nation-station two points for each year, during the 21-year period 1940-1960, that the nation had at least 30 percent of the seats in the lower house of the legislature held by minority parties; one point where there was some competition, but not sufficient to satisfy the 30 percent rule; one point for each year where the office of political executive was held by a person(s) elected through a competitive process; and one-half point where the executive, even though not chosen competitively, was at least not hereditary. The total number of possible points a nation could be allotted was 63 (3x21). The rankings of political development--thus defined as a combination of competitiveness and complexity of institutional forms--are presented in Table.5-4. (Also see R. Prizzia's use of ranking techniques in Chapter V, Eight Nation Study, pp. 85-109 of suggested text.)

TABLE 5-3. –Rank of Nation-States by Number of Deaths from
          Domestic Group Violence per 1.,000,000, Population,
          1950–1962

Rook

1	Cubas	2,900
2	Hungary	335
3	Indonesiao	
4	Bolivia	63
5	Iraq-	344
6	Colombia	
7	Philippines	292
8	Argentina	217
9		152
10.5	Honduras	
10.5	Venezuela	
12	Paraguay	60
13	Guatemala	57
14	South Korea	49
15	Syria	44
16	Ceylon	42
17	Iran	56
	South Africa	33
19	Dominican Republic	31
20	Peru	26
21	Panama	25
22	Costa Rica	24
23	Afghanistan	21
24	China	
25		
26		
27		
28		20
25	Ecuador	18
27	Haiti	16
27	Lebanon	16
27	Nicaragua	16
29	India	14
30	Ethiopia	10
31	Pakistan	9
32	Yemen	
33.5	Jordan	7
33.5	Nepal	7
35	Poland	
36	Mexico	4

Table 5-3 Continued

Rank	Nations	
38.5	Israel	3
38.5	Thailand	3
42	Chile	2
42	El Salvador	2
42	Greece	2
44	Egypt	1.6
	Brazil	1.0
45.5	Portugal	1.0
47.5	Belgium	.9
4-7.5	Turkey	.9
49.5	Czechoslovakia	.7
49.5	USS-R.	.7
51.5	France	.3
51.5	Uruguay	.3
54	IUIY	.2
54	Saudi Arabia	2
54	Spain	.2
56	Japan	.1
57	West Germany	.02
58	United States	.01
66.5	Australia	.0
66.5	Austria	.0

TABLE 5-4. Rank of Nation-States by Degree of Political Development

Rank	Nation	Rank	Nation
5	Australia	38.5	Venezuela
5	Canada	40.5	Honduras
5	Chile	40.5	Hungary
5	Ireland	43.5	Czechoslovakia
5	New Zealand	43.5	Lebanon
5	Sweden	43.5	Turkey
5	Switzerland	43.5	USSJL
5	United Kingdom	47.5	Bulgaria
5	US.A.	47.5	Ceylon
10.5	Panama	47-.5	India
10.5	Uruguay	47.5	Romania
13.5	Costa Rica	51	Albania
13.5	Denmark	51	Poland
13.5	Iceland	51	Yugoslavia
13.5	Norway	54	Burma
17.5	Belgium	54	Indonesia
7.5	France	54	Paraguay
17.5	Luxembourg	57	China
17.5	The Netherlands	57	S. Korea.
20	Cuba	57	Mongolia
22	Austria	59	Haiti
22	Finland	6o.5	Iraq
22	Nicaragua	60.5	Vietnam
25	Brazil	64.5	Dominican Republic
25	Italy	64.5	Malaya
25	Mexico	64.5	Pakistan
27.5	Guatemala	64.5	Portugal
27.5	Peru	64.5	Spain
30.5	Argentina	64.5	Syria
30.5	"via	68	'Thailand
30.5	Japan	69.5	Laos
30.5	Philippines	69.5	Jordan
33.5	West Germany	71	Afghanistan
33.5	Israel	72.5	Cambodia
36	Colombia	72.5	
36	Equador	74	Saudi Arabia
36	Greece	75	Nepal
38.5	E Salvador	76.5	Muscat
		76.5	Yemen

With regard to political development and "democracy," in 1938, E. M. Sait thought that he discerned "The Decline of Democracy" at the cross national level.10 Today, among the emerging nations, scholars have noted a trend away from democratic practices toward more authoritarian forms of government, including rule by the military. Among the Western democracies, identified trends include the decline of ideological and class-linked political struggles; 11 the decline in importance of legislatures, contrasting with the increasing importance of executives and bureaucracies;12 and the decline of political party membership, perhaps accompanied by the ascension of the professional party managers.13

Description and Explanation

One basic analytical problem is that of distinguishing between description and explanation. A characteristic singled out to describe a policy is almost by definition one that the analyst considers to be of importance in attempting to explain the policy. If the characteristic is not of this importance, there is little reason to mention it; indeed, what the analyst "sees" is itself usually derived from what he considers to be of explanatory importance. Description and explanation are thus two

10
  Edward McChesney Sait, Political Institutions: A Preface, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938, Chap. XIX.

11 Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," Daedalus (Winter, 1964), Vol. 93, pp. 271-303.

12David Truman,, "The Representative Function in Western Systems," in Edward H. Buehrig, ed., Essays in Political Science, Bloomington, Indiana, University Press, 1966, p. 84.

13Leon Epstein, "Political Parties in Western Democratic Systems," in Buehrig, Ed., Ibid., pp. 126-127; and Stein Rokkan, "Introduction," International Social Science Journal (No. 1. 1960), Vol. 12, p. 14. This'issue is devoted to "Citizen Participation in Political Life."

two sides of the same coin, with a descriptive characteristic always being able to double as an explanatory factor. The point may be illustrated by referring again to the list of 57 characteristics mentioned in A Cross-Polity Survey, and noting that any one of these may be seen as an aid in both describing a polity and explaining it.

The relationship between description and explanation may be formulated somewhat differently by saying that a dependent variable, i.e., the characteristic that must be explained, can in another context become the independent variable, i.e., the characteristic that serves to explain. Thus the analyst can ask why one polity has effective government and another one not, or instead he can follow Lipset and invoke the concept of "effectiveness" to explain the presence or absence of democratic stability. Similarly, the analyst can view the party system, the interest group system, leadership patterns, and so forth either as explanatory variables, or as objects of explanation. The same can be said of the broad typologies "democracy" and "political development." To illustrate: If four of the 57 Survey characteristics are taken as defingin the cluster called "stable democracy"--namely, the presence of constitutionalism, broad representation, freedom of opposition, and government stability--then the other 53 characteristics can be viewed as possible explanations for them. Conversely, if the analyst wants to explain why a polity is characterized by

some of the other 53 characteristics, the remaining four characteristics would help him out in his task. Therefore, an <u>independent variable is</u> the characteristic that serves to explain while the <u>dependent variable is</u> the characteristic that must be explained.

To avoid confusion two basic analytical distinctions can be used. The first distinction is between three broad types of explanatory factors. Again <u>A Cross-Polity Survey</u> may be used for purposes of illustration.

In Table 5-5 the characteristics taken from that volume are applied to a specific polity, namely Britain, and are grouped under three headings. Class I relates to geographical and historical characteristics. Class II relates to characteristics of the society--economic, demographic, and basis of unity and cleavage. Class III relates to political characteristics-specific institutions and processes, as well as broad political traits. Although the 5615 characteristics by no means exhaust the ways in which a polity may be described and explained--more will be introduced in following chapters--the list is sufficiently comprehensive to illustrate the analytical distinctions that must be made. More will be said of the three types of factors in Chapter 6.

The second distinction is between two basic modes of explanatory analysis, functional and causal. This second distinction is closely related to the first, since the one can be understood mainly in terms of the other.

TABLE 5-5

1. Geographic and Historical Characteristics
    A. Located in western Europe
    B. Size of area is medium
    C. Date of independence before 1800
    D. Historically a Western nation
    E Early European historical ripe

2. Characteristics of the Society
    A. Economic
        1. population growth is "high"
        2. agricultural production is very low
        3. gross national product is *high*
        4. per capita GNP is very high
        5. economically developed
        6. mixed Christian

15 One of the 57 characteristics found in A <u>Cross-Polity Survey,</u> "former colonial ruler," is not applicable to Britain.

    S. Demographic
        1. **population size is large**
        2. population density is high
        3. urbanization is high
        4. literacy rate is high
        5. per capita newspaper circulation is high
        6. mixed Christian
    C. Lines of Cleavage
        1. religiously heterogeneous
        2. racially homogeneous
        3. linguistically homogeneous
        4. extreme sectionalism

M. Political Characteristics
    A. Institutions and Processes
        1- parliamentary -royalist
        2. unitary
        3. common law
        4. bicameral legislature
        5. fully effective legislature
        6. strong (but not dominant) executive
        7. modern bureaucracy
        8. neutrality of military
        9. significant horizontal power distribution
        10. negligible *personalismo*
        11. negligible leadership charisma
        12. moderate elitist
        13- two party system
        14. stable party system
        15. class oriented party system
        16. competitive electoral system
        17. complete freedom of the press
        18. significant interest articulation by political parties
        19. high political enculturation (i.e., no extreme opposition)
        20. significant interest articulation -by associational groups
        21. limited interest articulation -by institutional groups
        22. limited interest articulation by
          (e.g., kinship, ethnic, religious, regional groups)
        23. very infrequent interest articulation by anomic groups
        24. significant interest aggregation by political parties
        25. moderate interest aggregation by the executive
        26. moderate interest aggregation by the legislature
        27. non-politically significant role of police
    B. Broad Characteristics
        1. constitutional
        2. government stability
        3. freedom of group opposition
        4. polyarchic (i.e., broadly representative)
        5. advanced modernization
        6. "nonmobilizational"
        7. conventional " ideology
        8. non-Communist bloc

Functional Explanation

Functional explanation may be illustrated by referring again to the example of Britain as portrayed by the 56 characteristics listed in the Survey. How can the analyst explain the fact that Britain is a stable democracy, i.e., that it is characterized by the four characteristics of constitutionalism, broad representation, freedom of opposition, and government stability?

To answer this question in the functional mode the analyst perceives the British society as a whole, and more specifically as an interrelated social system._ He then asks which of the other 52 characteristics might reasonably be identified as being supportive of the four-fold "democratic" cluster. (Instead of "support" the analyst might also use terms like "foster," "facilitate," "encourage," "help sustain," "contribute toward," "are conducive to play a role" or "play a function in maintaining." Thus he might argue that helping to sustain stable democracy in Britain are: a high GNP (II), racial and linguistic homogeneity (II), a stable16 party system (III), and a "non mobilizational

system style" (II-I). He argues that these factors refer to patterns of action and related orientations, and are themselves subsystems; and that all of these- whether called characteristics, patterns, or (sub)systems--are interconnected in a back--and-forth cause-and-effect relationship with each other as well as with the "stable democratic" cluster. He is not concerned with how the various supportive factors came into being, only with the function that they serve now that they are present in an ongoing, interrelated system.

Together in a reciprocally related whole, there is the strong presumption that the contribution each part, or at least each major part, is making to the whole (or the aspect of the whole he is trying to explain in this case stable democracy), is a positive, supportive contribution--or not use the more technical language, that it is functional and not dysfunctional.

To make this assertion of positive interdependence, the analyst's explanatory statements will be case in the format X (stable democracy) is a function of Y (say, a high GNP); or a function of Y is X; or a consequence of Y is X; or possibly, given the fact of Y there is also X. The language identifies interrelationships, stating that if X were to change Y would change also. Although the model stresses the integrality of the whole, the fact that X and Y can be identified indicates that these parts are at least in some degree autonomous. Similarly, although the model assumes the interrelatedness of all parts, the statement that X is a consequence (function) of Y suggests that these two parts are related in a fairly direct way rather than being related only in an indirect, "round about" way, through one or more intervening variables.

Thus it seems reasonable to assume that a nation's economic system may have a more direct relationship to the degree of political stability than does, say, the nation's system of child rearing.

Causal Explanation

What we may label causal explanation is probably more closely related to what the term "explanation" is usually thought to imply. It differs from functional explanation in three respects. First, whereas functional explanation is appropriate for identifying interrelationships in an ongoing system, reporting them either in terms of the function to the whole served by the respective parts or in terms of the change triggered off within the system when there is a change in one of the parts, causal explanation is called for when the analyst asks what caused an event like the change (e.g., the Nazi regime) to occur. Cause precedes effect in an observable temporal sequence, and the task is to "trace back" in time from observed effect to precipitating cause. Second, whereas functional explanation stresses interrelatedness and interdependence, causal explanation, without necessarily denying these, attempts to single out a factor, or factors, or possibly an interrelated cluster of factors, that may be thought of as having a sufficient degree of autonomy, importance, and priority in a temporal sequence that it, or they, may legitimately be highlighted as causal. Third, as a consequence of stressing autonomy and temporal sequence, causal analysis implies that the causal factor is a "prime mover," that is, that it is "self-propelled," "self-caused."

Thus it may be that all factors are bound together in a "seamless fabric," or "anthropological unity," but within the causal mode the analyst must now insist that some factors are far more autonomously important than others. It may be that all factors both affect and reflect, are both cause and consequence, are both chicken and egg, in a circle of causality, but causal analysis requires

that the analyst take the leap and settle the dilemma in favor of affect, cause, and the chicken. And it may be true that in any causal chain there is always a preceding link, but causal analysis requires that a first link be identified and that subsequent links be explained in terms of it. None of these decisions is taken easily, and the analyst will probably continue to be plagued by doubts. It is for this reason that functional explanation is the "easier," and sometimes the more intellectually satisfying mode of analysis.

The basic problem of causality can be illustrated by the debatable Marxian thesis that economic factors are the causal determinants of all other features of the society, including political features [Economics   0 Politics]. Political determinists would argue the other way around, claiming that through their policies governments mold the type of economy that prevails (Politics – Economics). Marxists would rejoin that governments are controlled by the owners of the means of production [Economics > Politics > Economics],Political determinists would rejoin...and so forth.   Another version of the same debate is the Weberian thesis that capitalism is the product of the Protestant Ethic [Ethics > Economics], and the Marxian reply that Protestantism was itself the product of the economic conditions that prevailed in the late medieval towns [Economics > Ethics > Economics].   The functionalist avoids both of these controversies by being concerned only with functional and dysfunctional relationships among political, economic, and ethical patterns in an ongoing system. However, it should be noted that there are also strong criticism of functionalism as well.

The Marxian and Weberian theses can also be used to illustrate two distinctions usually made between types of causes. First is the distinction between direct and indirect causation. It is possible to argue that the economic conditions of the late-medieval towns led both directly to the emergence of capitalism, as well as indirectly to capitalism through the intervening variable of the Protestant Ethic.

Within the causal mode it is also customary to differentiate degrees of causal importance. A factor may be deemed to be of some stated degree of contributory causal importance (the economic system was the primary contributor to the emergence of Protestantism; the economic system at least helped to contribute to the emergence of Protestantism). Or, a factor may be deemed to be of necessary causal importance (Protestantism would not have arisen without capitalism), or sufficient causal importance (capitalism was sufficient to cause Protestantism), or both necessary and sufficient.

Specific Administrative Criteria

Hence we find that "comparative" may be used within one country or many countries if you are comparing different classifications, typologies, and concepts, etc. However, "comparative" for the purpose of this course is comparisons of two countries using any of the following criteria in the administrative process.

1. Culture of the country and its effect on the administrative process.
2. Organizational structure.
3. Manage of organizations within the country.
4. Differences between the private and public sector.
5. Organizational effectiveness.
6. Individual characteristics and behavior.
7. Motivation and performance.
8. Groups within the organization.
9. Leadership styles.

10. The process of communication.
11. The process of decision-making.
12. The process of resolving disputes.
13. The process of coping with and resolving threats from without the organization.
15. Integration of administrative processes.
16. Consolidation of administrative process.

The above list represents only a sample of the many criteria to choose from. Table 5-6 provides a list of indicators by specific classification to assist in the analysis and explanation of some of the criteria for the purposes of comparisons.

TABLE 5-6. List of Social and Economic Indicators

A. Social Indicators

I. **Demographic Indicators:**
   1. Population density per sq. km.
   2. Annual rate of growth of population.
   3. Percentage of population living in urban areas.
   4. Population in localities of 20,000 and over as % of population.
   5. Average size of private household.
   6. Crude birth rate per 1,000 population.
   7. Crude death rate per 1,000 population.
   8. Infant mortality rate.
   9. Expectation of life at birth (average of male and female).
   10. Dependency ratio (children aged under 15 plus persons aged 65 and over as % of the age group 15-64).
   11. Child dependency ratio (children aged under 15 as % of the age group 15-64).
   12. Crude marriage rate per 1,000 population.
   13. Crude divorce rate per 1,000 population.

II. **Health and Nutritional Indicators:**
   14. Hospital beds per 10,000 population.
   15. Doctors per 10,000 population.
   16. Dentists per 10,000 population.
   17. Pharmacists per 10,000 population.
   18. Nurses per 10,000 population.
   19. Midwifery personnel per 10,000 population.
   20. Death rate due to infectious and parasitic diseases per 10,COO population.
   21. Dietary energy supply per capita daily kilo-calories.
   22. Grams protein consumer per capita per day.
   23. Total calorie consumption as % of requirement.
   24. % contribution of animal protein to total intake of protein.
   25. Consumption of calories derived from cereals and starchy roots as % of total calories consumed.

III. **Educational Indicators:**
   26. Percentage of literacy of adult population (15 plus).
   27. Percentage of female literacy (15 plus female population).
   28. First level enrollment ratio (as % of the age group 5-14).
   29. Second level enrollment ratio (as % of the age group IS- 19).
   30. Third level enrollment ratio (as % of the age group 20-24).
   31. % of females in the first level.
   32. % of females in the second level.
   33. % of females in the third level.
   34. Student/teacher ratio (number of students per one teacher) at the first level.
   35. Student/ teacher ratio (number of students per one teacher) at the second level.
   36. Student/teacher ratio (number of students per one teacher) at third level.
   37. Proportion of second level enrollment in vocational education.
   38. Proportion of third level enrollment in agricultural courses.
   39. Proportion of third level enrollment in medical courses.
   40. Proportion of third level enrollment in science and engineering courses.
   41. Public expenditure on education as % of GNP.
   42. Total stock of scientists, engineers and technicians per 10,000 population.
   43. Total stock of scientists, engineers and technicians engaged in research and experimental developments per 10,000 population.
   44. Expenditure for research and experimental development per 10,000 population.
   45. Production of books (number of titles by subject) per 10,000 population.

IV. **Housing Indicators:**
   46. Average size of dwelling (rooms per dwelling).
   47. Average number of persons per room.
   48. Dwellings with toilet (any type) as % of all dwellings.
   49. Dwellings with piped water as % of all dwellings.
   50. Dwellings with electricity as % of all dwellings.
   51. Dwellings constructed per 1,000 population.
   52. Index number of construction activity (1970 = 100). V. **Cultural Indicators:**
   53. Circulation of daily general-interest newspapers per 1,000 population.
   54. Circulation of non-daily general-interest newspapers per 1,000 population.
   55. Consumption of newsprint per inhabitant (kilograms).
   56. Consumption of printing paper (other than newsprint) and writing paper per inhabitant (kilograms).
   57. Cinema seats per 1,000 population.
   58. Annual cinema attendance per inhabitant.
   59. Number of radio sets per 1,000 population.
   60. Number of T.V. sets per 1,000 population.

V. **Political Indicators:**
   61. Defense expenditure as % of GNP.

62.. Military personnel per 1.000 population.
63. Voting participation: voter turnout as % of electorate.
64. Political stability index (average tenure of national/executive ruling group).
65. Death from political violence per one million population.
66. Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization.

B. Economic Indicators

I.   Agricultural Indicators:
67. % of total population living on agriculture.
68. Arable land per person in agriculture (hectare/capital).
69. Percentage contribution of agriculture in G.D.P.
70. Index number of per capita total agricultural production (1961-65 = 100).
71. Use of tractors per 1,000 hectare arable land.
72. Use of chemical fertilizers per 1,000 hectare arable land (in metric tons).

II. Industry:
73. Index of industrial production (general index, 1970 = 100).
74. % of total economically active population engaged in industrial activity.
75. % contribution of industrial activity in G.D.P.
76. % of contribution of manufacturing in G.D.P.
77. Per capita energy consumption (total commercial energy) in kilograms per capita.
78. Per capita electricity consumption (total industrial and public) in Kwh.
79. Per capita steel consumption (kilograms/capita).

III. Labor:
80. % of total population economically active.
81. % of females in total economically active population.
82. Share of non-agricultural population in total economically active population.
83. Salaried and wage-earners as % of total economically active population.
84. General level of unemployment.
85. Degree of industrial unrest (total working days lost as a % of total economically active population in industrial activity).

IV. Transport and Communications:
86. % of economically active population engaged in transport, storage and communications.
87. Passenger railway kilometers per capita.
88. Railway net ton kilometers per capita.
89. Motor vehicles (passenger and commercial) per 1,000 population.
90. Total road network per 100 population.
91. % of roads paved.
92. Civil aviation: passenger km per capita.
93. Civil aviation: total ton-km per capita.
94. International tourist travel: tourist receipts per capita (in U.S. dollars).
95. Domestic mail (received and sent) per capita.
96. Foreign mail (received and sent) per capita.
97. Domestic telegram (sent) per capita.
98. Foreign telegram (sent) per capita.
99. Number of telephones per 100 population.

V. International Trade:
100. Total value of exports per capita (in U.S. dollars).
101. Total value of imports per capita (in U.S. dollars).
102. Exports as % of GNP.
103. Imports as % of GNP.
104. Average annual growth rate of exports.
105. % contribution of agriculture in total value of exports.
106. % contribution of manufacturing in total value of exports.
107. Exports concentration index.
108. Exports diversification index.
109. Index of export fluctuations.
110. Terms of trade (average 1971-75, 1970 = 100). VT. General:
111. GNP per capita (at market prices) in U.S. dollars.
112. GDP at parity prices.
113. Annual growth rate of GNP per capita.
114. Government final consumption expenditure as % of GDP.
115. Private final consumption expenditure as % of GDP.
116. Gross fixed capital formation as % of GDP.
117. Total per capita receipt of foreign aid (official development assistance from DAC countries through bilateral agreements and through multilateral institutions in U.S. dollars).
118. Total per capita receipt of foreign capital (direct investment and other long-term private capital in SDR s).
119. Annual rate of inflation (average for 1971-75).
120. Gin index of income inequality.

Explanation of Some Frequently Used Terms in Comparisons

Demographic is the statistical science dealing with vital statistics of population. It is the study of human population, its distribution, composition, and change. We can compare birth and death rates for different societies, life expectancy, migration, etc.

Time-line is a line graph used to indicate performance, statistics, or of events, over a specified period of time. It may be used to show demographic evolution of a nation over a period of several years.

Continuum - The dimensional continuum of space and that of time, in which any event can be located, or the physical reality of such continuum, e.g., a separation of two extremes illustrated by a line used to compare communism and capitalism and on which various countries are placed to show their proximity of each other.

Graph is a chart with a diagram, as a curve, broken line, series of bars, etc., representing the successive changes in values of variables/quantity(ies). It could be a diagram consisting of nodes and links of certain statistical studies comparing two countries, e.g., population growth within a space of time, intersecting specific points on a series of coordinates and represent logical relationship or sequence of events and/or facts.

Correlation is to bring one of two related or interdependent quantities, sets of statistics, or sets of data into contrast with the other. It is related to causal explanation as previously explained. Two variables are "correlated" if they are mutually effected by each. The degree to which this relationship exists is usually represented in statistical terms (e.g., .5 or .6, etc.) and a .5 or above usually designates a "significant relationship." The .5 or .6 is referred to as the correlation coefficient.

<u>Comparative Study Using Historical Approach</u>

OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:

THE PROBLEMS OF ASSIMILATION AND ECONOMIC CONTROL

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This paper deals with what appear to be the main issues historically associated with overseas Chinese: (1) <u>assimilation</u> and (2) <u>economic control.</u> The assimilation issue involves the problems of Chinese allegiance to (mainland) China and the responsibilities of maintaining an ethnic Chinese community in the host country, versus the pressures to adopt the citizenship and values of the host country. The threat of economic control by the

Chinese, though often exaggerated for political purposes (e.g., scapegoatism) b), some government leaders of the host countries has greatly diminished compared to the pre-World War I.I era. However, the overriding success of Chinese entrepreneurs when compared with their host country counterparts has continued to be a source of irritation to the non-Chinese natives. This resentment has been mainly in legislation blatantly designed to deter and regulate the ethnic Chinese entrepreneur.

The focus of our discussion of assimilation is Southeast Asia, where ethnic Chinese represent a sizable proportion of the population. For the economic question, it is narrowed to the context of the ethnic Chinese and Tliai-Chinese2 in Thailand. Thailand was chosen because of the author's familiarity with the country and because there the economic issue has been of reIatively greater importance than that of assimilation.3 For example, the threat of the unusual entrepreneurial skills of the Chinese in Thailand prompted King Vajiravudh's now famous Jews of the Orient speech in 1914. In contrast, the issues of assimilation and economic control combined have been more intense in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

I. <u>DEMOGRAPHY</u>

Before examining historical developments, it is appropriate to describe overseas Chinese population patterns. The size and dispersion of the overseas Chinese are particularly significant.

Though the Philippine Chinese comprise only about 1.5% of the Philippine population, they constitute 25% of the population in such areas as Ouiapo, Tonado, San Pablo in Manila, and other certain districts of the major urban centers.

In Indonesia, the Chinese population is only about 2.5%, but their con-centration in the major urban areas of Java (e.g., Bandung, Djakarta, Surabaya, etc.) have made Indonesia Chinese extremely "visible."4

In Thailand, although the Chinese population is little more than that of Indonesia in terms of numbers, in some Thai cities, ethnic Chinese are as

numerous as the Thais. Thus, Thailand's capital, Bangkok, its twin-city, Thonburi, are often referred to by Thais as Chinese cities.

Even more striking are the Malaysian Chinese, comprising about 34% of the total population of Malaysia. They are a clear majority in all major urban areas. Singapore, of course, is the most extreme case, with over 30% of its population Chinese. For this reason, it has been omitted from this comparative analysis since it does not represent a juxtaposition of majority indigenous nationals and minority Chinese.

Table I below indicates the size of countries, in numbers and percentage of the total population.

Table II represents the approximate percentage of Chinese in the urban areas.

Table I

Demographic Characteristics of Overseas Chinese
in Southeast Asia (Population by Number and % Age)

Country	Number (by Million)	% Age of Total
Malaysia	3.4	34
Thailand	3.8	11
Indonesia	3.0	2.5
Philippines	.5	1.5

Table II

Urban Population of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia (by %)

Country	%
Malaysia	55 - 65%
Thailand.	45 - 65%
Indonesia	30 - 40%
Philippines	25%

Note: Source for Tables I and II is the 1972 Chulalongkorn University Population Institute Survey (CUPIS).

In addition to determining the approximate ethnic Chinese population of the major urban areas, a longitudinal study conducted by the Population Institute of Chulalongkorn University in 1972, also sought to find differences in rural-urban distributions among the ethnic Chinese. In an effort to delineate the various degrees of Chinese ethnicity, interviewers were instructed to observe and record the presence of certain items in the household which were 93 considered typically Chinese. In addition to data on place of birth, first and family names, and dialects, presence of photos of Chinese leaders (e.g., Dr. Sun Yat-Sen), Chinese lanterns, Chinese altars, and paper strips with Chinese characters, were also recorded. The survey results showed that photos of Chinese leaders and Chinese lanterns are becoming so rare

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that they were of virtually no use in determining ethnic Chinese households. Chinese altars and paper strips with Chinese characters were the most prevalent items. Both suggest that Chinese households are about twice as common in Bangkok-Thonburi than as in urban areas in the provinces. Only 5% of the rural households had any of the characteristic Chinese items at all. About 35% of the households in Bangkok-Thonburi had at least one such item, while approximately 50% of the provincial urban households did.5 Heads of households with names that are at least in part Chinese are also about twice as common in Bangkok than as in the provincial towns. In the rural areas they only occur infrequently; however, the number of household heads in Bangkok-Thonburi with at least one Chinese name is less than the number of households with at least one Chinese item. This finding supports other data on Chinese names which suggests that the later generation and even some of the first generation Chinese have adopted Thai names.

Overall, probably the most meaningful and useful single indicator of Chinese ethnic affiliation is the language spoken at home. For example, a recent study on assimilation identified Chinese as those who were raised in a family where parents spoke any Chinese dialect as their native language.6 The results of the CUPI study showed that the proportion of households in which only Chinese is spoken is small, with a much more substantial proportion being bilingual (i.e., both Chinese and Thai spoken at home). There were, however, several households where the older generation spoke primarily Chinese and the younger generation spoke both Thai and Chinese. When households in which only a Chinese dialect is spoken is combined with bilingual households, the proportion of ethnic Chinese households by this index is similar to the proportion of households in which at least one Chinese item was observed. Moreover, the longitudinal study showed that across all indicators of Chinese ethnicity the proportion of Chinese households in Bangkok-Thonburi was more than twice that of provincial towns, while Chinese households represented less than five percent of the total in rural areas.

II. HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF ASSIMILATION

Assimilation of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia can in large measure be understood from historical perspective which reveals a four-stage series of shifts in the accommodation patterns, arising from the changing role of the leaders of the Chinese communities.

Period One (1800-1900)

Chinese communities during the first period were represented by leaders who, although tradition-oriented, often acted as local agents of the intruding colonial power. These leaders were in the mold of what has come to be referred to as the "Kapitan"* type. The name derived from the Kapitan system prevalent in Java and Manila in the nineteenth century. In this system both constituencies of the Kapitan, local Chinese community notables and colonial authorities, were usually in agreement on the qualifications of for the position and participants in the selection process for the post. Wealth was the most significant criterion for selection. It was deemed necessary for the continued provision of community services. Moreover, as

*This name is hereinafter used to refer generally to the colonial power's Chinese community middle agent throughout Southeast Asia.

Skinner points out, rich men would be less likely to challenge the colonial power or abscond with funds.7 In Manila, Chinese community electors (the highest taxpayers) nominated two candidates every two years. The candidates' names, plus that of the incumbent, were passed to the civil governor in rank order. Although the governor made the final choice, he was committed by law to give preference to Catholics and to favor the electors' first choice.8

Kapitan Strategies. In Indonesia, the Kapitan often interceded with colonial authorities to attempt to modify decrees affecting the community adversely. However, even though the Kapitan might submit petitions to the Dutch and represent individuals and groups in their contracts with those outside, these middle agents and protective strategies became less important over time than the accommodative and regulative strategies. Kapitans developed to fulfill objectives of the colonial system. Ultimately it was the Kapitan who was responsible for community control and taxation.9

Cambodia. In Phnom Penh, chef de Congregation (heads of the five speech groups who were equivalent to Kapitans in rank) transmitted regulations and decrees from the French authorities to the Chinese, and functioned generally as record clerks (recording marriages and births), family court judges, and community marshals.10

Philippines. In implementing these strategies, Kapitans typically organized networks of followers into a loose governing coalition in the community. By the end of the nineteenth century in Manila, specialized agencies were developed to respond to each constituency. A council called, the gremio de chinos aided the gobernadorcillo (Kapitan) in handling relations with the colonial power while and association called the Shan-chu Kung-so (Benevolent Association) built the first Chinese hospital, managed the Chinese cemetery, and was responsible in general for community welfare.

Throughout this period, the Kapitan worked through existing associations in the community, particularly the secret societies, to insure peace and order." As this system matured, Kapitans eventually became indigenously acculturated, losing their support base in the Chinese community. Originally dependent agents of the colonial power, they now developed affective ties with leading officials, usually assuming the names of their patrons, and often receiving privileges, honors, and even citizenship from the state.12 As most of the rewards were given to the Kapitan by the state and not by the Chinese community, the Kapitan's role became increasingly adaptive during the 19th Century.

Period Two (1900-1945)

With the development of Chinese nationalism in the twentieth century, the Kapitan's role became increasingly anachronistic even though it continued among the Cambodian Chinese until 1958. More ethnic-oriented Chinese leaders emerged following the turn of the twentieth century in response to changing conditions. in China. This pattern of leadership continued among Indonesian and Philippine Chinese elites up until World War II.

In contrast to Kapitans, these leaders were much more culturally adapted. Although wealth and economic power continued to receive high status among Chinese throughout the region, the set of leadership qualifications was now influenced by efforts to realize Chinese national aspirations and objectives. Hence, leadership roles became attainable for some men who were not wealthy, but whose skills were instrumental in the development of ethnic awareness (e.g., publicists, educators, etc.). For example, in the Philippines, head officers in

the Chinese community now received their patents of authority from the local Chinese and from the new Embassy of the Republic of China.

Leadership positions in the community had become equated with ranking posts in the Chamber of Commerce. Now, this Embassy played an active role in the recruitment and selection of leaders of the Chamber 13 This function was eventually performed by the Philippine Branch of the Chinese Nationalist Party (developing in the Philippines from 1912 to 1926, the time of its first national conference). Non-business members of the elite were directly recruited by KMT leaders, and-during this time, the colonial authorities in the Philippines and Indonesia played no direct role in the selection of Chinese leaders.

This pattern of leadership reflected two elite goals: (1) to improve the life-conditions of Chinese, serving their needs and interests, and thereby limiting assimilation. An interesting description of the origin of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (The Chinese Association, the first pan-Chinese association in modern Indonesia) articulated the goals of the new Indonesian Chinese leaders as follows:

> At the beginning of 1900, when word of the reform movement in China had already come, there were several Chinese residents of Batavia, educated abroad in perspective and liberal in thought . . (who were) awake to the need for the Chinese here in Java to reform in order to lighten the oppressive burden of great variety in those customs and ceremonies connected with funerals, weddings, and other affairs . . . (They) met together to form an association to serve as the center of the whole movement for the reform and improvement of Chinese customs and traditions.14

Newspapers

Unifying the Chinese community culturally and politically required the establishment of new sinitic institutions and the development of propaganda vehicles that could be used to disparage the old and proselytize the new-a language to link dialect groups and a medium, the Chinese newspaper. In the Philippines, the first Chinese school--Chung-hsi Hsueh-hsiao--was founded in 1889. By the outset of the Pacific War, forty-five schools had been founded.

Mandarin was the language of instruction in most of these schools by the 1930s, with instruction by Philippine Chinese. The development of an educational alternative for Chinese effectively halted the assimilation of the youth generation. Of equal importance to the growth of ethnic schools was the development of the Chinese press, founded at the turn of the century and flourishing by the 1930s. Thirteen dailies were started in the first three decades of this century, three of which continue to publish.15 Similarly, in Indonesia a number of weeklies were founded: the Li Po in Sukabumi, Ho Po in Solo, and Loen Boen in Surabaya.16 The new press allowed the overseas Chinese to experience the Chinese literary renaissance.

The press proved most important in linking Chinese communities abroad to China through its focus on developments in areas of origin of the overseas Chinese and coverage of China's diplomatic and military crises. Another new ethnic institution--the Chinese Nationalists Party--founded newspapers and developed community-wide political campaigns. Southeast Asian Chinese had been energized through their support of the Republican Revolution of 1912. Their new elites were instrumental in financing the anti-Manchu campaigns. For example, the focus of support shifted in response to the Japanese threat. The vehicle for overseas support was the traditional mutual-assistance associations. For

example, Philippine Chinese leaders developed the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Salvation Association in 1924, for relief and development of Fukien Province. Chinese community leaders responded to appeals from nationalists party officials for assistance against Japanese incursions on the mainland. Filipino-Chinese party leaders formed an anti-Japanese society in 1928, through which they encouraged Chiinese merchants to stop trading in Japanese goods.17 Community leaders spurred the masses into direct political participation by staging boycotts in the 1930s against the Japanese goods.

These campaigns were quite successful with rewards and even positions in China provided which were much more coveted than anything the host country could offer.18 Mobilization appeals of leaders during this period were almost entirely effective and ideological, with the main objective to evoke a positive, active ethnic response, to strengthen the Chinese community and to support China. It is probable that these appeals produced a level of group awareness within the Chinese community that exceeded that within the host society- 19

To sum up: This period witnessed noticeable shift in the role of the Chinese leaders, from appeasement of the host society elite to overriding and more rewarding responsibilities toward the ethnic Chinese community. The appeals from the leadership were more directly linked with the China homeland. Illustrative of this was a Chinese leader in Quezon who became a promoter of overseas development of his native Fukien province, served as a member of the Provincial Board and was eventually decorated by Chiang Kai-shek.20

Period Three (1950-1965)

The crucial third period commenced with the culmination of anti-colonial pressures eventually leading to the emergence of independence states and Communist control of mainland China. This caused another shift in the pattern of leadership roles in the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia. Some of these shifts were accomplished with greater ease as in the case of Thailand, than they were in places like Indonesia and Malaysia. The Chinese communities, in general, became increasingly divided along ideological lines as antagonism from the newly formed nationalistic governments of the host countries greatly increased. The means employed were greater pressure for assimilation and citizenship, or deportation and disenfranchisement. Under these post-war circumstances, Chinese leaders were compelled to minimize their ties with the China mainland and to reduce promotion of Chinese ethnicity in an attempt to compromise with the new host-country governments. What evolved was a dual role for the leaders of the Chinese communities marked by appeasement and compromise much in the manner of the Kapitans who had been agents of the state, while at the same time acting as liaisons with the Chinese community to promote Chinese interests in the host society.

The leadership and recruitment procedures of these Chinese leaders began to resemble those of the Kapitan leaders of the nineteenth century much more than those of the ethnic nationalist type of pre-World War II. Wealth and economic power again became highly valued in the community and men of wealth came to dominate this leadership even to a greater extent than previously (e.g., 85% of the Chinese elite in Bangkok were rich businessmen).21 This pattern of leadership has persisted to the present, although there may have commenced an on-going fourth stage in the years following the admission of mainland China to the United Nations reflective of new Western respect, for that country coupled with its more peaceful stance. Modern day Philippine and Thai Chinese and Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) elites are at least partly acculturated. In Thailand, for example, being a Chinese Thai has become more advantageous for leadership roles even in the Chinese communities, than being merely an

ethnic-Chinese because of the wider support and contacts one of such mixed heritage receives. As Skinner points out, "the more powerful the Chinese leader, the more likely he is to have been born and reared in Thailand, to hold Thai citizenship, to use a Siamese name and speak Thai well, and to send his children to Thai schools." 22 Unlike the ethnic nationalist leaders, the modern Malay and Thai Chinese elite contains few propagandists" such as editors, educators, or Party leaders. These modern elites tend to be relatively better educated and acculturated which even further facilitates their relationship with national leaders, much more so than under the old Kapitan system. However, even though the two constituencies recruit and select leaders as they did in the old system, ethnic constituencies have changed and non-elites in the Chinese communities monitor elite action much more closely .23 Moreover, the modern day Kapitan tends to be generally more pragmatic, varying his strategies as dictated by the nature of the issues and crises.

Schools. A problem very much related to assimilation which best illustrates the various strategies of adaptation employed by the Chinese leaders was and remains the issue of Chinese schools. In the Philippines, the Chinese school system survived both Japanese occupation and national government pressures. Some scholars attribute this unusual development to the Sino Philippine Treaty of Amity which guaranteed reciprocal privileges for Chinese and Filipino educational institutions and the American mission which emphasized support for private schools.24 However, the inability of the Philippine government to design effective control policy on the overseas Chinese in the country was probably also a factor. Although these institutions (i.e., the Amity Treaty and American mission influence) did not prevent the media campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s, against the Chinese schools, they did provide an important mediating effect which allowed Chinese leaders to ally themselves with anti-communist Filipinos. This strategy by the Chinese leaders helped shift the issue from the question of existence of Chinese schools to only the presence of Communist elements in Chinese schools. When Chinese leaders joined Filipino officials to suppress communism, then the elimination of the schools themselves no longer became the major issue.

Another adaptive strategy of the Chinese-Filipino elite was the establishment of five "Filipinized" schools which enrolled not only children of affluent Chinese, but also children of Filipino politicians and other non-Chinese elite.25 Moreover, even provincial Chinese schools began to actively enroll Filipino students in the English-language session to avert charges of ethnic segregation.26

In contrast, Chinese schools in Thailand could not survive government pressures even though Chinese elite ties with the Thai elite were probably stronger than those existing in the Philippines. Rather than successfully developing a subtle Thai intrusion into the Chinese educational system as occurred in the Philippines., the Thai Chinese elite had to either send their children to English-language private religious schools or send them abroad (e.g., Taiwan, Hong Kong, etc.). In 1949, after a year of raids on Chinese schools, the last of the Chinese middle schools were closed. The new regulations on Chinese education included requirements that all teachers must pass an exam in Thai, instruction must be in Thai, the headmaster must be a Thai, and the syllabus must conform to government regulations. At present there are less than 200 Chinese primary schools. The legal limit is 16 in Bangkok 2 in each of the 71 provinces in Thailand.

Economic Adaptation. Another illustration of the adaptive nature of the modern leaders of the Chinese communities was the attempt by the national governments to nationalize certain economic sectors. In pre-World War II days

Chinese community elites could often prevent nationalization measures by bribing friendly legislators. In fact, in the Philippines some legislators would draft nationalization bills precisely so that they could be bribed.27 However, in the post-war period with the emergence of strong nationalist leaders, even bribes could not prevent the passage of such laws as the one in 103 the Philippines which nationalized the operation of the retail trade in 1954. Some Chinese leaders realized the need to establish new organizations and develop more indirect adaptations to pressures from the national government. In the Philippines the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce comprised primarily of the nation-wide KMT party elite was established as an alternative to the old Chamber of Commerce which represented mainly Manila-based economic interests. The Federation leaders strengthened,their adaptive capabilities by hiring Filipino lawyers to lobby in Congress for Chinese economic interests and by appealing to Chinese entrepreneurs to diversify their economic interests. Moreover, the Federation leaders began the publication of a Trade Journal which provided an exchange of relevant economic information, and often urged Chinese to begin investments in the import/export field and "pioneer industries," not yet proscribed from Chinese participation. 28 Similarly, as a consequence of Thai government pressures, the Bangkok Chamber leaders urged various strategies of adaptation, the most significant of which was the partnership scheme. Consequently, formal business alliances were formed between Chinese elite and Thai officials and existing Chinese corporations were reorganized to include Thai officials as stockholding members of the boards often with a controlling interest in the business.29

This adaptation was the result of yet another compromise in which the extraordinary entrepreneurial skills of the Chinese were monitored by incompetent and often corrupt Thai government leaders. The perceived threat of Chinese economic control which has been historically a major issue in Thailand is further explained in the following section.

III. THE QUESTION OF CHINESE CONTROL OF THE THAI ECONOMY

Up to the end of the nineteenth century the Chinese in Thailand tended to assimilate rather well and were relatively well treated. However, beginning about 1888, the Thais began to view the Chinese as money-accumulating transients. The death of the great King Chulalongkorn in 1910 seems to have been the turning point in Thai attitudes toward the Chinese entrepreneur. Moreover, events on the China mainland caused the overseas Chinese leadership to become more conscious of their Chinese nationality and more exclusive in their economic relationships for reasons previously discussed. Three particular strategies were employed by the Chinese leaders to achieve business advantages for the Chinese. These were: (1) development of Chinese business opportunities and organizations, (2) promotion and unification of the Chinese society and culture, and (3) development of political awareness. Trade associations were formed to unify and strengthen the position of Chinese merchants and assist the Chinese in improving their bargaining position with native or colonial producers.30 _In this way the trade association played the role of a new economic vehicle, allowing the Chinese to expand cooperation limits beyond the Chinese family enterprise. This approach made good sense economically and culturally for it supported the Chinese saying, "Do business with Chinese" because "Chinese can be trusted."31

Meanwhile, nationalism and the need for nation-building also became important to Thailand in the 20th century. King Vajiravudh (1910-1925), perhaps the greatest of the royal propagandist, stressed the need for a revitalization of old values (e.g., unity) in his writings aimed at furthering nationalism. Part of his idea of nationality was loyalty to the King. He also argued that adherence to traditional Buddhist values would further Thai strength.

The very idea of "national" consciousness was borrowed from the West and Vajiravudh's desire to create it was partly due to internal and external pressure from Westerners and other aliens. In order to increase the awareness of Thai identity, Vajiravudh established the Wild Tiger Corps,, introduced surnames and stressed the need for unity. Perhaps it was Vajiravudh himself speaking at the close of a play which he wrote about the Phra Ruang, the legendary founder of Sukothai:

I ask only that we Thai not destroy our nation. Let us unite our state, unite hearts into a great whole. Thai--do not harm or destroy Thai, but combine your spirit and your strength to preserve the state so that all foreign peoples will give us increasing respect.32 Two of the nationalistic aims of the "Promoters" who carried out the Watershed 1932 coup were to rid the country of royal absolutism and economic control by foreigners. A nationalistic campaign, aimed primarily at the Chinese, which has been promoted by the military-bureaucratic elite from that time to the present, reached its greatest intensity in the period 1939-1944 and 1952-1954. Governmental policies, particularly with regard to schooling and immigration, have been very successful in assimilating the Chinese but they have called attention away from the cooperation and lack of enmity which has always existed between the Chinese and the Thai. As Barnett put it in 1954, ". . . being anti-Chinese is now virtually a prerequisite for playing a part in Thai politics, regardless of one's personal feelings toward the Chinese."33 However, this attitude changed after Field Marshall Sarit led the 1958 coup. Although the anti-Chinese theme was still present, it became more anti-communist under his leadership. Overall, it is the authors' judgment that the case for detrimental Chinese monopolistic control in Thailand has been exaggerated, and sometimes fabricated. The result has been a negative effect on economic development 106 in that the functional role of the Chinese has been obscured and their potential role as innovators with valuable entrepreneurial skills has been scorned rather than adopted.

In Thailand, as throughout Southeast Asia, a striking, common ethnic division of labor exists, which, it is sometimes alleged, hinders economic development and prevents a more equitable distribution of income--minority Chinese are dominant in commerce, industry and artisan occupations and they play the strategic role of middle-men between primary producers and processors, exporters and retailers, while non-Chinese indigenous peoples, who constitute the majority, are concentrated in agricultural production, government and professional work. In order to see the origins of the Chinese middle-man position and the reasons for their economic effectiveness, primary focus here shall be on certain econo-logical (sic) factors--kinship, time horizon and world view--which have helped to make the Chinese more economically functional than the ethnic Thais within the economic constraints imposed by the Thai environment.

To begin, it is important to note how the Chinese arrived on the scene. Chinese traders and artisans probably came to Thailand in increasing numbers during the late Tang and Sung Periods (8th to 13th centuries) when there was a commercial revolution in China bringing with it an expansion of maritime activity. The Chinese interest in tin mining in the Malay peninsula region dates from about the 14th century. In 1629 royal monopolies began and the Chinese took part in this trade, which included the sale of tin, pepper and saltpeter in the nineteenth century, until such monopolies were ended following the Bowring Treaty of 1855, when Thailand was opened to Western trade. However, the Chinese continued to be the principal operators and consumers in the lucrative opium, gambling, lottery and liquor concessions which 107 provided between 40 and 50 percent of the total state revenues during most of the nineteenth century."34

Immigration gradually increased in the 19th century as China underwent a period of unrest, due to Western intrusion. Prior to the 1880s, when steamship service was inaugurated between Bangkok and Swatow, many of the immigrants, who came mainly from Fukien and Kwangtung on the south China coast, were merchants. However, beginning in the latter part of the century, the dominant type was the coolie laborer, and during the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), Thailand became increasingly modernized and Chinese immigrants were readily utilized for the construction of roads, railways and bridges. Most of the Chinese immigration was in the first three decades of the 20th century. By 1957, the ethnic Chinese (those speaking Chinese as a first tongue and following Chinese customs) numbered about 2,315,000 out of a total population of 20,480,000.35 More recent estimates put the number of ethnic Chinese at some 3,821,180 (11%) out of a total population of 34,738,000 (1969).36

The Chinese became firmly established in paddy collection, rice milling and export, tin mining, wood production, coastal fishing, fish processing and marketing, pork slaughtering and preparation, rubber production and processing, sugar production and processing, plantation agriculture, truck faming, textile trade and light industry. Moreover, they became compardores (i.e., agents who act as guarantors for unknown borrowers in exchange for a small percentage of the loan) for Western banks and import-export houses in Bangkok. They bought large tracts of land in the Central Plain but did not undertake rice cultivation themselves.

Today, the Chinese still dominate inter-village market trade and they bring manufactured goods to the villages and towns. Local intra-village 108 market trade, however is controlled by Thai women who engage in small quantity transactions involving the exchange of vegetables and fruits, peanuts, soap, locally made cigarettes, fried banana chips, eggs and poultry, sweets, matches and similar items. Thais are also engaged in fishing and household industry; e.g., basket making, pottery, weaving and ware manufacture. However, many of the local stores which keep a stock of small goods on hand for after-market hours and emergency buying are run by the Chinese.

The position of the Chinese as middle-men is explainable to a large extent by some of the historical developments examined above. They had secured an early foothold in Thai commerce through the junk trade and they further consolidated their position through participation in the royal monopolies and later through the revenue concessions. King Taksin, the ruler in 1767, whose father was Chinese, favored the Chinese as did the Chakkri kings who followed him.

Contrasts in Horizontal Mobility

Up to the 1890s, the movement of the non-slave, non-elite section of the Thai population was restricted by the patron-client system which obligated a freeman to his patron. In addition, freeman had to pay a yearly head tax and they were required to render corvee (labor) service four months of the year.

The Chinese, on the other hand, only had to pay a trinennial head tax and they were free to go anywhere and to rent or own land. The first significant legal restrictions on their freedom of movement and property only came into effect in 1943, although there may have been de facto restrictions on their movement and right to own property prior to this legislation.

The Chinese emigrants had probably gained some commercial experience in the south China port cities prior to their departure. Even in the rural villages, they came into contact with a commercialized economy which was becoming increasingly monetized . . . . Emigration itself made for selection of the bold

and strong. Thus, according to Lee, "About 30 or 40 years ago, only the Chinese coolies (mainly Teochins) were employed to carry rice in the mills and to load vessels--because Thai coolies could not carry such a heavy bag as 100 kilograms."37 In sum, greater freedom of movement and a lesser tax burden than that of the Thais plus commercial experience and boldness put the Chinese in a good position to go into trade.

Farming and Wage Labor

At first, the Chinese only planned on staying overseas temporarily and thus, they were willing to go into low paying wage labor jobs in order to get money more quickly than one could in agriculture. In addition, prior to the 1920s, most of the Chinese men were single while rice agriculture required family cooperation. In the latter part of the 19th century, moreover, as rice prices rose due to an increasing external demand, the government pursued a liberal land and tax policy which encouraged Thai farmers to stay in agriculture and increase production by expanding their paddy land. There were low tax rates on newly acquired land and in some areas taxes were not collected. The amount of land which might be acquired was only limited to about as much as a farmer could reasonably cultivate.38 The freeing of the Thai masses through the elimination of corvee requirements, slavery and the patron-client system and the increasing demand for wage labor for the purposes of modernization during Chulalongkorn's reign might have brought the Thai farmer out of agricultural production. This did not occur, however, 110 due, in part, to the influx of Chinese immigrants willing to undertake wage labor, and to increasing farm income brought about by the rising price of rice.39 Perhaps the crucial attitude, then and now, which inhabits large scale movement of the Thais from agricultural production to urban wage labor, is that which has been observed among Burmese and northern Thai hill tribesmen; namely, a tendency to equate wage labor with bondage and to value independence more highly than economic advantage.40

The historical factors we have considered show, to some extent, how the Chinese assumed their traditional position in the economy as wage laborers and traders. They do not, however, sufficiently explain the continuation of the ethnic division, the apparent reluctance of the Thais to engage in commerce or Chinese efficiently in that area. In order to examine the question of entrepreneurial efficiency more closely, we must first note some of the limiting conditions of the Thai environment.

Overall, the Thai economic environment is based upon agriculture, particularly rice production. To a large extent, this production is at a self-subsistent level which minimizes profit margins and makes capital accumulation difficult. Capital sources are expensive and few. A farmer's activities are primarily confined to his village and he has few personal contacts outside of the village. The inter and intra village trade that exists between Thais is on a small scale, and it is characterized by many buyers and sellers meeting only transiently; profit margins must be kept low or else the producer will be encouraged to sell directly to the consumer. Thus, the scale of exchange makes capital accumulation difficult. Enforceable contract law is largely undeveloped at the village level and farmers and traders tend to rely on verbal agreements. Since a Thai farmer or petty trader has few contacts outside of the village or district, he has virtually no means of bringing informal sanctions to bear in order to assure that agreements are fulfilled and debts paid. Means of transportation and communication links are still in a developing stage.

In this context, how have the Chinese been able to succeed so well in trade and business? Is it that the Thais are spiritually orientated, as some would

claim, and that thus they are uninterested in commerce? Religion is a factor, but this is not to say that the Thais are not materialistic. Muscat's study shows that the Thai, just as much as the Chinese, is an economic man, always interested in maximizing profit. For example, in Udorn, where the railway was late in coming, the local retail and wholesale trade is handled almost exclusively by ethnic Thai.41 To examine the question more systematically, it is necessary to examine the difference between the Chinese and Thai kinship relationships, time-horizon and world view.

Thai Kinship

     The fundamental difference in kinship relationships between the Thai and Chinese is that between bilateral and unilateral descent. The Thai family is based upon bilateral descent; however, the significance of the family unit is based upon the conugal tie. The sphere of kindred relationships of the family is based upon the individual in the family. He has a great variety of relationships available to him, and he is free to choose in establishing relationships. For example, he can decide whether or not he will help, his uncle or brother in a business venture. He can decide upon how he will relate to his mother's sister. The possibilities of extending relationships horizontally on both matrilineal
     and patrilineal sides are great. However, compared to the great possibilities of extending ties, the importance of these ties to the individual is relatively small. They are transient and often described as "casual." An example of the casualness mentioned can be seen in the case cited by Embree of a Thai in the North who went to live with his relatives in Bangkok. They secured him work in a factory, but after a time he returned to the North without saying anything to them. Neither party was greatly perturbed by the casualness of his departure.42

     The typical Thai family is nuclear, consisting of the parents, children and perhaps a few grandparents. To the extent to which there is cooperation the family functions as an independent unit. Its existence is transient, however, and it tends to break up as the children marry and move away. Upon the death of the parents, the family breaks up as property is divided among the siblings. During its existence, family property and money is not controlled by one individual. The wife has considerable control over the family budget and children have their own activities. Although the mother teaches the children the Buddhist rules of family obligation, which include parents' duties to children--such as transferring property in good time--43 there is little emphasis placed on the continuation of the family tradition nor on the necessity of preserving family capital over time.

Family names only came into use in 1916, 44 and family records are seldom kept. The looseness of the Thai family structure can be seen in the ease with which a person loses contact with his immediate family if he marries outside the village or moves to a new locality."45 According to De Young, "within one generation kinship ties among villagers tend to be broken and contact is rarely maintained among family members in neighboring villages unless they are of the same generation." 46In connection with this, Embree states, ". . . in practice there is none of the strong sense of duty and obligation to parents which is so characteristic . . . of China."47 There is also less stress on the importance of reciprocal rights and duties towards others in one's kindred. As Embree puts it, ". . . the structure of the (Thai) family is a loose one and while obligations are recognized, they are not allowed to burden one unduly. Such as are sanctioned, are observed freely by the individual--he acts of his own will, not as a result of social pressure.',48

Chinese--Kinship

The Chinese family, on the other hand, is patrilinealy organized and thus it is easily socially delineated. The significance of the family is based upon descent. There is great emphasis placed on obligations to one's relative. The individual is affiliated into a corporate kin group, and he is exclusively related to others in the group through the patrilineal line. He cannot establish ties with "relatives" on the matrilineal side of the family because such "relatives" (e.g., his mother's sister) are not considered relatives by the corporate family group. Thus, the possibilities of relating to others for the individual only exist on the patrilineal side. In extending relationships with relatives on the patrilineal side, the individual is not able to be casual about these ties as is the Thai. The ties have a lasting and great importance for him, and they are predicated on his obligations to the family members. A typical Chinese family includes three generations, and the family endures over time. Property rights are divided but control is typically by one member of the family. The control of the family money is by one member of the ¡family or even lineage. There is a great tendency to keep property corporately controlled. Thus, Lee, in describing Chinese business concerns in Thailand, states, "Many of the companies nominally called 'company limited' are not really of such a nature because the shareholders are the family members and capital and management is under the control of one man. ,49 Unlike the Thai family, when the parents die, the family property will not be dispersed; rather, it will be corporately controlled, and thus preserved over time. Each unit of the Chinese family belongs to a greater unit at different levels. Thus, units of the family may be geographically separated, but nevertheless, family ties of obligation still exist and relatives in other areas can be called upon for assistance or credit.

Thai World Views and Time-Horizon

In comparing world views one is immediately struck by the high value placed on leisure by the Thais, which some scholars attribute to the long standing favorable agricultural conditions and low ratio of population to land in the country which meant that the basic necessities of life could be secured with relative ease. As the 13th century Thai monarch Ramkamhaeng put it in a now famous phrase: "In the water there are fish; in the fields there is rice." The importance of leisure, convenience and fun is related to the Thai attitude toward time and prestige. Since subsistence production leaves little room for long-tem investment and planning, the Thai farmer tends to have a short time-horizon. Thus, it makes sense for him to seek immediate gains of money, fun or prestige. This often means that a large part of a Thai's income will be spent on liquor and clothes. One Thai I talked with said that when Thai students graduate from school they want to be the boss now, and thus, they go into government work rather than commerce. Government work also allows a Thai to maximize his leisure sometimes by working short hours so long as he has the tacit consent of his superior. Finally, in the Thai world view, the preservation of one's prestige, or "face" is a concern which is often paramount. To insure that one does not lose face, disputes will often involve a third party who is the communication link between the two disputants. In a conflict situation, the "correct" attitude for a Thai is cool, unruffled demeanor. Such situations are sometimes avoided when one or both of the parties in potential conflict adopt a stoic-like disposition toward the difficulty, stating "mai ben rai" (it doesn't matter), even though they sometimes still feel that it really does.

Attitude Toward Borrowing

With the foregoing considerations in mind, the Thai attitude toward borrowing money can perhaps be more easily understood. Thais are typically

reluctant to borrow money. If it is done, it is kept a secret. This suggests that there is some loss of face involved if it is known that one has had to borrow money. This attitude appears to be a common one in Southeast Asia. Thus, a Filipino student stated that borrowing money is taken as a sign of weakness. In Thailand, kinship makes borrowing even more difficult. Consider Phillips' observation, "Very often people do not want to borrow from or lend money or equipment to kinsmen precisely because the intrusion of the kinship tie makes the collection of such debts doubly awkward. . . .,,50

This attitude toward borrowing has made it difficult to survey the amount of indebtedness existing. When, money is lent between Thais, very often the date for repayment is left open. The creditor will not press the borrower for repayment because it might embarrass the latter. He will often say, "Pay it back some day." Such a statement exemplifies both the "mai ben rai" attitude and the desire to prevent a loss of face. One Thai said that this is why a Chinese money lender is successful. He is likely to ask for repayment at a certain time and he is not reluctant to press the borrower for repayment.

Thus, the Bang Chan study showed that the farmers did not want to borrow money from urban lenders because they were more strict about repayment. When a Thai lends money to an acquaintance there is often greater risk involved. If the borrower defaults and leaves the village, there is no way to bring informal sanctions to bear upon him.

Chinese World View and Time-Horizon

In contrast to the above, the Chinese world view is characterized, ideally, by a long-time horizon. There is a great emphasis on saving now for the sake of security and wealth in the long run. For the Chinese, hard work, perserverance and frugality are important values, for through them, capital can be accumulated. In contrast to the Thais, the Chinese are willing to work long hours rather than get immediate gains in leisure, profit convenience or fun. In the home, the value of saving, frugality and the preservation of the family business and name are stressed.

In the Thai setting, education traditionally has not been seen by the Chinese as a path toward upward mobility. As Skinner puts it, "Scholarship was a luxury indulged in after high status was attained through the accumulation of wealth. ,5 1 Following compulsory education, the Chinese student was encouraged to join the family business and to pick up the necessary skills on-the-job. Today, this attitude is changing as more second generation Chinese enter the civil service and move into big business and finance. Yet, the preferred education is one in business and thus Thai-Chinese are predominant in business and commerce schools.

Chinese spending is for the sake of life--in this life--and thus, compared to the Thais, less money is spent for religion. For example, the Chinese do not have to undertake the great expense of ceremoniously initiating their sons into the priesthood as do the Ahais.

Trust, a crucial value essential to the Chinese corporate philosophy is reinforced by kinship ties and the potential for sanctions if it is broken. It arises out of the need for reciprocity between family members. Although geographically separated, one Chinese can rely upon his relatives or friends for help or credit, for reciprocity means that it is in the borrowers' own interest not to default--for he is not an isolated agent. Rather, he is tied into a nexus of reciprocal relationships with other Chinese. He does not want to default, for he is counting on other Chinese fulfilling their agreements with him. Very

often, these relationships are preserved by not paying off debts completely. If he were to default on his agreement, the injured party could impose sanctions on him by getting in touch with other Chinese who have agreements with him and perhaps give him credit. It is like the village situation where a Thai can impose informal sanctions on another, if necessary, so long as the other person stays within the village or in close proximity. If a Chinese in Bangkok does not make good on his agreement and leaves, the injured Chinese party can still "get to him" so long as the defaulter is in contact with other Chinese.

It should be clear at this point that the difference in kinship relationships and what they imply for the Chinese and Thai and their respective world views complementing these relationships tend to preserve the ethnic division of labor which was established historically. The corporate organization of the Chinese family makes it better suited for trade and commercial activity than the Thai family. Moreover, the possibilities which exist for bringing informal sanctions to bear on non-kin Chinese who may be distantly located--which hardly exist for the Thai dealing with other 118 Thais outside of his community--further increase the advantages for the Chinese concern. A typical illustration follows. A Chinese family initially having a low income can, given its world view, begin to overcome this problem by emphasizing saving and hard work. The family is not dependent on small scale agricultural production, with its minimal profit return, for its income. Thus, it is in a better position than the Thai one to accumulate capital. The Chinese family can mobilize its members, dividing tasks in a complementary way and pooling the income of the family members, with unified control and direction supplied by the patriarch or another designated leader. It is quite unlike the case of the Thai in Bang Chan for whom the squandering,52 of money is the most frequent cause of family discord.

Again, unlike the considerable permissiveness which exists for the members of a Thai family, the members of the Chinese family are obligated to work for the sake of the family business and name. Moreover, the penalties for mismanagement are severe.

Government Policy

Returning to the ethnic division of labor, governmental attempts to increase the participation of Thais in non-agricultural work by reserving certain occupations for them, such as taxi driving were unsuccessful in excluding ethnic Chinese from these occupations. In fact, the government pressure against the Chinese, which reached its peaks in 1930s and 1950s has resulted in the linking up of Chinese commercial power and Thai political power, an accommodation strategy mentioned in Section II. Members of the Thai political elite, in the post World War II years became advisors or members of the boards of Chinese corporations, thereby gaining a financial base while the Chinese entrepreneurs gained protection and government help. As Skinner puts 119 it, "In one of the most intriguing paradoxes of Thai history, militant economic nationalism has resulted not in defeat of the enemy but in cooperation between the antagonists."53 Strangely enough, while government rhetoric tended to criticize the Chinese for alleged monopolistic control, the government itself has continued to operate monopoly control over such products as whiskey and tobacco, resulting in increased revenue sometimes through higher prices to the consumer and lower returns to primary producers than would prevail in a free market situation. Furthermore, most of the more than 100 state manufacturing enterprises established between 1953 and 1958 produced a net drain on the treasury so that by the late '50s, due to increasing criticism, government policy called for a disengagement from entrepreneurial activity in 54 industry as increasing reliance was placed on the private sector.

At this point, it should be noted that the ethnic division of labor which has been examined has become less noticeable in recent years and the rising trend of Thai participation in non-.agricultural jobs will probably continue in the future as the supply of farm land decreases and opportunities for employment in commerce and industry become available. This trend can already be seen in the increasing number of Thais coming to Bangkok from the Northeast to find employment. As Freyn explains it, in the future, no matter how much Thai school graduates want to work for the government or armed forces, eventually the limited number of openings will force them to seek employment in industry and commerce.

Immigration policies no longer permit a free influx of Chinese. Thus, as the population rises, the percentage of Chinese in the country will diminish. Moreover, government politics of basing citizenship on jus soli and requiring the teaching of Thai and the following of a Thai curriculum in the Chinese schools will continue to promote assimilation of the Chinese.

As the Southeast Asian countries seek rapid economic development, entrepreneurship is perhaps the key resource for this purpose. It is in the interest of these national aspiration, for the respective governments to cooperate with and enlist the support of the experienced Chinese elite rather than to condemn it outright.

In Section One, the primary focus of discussion was overseas Chinese assimilation in Southeast Asia. Three district stages of change in the pattern of Chinese leadership were delimited, with the possibility raised that a new fourth stage pattern has been evolving since the mid '60s. These periods are as follows:

Period One (1.800-1900): Prevalence of the Kapitan System. The Chinese middle-agent typically acquiesces to colonial power initiatives and mandates.

Period Two (1900-1945): A more ethically oriented Chinese leadership elite emerges following the collapse of Chinese dynastic government and the awakening of Chinese Republican nationalism.

Period Three (1950-1965): The Chinese leadership stresses compromise with the host-country and minimization of Chinese ethnicity in the face of government hostility arising from government fear of Chinese communist consciousness and economic control. The prevailing strategy resembles that in the Kapitan System.

Period Four (1965-Present): It is hypothesized but perhaps too early to determine conclusively that with the decrease in Mainland Chinese militancy and increasing world respect for that country, overseas Chinese emphasis on ethnicity and links with the mainland may become increasingly legitimized in a pattern reminiscent of Period Two.

Section Two of our discussion has dealt with the issue of overseas Chinese economic control--with the developments in Thailand as a case study.

Thai and Chinese Kinship, World-views and Time-horizon were compiled in the context of the economic constraints of the Thai environment. It was suggested that Chinese patrilineal kinship tends to mobilize and preserve family capital over time and space. This factor coupled with the typical Chinese value system ranking work higher than leisure plus an extended time horizon seems to give the Chinese entrepreneur a comparative advantage over the Thai. This advantage

considered in the light of historical developments would seem to explain the typical two-sector division of labor common in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The final part of Section Two presented the thesis that detrimental Chinese economic control--at least in the Thai setting--has been exaggerated and perhaps even fabricated at times for governmental political reasons. The spectre of Chinese economic domination has in fact been used to mask not only the operations of governmental monopoly enterprises but also economic cooperation between Thai politicians and Chinese businessmen. In the process, the valuable features of Chinese entrepreneurship have been obscured. For achievement of Southeast Asian rational economic development objectives, it would seem to be more constructive if these features were objectively considered and perhaps even emulated. This could mean a government policy of cooperation with the Chinese entrepreneurial elite--with reliance on this group for the training and development of new managerial resources.

FOOTNOTES

1   Broadly defined as those maintenance Chinese customs and language. For more detail see CUPI Survey, 1972, infra, p. 43.

2   Those of mixed descent delineated by Thai-Chinese lineage rather than customs and language exclusively.

3   The discussion of Chinese entrepreneurship is based on an earlier study by William King, Chinese Entrepreneurship in Thailand as a Paradigm of Economic Functionalism in Southeast Asia 1972.

4   See Donald L. Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the New States: Toward a Theory of Conflict," issues in Comparative Politics. Robert iackson and Michael Stein, ed. (New York), 1971), p. 19.

5   "The Rural and Urban Populations of Thailand: Comparative Profiles," Research Report no 3, Institute of Population Studies Chulalongkorn University (December 1972), pp. 43-46.

6   Boonsanong Punyodyana, "Later-life Socialization and Differential Social Assimilation of the Chinese in Urban Thailand," Social Forces, 50 (December 1971), pp. 232-238.

7   See William Skinner, "Overseas Chinese Leadership: Paradigm for a Paradox," in Leadership and Authority: A Symposium, G. Wijeyewardene, ed. (Kuala Lumpur, 1968), p. 195.

8   See E. Wickberg, "The Chinese in Philippines Life 1850-1898," New Haven, 1965, pp. 180-181.

9   See D. Willmott, "The Chinese of Semarang: A Changing Minority Community in Indonesia" (Ithaca, 1960), p. 135.

10   D. Willmott, "The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia" (London, 1970), p. 38.

11   E. Wickberg, op. cit., pp. 196-197.

12   See G. Tan, "The Chinese of Sukabum A Study in Social and Cultural Accommodation," Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series (Ithaca, 1963), p. 210.

13   The demand of two ethnic constituencies and the nature of ties formed to service these distinct groups produced increased role stress, resolved finally by the Kapitan's neglect and/or exploitation of his community. When the last Manila Kapitan, Don Carlos Palanca, was appointed acting Chinese Consul General in 1898, he was vehemently opposed by major factions in the community who objected to his naturalization as a Spanish citizen, See Tan 1972, p. 211.

14   See K. T. Hoay, "The Origins of the Modern Chinese Movement in Indonesia," Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program (Ithaca, 1969), P. 11.

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16 Hoay, op. cit., p. 63.

17 See A. S. Tan, op. cit., p. 273.

18 Ibid., p. 131.

19 Hoay, op. cit., p. 64.

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21 See G. W. Skinner, "Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand," (Ithaca, 1958), p. 172.

22 Ibid., p. 242.

23 See Skinner, op. cit., 1968, p. 200.

24 See G. W. McBeath, "Political Integration of the Philippine Chinese," Research Monogram (R.M.) no 8, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies (Berkeley, 1973).

25 Ibid., p. 26.

26 Ibid.

27 See G. H. Weightman, "The Philippine Chinese: A Cultural History of a Marginal Trading Community" (Ithaca, 1960), p. 230'.

28 See McBeath, op. cit., p. 36.

29 See Skinner, "Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand" (Ithaca, 1958), p. 155.

30 Wickberg, op. cit., pp. 100-104.

31 McBeath, op. cit., and Wickberg, op. cit., pp. 100-104.

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43   Ibid., p. 183.

44   John DeYoung, "Village Life in Modern Thailand" (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 25.

45   Ibid.

46   Ibid.

47   Embree, op. cit., p. 183.

48   Ibid., p. 184.

49   Lee, op. cit., p. 407.

50   Herbert P. Phillips, "Thai Peasant Personality" (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 28.

51   Skinner, op. cit., p. 135.

52   Phillips, op. cit., p. 26.

53   Skinner, op. cit., p. 360.

54   Ingram, op. cit., pp. 287-288.

Assigned Readings

Read: "Thailand in a Comparative Perspective: An Eight Nation Study,"
pp. 85-108 in Thailand by Prizzia and Sinsawadi.

Terms You Should Know

classification	typology
category	polity
sectionalism	graph
ranking	indicator
independent variable	dependent variable
description	explanation
functional	causal
correlation	correlation coefficient
criteria	demographic
time-line	continuum
assimilation	

Discussion Questions/Exercises

1. What is the difference between description and explanation?

2. Why is it important to distinguish between functional and causal
    explanations?

3. Suppose you were asked to compare any two countries in terms of size,
    location, population, religion and culture. How would you approach this
    problem? What questions do you need to ask? What criteria (i.e., standards)
    would you use?

4. Suppose you were asked to compare any two countries in terms of leadership
    styles, decision-making, historical development, political development,
    and economic development. How would you approach this assignment? What
    questions do you need to ask? What criteria (i.e., standards) would you use?

VI. Sample Bibliography and Source Material

For Selected Countries in Asia and the Pacific

To assist you as students of general Comparative Administration and in your specific country project--a sample of material (i.e., books, articles, etc.) available for your use is provided. Most of these materials are available through the UH Library system and in many cases the card catalog number is also provided. Also provided is a list of other "selected reference sources" and a brief description of a compilation of four mainland data sources for selected countries in Asia.

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