

# Neiwai, Civility, and Gender Distinctions

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*The spatial bipolar of neiwai, that marks proper gender distinctions in the Chinese world, is often assumed to be congruous with the Western dualistic concept of private/public. However, the neiwai binary in the Chinese imaginary is rather a shifting boundary between what is perceived as central and peripheral, or civil and barbaric. In the following, we will explore the philosophical roots of the term neiwai whose ritual, symbolic functions in the process of genderization are extended beyond gender and are intrinsically intertwined with the very defining features of a civilized society.*

In comparison with the cosmic metaphor of *yinyang*, the spatial bipolar of *neiwai*, that is often used to signify gender distinctions in the Chinese world has been relatively neglected because of its apparently unproblematic congruity with the Western concept of private/public.<sup>1</sup> The term *neiwai* when correlated with gender is often equated with these two mutually opposing and conflicting spheres – family and state, which in turn signify a distinct separation between private and public, or woman and man. The conventional emphasis on the nature of the separation of man and woman in a literal, physical sense in understanding Chinese gender constructions has also overlooked the symbolic functions of the dynamic and correlative metaphor of *neiwai* in the process of genderization. Consequently the conventional analysis on the problem of gender relations in the Chinese world is also one-sided. Since with the emphasis on the static nature of the *neiwai* in gender constructions, China along with its stable family structure, in the Western eye, inevitably appears to be frozen in time and left outside of this progressive world. As Foucault puts it,

In our traditional imagery, the Chinese culture is the most meticulous, the most rigidly ordered, the one most deaf to temporal events, most attached to the pure delineation of space; we think of it as a civilization of dykes and dams beneath the eternal face of the sky; we see it spread and frozen, over the entire surface of a continent surrounded by walls.<sup>2</sup>

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The shared image of China as a stagnant civilization frozen in time and surrounded by rigid walls and gates in the Western eye, in part, comes from the perception of Chinese family and social structure where both man and woman are said to have their separate places defined by the line separating the *nei* from the *wai* with no transgression permitted. Yet, the *neiwai* as a sign of gender propriety is rather a dynamic interplay between what is perceived as central and peripheral, or what is fundamental and derivative. The boundary between the *nei* and *wai* is constantly moving and being re-negotiated, depending on the unique make-up of its social and political context. Its multi layers of meaning cannot be encapsulated by the static representation of the separation between the family and the state or the private and the public in a dualistic fashion where women's oppression is conveniently summed up by the seclusion of the domestic life separated from the public life of men. The conventional rendering of the *neiwai* as a static separation of man and woman in the personal, social, and political sphere is inadequate since it has been shown in recent historical studies on gender relations in China that women did and were socially sanctioned to traverse the assumed rigid boundary of the *nei* and the *wai*.<sup>3</sup>

In the following, we will begin by examining the historical roots of the spatial binary of *neiwai* along with the concept of the differentiation between man and woman (*nannuzhibie*) and the concept of *li* in the *Five Classics*, the Confucian *Four Books* as well as pre-Han texts such as the *Guanzi*, *Mozi*, and *Xunzi*, and Han texts such as the *Yantie lun*, *Huainanzi*, and *Hanshu*. Such a historical, textual study will enable us to locate the philosophical roots of the term *neiwai* whose symbolic functions in the process of genderization through boundary marking are extended beyond gender and are intrinsically intertwined with the very defining features of a civilized society. Once the dynamic, multifacet layers of meaning of the term is clear, we will then focus on the symbolic functions of the *neiwai* in the process of genderization through assuming a definitive gender role in the household economy and its correlation with gender hierarchy through the concept of the Threefold Following or Dependence (*sancong*). The complexity of gender relations in the Chinese world cannot be fully understood without grasping the shifting nature of the *nei* and the *wai* and their symbolic functions in defining civility as well as gender propriety. Instead of assuming an immediate congruity between *neiwai* and gender hierarchy, private/public, or family/state, we begin with a textual study of the term to uncover its historical roots and to reveal the hidden yet assumed equivocation between *nei/wai*, ritualization, and civilization in the Chinese perception.

### ***Neiwai as a Spatial Boundary between the Imperial Court and the Outside World***

It is curious to note that the term *neiwai*, which is prominent in the later ritual and instruction books defining proper gender relations and spheres, is not prominent at all in early canonical texts and when it occurs, is not correlated with gender. In the *Five Classics*, except in the *Liji* that was compiled in the early Han and the commentary of the *Yijing* that was probably written in the late Warring States period or in the early Han, the term *neiwai* is rather insignificant and is not correlated with gender.<sup>4</sup> Also, the term *neiwai* is absent both in the *Shijing* and the *Chunqiu*, and is

rarely used in the *Shujing*.<sup>5</sup> As for the *Four Books*, the term *neiwai* is not found in the *Analects*. In both the *Daxue* and *Zhongyong*, *neiwai* is not correlated with gender. Instead it is correlated with what is fundamental, i.e. virtue, and what is derivative, i.e. wealth, or is correlated with various virtues such as *ren* and *zhi* (wisdom). The correlation between gender and *neiwai* only appears once in the *Mencius* among the Confucian *Four Books* and its correlation is made rather loosely. In sum, the term *neiwai* found in the Confucian *Four Books* is not intended to denote gender relations and by and large signifies various correlative virtues or forms of conduct in the process of self-cultivation.

The earliest appearance of the *nei* and the *wai* as a term is found in the *Shujing* where *neiwai* is primarily a spatial concept signifying the boundary between the inner, civic sphere of the imperial court and the military sphere of the outside world. As it says in the 'Hongfan' chapter of the *Shujing* in regards to a divination for the state affairs, 'If you [i.e. the King] and the tortoise agree, while the milfoil, the nobles and officers, and the common people oppose, the *nei* operations will be fortunate, and the *wai* operations will be unfortunate.' The *nei* and the *wai* in this passage, as James Legge points out, signify the internal, civic affairs of the imperial court and the external, military affairs of the outside world respectively, since the ordering of the imperial court depends on the King himself while the success or failure of the military affairs depends on the proper employment of the nobles and the commoners.<sup>6</sup> This usage of the *nei* and the *wai* is also found in the 'Jiu hao' chapter of the *Shujing*.<sup>7</sup> In other words, the term *neiwai* in its early usage is non-gender specific primarily signifying the spatial boundary between the orderly imperial court and the chaotic outside world; and hence it is eventually a boundary between what is civil and what is barbaric. And it is from this understanding of the *nei* and the *wai* as a symbolic boundary between civility and barbarism that the later use of the *neiwai* along with the concepts of *li* and *bie* derives its authority in defining proper gender distinctions.

The link between *neiwai* and ritualization, or the concept of *li* and *bie*, although hidden, is important in understanding the symbolic functions of genderization in terms of the *nei* and the *wai* in the Han's project of sinicization of the barbarians. The problem of barbarian invasions which began in the Spring and Autumn period (c.722–481 BCE) and culminated in the early Han period (c.206 BCE), as Yu Ying-shi in his classic study on sino-barbarian economic relations in the Han points out, has made the boundary between the civil and the barbaric especially pressing in the imperial Han court's self-representation.<sup>8</sup> The first dynasty – Qin's famous wall-building in the northern boarder in the 3rd century BCE, which was expanded in the Ming around the late 16th and early 17th century, is a case in point.<sup>9</sup> Besides setting up a physical boundary to prevent barbaric forces from disrupting the imperial order of the Han, the boundary of Han civility is also drawn through the proper differentiation between genders. The barbarians in the Han's perception are characterized, among other things, as making no distinctions between man and woman. For instance, in the Han text – *Yantielun* or the *Discourses on Salt and Iron*, the life of the Xiongnu, the strongest barbaric tribe in the northwest, is portrayed by imperial literati as follows:

The Xiongnu live in the desert and grow in the land which produces no food. They are the people who are abandoned by *tian* for being good-for-nothing. They have no houses to shelter themselves, and make no distinctions between man and women.<sup>10</sup>

Also in the *Hou Hanshu* – the dynastic history of the latter Han, the southern barbarians, Nanman, are characterized in the same fashion; they are said to have both man and woman bath in the same river and are like birds and beasts (*qinshou*) making no distinctions between old and young.<sup>11</sup> In other words, the boundary between the barbarian and the Han symbolically is drawn on the proper ritual distinction between genders as well as on the differentiation between unequal yet reciprocal social and kinship roles.

### ***Neiwai as a Ritual Boundary between Unequal Social Status and Kinship Roles***

*Neiwai* as a spatial boundary separating the uncivilized barbarian from the imperial Han is not only a political, physical boundary that is substantiated by walls and gates in the frontiers, but more importantly a cultural, symbolic boundary that is intrinsically intertwined with the very fabric of the Han order in which civility is expressed through the differentiation between kinship and social roles. For gender in the Chinese perception is not anchored in the physical features of human body or innate gender traits *per se*, but on the differentiation of social roles where the process of ritualization is co-extensive with the process of genderization in the familial, kinship system. The very act of drawing boundaries is also the beginning of making distinctions among unequal yet reciprocal social roles through the concept of *bie* and the concept of *li*.

According to Xunzi, the ability to make distinctions or to differentiate is what distinguishes humans from beasts. To Xunzi, ‘No distinction is greater than social distinctions; no social distinction is greater than *li*; and no *li* is greater than [the *li*] of the sage-king.’<sup>12</sup> In other words, to make distinctions is to make social divisions where the high is distinguished from the low, the noble from the base, and the senior from the junior. As said in the Han text – *Huainanzi*, ‘*Li* is for the purpose of distinguishing the superior from the inferior, and of discriminating between the noble and the humble.’<sup>13</sup> Or, what is the same, ‘*Li* is the interactions between the ruler and minister, between the father and son, through which the noble and the humble, the virtuous and the unworthy are distinguished from each other.’<sup>14</sup> The purpose of making such an unequal, yet reciprocal social division, according to Xunzi, is to regulate human desires and to meet human needs. As Xunzi explains,

Humans by birth have desires; when desires are not satisfied, they then cannot be without a seeking for satisfaction. When this seeking for satisfaction is without limits, they then cannot be without contention. When there is contention, there will be disorder, and when there is disorder, there will be poverty. The former kings detested disorder, hence they established *li* and *yi* in order to make proper social divisions, to provide for human desires and to give them a chance to seek satisfactions, so that desire must not be extinguished by material things, nor should material things be exhausted by desire. These two should support each other and continue to grow. This is the origin of *li*.<sup>15</sup>

In sum, *li*, as a means to differentiate, to draw boundaries, is understood as originating in the need for social division of labor in order to achieve social harmony and good governing.

### *Neiwai as a Symbolic Boundary between Civility and Bestiality*

*Li* holds the key to social as well as political cohesion and harmony because *li* is a body of normative expressions and institutions that defines as well as reflects one's unequal yet reciprocal social status and kinship role in relation to others. Among all the social distinctions, the distinction between man and woman is the most primary one that sets humans apart from beasts. As Xunzi writes,

The reason why humans are human is ... because they have the ability to make distinctions. Whereas beasts have father and son, they don't have the affection between father and son; and whereas beasts have male and female (*pin/mu*), they do not have the differentiation between man and woman (*nannuzhibie*). Hence the way of humanity cannot be without distinctions.<sup>16</sup>

In other words, the ritualized, normative distinctions between gender roles as opposed to the physical differences between the male and female bodies is what elevates humanity from brute bestiality. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the proper distinction between genders in the early Han's self-understanding also defines Han's civility as opposed to the neighboring barbaric tribes. *Neiwai* as a boundary marker between Han and barbarians, or between civility and bestiality, hence is intertwined with the idea of the differentiation between man and woman or *nannuzhibie*.

The proper distinction between man and woman found in several pre-Han as well as Han texts, as Lisa Raphals in her study of the representation of women in early China points out, is viewed as a defining feature of human civilization.<sup>17</sup> The presence of a proper distinction between genders signifies a well-ordered state and its absence a state in chaos. For instance, several passages in the pre-Han text – *Mozi* have linked the distinction between man and woman to the distinction between the virtuous and the vicious or the civilized and the barbaric mode of life. Mozi argues in chapter 9, 'Exaltation of the virtuous,' that if the rulers do not exalt the virtuous and employ the capable in government, they will be surrounded by vicious men who are unfilial toward their parents at home, do not respect the elders in the village, and make no distinctions between man and woman (*nannuwubie*).<sup>18</sup> In contrast, in chapter 35, 'Against fatalism,' when the sage-kings exalt the virtuous, the common people then are said to be filial toward their parents at home, respectful to the elders in the village, and maintain distinctions between man and woman (*nannuyoubian*).<sup>19</sup> Maintaining a proper distinction between man and woman, in other words, signifies the sage-king's virtuous, orderly governance. Gender distinction hence is also a sign of the harmonious order of the state.

Like Mozi, Guanzi also equates the absence of the proper distinction between man and woman with chaos and primitive modes of life. According to Guanzi, if ministers take indulging in pleasures and desires to be caring for their lives, then

they will follow their desires and behave with reckless abandon. There will be no

distinction between man and woman (*nannuwubie*) and instead they will revert to being animals (*qingshou*). Consequently the rules of propriety, righteous conduct, integrity and a sense of shame will not be established and the prince of people will have nothing with which to protect himself.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, as does Mozi, Guanzi takes the distinction between genders as a sign of a strong, well-ordered state under a virtuous ruler. As Guanzi writes,

If there is no cultivation [of appropriate conduct] within the state, [the prince] will not be able to face distant princes. For this reason, he rectifies appropriate conduct (*yi*) between ruler and minister, the superior and the inferior, fosters appropriate conduct between father and son, elder and younger brother, and husband and wife. He also fosters the distinction between man and woman (*nannuzhibie*).<sup>21</sup>

For the distinction between man and woman or the distinction between the *wai* and *nei* is a sign of civil order. As Guanzi elaborates, ‘When the brilliance of the prince is fully trusted, the five officers are stern, the gentry above corruption, the peasants simple, and the merchants and artisans honest, the ruler and his subject will be as one, and there will be distinctions between the *wai* and the *nei*.<sup>22</sup> In short, the proper distinction between genders is an integral part of good governing, and hence is the defining feature of a civilized society as opposed to the primitive mode of life that makes no distinctions among the unequals.

### ***Neiwai as a Shifting Boundary between Center and Periphery***

The boundary between what is civil and what is barbaric made along with the concept of *neiwai* however is not static. For the spatial image of the *nei* and *wai* separating the Han from its neighboring barbarians is not solely anchored in the physical walls and gates in the frontier *per se*, but more importantly is anchored in one’s relative degrees of cultural understanding of the Han imperial order. The shifting nature of the *nei/wai* boundary can be best illustrated by the ‘Five-zone’ (*wufu*) theory that first appears in the *Shujing*.<sup>23</sup> According to this Five-zone theory, as Yu Ying-shih in his study on ‘Han foreign relations’ explains,

China since the Hsia dynasty had been divided into five concentric and hierarchical zones or areas. The central zone (*tien-fu*) was the royal domain, under the direct rule of the king. The royal domain was immediately surrounded by the Chinese states established by the king, known collectively as the lords’ zone (*hou-fu*). Beyond the *hou-fu* were Chinese states conquered by the reigning dynasty, which constituted the so-called pacified zone (*sui-fu*, or *pin-fu*, guest zone). The last two zones were reserved for the barbarians. The Man and I barbarians lived outside the *sui-fu* or *pin-fu* in the controlled zone (*yao-fu*), which was so called because the Man and I were supposedly subject to Chinese control, albeit control of a rather loose kind. Finally beyond the controlled zone lay the Jung and Ti barbarians, who were basically their own masters in the wild zone (*huang-fu*) where the sino-centric world order reached its natural end.<sup>24</sup>

In other words, the world is arranged in a series of descending concentric circles where the Han royal domain is the center or the focus with an ever-extending outward field as its surrounding periphery.

Although the Han world order under the Five-zone theory is inescapably hierarchical, it is also fundamentally correlative and indeterminate. For what counts as the inner or outer circle depends on its relative degree of proximity to the royal center. The boundary between the center and the periphery is relative. As said in the Han text – *Chunqiu fanlu* – in regards to the correct proceeding of the ruler, ‘One should proceed from what is near to what is remote. ... Therefore one should proceed from what is within the state and then to the lords’ region outside, and then proceed from what is within the lords’ region to the barbarians outside.’<sup>25</sup> Measuring against the royal center, the lords’ region is the *wai* relative to the state, but it becomes *nei* relative to the barbarians in the *wai*. In the same way, the Five-zone theory that marks the boundary between civil and barbaric relative to the Han center, as Yu Ying-shih puts it,

basically and in realistic terms, described no more than a relative dichotomy between the inner and the outer areas. China was the inner region relative to the outer region of the barbarians, just as the royal domain was, relative to the outer lords’ zone, an inner zone, and the controlled zone became the inner area relative to the wild zone on the periphery of Chinese civilization.<sup>26</sup>

In sum, the *neiwai* binary interpreted so far, first, at the rudimentary level, is conceived of a spatial boundary separating the Han from its neighboring barbarians through the physical walls and gates in the frontiers. Second, at the symbolic level, the *neiwai* boundary between civility and barbarism also signifies the process of ritualization and genderization where social distinctions and reciprocal obligations between the high and the low, the old and the young, and man and woman are established and maintained, and that which in turn is a sign of the civilized human society in the Han perception. The *neiwai* boundary, at the symbolic level, is also a ritual and cultural boundary where the civility of human society is expressed through making and maintaining proper social and gender distinctions. Moreover, since the boundary between civility and barbarism is a cultural one instead of an ethnic one, the boundary between Han and non-Han is also a shifting boundary depending on one’s relative degree of proximity to the Han imperial center expressed through one’s acceptance of Chinese rule. Hence the *neiwai* binary is a relative, shifting boundary between center and periphery, or, what Roger Ames calls, between ‘focus and field’, in a series of descending concentric circles.<sup>27</sup>

### ***Neiwai as a Functional Distinction of Gender Division of Labor***

The acceptance of Chinese rule in accordance with the Han imperial center entails more than a formal submission in political, tributary terms; more substantially it is expressed through the concrete adaptation of Chinese ritualized way of life, which in turn is intertwined with the making and maintaining of proper gender distinctions. For, as pointed out earlier, having a proper distinction between genders is what separates the Han from its neighboring barbarians. The project of civilization must then begin by drawing a ritual boundary between genders and along with it the gender division of labor where both man and woman are inscribed with two sets of different yet complementary duties and activities. In the traditional account, the

gender division of labor is often defined in terms of the idea of *nangeng nuzhi* where man plows and woman weaves. This traditional account of the gender division of labor is reflected in the imperial sacrificial ceremony held annually where the emperor's ritual plowing in the fields during the spring is paired with the empress's symbolic act of tending silkworms. As said in the *Baihutong* – a Han commentary on ancient rituals and origins, 'Why does the King [inaugurate] the plowing of the fields, and the Queen the picking of mulberry-leaves [for the silk worms] in person? It is to take the lead in the work of agriculture and sericulture in all under heaven.'<sup>28</sup> In other words, the ritual activities of plowing the field and tending the silkworms performed by the emperor and the empress defines as well as reflects the normative gender division of labor where man plows and woman weaves. And since proper gender distinction as a sign of the Han's civility, in part, is expressed through the normative gender division of labor, the idea of *nankeng nuzhi* then symbolizes not only the process of genderization but also the process of civilization as well.

The hidden link of the normative gender division of labor to the process of civilization can be best illustrated through the project of 'sinicization' or rather 'civilization' during the Later Han and early Wei period when the conquered barbarians that originally lived in a nomadic way of life were encouraged to develop a more settled, labor intensive economy. As recorded in the *Hou Hanshu*, the barbarians in the south were encouraged by the imperial official, Zi Chong, to plant mulberry trees for sericulture and hemp for the production of sandals.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, according to the *Sanguozhi*, the Xiongnu (i.e. the strongest barbarian tribe in the northwest) who lived under the jurisdiction of the imperial official, Liang Xi, in the early 3rd century CE were also encouraged to develop both agriculture and sericulture.<sup>30</sup> And curiously enough, the imperial officials sent to govern the exterior provinces along the frontiers, as Yu Ying-shih notes, 'always assumed it to be their immediate duty to teach the barbarians plowing and weaving'.<sup>31</sup> This is so because the normative gender division of labor, or the idea of *nangeng nuzhi* where man plows and woman weaves, in the Han perception, forms not only part of the proper distinction between genders, but also the very notion of civility. The Han's labor-intensive economy of agriculture and sericulture wherein both genders assume their distinct yet complementary roles in production is intertwined with the propriety of one's gender and ethnic identity.

In practical terms, such a gender division of labor where man plows and woman weaves contributes to a more settled way of life, which encourages the continuity of familial lineage, develops the cohesion of local community, and facilitates centralized governmental supervision and taxation. In fact, before the tax reform introduced in the mid-Ming of the late 16th century, all households were taxed in textiles as well as grains.<sup>32</sup> The normative gender division of labor, exemplified by the emperor's annual plowing and empress's tending silkworms, is re-enforced by the centralized taxation system where both man and woman's roles as producers in the household economy are all equally recognized by the imperial court. In symbolic terms, *nangeng nuzhi* also constitutes the moral characters of one's own person where the virtue of diligence, industry and filial servitude are expressed. As said in the *Guliang* commentary – a Qing text – on the *Zuozhuan* in regards to the ancient rituals of



plowing the field and tending the silkworms by the emperor and empress, ‘The emperor himself plows to supply millet for the sacrificial vessels; the empress herself tends the silkworms to supply robes for the sacrificial rites. This does not mean that the realm lacks good farmers and woman workers, but rather that it is not as desirable to serve your ancestors with what others have produced as it is to serve them with what you have produced yourself.’<sup>33</sup> The emperor and empress’s filial devotion to the ancestor is thereby expressed through performing their distinct gender work of plowing and weaving just as the commoners regardless their royal status.

### Physical Segregation and Proper Gender Spheres

Gender division of labor however only expresses part of the grand notion of the propriety of gender distinctions where the process of genderization begins from birth through regulating the use of space, body, possession, and ritual items. For instance, in the *Liji*, different ritual items are used to signify the sex of a child at birth. As it says, ‘If the child is a boy, a bow is placed on the left of the door; and if is a girl, a handkerchief on the right of it.’<sup>34</sup> Obviously the bow signifies the art of archery, which forms part of the Confucian ‘six arts’ education for boys.<sup>35</sup> As the passage in the *Liji* goes on to say, ‘After three days, the child begins to be carried, and some archery is practiced for a boy, but not for a girl.’<sup>36</sup> Paralleling the bow, the handkerchief symbolizing the birth of a girl signifies the importance of women’s work of weaving, spinning, and embroidering, which is one of the four womanly virtues – that is, *fude* (women’s excellence), *fugong* (women’s work), *fuyan* (women’s speech), and *furong* (women’s deportment).

It is undeniable that the physical separation of man and woman is prominent in defining proper gender spheres where the *nei* and the *wai* are separated by walls and gates and where man and woman not only should have no direct physical contact in a literal sense, but also should not do, wear, or share the same thing. As said in the *Liji*,

The observances of propriety commence with a careful attention to the relations between husband and wife. They built the mansion and its apartments, distinguishing between the exterior and interior parts. The men occupied the exterior; women the interior. The mansion was deep, and the doors were strong, guarded by porter and eunuch. The men did not enter the *nei* and women did not come out into the *wai*.<sup>37</sup>

Moreover, ‘Men and women should not sit together, nor have the same stand for clothes, nor use the same towel or comb, nor let their hands touch in giving and receiving’.<sup>38</sup> The emphasis on the physical separation of men and women substantiated by walls and gates can also found in the *Guanzi*. As *Guanzi* writes in regards to local administration and national security,

The main city wall must be well constructed, the suburban walls impenetrable, village boundaries secure from all sides, gates kept closed, and residential walls and door-locks kept in good repair. The reason is that if the main walls are not well constructed, rebels and brigands will plot to make trouble. If suburban walls can be penetrated, evil

fugitives and trespassers will abound. If village boundaries can be crossed, thieves and robbers will not be stopped. If gates are not kept closed and there are passages in and out, and there will be no distinction between men and women.<sup>39</sup>

It is clear that, in the above passages, gender distinctions are intertwined with the physical, spatial boundary substantiated by walls and gates, which in turn is linked to the concern of order and security. This understanding of the *neiwai* binary as a spatial boundary is consistent with the early use of the *neiwai* as a boundary between the inner imperial court and the outer barbarian world marked by walls and gates in the frontiers. However, at the symbolic level, the walls as boundaries, as John Hay in his study of boundaries in China points out, are 'in themselves sites for meaning, having no inherent meaning of their own beyond the bounding function.'<sup>40</sup> In other words, the physical walls and gates used to preserve order and security are in effect ritual boundaries as well, since they must be sustained by ritual and ethical representation of the propriety of the ruler, the mode of production, and gender differentiation. As Guanzi writes, 'The preservation of territory depends on walls; the preservation of walls depends on arms. The preservation of arms depends on people, and the preservation of people depends on grain. Therefore, unless a territory is brought under cultivation, its walls will not be secure.'<sup>41</sup> In other words, the preservation of the state eventually depends on not the physical walls and gates but the proper cultivation of the field, which in turn ties to the normative gender division of labor where man plows and woman weaves. Hence the physical separation between man and woman substantiated by walls and gates is also a ritual representation where gender propriety is in part expressed through locating oneself in a proper site without being bound to the actual physical walls and gates.

The symbolic meaning of gender propriety is, instead, located in the very act of differentiation, since man and woman from the ritualistic viewpoint, as Patricia Ebrey points out, 'should do different things, or the same things differently'.<sup>42</sup> The emphasis here is as much on gender as on the necessity to differentiate duties and roles, and the ability to differentiate, as pointed out earlier, is what separates humans from beasts, or civility from barbarianism. 'Not to differentiate,' according to Xunzi, 'causes the greatest injury to human beings, and to differentiate forms the basic advantages of the world'.<sup>43</sup> For, as Xunzi explains, 'Humans cannot survive without living together, yet living together without differentiation will result in contention. If there is contention, there will be disorder and if there is disorder, there then will be poverty.'<sup>44</sup> Hence the very act of differentiating man and woman into the two distinct gender spheres in terms of the *wai* and the *nei* is also the beginning of a well-ordered, prosperous, and civilized society in the Chinese perception of the world.

### *Neiwai vs. Private/public or Family/state*

Although gender propriety as seen in the ritual text of *Liji* is clearly defined along the line of the *nei* and the *wai* as two distinct gender spheres coupled with the physical walls and gates in its ritual representation, the *neiwai* binary does not

exactly correspond to the Western dualistic paradigm of private/public or family/state. For to equate the *neiwai* with the Western dualistic paradigm of private/public or family/state is to overlook not only the interconnection between family and state, but also the centrality of women and family in sustaining political order in the Chinese world. As shown in Confucian teachings, the familial order is not separate from the social or the political order of the state; moreover, familial virtues of filial piety and fraternal deference instead of being private virtues are in effect seen as the root of the public virtue of *ren* (cf. *Lunyu* 1.2). Moreover, as said in the *Mencius*, ‘People have this common saying – “The world, the state and the family”’. The root of the world is in the state. The root of the state is in the family. The root of the family is in one’s own person.’<sup>45</sup> Or, what is the same, as said in the *Daxue*, ‘The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the world, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their own persons.’<sup>46</sup> The family wherein one is first situated, in a word, is the starting point, the focused center of a series of descending ‘concentric circles’ where the family, social and political order are intertwined with one another.<sup>47</sup>

Because the family is not separate from the political realm of the state, women who are located in the domestic realm of the *nei* are neither disconnected with the male sphere of the *wai*, nor are they secluded in their separate inner quarters marginal to the discourse on familial virtues as public virtues. Instead, women’s virtues and propriety in the *nei*, as repeatedly pointed out in canonical texts as well as instruction books for women, are centripetal to the concentric circles of family, community and state. For instance, the propriety of the husband–wife relation among the five core social relations is singled out as the foundation. As said in the *Xunzi*, ‘The way of husband and wife cannot but be proper; it is the root of the way of ruler and minister, and father and son.’<sup>48</sup> In the *Zhongyong*, it also says, ‘The way of the *junzi* in its simplest element is found in the husband–wife relation.’<sup>49</sup> It then can be said that what women do in the *nei* has an effect in the *wai*, since the *nei* and the *wai* are intrinsically relational and reciprocal. The juxtaposition of the centripetal wifely virtues with the state is also clearly shown in the following passage of the *Mencius*, where the transformation of a state is credited to two skillful wives. As Mencius says, ‘The wives of Hua Zhou and Ge Liang bewailed their husbands so skillfully that they changed the custom of the state. What is in the *nei* will manifest itself in the *wai*.’<sup>50</sup> In sum, family and state, or the *nei* and *wai* are relational, instead of contradictory, realms

### Gender Roles and Gender Hierarchy

When the *neiwai* distinction signifies the distinction between genders, the *nei*, as a gender sphere for women, signifies the domestic realm wherein through occupying the role of daughter, wife, and mother, a woman becomes a socially recognizable ‘woman’, a properly gendered social subject. In contrast, the *wai* symbolizes the extended field beyond the centripetal domestic realm, or, if you will, the ‘non-familial’ realm, where a man becomes gendered not only through occupying the familial

roles of son, husband, and father, but also through acquiring a post, a non-kinship role in the web of extra-familial relations. The disparity between man and woman in the process of genderization is undeniable. However one thing must be immediately noted here. The confinement of women to the familial realm of *nei* by no means in itself signifies the natural inferiority or subordination of women to men. On the contrary, the familial realm of *nei* as well as women's roles as daughter, wife, and mother are perceived by both genders as the focused center, the foundation upon which the extra-familial realm of the *wai* is based. Moreover, in the Chinese world, the category of 'woman' understood as outside the familial, kinship realm is non-existent. The process of genderization is in effect co-extensive with the process of ritualization within the hierarchical kinship system where the senior is privileged over the junior. Gender disparity in the Chinese world then is inevitably intertwined with and submerged in kinship hierarchy.

The connection between kinship hierarchy and gender disparity has begun to emerge as a critical area in Chinese gender studies where the problem of gender is no longer perceived as a uniform subordination of woman to man in all aspects of life. Instead, gender disparity must be situated in the complex web of kinship relations where the disparity between genders forms only part of the social inequality between the senior and the junior in the kinship system. Gender by itself cannot determine one's position in life, since in Chinese kinship system gender must also be combined with age, generation, marriage, and class etc. to amount to anything significant. And the hierarchical kinship system in which one finds one's legitimate place in society is also a reciprocal one; that is to say, one's position as a senior or a junior in the kinship system is not determinative. Those unequal kinship roles are, as what Toni Barlow calls, 'reciprocal inequalities'.<sup>51</sup> For in the hierarchal kinship system one shifts from being a senior to a junior, or vice versa, or being both at the same time, depending on the relative position that one occupies, and it must be calculated across a lifetime. In short, gender disparity in China is intertwined and complicated by kinship hierarchy.

Nevertheless, the problem of gender cannot be reduced to, or explained away, by appealing to the nongender-based principle of genealogical seniority in the kinship system. After all, in Chinese society, just as in other hierarchal societies, 'there is still an overall male-favoring bias in the system', as Ortner cautions, where '[w]ithin the "strata", men are formally superior to women, have near-exclusive access to positions of social leadership, and dominate decision making on issues of importance to the unit as a whole'.<sup>52</sup> In other words, although Chinese gender constructions are intertwined with and submerged in the kinship system where nongender-based genealogical seniority is the organizational principle, the problem of gender disparity runs deeper than the formal submission of the junior to the senior in kinship hierarchy.

Indeed, neither a uniform subordination of woman to man regardless of their kinship status, nor the nongender-based principle of genealogical seniority can encapsulate the complexity of the status of the Chinese woman whose position in the political and kinship discourse is central yet at the same time limiting. The complexity of the position of women in China where gender inequality intersects

with other forms of inequality can be best illustrated by the many ironies found in historical and social reality, as Rubie Watson reflects in the 'Afterword' of her anthology on marriage and inequality in Chinese society,

[W]omen may be property holders but have few or no legal rights to property, they may be decision makers without the authority to make decisions, they may have physical mobility but are socially and economically constrained, they may exercise the power of an emperor but have no right to the imperial title.<sup>53</sup>

This predicament of the life of Chinese women, however, in part, must be explained through the concept of *neiwai* as a regulative ideal where the actual transgression across the boundary is permitted insofar as the formal, ritual representation of gender propriety is upheld. In other words, owing to the *neiwai* distinction as a functional, gender distinction, women may enter the political, social, and literary realm of the *wai* only insofar as they are under concealment or without being granted a formal right to do so. It is with the lack of a formal right or social legitimacy to enter the realm of *wai* that women of all classes are abided by the doctrine of 'Threefold Dependence', or *sancong*, where women who are formally bound to the domestic realm of *nei* must depend on their fathers, husbands and sons at different stages of their lives.

The doctrine of *sancong* first appears in the *Liji* and is frequently quoted and elaborated by subsequent instruction books for women as well as commentaries on canonical texts such as the *Lienuzhuan*, *Baihutong*, and *Kongzi jiyu*. In the *Liji*, the 'Threefold Dependence' can be found in the following passage in regards to the marriage rite, 'In passing through the great gate of (her father's house), the man leads the woman and the woman follows the man. This is the beginning of the proper relation between husband and wife. Women are the ones who follow others: when they are little they follow their fathers and elder brothers, when they are married they follow their husbands, and when their husbands die they follow their sons. "Husband" denotes supporter. A husband uses wisdom to lead others.'<sup>54</sup> The same principle is also elaborated in the *Kongzi jiyu*.<sup>55</sup> It seems that the doctrine requires the submission of woman to man at all three stages of a woman's life, and hence the doctrine of *sancong* is often taken as an indication of women's natural inferiority or subordination to men. In fact, *sancong* is usually rendered as 'Threefold Obedience or Subordination' in order to accentuate the submissiveness of women's position regardless of their kinship status in Chinese society.

Yet, the problem of the authority of mother in Chinese society where, in its hierarchal kinship system, the junior is subordinated to the senior would immediately confront the proponents for the rendition of *sancong* as Threefold Obedience where women are assumed to be subordinated to men in all three stages of a woman's life. However, in social as well as historical reality, not only that the mother does not subordinate herself to her son in any shape or form, but the reverse is true; that is, the mother, especially if she is widowed, has a tremendous power over the son, even if the son is an emperor! The mother's authority over her son is not limited to the son's childhood; it is fairly common that mothers continue to instruct and admonish

their grown sons who might be emperors, military generals, or state ministers regarding familial as well as governmental affairs.

The reverence accorded to mother in Chinese society can be best illustrated by the following lengthy comments made by Thomas Taylor Meadows, a British observer in late 19th century China. Despite his inflated polemics of the inferior status of Chinese women in comparison to the West, Meadows's detailed observation of maternal authority in Chinese society is nevertheless telling:<sup>56</sup>

Woman is still more of a slave of man among the Chinese than among Anglo-Saxons. The quality of her slavery is, however, much tempered by the great veneration which Confucian principles require sons to pay both parents. The Imperial Government dare not refuse leave of absence to a mandarin if he, as an only son, requires it in order to tend his widowed mother during her declining years; even though the government may know that the real cause of his asking for leave is to escape from some impending official difficulty. ... A Chinese will rarely introduce his most intimate male acquaintance to his wife. ... Introductions to mothers are, on the other hand, not infrequent. The friend introduced then performs the kow tow to the lady, i.e., he kneels before her and touches the ground repeatedly with his forehead. The son does not prevent him, but he returns the salute by kneeling and kowtowing to his friend. Thus two men, and often, of course, gray bearded men of high stations, will in China be found knocking their heads against the floor in honour of a women of their own class in society. Add to this that if a mother accuses her son before the magistrate, the latter will punish without inquiry into the specific offence. The reader will conclude that this great social and legal authority of mothers in China must operate to raise the position of females generally; and this it does in fact; though in the contraction of their own marriages each is but a passive instrument.

It is clear then, because of the hierarchical kinship system where the junior is subordinated to the senior and the emphasis on the importance of filial piety in Chinese society, a great deal of social respect and legal authority are accorded to mother. Hence the rendering of *sancong* as Threefold Obedience or Subordination where a widowed mother is supposed to subordinate herself to her son is indeed not without contradiction. In fact, Chinese scholar, Chu Tung-tsu, goes further to argue that because 'there is no evidence to support the theory that a mother was subordinated to her son after the death of the father', the question of mother's subordination must be separated from other forms of subordination of women.<sup>57</sup>

Perhaps a more consistent approach to the problem of women's subordination would be to modify one's understanding of *sancong* from Threefold Obedience to 'Threefold Following or Dependence'. Because of the authority of mother exalted in ritual texts and supported by laws in Chinese society, what *sancong* inscribes cannot be an absolute submission of women to men regardless of their kinship status. Instead, a more probable reading of *sancong* is that it inscribes the necessity for women who are formally confined to the domestic realm of *nei* to follow and to depend on the rank of the most senior man in the household where the most senior man functions as the woman's legitimate link to the *wai* realm. In other words, *sancong* signifies the practical necessity for women to follow and to depend on the highest rank of men in the household than women's natural inferiority or subordination to men regardless of their kinship status.

It is a practical necessity for women to follow men, since women in general are without rank (*jue*); their status and position in society must depend on the status of their fathers, husbands, and sons. It is true that such a dependency inevitably reflects the structural limitation imposed on women who have no legitimate access to the realm of the *wai*, and consequently women are without name, title, or rank. The *sancong* nevertheless provides a sense of gender parity especially between husband and wife. As said in the *Liji* immediately after the passage on the *sancong* in regards to the propriety of the marriage rites, 'Husband and wife eat together of the same sacrificial item and thereby they are equally noble and base (i.e. same rank). Therefore, while the wife has no rank, she follows the rank of her husband and takes her seat according to the position of her husband.'<sup>58</sup> The wife is to be respected as the husband, since she is entitled to the same privileges and status that her husband holds. Although her status is dependent and derivative of her husband's, the husband and wife nevertheless are conceptualized as one single body equal to one another. For, etymologically speaking, the word *qi* or wife, as explained in the *Baihutong*, means *qi\** or equal; that is to say, the wife is equal to her husband (*yufuqiti*). This meaning of *qi* or wife as an equal to her husband, as the *Baihutong* goes on to explain, is used from the son of heaven down to the common people.<sup>59</sup> In other words, the ritual parity between husband and wife is deemed as a regulative ideal applied to all regardless of their social status.

However the emphasis on the parity between husband and wife, in part, stems from the importance of the role of wife as the successor of the mother in continuing the patrilineal line and in assisting ancestor worship. As said in the *Baihutong*, when the groom goes to meet the bride in person, the father would admonish the son saying, 'Go and meet your helpmate, that [with her] you may succeed me in the sacrifices to the ancestral temple. With diligence lead her, [but also] with respect, [for she is] the successor of your mother after her death.'<sup>60</sup> Indeed the continuity of ancestor worship and the family line, that underpin the purpose of marriage, are what accentuates the sanctity and importance of the role of wife. As explained in the *Liji*, 'The marriage rites are intended to be a bond of love between two [families of different] surnames, with a view, in its retrospective character, to secure the services in the ancestral temple, and in its prospective character, to secure the continuance of the family line.'<sup>61</sup> Because the wife is essential in fulfilling these two purposes of marriage, the husband must treat her with a sense of deference and respect. As the passage goes on to say,

When the bride arrives, the groom bows to her as she enters. They then eat together of the same [sacrificial] animal, and join in sipping from the cups made of the same melon; thereby showing that they form one body, are of equal rank and pledge mutual affection.<sup>62</sup>

In short, although not without constraints, the husband–wife relation by and large is conceived of a deferential parity instead of a one-sided domination. Hence the *nei/wai* distinction as gender distinctions, where women are in charge of the familial realm of *nei* and men the extended, extra-familial realm of *wai*, provides more a sense of complementarity between husband and wife than a lineal hierarchy.

## Conclusion

In sum, the *neiwai* binary, as indicated in our historical, textual study, indeed goes beyond the often assumed rigidity of two separate as well as conflicting gender spheres or private/public, family/state. *Neiwai* as a spatial binary is first and foremost a shifting, symbolic boundary between civility and bestiality, or center and periphery. Hence, just as the *yinyang* binary, the *neiwai* binary is also a correlative, relational binary whose boundaries change with context. However, unlike the *yinyang*, the *neiwai* distinction is also a functional distinction that defines the propriety of two gender spheres and the normative gender division of labor. Although the *neiwai* boundary is primarily a ritual boundary, the regulative force of the *neiwai* distinction where women are formally confined to the familial realm of *nei* – that is, the realm of domestic skills and household management and men to the extended field of the non-familial realm of *wai* – that is, the realm of literary learning, culture, and remembrance, is not a merely theoretical ideal separate from social reality. The regulative force of the *nei* and *wai* in defining the proper and the limiting sphere for women regardless of their social status or literary accomplishments, for instance, is especially telling in the representation of virtuous women found uniquely in the literary tradition of China – that is, virtuous women’s biographies in dynastic histories and the didactic books written for and by women where women are both the subject that defines and transmits women’s culture and the object that is defined by and confined to the limited, non-literary realm of the *nei*. Hence the paradox of Chinese women in traversing the *neiwai* boundary in everyday life yet at the same time being bound to it in the formal ritual representation cannot and should not be reduced to a static, dualistic conception of the strict physical separation between man and woman or private and public without taking into account of the dynamic interplay among civilization, ritualization, and genderization in the Chinese world.

## Notes

- [1] Whether in philosophy or in Chinese gender studies, the philosophical study on the terms *nei/wai* have been rather sketchy. For a more in-depth study on *nei/wai*, see Raphals, L. (1998). *Sharing the light: Representations of women and virtue in Early China*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press (esp. chs. 8 & 9). For a brief discussion on the shifting nature of the *nei/wai* boundary, see Ames, R. T. (1994). The focus-field self in classical confucianism. In R. T. Ames, W. Disanayake, and T. P. Kasulis (Eds.), *Self as person in Asian theory and practice* (pp. 204–205). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press; Ko, D. (1994). *Teachers of the inner chambers: Women and culture in seventeenth century China* (pp. 12–14, 143–147). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Mann, S. (1997). *Precious records: Women in China’s long eighteenth century* (pp. 15, 223–224); Ebrey, P. B. (1993). *The inner quarters: Marriage and lives of Chinese women in the Sung Period* (pp. 23–27). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; Hu Ying. (1997). Re-configuring *nei/wai*: writing the woman traveler in the Late Qing. *Later Imperial China*, 19(1), 72–99. However, Hu’s essay focuses on the representation of *nei* as familiar homeland and *wai* as barbaric outerland in fictional writings.
- [2] As quoted in Hay, J. (1994). *Boundaries in China* (p. 8). London: Reaktion Books.
- [3] See for example, Raphals, op. cit., note 1, chs. 8 & 9; Ko, op. cit., note 1; Mann, op. cit., note 1; Ebrey, op. cit., note 1.



- [4] For instance, see *Liji*, 'Nize' chapter where the proper gender sphere for man and woman is defined along the line of the *nei* and *wai*; cf. Legge, J. (1967). *Li Chi: Book of rites* (Vol. I, pp. 449–479). New York: University Books (2 vols., reprint). As for the *Yijing*, see, for example, hexagram 37 – *Jiaren*; cf. Wilhelm, R. & Baynes, C. F. (trans.) (1961). *The I Ching or book of changes* (Bollingen Series XIX, pp. 214–224). New York: Pantheon Books.
- [5] Cf. Legge, J. (1960). *The Chinese classics* (Vols. III, IV & V). Hong Kong: Hong University Press (5 vols., reprint). However, the term *neiwai* does occur in the *Zuozhuan*. For the compiling date of the *Zuozhuan*, see Loewe, M. (1993). *Chua chiu, Kung yang, Ku liang and Tso chuan*. In M. Loewe (Ed.), *Early Chinese texts: A bibliographical guide* (pp. 67–76). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- [6] *Shujing*, The books of Zhou, *Hongfan* chapter; cf. Legge, op. cit., note 5, Vol. III, pp. 337–338.
- [7] *Ibid.*, *Jiu hao* chapter; cf. Legge, op. cit., note 5, Vol. III, p. 407. For other passages containing the term *neiwai*, see Legge, op. cit., note 5, Vol. III, pp. 654, 664.
- [8] Yu Ying-shi. (1967). *Trade and expansion in Han China: A study in the structure of Sino-barbarian economic relations* (p. 4). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- [9] Hay, op. cit., note 2, p. 12.
- [10] Yu, op. cit., note 8, p. 40.
- [11] *Hou Hanshu*, 116 *chuan*. A similar description of other barbarian tribes can also be found in the *Hou Hanshu* from 115 to 120 *chuan*. cf. *Hou Hanshu* (Reprint, Taipei: shih chieh shu chu, 1988).
- [12] *Xunzi*, ch. 5, cf. Dubs, H. H. (trans.). (1966). *The works of Hsuntze* (p. 71). Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Pub. Co. (reprint).
- [13] *Huainanzi*, II, la, as quoted in Chu Tung-tsu, *Law and society in traditional China* (p. 233, n. 25). Paris: Mouton.
- [14] *Huainanzi*, 6, Ib, cf. *ibid.*, p. 233, n. 26.
- [15] *Xunzi*, ch. 19, Dubs, op. cit., note 12, p. 213.
- [16] *Xunzi*, ch. 5, *ibid.*, p. 72.
- [17] Raphals, op. cit., note 1, p. 207.
- [18] *Mozi*, ch. 9, cf. Yi-Pao Mei. (trans.). (1929). *The ethical and political works of Motse* (p. 40). London: Arthur Probsthain.
- [19] *Mozi*, ch. 35, *ibid.*, pp. 185–186. For more passages in the *Mozi* dealing with the concept of *nannuzhibie*, see Raphals, op. cit., note 1, pp. 207–208. However, regarding the passage in ch. 19 of *Mozi* where the downfall of King Zhou of Shang is linked to a series of natural anomalies including women becoming men, Raphals speculates the women here refers to Moxi. Yet Moxi belongs to the Xia dynasty not Shang. Hence the woman who is denounced for crossing the boundary of gender propriety, in my estimation, probably refers to Danji of Shang instead. See Raphals, op. cit., note 1, p. 208.
- [20] *Guanzi*, Book XXI, ch. 65, Explanation to the section on nine ways to failure, cf. Rickett, W. A. (trans.). (1985). *Guanzi: Political, economic, and philosophical essays from Early China* (Vol. I, pp. 110–111). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2 vols.).
- [21] *Guanzi*, Book XXI, ch. 66, Explanation to the *Ban Fa*, cf. *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 145.
- [22] *Guanzi*, Book X, ch. 30, The prince and his ministers I, cf. *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 403.
- [23] *Shujing*, the Books of Xia, *Kaoyaomo* chapter, cf. Legge, op. cit., note 5, Vol. III, p. 74. For more details on the five-zone theory, see Yu Ying-shi. (1986). Han foreign relations. In D. Twitchett & M. Loewe (Eds.), *The Cambridge history of China* (Vol. I, p. 379, n. 6). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [24] *Ibid.*, pp. 379–380.
- [25] *Chunqiu fanlu*, ch. 6. The way of the ruler [my translation]. cf. Dong Zhongshu, *Chunqiu fanlu* (Reprint, Taipei: shang wu yin shu guan, 1967).
- [26] Yu, op. cit., note 23, p. 87.
- [27] Ames, op. cit., note 1, pp. 204–208.

- [28] *Baihutong*, ch. 17, Plowing and gathering mulberry-leaves, cf. Tjan Tjoe Som, (trans.), (1952). *Po Hu Tung: The comprehensive discussions in the White Tiger Hall*. Leiden: E. J. Brill (2 vols.).
- [29] Miyakawa, H. (1960). The Confucianization of South China. In A. Wright (Ed.), *The Confucian Persuasion* (p. 31). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- [30] Yu, op. cit., note 8, p. 87.
- [31] *Ibid.*
- [32] Bray, F. (1995). Textile production and gender roles in China, 1000–1700. *Chinese Science*, 12, 115–137 (see p. 132).
- [33] *Guliang zhuan* (14th year of Duke Huan, 8th month), cf. Mann, op. cit., note 1, pp. 151–152.
- [34] *Liji, Neize* chapter, cf. Legge, op. cit., note 4, Vol. I, pp. 471–472.
- [35] The Confucian ‘six arts’ consists of archery, arithmetic, ritual, music, charioteering, and calligraphy. See Tu Wu-ming. (1985). *Confucian thought: Selfhood as creative transformation* (p. 76). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- [36] *Liji, Neize* chapter, cf. Legge, op. cit., note 4, Vol. I, p. 472.
- [37] *Ibid.*, p. 470.
- [38] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
- [39] *Guanzi*, Book V, ch. 13, Eight observations, cf. Rickett, op. cit., note 20, Vol. I, p. 226.
- [40] Hay, op. cit., note 2, p. 13.
- [41] *Guanzi*, Book I, ch. 3, On the cultivation of political power, cf. Rickett, op. cit., note 20, Vol. I, p. 95.
- [42] Ebrey, op. cit., note 1, p. 24.
- [43] *Xunzi*, ch. 10, A wealthy state. [my translation] Cf. *Xunzi* (Reprint, Taipei: san min shu chu, 1978).
- [44] *Ibid.*
- [45] *Mencius* 4A/5, cf. Legge, op. cit., note 5, Vol. II, p. 295.
- [46] *Daxue*, The text, cf. *ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 357.
- [47] For the metaphor of ‘concentric circles’, see Tu, op. cit., note 35, pp. 171–181.
- [48] *Xunzi*, ch. 27, summary [my translation] see note 43.
- [49] *Zhongyong*, ch. 12, Legge, op. cit., note 5, Vol. I, p. 393.
- [50] *Mencius* 6B/6, cf. Legge, op. cit., note 5, Vol. II, p. 434.
- [51] Barlow, T. (1989). Asian perspective: Beyond dichotomies. *Gender and History*, 1(3), 318–330 (see p. 325).
- [52] Ortner, S. B. (1991). Gender and sexuality in hierarchical societies: The case of Polynesia and some comparative implications. In S. B. Ortner & H. Whitehead (Eds.), *Sexual meanings: The cultural construction of gender and sexuality* (p. 397). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [53] Watson, R. S. (1991). Afterword: Marriage and gender inequality. In R. S. Watson & P. P. Ebrey (Eds.), *Marriage and inequality in Chinese society* (p. 348). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- [54] *Liji, Jiaotesheng* chapter, cf. Legge, op. cit., note 4, Vol. I, p. 441.
- [55] *Kongzi jiayu*, ch. 26, The root of human propensities explained [my translation] Cf. *Kongzi jiayu* (Reprint Taipei: san min shu chu, 1996).
- [56] As quoted in Yang Lien-sheng, (1992). Female rulers in Ancient China. In Li Yu-ning (Ed.), *Chinese women through Chinese eyes* (p. 17). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharple.
- [57] As quoted in Raphals, op. cit., note 1, p. 219 and n. 17.
- [58] *Liji, Jiaotesheng* chapter, cf. Legge, op. cit., note 4, Vol. I, p. 441. In ch. 3, ‘Posthumous names’ of the *Baihutong*, it also says that even the spouse of a feudal lord does not receive a posthumous name, because she has no rank, cf. Tjan, op. cit., note 28, Vol. I, p. 373.
- [59] *Baihutong*, ch. 40, Marriage, cf. Tjan, op. cit., note 28, Vol. I, p. 261.
- [60] *Ibid.*, pp. 349–250.
- [61] *Liji*, cf. Legge (1967), op. cit., Vol. II, p. 429.
- [62] *Ibid.*, pp. 429–430.

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