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<i>ADDITIONAL NOTES</i>	

Confucian Authority and the Politics of Caring

By Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee

It is inarguable that Confucianism is the most prominent intellectual tradition in Chinese civilization, whose earliest dynastic records stretch back to the Xia dynasty (2070– 1600 BCE) founded by three sage- kings: Yao, Shun, and Yu. Their benevolent governance is seen as partly historical and partly didactic by later generations, including Kongzi 孔子 , Latinized as Confucius (551– 479 BCE).

Confucius was born in the state of Lu to a minor knight who in his old age took in a young maiden as his concubine. Since his father passed away when Confucius was young, being a son of a concubine, Confucius grew up impoverished, but was keen at learning. The most detailed records that we have of Confucius come from the *Analects* , a collection of sayings and deeds of Confucius and others compiled by his disciples after Confucius's death.¹ Although Confucius left no writings of his own, many of the ancient classics are said to be compiled by Confucius, including the *Shujing* (Classic of Documents, the earliest dynastic records stretching back to the Xia dynasty), the *Shijing* (Classic of Poetry, many of the poems of which were speculated to be composed by women and preserved by Confucius), and the *Yijing* (Classic of Change with 64 hexagrams, offering guidance for a multitude of affairs). Hence, in the studies of Confucius's thought, many ancient Classics also become part of the Confucian canon as well.

As a political philosophy, the teaching of Confucianism hinges on actualizing benevolent governance (*ren zheng* 仁政), which starts with the self- cultivation (*xiu shen* 修身) of a moral personhood at home; one's sphere of moral influences is then concentrically radiated from one's own family, community, state, to the world at large. Confucianism's one binding thread in interpersonal relationship is reciprocity (*shu* 恕), and its presumption of human nature is our in- born goodness (*xing shan* 性善) and our receptivity to positive social modeling through ritual (*li* 禮). Confucianism demands the exercise of authority of any kind, both personal and political, to be initially and continuously grounded in one's capacity to serve and to care for others.

In the realm of politics, this Confucian demand is manifested in the call for the ruler or state to care for the people, especially those in vulnerable positions: the young, the old, the sick, and the disabled. Dependency care, in other words, is the crux of Confucian political philosophy and hence, there is much we can learn from Confucianism in dealing with the issue of prolonged dependency and caring for the dependent in our own time.²

In this chapter, I offer a Confucian take on what constitutes a legitimate political authority and its accompanying obligations to care for its political constituents, especially the vulnerable—the young, the old, the sick, and the disabled—as a mitigating measure in shifting our attitude toward caring for others. Learning from Confucianism, I understand that caring for the dependent is both an ethical constituent of one’s relational personhood and a political, legitimating benchmark of state authority. My focus on the Confucian relational self, and the associated political obligations of dependency, suggests a framework for reorienting our thinking about compassionate care for the members of a community, throughout their life cycle. While this chapter does not offer a sustained meditation on death and the individual self (the focus of so much western philosophical thought), its exploration of the Confucian model of caring and responsibility is a necessary moral counterweight and alternative that can help us address the challenges of prolonged dependency that are incident to prolonged (but finite) lifespans.

A Primer of Confucianism

Many contemporary scholars have argued that the term “Confucianism” is an inexact translation of its Chinese counterpart, *Ru* 儒, which, prior to Confucius, generally refers to classicists or learned literati.³ By Confucius’s times, the term *Ru* has become increasingly a signifier for a distinct school of thought. After Confucius’s death, Confucius becomes the most prominent thinker in the school of *Ru* (*Ru jia* 儒家) distinct from other competing schools of thought, such as the school of *Dao* (*Dao jia* 道家) and the school of *Mo* (*Mo jia* 墨家). Many of Confucius’s disciples and their subsequent disciples have also achieved canonical status, such as Mencius (372– 289 BCE) and Xunzi (third century BCE). In sum, the school of *Ru*— or Confucianism as it has been known in the wider world—is not limited to any singular thinker; instead, it is a complex, long- running commentary tradition of the various Classics

and those who study and teach them. Nevertheless, Confucius occupies a singularly significant place in the school of *Ru*.

Unlike other schools of thought, Confucianism enjoys the backing of the dynastic court as the state orthodox teaching since the Han dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE). As early as the second century BCE, civil service exams based on Confucianism were set up as an impartial way to rank the merit of the imperial officials; and by the mid-seventh century during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), it was further expanded into an open system to recruit talented and worthy civil servants, both aristocrats and commoners, to serve in the dynastic court and at the provincial level. This merit-based system—rarely seen anywhere else in the world during the pre-modern era—was used throughout Chinese dynastic history till the last dynasty of Qing (1644–1912 CE). In brief, Confucianism is not just an intellectual tradition; in many ways, Confucianism is the official seal of the state political authority seeking to revive and augment the past sage-kings' moral vision for the world at large, and hence its focus has been unmistakably pragmatic and this-worldly.⁴

Xiao and Relational Personhood

Unlike the western liberal model of individualism, Confucianism offers a relational conception of the self whose personhood is deeply entrenched in the intertwining of the self and other; in this model, the answer to the question of “who am I” is never about what the self or the soul by itself constitutes per se, but instead focuses on the human ecology in which one emerges as an ethically, socially, and politically viable being. In other words, Confucian moral personhood presupposes an intra- and inter-generational co-dependency from the very start. Confucianism understands dependency and caring for the dependent—since caring for others and being cared for are part of the shared human experience—as inevitable existential givens.⁵

As Confucius says in the *Analects*, those who are *ren* (humane, benevolent)—the highest Confucian accolade—in wishing to establish themselves establish others, in wishing to promote themselves promote others (夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人); or as says Mencius, those who are *ren* love others (仁者愛人).⁶ It is not just that a good person is compassionate and hence seeks to help others. Rather, for Confucius, the sense of self can only be formed in a state of co-dependency. Without others, Confucius argues, there is no self; the self is always a self with and among

others, as the etymology of ren 仁 that is composed of two 二 and person 人 indicates. Hence, to cultivate oneself is to cultivate one's interpersonal relationships with and among others intra- and inter-generationally, and to be ren is to extend one's familial love and affection to all, albeit through gradations, in the ever widening and overlapping webs of human relations. Unlike the western liberal tradition which focuses on the consent of free, equal, and independent (male) adults who are themselves no longer dependents and are unburdened by the work of caring for others, the relational conception of the Confucian self naturally leads to a different kind of theorizing in dealing with our ethical as well as political obligations to one another intra- and inter-generationally.

For instance, familial obligation to care for one's parents when they are infirm is a rare topic in western ethical or political theories that, for the most part, deny such obligation.⁷ In contrast, caring for others is paramount in Confucian political thought, and *xiao* 孝 (filiality)—caring for one's parents and family—is the most fundamental Confucian virtue. In Confucianism, there are five core social relations, and each relation is anchored by a specific virtue: parent–child (孝 *xiao*/ *filiality*), spousal (别 *bie*/functional distinction), siblings (序 *xu*/deference), ruler–subject (義 *yi*/righteousness), and friends (信 *xin*/ trust).⁸ While these five social relations are not meant to be exhaustive, they focus our self- cultivation (*xiu shen* 修身) on our interpersonal relationships by prioritizing these five core social relations.

The parent–child relation marks the beginning of our moral personhood. As Confucius says in the opening passage of the *Xiaojing*—the Classic devoted to explicating the multi- faceted meaning of filiality—*xiao* is the root of excellence and whence comes the birth of moral education (夫孝, 德之本也, 教之所由生也). And to *bexiao*, as Confucius continues to say, begins with serving one's parents, then proceeds to serving one's ruler, and is completed by the establishment of one's character (夫孝, 始於事親, 中於事君, 終於立身).⁹ In other words, to Confucius, how one fares in meeting one's familial obligations is not irrelevant to, nor distinct from, how one fares in meeting one's social and political obligations; instead a complete person (*chengren* 成人), who is ethically, socially, and politically adept, literally grows out of a filial child at home.

Personhood for Confucianism is not a matter of listing an array of inward and individual characteristics, rational or otherwise; rather it is a matter of how well various social roles, some given and some acquired, are inhabited throughout one's lifetime. Familial roles, for the most part, are the first ones that we are given to embody, but the skills we need to inhabit these roles are not given to us by nature; they are learned primarily through the positive social modeling in the parent–child relation. In other words, the way we are well cared for by our parents provides a positive model for us to make ourselves worthy social companions to others, learning how to be cared for and how to care for others well.

The effect of parental care well done goes beyond just helping us to survive our most vulnerable stages in life; it helps shape our dispositions that color the lens through which we encounter the world, and our expectations of how interpersonal relationships, both familial and non-familial, should take place. These skills that we learn in the parent–child relation, in short, make the kind of world we anticipate to live in and lay the foundation upon which all other social relations are built. Family and familial relations are the foundation, the inception for all that follows. Hence, the completion of one's moral personhood starts with one's skillful embodiment of a filial child at home.¹⁰

The totality of one's personhood, for Confucianism, is a continuous and accumulative process of how one fares in widening and sustaining the overlapping webs of human relations, traversing the personal, social, and political. The conventional, western, bifurcation of the private and public, the familial and the ethical, or the personal and the political is not a shared background assumption in the Confucian theoretical construction of what an ethical and political subject should look like. Hence, caring for one's family, especially one's aging parents, is not just a matter concerning the private, the personal, or the sentimental; rather it is a matter with ethical, social, and political importance.

Ren and Care-based Political Authority

A well-ordered humane state of *ren* 仁, for Confucius, builds on a well-ordered family where the parents are affectionate and the children filial. Filiality is the Confucian response to the perpetual parental care rendered on one's behalf, especially during one's infancy and childhood, a time crucial to one's physical survival and formative to one's lifelong dispositions. The survival of a newborn requires the

utmost attentiveness from the caregivers whose successful care, in turn, requires them to be completely absorbed into the needs of this frail being who is not yet able to verbalize its needs, to express its gratitude, or to indicate its willingness to reciprocate later on. Caring for a newborn is a completely one-sided affair of self-sacrifice with delayed and uncertain gratitude that might never come. Nonetheless, affectionate parents give themselves entirely to meeting the needs of their newborn. And that affection and generosity of parenthood toward a newborn is how Confucians see a benevolent state of *ren* behaving toward its people.

It is important to note that the parent–child relationship is not thus conceived of as a contractual transaction where the parents care for the young with the anticipated return of care in their old age. Confucian *xiao* goes beyond that. The virtue of *xiao* is intertwined not just with a sense of gratitude for the actual favors incurred on one’s behalf, but more importantly with the understanding of our inherent interdependency. We do not come into existence by our own sheer will or just with the help of our own immediate family; what we get to enjoy today we owe to those who came before inter- and intra-generationally. As says the Chinese proverb, when one drinks the water, one thinks of its source (飲水思源).

Hence, in Confucianism, caring for others is not just a matter of a transactional reasoning; instead, we care for others as an act of strengthening this web of relations that sustains us in the first place by paying it forward so that others can also come into existence. Parental care is enacted similarly. Parents care for the newborn with the understanding that they themselves came into existence because someone else had cared for them. This gratitude and understanding of our existential interdependency are then passed down to the next generation and beyond, when the care is reciprocated to one’s aging parents and the care is bestowed on the vulnerable newborn.

In fact, according to the school of *Mo* (*Mo jia* 墨家), a competing school of thought, the way of Confucians is characterized by their parental devotion to caring for the new-born infant (儒者之, 道古之人『若保赤子』).¹¹ Remarkably, in Confucianism, discussion of caring for the newborn infant occurs not in the context of the so-called “womanly sphere,” as one might expect in the western tradition, but instead in the context of state governance with the emphasis on the continuum of the family and the state. For in Confucianism, there is no chasm between the personal,

the social, and the political; how one behaves at home lays the foundation for how one behaves socially and politically.

The metaphor of caring for the newborn infant in state governance is first derived from the *Shujing* (Classic of Documents) where it is said “if the king tended to the people as if he were tending to his own newborn infant, then the people would be tranquil and orderly” (若保赤子, 惟民其康乂).¹² And the way to tend to the newborn infant is to be responsive and sincere. The same passage from the *Shujing* is further elaborated in the Great Learning (*Daxue*)—one of the canonical Confucian Four Books:

*In the “Kangzhuo” (of Shujing) it is said, “Act as if you were watching over an infant.” If one is really responsively sincere, though one may not hit exactly the wants of the infant, one will not be far from doing so (《康誥》曰：「如保赤子」，心誠求之，雖不中不遠矣).*¹³

In other words, responsive sincerity is the key to meeting the needs of the vulnerable who cannot help themselves in private as well as in public.

Caring for one’s family, starting with one’s newborn, has a radiant effect on the whole state. The caring example starts with the ruler whose efficacious authority hinges on a demonstrated caring capacity for the family and the people; tyrants who care for no one but themselves are often depicted as inviting calamities leading to their own ruin. Hence, the Great Learning concludes with a call for rulers themselves to first demonstrate their due care for their own families before they can teach their subjects to follow suit (宜其家人, 而後可以教國人). Not only is the chasm between the family and state not present, neither is caring seen as a predominately feminine characteristic. More importantly, providing good care for the most vulnerable is an integral part of the Confucian political discourse, a legitimating benchmark of the state’s authority.

A kingly, benevolent state, as said in the *Mencius*, takes caring for those without the care of a family—the widower, the widow, the childless, and the orphan—as its first political consideration (老而無妻曰鰥。老而無夫曰寡。老而無子曰獨。幼而無父曰孤。此四者，天下之窮民而無告者。文王發政施仁，必先斯四者)。

¹⁴ Xunzi further expands the list of the vulnerable to include the disabled in his discussion of the regulation of a king:

*Those who have one of the Five Illnesses should be raised up and gathered in so that they can be cared for. They should be given official duties commensurable with their abilities and employment adequate to feed and clothe themselves so that all are included and not even one of them is overlooked (五疾, 上收而養之, 材而事之, 官施而衣食之, 兼覆無遺).*¹⁵

According to later commentary, the “Five Illnesses” refers to those who have physical or mental disabilities.¹⁶

Keep in mind that the political relationship between the ruler and subject in Confucianism is neither contractual, nor a matter of dictatorial paternalism; rather, it is a responsive virtue-based leadership. In order to rule efficaciously, the rulers must offer themselves as positive social models to care for their own family and to care for the people who cannot care for themselves. Through positive social modeling, the people then are thus moved to care for their own family and one another. Caring for the social dependent is the defining feature of the Confucian state whose political authority is premised, first and foremost, on its caring capacity.

Unlike the liberal bifurcation of the family and the state, the private and the public, the autonomous subject and the dependent, the Confucian model provides a relational alternative to cope with the issue of prolonged dependency and caring for the elderly, the sick, and the dying. But to imagine such a Confucian alternative will require a reorientation of not only our individualistic conception of the self to a relational one, but also a shift from our law-based society to a ritual-based one where intersubjective relationship is seen as a matter of ritual civility and mutual obligation.

***Li* and Social Cohesion**

Rights-based states, like western liberal democracies, regulate interpersonal relationships through law, which is general by design and coercive by nature. Hence, interpersonal relationships in the western individual paradigm are essentially impersonal. Law can regulate only external behavior and ensure only external compliance, but by itself, it cannot bring about a harmonious, cohesive society; in fact, law, by necessity, is impersonal, punitive, and reactive. Due to these characteristics, laws and regulations in statecraft have their advantages and drawbacks. As noted by Confucius,

Lead the people with administrative injunctions and keep them orderly with penal law, and they will avoid punishments but will be without a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence and keep them orderly through observing ritual propriety and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves.¹⁷

In other words, laws and regulations can define the outer boundaries of human behavior, but they provide no proactive, positive models and appropriate social mechanism for actual self-transformation to take place. For that to take place, *li* 禮 (ritual) is required.

Confucian *li* covers both religious and civil rituals, and both religious and civil rituals are solemn in importance and both are also subject to change, albeit conservatively.¹⁸ It is this solemnly spiritual as well as pragmatic feature of Confucian *li* that makes it a proficient vehicle for social cohesion and harmonization. For the most prized function of ritual, as said in the *Analects*, is harmonization (禮之用, 和為貴).¹⁹ The emphasis on *li* in political discourse is quintessentially, if not uniquely, Confucian, in the Chinese intellectual tradition and as compared to the vast western intellectual traditions. Confucianism sees the overlapping of the personal and the political, and understands that law must be completed by ritual as a necessary component in successful statecraft. In other words, ritual is the necessary ingredient in making governing effective. For law functions like a physical fence demarcating the outer boundaries of human behavior, whereas ritual works as the actual knot that binds us to one another personally, socially, politically, and spiritually. Ritual, in short, is a complex set of social rhythms whose tune, through positive modeling, we have gradually learned to dance to with grace and due measure in our daily encounter with others.

Rituals are public performances with socially recognizable scripts, and a ritual script involves various components such as physical object, posture, sentiment, verbal communication, and timing. In a well-performed ritual, all these elements—the natural, human, and cosmic worlds—are brought into harmony and a productive outcome is effected. That is to say, in performing a ritual script, we not only bring our measured inner emotions and desires into synchronicity with our measured outer postures and speeches, but also bring the human community into synchronicity with what the natural world is able to sustainably provide with proper timing and material modesty.

To be proficient in ritual performance requires a lengthy training through positive social modeling. Family is the institution where positive social modeling first takes place. In order to raise a filial child, for instance, parents will have to be filial themselves toward their own parents so as to offer themselves as positive models for their children to follow. In the same way, in order to be served well in a civil state, the social superior must first learn to serve others well so as to offer themselves as positive models for their social inferiors to follow. In short, reciprocity 恕, as Confucius says, is the enduring guideline in human conduct (其恕乎! 己所不欲, 勿施於人).²⁰ Ritual with a concrete social script is the figurative knot that binds us together in a synchronistic harmony born out of internalized positive social modeling starting at home and radiating into society at large.

Guided by reciprocity, ritual serves specifically to provide a refined, measured, and sustainable outlet for human emotions and to meet human desires such as for food or shelter. As explained in the *Liji* (Record of Rites), we are born with seven dispositions (人情)—joy, anger, grief, fear, love, hate, and desire (喜怒哀懼愛惡欲七者)—and the sages use ritual to enhance or moderate these untaught human dispositions in order to govern well (故聖人所以治人七情, 修十義, 講信修睦, 尚辭讓, 去爭奪, 舍禮何以治之?).²¹ These seven untaught human dispositions are further conceptualized as an uncultivated field in need of ritual as the first facilitating instrument that makes a productive and sustainable garden possible (故人情者, 聖王之田也, 修禮以耕之).²²

Without ritual, our inborn dispositions might not yield a productive outcome, just like an uncultivated field, whose future harvesting is uncertain, lies wasted at the mercy of chance. In contrast, with ritual one takes the first step toward the sustainable ownership of one's inborn dispositions in this mutually enriching, communal garden. To govern without ritual, as the *Liji* continues to explain, is like ploughing the field without a share (故治國不以禮, 猶無耜而耕也).²³ Ritual is essential to governance, just as ploughing is to the field; without the former, nothing productive can come of the latter.

Ritual provides a structured and refined social outlet for us to express our emotions and to meet our basic needs such as material comforts. In times of great adversity such as when facing death or mourning for one's family, excessive grief can

be harmful to one- self and to one’s surviving loved ones. Mourning ritual, for instance, is able to provide an appropriate outlet for one to mourn while at the same time to guard against a complete self-abandonment to bereavement. That refining and cultivating function of ritual is what enables us to derive a more favorable outcome from our natural dispositions. Ritual, in other words, is like a levee (*fang* 坊) that helps channel our flow of emotions and desires to a greater and helpful outcome.²⁴ And since ritual is a public performance, to cultivate one’s natural dispositions through ritual will require others to offer themselves as positive social models, as it were, to help plough the field of our natural dispositions in hopes of a greater harvesting in this mutually enriching, communal garden.

Datong and the Great Community

The metaphor of a communal garden as a way to envision the interdependency of human ecology is instructive. Since Confucianism understands personhood as a process, from which an ethically, socially, and politically adept person will emerge, one must properly attend to the field of human dispositions with a wide range of social cooperation. First, those who come before must plough the field and provide themselves as positive models for the seeds of virtue to be planted, and then there must be continuing instruction and schooling to further enable others to optimize the seeded field. When the time comes for harvesting, as says the Liji, one harvests the fruits with generosity to share and to celebrate the harvest with music to give repose to all in this community garden (本仁以聚之， 播樂以安之).²⁵ On the flip side, if the field is neglected or no positive social model is initially provided, whether or not the field yields any fruits at all will only be a matter of chance.

In a civil society, we all are reliant on the communal garden to survive and to thrive. We owe the fruits that we enjoy today to the works of the previous generation, and what seeds get to be planted in the field will depend on our willingness to give ourselves as positive models to plough and maintain this communal garden for generations to come. If one acknowledges that the roots of self and others are all depending on the same plot of communal land that feeds all, then the goal for each will not be to grow as big and overshadowing to others as possible, since a depleted soil impoverishes all who grow in it. Cooperation, generosity, and material modesty take precedence in the Confucian utopia of a Great Community (*datong* 大同).

As written in the *Liji*, Confucius recounts a time past “when the great *dao* prevailed” (大道之行也) and the world was a harmonious unity.²⁶ *Datong* is the highest political aspiration for Confucians, an idealized state that safeguards its vulnerable members, including the aged, the ill, and the dying. In this idyllic Great Community, one not only cares for one’s family, but also cares for others; therefore, those without the care of family are not left behind. The realization of this idyllic community is, in part, dependent on our willingness to go beyond narrow concerns of our own selves or our immediate families, in order to also care for others, especially the vulnerable—the old, the young, the sick, and the disabled (矜寡孤獨廢疾者, 皆有所養).²⁷ To build this idyllic Confucian Great Community requires a different conception of the self, a self that is at its core porous to others so that each is constitutive of the other from the start of each’s personhood.

The cultivation of Confucian moral personhood starts with *xiao*, which in turn requires the parents to offer themselves as positive models to their children first in order for them to learn how to be cared for and how to care for others well. Similarly, to be served well, the rulers themselves first have to be the positive social models for their subjects by caring for their own family well and by caring for the subjects, especially the vulnerable ones, well. Each of us came into the world through the work of others, not just for our physical survival, but also for the sort of dispositions we inhabit. Through *li*, our natural dispositions are shaped and channeled into a greater, helpful outcome where we learn to dance to the tune of a complex set of social rhythms with grace and due measure, in harmony and with material modesty. Ritual binds us and deepens our understanding of the interdependency of human ecology where the making of oneself initially, and in a large part, depends on the attentive generosity of others inter- and intra-generationally. The wellbeing of the self, hence, at its very outset is not just an individual concern of self-happiness, but a larger relational issue where the self and the other must be addressed simultaneously, with the resultant Great Harmony for all.

Conclusion

The Confucian relational self is much closer to our existential experience of the self than the western individualistic self that is wholly in possession of himself. Hence, the Confucian self is much better positioned to address our existential challenges—such as caring for others or being cared for as we move through different stages of

life. Dealing with the issue of prolonged dependency in our time will require more than sufficient financial resources. It will also require a reorientation of our conception of the self, what a desirable society should look like, and where the political authority lies so that a more inclusive and compassionate society can be built. Confucianism offers a framework for caring for others, starting with one's family and extending more generally to the young, the old, the sick, and the disabled. The health of our communal garden should concern us all and requires all of us to attend to it by offering ourselves as positive models to plough the field and to plant the seeds of virtue for future harvesting. With attentive generosity and material modesty, we will be able to continue to live and die, and most of all to share and thrive in this great garden of ours.

Notes

1 For Chinese intellectual history, see De Bary et al. For the translation of the *Analects*, see Ames and Rosemont.

2 For Confucius's view of death and mourning rituals, see Olberding, "Consummation of Sorrow" and "I Know Not 'Seems'."

3 For the origin of *Ru*, see Jensen; and Rosenlee, *Confucianism and Women*.

4 In North America and Europe, Confucianism is usually taught as a religion or ethnic study instead of philosophy. For the systematic exclusion of non-western philosophy from the history of philosophy and its racist lineage, see Park; and Rosenlee, "Revisionist History."

5 For feminist care ethics and its critiques of the western political paradigms, see Noddings; Kittay; Held; and Rosenlee, "Feminism and Multiculturalism."

6 *Analects* 6:30; *Mencius* 4B3.

7 Aristotle might be one exception who explicitly discusses adult children's obligation to care for their parents as a way to repay the actual favors incurred on one's behalf (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1164b4–5). For contemporary scholarship, see English; Sommers; Dixon; Ivanhoe; and Rosenlee, "Why Care?"

8 *Mencius* 3A4.

9 *Xiaojing*, Ch. 1.

- 10 On the effects of parental care, see Olberding, “I Know Not ‘Seems’.”
- 11 *Mencius* 3A5.
- 12 *Shujing*, “Kangzhao” chapter.
- 13 The Confucian Four Books refers to the *Analects*, *the Mencius*, *the Great Learning* (Daxue), and the *Zhongyong*.
- 14 *Mencius* 1B5.
- 15 *Xunzi* 9.1.
- 16 Watson, 34.
- 17 *Analects* 2.3.
- 18 For a brief account of Confucian rituals where the secular and the sacred overlap, see Fingarette.
- 19 *Analects* 1.12.
- 20 *Analects* 15.24.
- 21 *Liji*, “Liyun” chapter.
- 22 *Liji*, “Liyun” chapter.
- 23 *Liji*, “Liyun” chapter.
- 24 For a detailed study of Confucian rituals, see Ing.
- 25 *Liji*, “Liyun” chapter.
- 26 *Liji*, “Liyun” chapter.
- 27 *Liji*, “Liyun” chapter.

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